Blue Book Advanced

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***Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.***

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Authors

# Vance Trefethen, Editor and Writer

Vance is widely known as "Coach Vance" by thousands of homeschoolers nationwide who participate in the National Christian Forensics and Communications Association. President of Training Minds Ministry Chris Jeub accredits Vance as being the "backbone" contributor who does the lion's share of research for the ministry. Vance also heads up Training Minds Debate Camps, 5-day intense study of the year's debate topic and debate training.

Vance debated in the National Forensic League while in high school from 1979-1982. In college, he judged at high school NFL tournaments in North Carolina. After college, he moved around the country for various jobs, including some time with the Defense Department in the Washington, D.C., area and several years at the headquarters of Wal-Mart in Arkansas.   
  
After moving back to North Carolina, he once again got involved in debate by volunteering as an assistant coach for public school NFL debaters. A home schooling dad himself, he realized the growing potential and benefit of home school debate and switched over to coaching NCFCA students. In 2001, he first got involved with Blue Book to write the evidence briefs, and has been doing so ever since. In 2004, Vance put much of his expertise together for an advanced debate textbook called Strategic Debate: Reason, Argumentation, and Strategy for Winning Scholastic Debates.

Blue Book Advanced is Vance's idea and his ultimate creation. He worked as chief-talent among the talented individuals listed below. Vance looks forward to many years of Blue Book Advanced with more talent to add to the mix.

Pictured: Vance instructs students and coaches at the 2005 Colorado Debate Camp on how to properly flow a debate round.

# Rachel Marie Blum, Writer

Rachel Blum competed in the NCFCA for 5 years, qualifying to the National Tournament in 3 or more events 4 of those 5 years.  Rachel holds over 70 titles overall, 14 of which are national titles.  Some of Rachel's accomplishment include the title of 2004 National Lincoln Douglas Debate Champion, 2006 Team Policy Runner-Up, and 2006 2nd place National Team Policy Speaker.  Rachel has also been a national finalist in Impromptu, Extemporaneous, and Apologetics speech events, as well as being an Iron Man and Team Debate National Double Octafinalist in 2005.  Rachel co-wrote for the 2005 Team Policy sourcebook Purple Killer Bunnies and has coached her local Denver club, Dialectic, for two years.  Rachel is currently a student at Patrick Henry College, where she's majoring in Government: Public Policy and participating on their debate team.

# Matthew Baker, Writer

Over the course of four years of competition, Matt has won over 37 debate titles.His achievements in NCFCA include Georgia State Champion (2003-2004), 1st Team NC Open Pre-qualified Tournament (2003-2004), 2nd Team Nationals (2003-2004), and 2nd Team Nationals (2004-2005).In his senior year, he also served as assistant coach for Equitas Debate Club.Matt’s debate success continues in college where he has won NEDA tournaments at Capital University and Ball State University and placed 2nd at the 2006 NEDA Nationals.

Matt is currently a sophomore at Bob Jones University where he is double majoring in accounting and pre-law.He serves as treasurer for the Greenville College Republicans. In addition, Matt is an award winning author who has won recognition for his essays in the fields of environmental property rights and African development.

# David Carter, Writer

Coach Carter began debating in eigth grade at Kirby Junior High School and Judson High School just outside San Antonio, Texas. He debated for about three years and managed one tournament championship in 11th grade. Since high school he judged several tournaments.

He was commisioned as an officer in the Air Force upon graduating college in 1984 with a B.A. in Political Science and has since earned his M.A. in Management and serves as Major in the US Air Force. David and his wife, Nancy, have been homeschooling their kids (Josh, Brittany and Jessica) for since 2000. David started Peak Communicators with Coach Jeub in Colorado Springs in 2004, and together they coached a dozen students, led Tab for Region 5 Regionals, and led Tab for the Gold Standard National NCFCA Open Tournament.

Coach Carter was restationed to San Antonio for the 2005-2006 school year, but this hasn't slowed him down. Along with assistant coaching at TMM's Debate Camps, he is starting a new club in Texas.

Pictured: Coach Carter instructs students and parents at the 2005 Colorado Debate Camp.

Introduction

Going Advanced

*Blue Book* has always been the most popular resource that students and parents turn to first to get their debate season started. But Chris and I for some time have wished *Blue Book* could be even more than it is. We've expanded it to the point where we feel it can grow, but we still wanted it to be more.

The solution came when we decided to do two things we'd never done before: Get outside writers involved, and publish a second book of briefs to accompany the annual Blue Book. The result is what we call *Blue Book Advanced*.

The "Advanced" title does not mean that the regular *Blue Book* is "simple" – far from it. I think it's a common misconception that the regular *Blue Book* is only for beginners. I would happily compare the cases and briefs in regular *Blue Book* with anyone else's sourcebook for their depth, organization, research, quality, and advanced level of thinking. To me, this supplemental "Advanced" *Blue Book* is advanced because:

* It gives the additional perspectives and angles of some highly qualified student debaters, who bring with them their own way of presenting a case.
* It provides us the opportunity to present 17 additional Affirmative cases that were not in Blue Book, some of them a little more "squirrely" or unusual than *Blue Book* had.
* It advances your preparation to the point that if you have *Blue Book* + *Blue Book Advanced*, you very likely do not need any other sourcebooks, but are prepared to do battle with these two books plus your own research.

The NATO topic was a good one on which to start *Blue Book Advanced*. The scope of potential policy areas covered by the NATO resolution is enormous and made it easy for us to produce a book with 17 new Affirmative cases and a total of over 1000 pieces of new evidence that have almost no overlap with regular Blue Book.

With 29 total cases to pick from, every debater from beginner to expert can find material he can use to build his winning 1AC. And with even more Negative briefs – against all of our cases plus other potential Affirmative positions we don't have – every debater of every skill level can be well-prepared for lots of Affirmative surprises. *Blue Book* plus *Blue Book Advanced* = a well prepared debater.

Good luck in your debating and don't hesitate to contact us if we can help you achieve more during this year's debate season.

**Vance Trefethen**

GAME OVER: THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING NATO

By Rachel Marie Blum

NATO is losing its appeal. It has become an organization that offers declining advantages in terms of additional strength and tools to use against American foes, while placing potential limits on the US's options of when and where to use force." Declared the Brookings Institute in 2003.

(Peter W. Singer (Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies) and John M. Olin (Post-Doctoral Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies), "New Thinking on Transatlantic Security: Terrorism, NATO, and Beyond," from Weltpolitik, a publication of the Brookings Institute, January 15, 2003, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/speeches/singer/20030115.htm> )

It is because NATO is the inefficient remnant of an organization built to address a now nonexistent security threat that we stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished. In order to find common ground, we offer the following

DEFINITION of

**NATO:** North Atlantic Treaty Organization, begun in 1949 as a military and political alliance of European nations and the United States and Canada designed to protect Western Europe from a Soviet attack. – from The Encyclopedia Britannica.

(Encyclopedia of the Cold War, Thomas S. Arms; The Cold War, 1945-1991, Benjamin Frankel, editor; The Cold War: A History, Martin Walker; Cold War Chronology, Soviet-American Relations 1945-1991, Kenneth L. Hill; Encyclopedia Britannica. <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/kbank/glossary/nz.index.html> )

This brings us to the first and most important part of the affirmative case – the

GOALwhich is an efficient foreign policy. Efficient is defined by *Princeton University* as: "being effective without wasting time or effort or expense." We believe that the goal of every nation's involvements in foreign affairs should be to have an efficient foreign policy: one in which the goals of each nation individually are met in the most effective manner possible, and in which alliances function in a way that is not wasteful to any party.

In this round, the affirmative team will offer a comparative advantage case that evaluates whether the status quo or the affirmative plan best achieves the goal of an efficient foreign policy.

Next we need to see how the current system is failing to meet the goal of an efficient foreign policy through two

**INHERENCY** points.

Point 1: NATO is irrelevant and toxic.

Dr. Steven E. Meyer (Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, the U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Winter 2003-4.

This inertial approach, characterized by Washington's unbending support for NATO and its expansion, has defined American foreign and security policy since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the bipolar world. During the Cold War, NATO provided the proper linchpin of American—and West European—security policy, and served as a useful, even fundamental deterrent to Soviet military might and expansionism. However, NATO's time has come and gone, and today there is no legitimate reason for it to exist. Although the strong differences exhibited in the Alliance over the war against Iraq have accelerated NATO's irrelevancy, the root causes of its problems go much deeper. Consequently, for both the United States and Europe, NATO is at best an irrelevant distraction and at worst toxic to their respective contemporary security needs.

Point 2: Pressing countries to spend money on NATO means that they inefficiently allocate their resources.

Dr. Steven E. Meyer (Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, the U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Winter 2003-4.

In addition, NATO membership—including vulnerability to Western arms merchants—damages the ability of these countries to deal with genuine emerging security issues. Issues of social and economic justice, crime and corruption, environmental degradation, and ethnic reconciliation bear more directly on the security futures of these countries than does their struggle to satisfy NATO's arcane demands for membership. Consequently, instead of pressing these countries to spend scarce resources on NATO, Washington should encourage them to focus exclusively on European and regional organizations that are better geared to help address the real, pressing interests.

Because NATO is an inefficient organization that places unnecessary burdens on its member states, violating the goal of an efficient foreign policy, we offer the following

PLAN

Plank 1 Agency: The governments of the 26 NATO member states.

Plank 2 Mandate: NATO shall be abolished and all member states shall discontinue NATO-related operations in as timely manner as possible, leaving the continuation of any said operations to individual countries or other alliances or organizations.

Plank 3 Funding: No funding shall be necessary.

Plank 4 Enforcement: Any government official not in compliance with the plan shall be removed from office.

Plank 5 Timeline: This plan takes effect 3 months after the affirmative ballot.

Plank 6 All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying this plan.

This brings us to the

ADVANTAGES

Where we will see that abolishing NATO produces 3 significant benefits over the status quo.

Advantage 1: Increased military efficiency through increased unilateral freedom of action

a. NATO as an organization provides no help in obtaining international cooperation.

Christopher Layne (visiting fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato), "Casualties of War - Transatlantic Relations and the Future of NATO in the Wake of the Second Gulf War," the Cato Institute Executive Summary No. 483, August 13, 2003, [www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa483.pdf](http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa483.pdf)

In assessing the depth of current transatlantic tensions, and NATO's future, a simple question must be asked: How does the alliance contribute to American security? As already pointed out, the United States has received valuable help from many NATO states in the War on Terrorism in the realms of intelligence, police work, and choking off terrorists' access to money. But this assistance owes little to NATO as an institution. The advanced industrial states have a common interest in fighting terrorism and would cooperate in this endeavor even if there were no NATO.

b. Impact: Working through NATO impairs efficient war-fighting operations

The Right Honorable Lord David Owen (former British Foreign Secretary, member of the House of Lords), 10 Apr 2006, LECTURE TO THE NETHERLANDS ATLANTIC ASSOCIATION ON THE OCCASION OF THE 57TH ANNIVERSIARY OF THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON, Societeit De Witte, The Hague, <http://www.atlcom.nl/speechOwen.htm>

There were many strains in NATO's command structures during NATO's first-ever military confrontation. The US Generals in the Pentagon, in part because they never understood that Kosovo was a humanitarian intervention, were at odds with their own senior officer in NATO SACEUR. The senior politicians and military in the Pentagon also became very angry over President Chirac's insistence on frequently reviewing NATO's operational targeting, considering this political interference on operational matters intolerable. The legacy of this is that many Americans felt Kosovo showed it was impossible in the future for the US to contemplate conducting serious war operations within a NATO structure.

Advantage 2: Increased foreign policy efficiency through reliance on more efficient organizations.

a. NATO has no capacity for implementation of policies and always relies on other organizations

James Dobbins (former US Ambassador to the European community, Assist. Sec. of State for Europe, Director of International Security & Defense Policy Center at RAND), "NATO's Role in Nation-building," from the NATO Review, a publication of the RAND Institute, Summer 2005, <http://www.rand.org/commentary/120805NR.html>

NATO, on the other hand, has no capacity for civil implementation and must always depend upon the United Nations and/or some ad hoc coalition of willing countries to perform the myriad of non-military functions essential to the success of any nation-building operation. As a result, NATO's exit strategy always depends upon the performance of other organizations.

b. The UN is a more experienced organization.

James Dobbins (former US Ambassador to the European community, Assist. Sec. of State for Europe, Director of International Security & Defense Policy Center at RAND), "NATO's Role in Nation-building," from the NATO Review, a publication of the RAND Institute, Summer 2005, http://www.rand.org/commentary/120805NR.html

The United Nations also plays a significant role in all nation-building missions that other institutions lead. There are many UN operations with no EU, NATO or US involvement. There are no EU, NATO or US operations without some, often quite important UN involvement.

c. Impact: Allowing more efficient organizations to take over decreases the costs, risks, and burdens of foreign policy.

James Dobbins (former US Ambassador to the European community, Assist. Sec. of State for Europe, Director of International Security & Defense Policy Center at RAND), "NATO's Role in Nation-building," from the NATO Review, a publication of the RAND Institute, Summer 2005, <http://www.rand.org/commentary/120805NR.html>

For a variety of reasons, the United Nations should remain the West's nation-builder of first resort. The United Nations is cheaper; it is more experienced; it is more widely acceptable in most circumstances; and the risks and burdens of UN-led operations are shared among a much broader base of countries.

Advantage 3: Increased foreign policy efficiency through increased European defense capabilities.

a. NATO is stunting European capabilities

Wayne Merry (former State Dept. & Pentagon official, is a Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), ‘‘Therapy's End: Thinking beyond NATO,'' National Interest, no. 74, Winter 2003–4 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

Many Europeans admit they want to maintain NATO so that the Americans will pay a large share of Europe's security costs. This is a classic problem of welfare dependency-the mentality of the dole. Few refuse a subsidy, even when they recognize they would be more independent and productive without it. Free money has a narcotic effect on governments, especially finance ministers, but narcotic dependency is widely recognized to be unhealthy, producing lethargy and leading to gradual deterioration of the organism.

b. Impact: Abolishing NATO opens the way to enhanced European security.

Wayne Merry (former State Dept. & Pentagon official, is a Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), ‘‘Therapy's End: Thinking beyond NATO,'' National Interest, no. 74, Winter 2003–4 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

NATO is not the solution to this split; it is the heart of the problem. The continuing existence of this Cold War relic stands in the way of the necessary evolution of European integration to include full responsibility for Continental security. In the 21st century, Europe can neither become a responsible power center nor a competent partner for the United States so long as Europeans remain dependent on a non-European power for their security-or even for the appearance of their security.

In summary, we've seen that NATO is a dying organization that no longer has any reason for existing, but merely burdens its member states strategically and financially. In contrast , we've see an affirmative plan that increases military efficiency, allows operations to be performed by the most efficient organizations, and encourages European defense responsibility. Please vote for the more efficient foreign policy with an Affirmative ballot in today's round.

2A EVIDENCE: ABOLISH NATO

DEFINITIONS

1. NATO

Encarta World English Dictionary, 2006, <http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861632498>

International military alliance: an international organization established in 1949 to promote mutual defense and collective security that was the primary Western alliance during the Cold War.

2. NATO

The Columbia Encyclopedia, 6th edition, 2001-5, <http://www.bartleby.com/65/na/NAtlTrO.html> .

The treaty, one of the major Western countermeasures against the threat of aggression by the Soviet Union during the *cold war*, was aimed at safeguarding the freedom of the North Atlantic community.

INHERENCY

1. NATO members are at odds.

Peter W. Singer (Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies) and John M. Olin (Post-Doctoral Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies), "New Thinking on Transatlantic Security: Terrorism, NATO, and Beyond," from Weltpolitik, a publication of the Brookings Institute, January 15, 2003, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/speeches/singer/20030115.htm>

While the two sides may not resolve this divergence in viewpoint in the near-term, one thing is certain, its importance must be accounted for in transatlantic relations. This disagreement places incredible burdens and tensions on NATO. Simply put, it is hard to maintain a close military alliance when one party sees itself at war and the other partner does not.

2. NATO is irrelevant to coalition-building

Christopher Layne (visiting fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato), "Casualties of War - Transatlantic Relations and the Future of NATO in the Wake of the Second Gulf War," the Cato Institute Executive Summary No. 483, August 13, 2003, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa483.pdf>

Notwithstanding the accession of several new NATO members, the alliance has not adapted to meet the new threats of the post–Cold War world. The Iraq War merely points to the utter irrelevance of the "new" NATO. Although some NATO member states have supported the United States in the War on Terrorism, NATO made no contribution either to the campaign in Afghanistan or to the Iraq War. The Bush administration could easily have assembled the same limited "coalition of the willing" even if there was no NATO.

3. Current European involvement in NATO has no benefits.

Wayne Merry (former State Dept. & Pentagon official, is a Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), ‘‘Therapy's End: Thinking beyond NATO,'' National Interest, no. 74, Winter 2003–4 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

No longer can thoughtful Europeans argue that Europe's interests are congruant with NATO's purpose. The United States envisions a NATO that no longer provides for Europe's security, but instead requires Europeans to serve as auxiliaries in distant enterprises of questionable benefit to Europe (and with little if any genuine consultation). Whether out-of-area activities are valid on their merits is not the point. In going out of area to avoid going out of business, in the formulation of a former Secretary-General, NATO has carried out a silent, political coup d'etat on its member-states.

4. NATO has no substantial dialogue or common ground.

Bert Koenders (NATO General Rapporteur), 2004, "NATO AND THE USE OF FORCE," NATO Parliamentary Assembly, <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=500>

There has been no substantial political dialogue about the major direction of NATO. For example, while there is unanimity that NATO has a pivotal role for Euro-Atlantic security, there is no common ground on the level of ambition of the Alliance - which can pose a serious risk. In addition, promises and actual contributions diverge, as was vividly illustrated by Secretary Generals Robertson and de Hoop Scheffer long and arduous efforts to literally beg the Allies for troop contributions in Afghanistan.

5. The lack of NATO consensus cripples effective dealings with security threats.

Bert Koenders (NATO General Rapporteur), 2004, "165 PC 04 E rev. 1 - NATO AND THE USE OF FORCE," NATO Parliamentary Assembly, <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=500>

Finding a NATO consensus is a prerequisite for dealing effectively with today's main security threats. To do this, we need a dialogue, but the current state of the transatlantic partnership is characterised by an absence of debate on the primary goals of the Alliance. No agreement exists on the best way to tackle terrorism and countries with WMD. Some nations believe that the way in which the current fight against terrorism is framed might actually lead to more terrorism. No agreement exists on the relevance of the concepts of containment and deterrence in case of new proliferators.

6. NATO has too many problems to be effective today.

Bert Koenders (NATO General Rapporteur), 2004, "165 PC 04 E rev. 1 - NATO AND THE USE OF FORCE," NATO Parliamentary Assembly, <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=500>

Except for Afghanistan, 'failing states' such as Sudan and Central Africa do not receive attention from NATO. However, in a world in which the demand for effective security policies is overstretching supply, NATO is faced with multiple challenges at a time of military diminishing resources and a lack of agreement on practical priorities. Agreement on basic principles is important to rebuild trust and confidence on NATO's agenda, its priorities and the specific mix of policy instruments to be employed. 'Coalitions of the willing' are sometimes necessary to deal with security issues, but a proliferation of this thinking would be counterproductive to the Alliance's raison d'être. The NATO Council plays an insufficient role in fostering a real political dialogue on these pertinent issues.

7. NATO has an ill-defined role in the 21st century

Economist, "A moment of truth," 5-2-02, <http://economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1109654>

Both boosters and detractors call it the most successful military alliance in history. But does it have a future? It is hard for Americans and Europeans to imagine the past 50 years without the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation there to defend them. Yet it is harder than it used to be to imagine NATO, as it is, advancing far into the 21st century.

8. NATOs failure is due to the incapable European nations and the intransigent US.

Christopher Layne (visiting fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato), "Casualties of WarTransatlantic Relations and the Future of NATO in the Wake of the Second Gulf War," the Cato Institute Executive Summary No. 483, August 13, 2003, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa483.pdf>

NATO has failed to live up to expectations in the post–Cold War world for three main reasons. First, the military capabilities of the European NATO members are limited. Second, the European members of NATO do not share Washington's enthusiasm for confronting "out of area" threats. And, third, Washington has deliberately chosen to bypass the alliance because it regards the European NATO military capabilities as a drag on American power rather than a contributor to it.

9. There's no longer an external threat to hold NATO together.

Christopher Layne (visiting fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato), "Casualties of WarTransatlantic Relations and the Future of NATO in the Wake of the Second Gulf War," the Cato Institute Executive Summary No. 483, August 13, 2003, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa483.pdf>

Although there had been pronounced fissiparous trends in transatlantic relations during the Cold War, the Soviet threat had kept those trends in check, and thus kept the alliance intact. However, with the Soviet Union removed from the geopolitical equation, Walt noted, there was no longer a common external threat to hold at bay the forces undermining the alliance's cohesion.

10. The EU constitution makes NATO redundant.

Jeffry L. Cimbalo, "Saving NATO from Europe," Foreign Affairs, January-February 2006 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

Article 40 of the constitution starkly states that, "until such time" as the common defense policy materializes, "the participating Member States shall work in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." No provision is made for cooperation after that time. As a whole, the constitution makes clear that NATO is ultimately superfluous to EU security policy. Various provisions of the constitution cannot be reconciled with the existing obligations of NATO membership. Under Article 8 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO member states "are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence "and "undertake not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty." Although the constitution states that the proposed common security and defense policy will "be compatible with" that of NATO, NATO's involvement in European security affairs once the constitution takes effect will be limited to providing life support for certain European national armed forces until the EU, in whole or in part, decides that "cooperation" with NATO is no longer necessary. That does not fit any definition of compatibility.

11. NATO fails as a military alliance because of the inadequacies of European militaries.

Christopher Layne (visiting fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato), "Casualties of War -Transatlantic Relations and the Future of NATO in the Wake of the Second Gulf War," the Cato Institute Executive Summary No. 483, August 13, 2003, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa483.pdf>

NATO also falls short as a military alliance. As already noted, there is a huge gap between the respective military capabilities of the United States and NATO. This gap is not simply quantitative, measured by the difference in the defense burdens borne by the United States and the Europeans (e.g., the U.S. spends nearly 3.5 percent of GDP on defense compared with 2.5 percent for France, and 1.5 percent for Germany) but is, more importantly, qualitative. As already pointed out, the European NATO militaries lack the kind of advanced, technologically sophisticated weaponry and supporting systems that are the backbone of the U.S. military. To be blunt, NATO Europe has nothing to offer the United States militarily.

12. NATO has yet to define its post-Soviet role.

Economist, "A time to rebuild," June 24, 2004, <http://economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=2792580>

Despite many claims to the contrary, NATO has yet to define its place in a post-Soviet world. Over the past decade, it has assumed some new roles: peacekeeping in the Balkans and Afghanistan, partnership with Russia, endless diplomatic dialogue. The old concern of defending its members' territory has faded into the background—leaving a question mark as to why the alliance need exist at all. At first look, America's recent wars seem to have pushed the alliance further off stage. Spurning NATO's offers, the Pentagon shouldered the hardest part of the Afghan war alone. Ahead of the Iraq war, the alliance was at first unable, thanks to France, to play even a bit part, by providing air-defences to Turkey.

13. America's reluctance to use NATO is because of NATO's lack of functionality.

Economist, "A time to rebuild," June 24, 2004, <http://economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=2792580>

The Europeans' efforts have justified America's reluctance to use NATO. After ten months of peacekeeping in Afghanistan, the alliance has still deployed only 250 soldiers outside Kabul. A lack of decent troops and aircraft is only part of the problem: more serious is the lack of will among European governments.

14. Europe is yesterday's problem.

Wayne Merry (former State Dept. & Pentagon official, is a Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), ‘‘Therapy's End: Thinking beyond NATO,'' National Interest, no. 74, Winter 2003–4 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

Painful though it may be for many Europeans to recognize, America's destiny lies in many directions. Europe is yesterday's problem precisely because the Alliance's mission was so fully achieved. (As is surely obvious, the same is not true in other parts of the globe.)

15. Legitimate threats are gone.

Dr. Steven E. Meyer (Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, the U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Winter 2003-4.

The legitimate threat that justified NATO really is gone. All three US administrations since the collapse of the Soviet Union have paid lip service to this aphorism. For more than a decade, US security has advocated cooperation with Russia, but the structural and functional reality is quite different.

16. Europe has outgrown NATO.

Dr. Steven E. Meyer (Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, the U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Winter 2003-4.

The whole nature of contemporary European politics has changed so fundamentally that it has outgrown NATO-type alliances. For the first time in about 1,800 years, there is no world-class threat to or from any European state or combination of European states that requires a wide-ranging, comprehensive alliance such as NATO.7 For the most part, borders are set, uncontested, and peaceful. Aggressive nationalism (although not nationalism itself) and the race for arms and empire that so dominated the politics of every major power from the 16th through the early 20th centuries are gone. In Western Europe, the political struggle has replaced many of the characteristics of Westphalian sovereignty with a more intricate system of regions, states, and supra-national organizations.

17. The Soviet Question has been resolved.

Dr. Steven E. Meyer (Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, the U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Winter 2003-4.

The collapse of the Stalinist system has resolved the "Soviet Question" that dominated much of the second half of the 20th century. Although we can't predict Russia's future exactly, it is highly unlikely that the Stalinist system will be reestablished, and by including Russia as an equal we greatly enhance her prospects for a stable political order and a more traditional, non-antagonistic relationship with the United States and the rest of the West.

18. NATO nations have no common bond.

Dr. Steven E. Meyer (Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, the U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Winter 2003-4.

Even in a collective "security alliance," there must be at least some overriding common security bond that holds the participants together. As noted before, quite the opposite is happening—not only on security issues, but in the political realm as well. The NATO that has emerged since the end of the Cold War does not satisfy even the most rudimentary tests of what an alliance is supposed to do.

SIGNIFICANCE

1. NATO is a mission-less alliance that is crippling Europe.

Rep. Doug Bereuter and John Lis, "Reorienting Transatlantic Defense," The National Interest, Summer 2004 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

[NATO is] an Atlantic Alliance that is casting about in search of a mission, having outlived its usefulness with the demise of its original adversary. Indeed, he argued that NATO continues to keep Europe in a state of dependence, frustrating the rise of a European Union that can act as an equal partner to the United States. Yet even some of NATO's defenders-such as John Hulsman, writing in the Spring 2004 issue-view NATO primarily as a useful toolbox from which the United States can draw as it undertakes military adventures far from Europe's shores, cherry-picking allies on a case-by-case basis.

2. NATO antagonizes Russia

Economist Global Agenda, "NATO and Russia say yes," December 17, 2006, <http://economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=903083>

FOR most of the past decade, the relationship between NATO and Russia, its cold war enemy, has teetered between grudging co-operation and outright hostility. Russia never quite believed the West's assurances that the Atlantic alliance, formed in 1949 as a counterweight to the Soviet Union and its expanding empire, no longer had any particular adversary in its sights.

3. NATO is a hindrance that the US does not need.

Christopher Layne (visiting fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato), "Casualties of War - Transatlantic Relations and the Future of NATO in the Wake of the Second Gulf War," the Cato Institute Executive Summary No. 483, August 13, 2003, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa483.pdf>

Washington's growing belief that NATO is more of a grand strategic hindrance than an asset is the final nail in the coffin with respect to NATO's irrelevance as a military alliance. This belief rests on a core truth: given the huge disparity between America's military capabilities and those of NATO Europe, the alliance really does not have much to contribute to U.S. military operations. With the partial exception of British forces, NATO militaries do not possess the sophisticated capabilities to fight on the same battlefield alongside American troops. European NATO forces lack stealth technologies, advanced real-time reconnaissance/surveillance systems, precision guided munitions and power projection capabilities, among other things. Put more bluntly, the United States does not need any help from NATO Europe to fight wars like those conducted in Afghanistan and Iraq.

5. NATO hurts US-Europe economic relationship.

Dr. Steven E. Meyer (Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, the U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Winter 2003-4.

Of course, the United States does have interests in common with the Europe that is emerging, but without the kind of overall mutual threat we faced in the past, they are much more issue-specific. For example, economic ties now provide America's single most important relationship with Europe—both as partner and competitor. However, we are doing much less than we should do to prepare for the future of this relationship, in part because we are distracted by an anachronistic security relationship.

SOLVENCY

1. The European Union can accomplish NATO's duties.

Rep. Doug Bereuter and John Lis, "Reorienting Transatlantic Defense," The National Interest, Summer 2004 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

The EU also aspires to play a role in operations outside of Europe, as demonstrated by the operation in 2003 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The EU should be encouraged to undertake crisis management and humanitarian tasks outside of Europe, provided that it has the necessary capabilities

*The source goes on to say that:* 19 of the 26 NATO members are also EU members.

2. Peacekeeping and nation-building operations have become increasingly important, and the UN is the most prolific operator.

James Dobbins (former US Ambassador to European community, Assist. Sec. of State for Europe, Director of International Security & Defense Policy Center at RAND), "NATO's Role in Nation-building," from the NATO Review, a publication of RAND, Summer 2005, <http://www.rand.org/commentary/120805NR.html>

Nation-building has been a growth industry since the end of the Cold War. The United Nations, NATO, the United States and more recently the European Union have all become engaged in missions that employ armed force in post-conflict environments with the objective of supporting a political transformation, that is to say democratisation. Not every recent military expedition fits this description, but nation-building, peace-building or stabilisation operations, depending on one's preferred terminology, have become the dominant paradigm for the use of armed force in the post-Cold War world. Since 1989, the frequency, scale, scope and duration of these nation-building missions have steadily risen. During the Cold War the United States mounted a new military intervention, on average, once a decade. The United Nations launched a new peacekeeping operation, on average, once every four years. Since 1989, the frequency of US-led interventions is approaching one every other year. New UN peacekeeping missions are being launched, on average, about once every six months.

3. NATO is not needed to solve any world problems.

Dr. Steven E. Meyer (Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, the U.S. Army War College Quarterly, Winter 2003-4.

We also have other common interests in such areas as the environment, terrorism, and others, none of which are particularly well suited to resolution by NATO or any other like alliance. Occasionally, the United States and specific European countries or groups of countries may need to engage in joint military activities—the Gulf War in the early 1990s and the more recent war in Afghanistan provide two excellent examples. In both cases coalitions were put together to deal with specific issues and, during both, NATO was little more than a "truck stop."

4. Europe is capable of providing for its own defense.

Wayne Merry (former State Dept. & Pentagon official, is a Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), ‘‘Therapy's End: Thinking beyond NATO,'' National Interest, no. 74, Winter 2003–4 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

The reality stands in sharp contrast. Europe has a larger population than America, a total economy of comparable size, a modern industrial and technological base often very competitive with America's (and certainly beyond those of any other part of the world), and a vast wealth of relevant military and political experience. The notion that, somehow, Europe is "not ready" for security independence is nonsense.

5. The EU can pick up NATO's role

Bettina Hunoid, "Future Prospects for EU and NATO," Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2005, <http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/2005/solana.php?menu_2005=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&>

Besides, the two alliances were already cooperating, he added, since the forces earmarked for the EU battle groups came from the same contingent as the units of the NATO Response Force. Mr. Solana, the former NATO Secretary General, also affirmed that the cooperation of the two alliances had been significantly enhanced since his term of office. While in former times it had been impossible to organize just one single meeting, now there were meetings every week.

6. No NATO means the EU has greater freedom to develop it's own foreign policy

Philip Gordan (Director of the Brookings Institution's Center on the United States and Europe, Senior Fellow of Brookings Foreign Policy Studies, Member of Council on Foreign Relations and the Board of the US Committee on NATO), "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2006, http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/gordon/emirates20060530.pdf

A number of Europeans – in France, Belgium, Spain (under the government elected in spring 2004), and some in Germany – believe that an overly strong and active NATO is an impediment to the development of the European Union as a global political and strategic actor. In contrast to more "Atlanticist" NATO member states such as Britain, Italy, Poland and the Netherlands, they see the NATO–EU relationship as essentially competitive and want Europeans to have more control over their own fate than they would in the US-dominated NATO.

Additional Advantage: Increased efficiency in foreign policy through decrease in financial waste.

a. The US pays for 85% of NATO.

John C. Hulsman, PhD, "The Future of NATO," The Heritage Foundation – Issues 2006: The Candidate's Briefing Book, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/research/features/issues/pdfs/NATO.pdf> , [brackets added]

Perhaps the most alarming statistic with regard to NATO has been the ever-widening disparity in defense expenditures between the United States on the one hand and Canada and Europe on the other. For the fiscal year 2007 defense budget, the United States has allocated $439.3 billion (3.2 percent of GDP) for the Department of Defense—an increase of 7 percent from FY 2006. This sum dwarfs the respective defense budgets of fellow NATO members: United Kingdom $65.25 bil­lion (2.7 percent of GDP); France $45 billion (2.6 percent); Germany $30 billion (1.2 percent); Italy $28.2 billion (1.8 percent); Spain $9.9 billion (1.2 percent). Consequently, the United States now represents 85 percent. [of NATO spending]

b. Impact: Ending subsidies makes the US military spending more efficient by freeing funds for other uses.

Wayne Merry (former State Dept. & Pentagon official, is a Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), ‘‘Therapy's End: Thinking beyond NATO,'' National Interest, no. 74, Winter 2003–4 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

While U.S. operational and logistical capabilities are today supreme, America's overall force structure is little more than half the size it was a generation ago, and its reserves are seriously overcommitted. The best forces can cover only limited tasks, especially for a democratic nation that employs only volunteers. Stated plainly, NATO is a luxury the United States can no longer justify. This vast subsidy for Europe is in direct conflict with the procurement and development budgets required to maintain the American technological lead in an ever-competitive world. Today's precision weapons will be commonplace tomorrow, and even the Pentagon's immense budget cannot always keep up.

CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER: THE CASE FOR BANNING DEPLETED URANIUM

By Rachel Marie Blum

Children and adults alike are experiencing multiple bouts of cancer, chronic illness, and shortened lifespans. Babies are being born with missing limbs and damaged brains. The water is contaminated and the air contains toxic dust. These aren't problems out of a science fiction novel; these are real symptoms experienced by real people in real countries today, and the symptoms are getting worse. This is the fate of citizens of countries where a radioactive substance known as depleted uranium has been used in weapons by the military personnel of NATO countries. It is because depleted uranium shows a lack of respect for human life that we stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

Before we look at anything else, let's first establish some

DEFINITIONS of key terms

**NATO:** The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." (*North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" http://www.nato.int/home.htm#)*

NATO as an organization dropped depleted uranium bombs in the Balkans in 1999, and individual NATO member states have used depleted uranium since the Gulf War. Both uses of depleted uranium will be referred to throughout this case.

The following two definitions are found in the *American Heritage Dictionary, 2000*.

**Significant:** Important.

**Reform:** To abolish abuse or malpractice in.

And finally, "DU," or "Depleted uranium":

Vince Calder (PhD in physical chemistry from UC-Berkeley), "Depleted uranium poses significant dangers," The Journal Times, September 12, 2003, <http://www.journaltimes.com/articles/2003/09/19/opinion/iq_2452057.txt>.

For every pound Uranium is the metal used to make nuclear weapons and fuel rods employed in nuclear reactors. But only a tiny fraction, less than 1 percent, of mined and purified uranium is useable for these purposes. This useable fraction is extracted and concentrated. What is left behind is so-called "depleted uranium" - called DU for short. of useable product produced, some 200 pounds of "depleted uranium" are left behind. A number of very major problems are also left behind.

Next, we need to examine the

CRITERION

of the affirmative team, which is the guiding focus of this round. Our criterion is that of preserving and valuing human life. Our plan will earn an affirmative ballot at the end of this round by upholding human life better than the Status Quo.

Now we need to look at the facts surrounding the use of depleted uranium in

INHERENCY

1. NATO has been using depleted uranium in the battlefield since the 1970s.

Tedd Wyman (UMRC Researcher), "UMRC's Preliminary Findings from Afghanistan & Operation Enduring Freedom," Uranium Medical Research Center, January 2003, http://www.projectcensored.org/publications/2005/4.html.

The United States and several of its Coalition partners and NATO allies have been deploying in battlefield and experimenting with chemically toxic and radioactive heavy metals in various types of bullets, bombs and warheads since the early 1970s. Uranium powder is taken from the nuclear fuel reprocessing cycle, after it has been mixed with nuclear reactor waste products and spent fuel, to supply the non-fissile weapons' manufacturing industry.

2. NATO is covering up Depleted Uranium casualty information

Piotr Bein, PhD, "Uranium Weapons Cover-ups in Our Midst," from the World Uranium Weapons Conference at Hamburg, October 16-19, 2003, http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/bein/hamburg.htm.

NATO coerced old and new Yugoslav governments to suppress DU casualty information. Yugoslav de-contamination units operated during NATO bombing, while the government likely concealed DU casualties in military hospitals. After a new Yugoslav foreign minister visited Lord Robertson in the beginning of 2001, the Western media reported that Yugoslavia tested soldiers for DU "negative," as in all NATO countries.

Now let's examine the problems brought about by the use of radioactive depleted uranium in the

HARMS

Harm 1: NATO DU bombings are causing an outbreak of cancer

Doug Westerman, "Depleted Uranium – Far Worse Than 9/11," Centre for Research on Globalization, May 3, 2006, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20060503&articleId=2374

Such relatively swift development of cancers has been reported by doctors in hospitals treating civilians following NATO bombing with DU in Yugoslavia in 1998-1999 and the US military invasion of Iraq using DU for the first time in 1991. Medical experts report that this phenomenon of multiple malignancies from unrelated causes has been unknown until now and is a new syndrome associated with internal DU exposure.

Harm 2: Radiation stunts the development of unborn children.

Brice Smith, PhD, and Arjun Makijani, PhD, "Costs and Risks of Depleted Uranium from a Proposed Enrichment Facility," Science and Democratic Action, a publication of the Institute for Energy and Environment Research, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 16, 2005, <http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/13-2.pdf>

In addition to the potential for uranium to play a chemically neurotoxic role analogous to lead, radiation is also known to adversely affect the nervous system of the embryo/fetus. From a review of the Japanese atomic bomb survivor data, the ICRP, in the same publication referenced earlier, concluded: There is a clear constellation of effects of prenatal irradia­tion on the developing central nervous system – mental retardation, decreased intelligence scores and school perfor­mance, and seizure disorders.

Harm 3: Terrorist dirty bombs

Piotr Bein, PhD, "Uranium Weapons Cover-ups in Our Midst," from the World Uranium Weapons Conference at Hamburg, October 16-19, 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/bein/hamburg.htm>.

Unexploded DU bullets are themselves a potential terrorist weapon. Shortly after ABC News reporters smuggled 7 kg of DU into the country in September 2003 to show how ineffective home security was, a retired Californian research chemist Dr. Vince Calder noted that intact DU bullets pose a terrorist threat. They are readily available from the battlefields, easy to import, and simple to turn into dirty bombs, making them a potential WMD inside the US territory.

Harm 4: Bad precedent - Depleted uranium weapons make use of nuclear weapons more probable.

A. Gsponer, "Depleted-Uranium Weapons: the Whys and Wherefores," Independent Scientific Research Institute report number ISRI-03-03, May 8, 2003, <http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0301059>

Finally, there is the very grave military and legal precedent created by the combat use of a radioactive material, which is a clear violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of a norm that was in force since 1945. To argue that nobody holding a position of competence or responsibility was aware of the full consequences of breaking this norm would be quite unreasonable. On the contrary, considering the existence of a lively internal debate on the consequences of the battlefield use of depleted uranium and other nuclear materials, it is certain that these had been thoroughly investigated long before the 1991. One must admit, therefore, that the choice made in favor of using depleted uranium took into account the fact that its battlefield use would trivialize the military use of radioactive materials, and would therefore make the use of nuclear weapons more probable..

The use of depleted uranium is obviously a serious problem in the status quo. This is why we present the following

PLAN

Plank1Agency**:** shall be the governments of the 26 NATO member states and/or their representatives on the North Atlantic Council.

Plank 2 Mandates:

Mandate 1: All NATO countries shall immediately cease the development, testing, production, and use of depleted uranium weapons in NATO missions.

Mandate 2: Non-use of depleted uranium shall be a requirement for NATO membership.

Plank 3 Enforcement: Any government official not in compliance shall automatically be removed from office.

Plank 4 Funding: Funding will come from cuts in European agricultural subsidies and from block grants from the US Federal Government derived from general federal revenues and cutting Head Start and the National Institute on Aging.

Plank 5 Timeline: Mandate 1 shall be phased in during 1 year following an Affirmative ballot. Mandate 2 takes effect immediately.

Plank 6 Clarification: All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

This leads us to how our plan is the best answer, or

SOLVENCY: Ending use of depleted uranium weapons is the only answer.

Piotr Bein, PhD, "Uranium Weapons Cover-ups in Our Midst," from the World Uranium Weapons Conference at Hamburg, October 16-19, 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/bein/hamburg.htm> .

Ultimately, massive long-term human catastrophe might result, far beyond the borders of radioactive wars. Thus, the only solution might be a complete and universal termination of the development, testing, production and use of these weapons of indiscriminate effect and delayed mass destruction.

Finally, we need to look quickly at the

ADVANTAGES produced by the affirmative case.

The advantages of our case are simple, and they all related to human life. We cannot give life back to the people who have already been contaminated by depleted uranium, but by stopping the use of depleted uranium, we can protect countless lives. Our advantages are not immediately quantifiable, but we know that by abolishing the use of depleted uranium, the affirmative case will have the following effects:

1. Fewer instances of preventable cancer
2. Fewer deformities and mutations in babies and future generations
3. A less toxic living environment
4. Increased safety because of fewer bomb materials being readily available to terrorists.
5. Reduced acceptability of nuclear weapons.

We've seen the horrible effects that depleted uranium has on human health and on the safety of our world at large, and how it places human life in jeopardy at every turn, a serious problem that mandates a serious answer. Today, we've presented that answer through a plan that abolishes the use of depleted uranium, holding NATO and its signatory countries accountable for the protection of human life.

2A EVIDENCE: DEPLETED URANIUM

INHERENCY

1. Depleted uranium is a permanent contaminent.

Tedd Wyman (UMRC Researcher), "UMRC's Preliminary Findings from Afghanistan & Operation Enduring Freedom," Uranium Medical Research Center, January 2003, <http://www.projectcensored.org/publications/2005/4.html>.

Most American weapons (missiles, smart bombs, dumb bombs, bullets, tank shells, cruise missiles, etc.) contain high amounts of radioactive uranium. Depleted or non-depleted, these types of weapons, on detonation, release a radioactive dust which, when inhaled, goes into the body and stays there. It has a half-life of 4.5 billion years. Basically, it's a permanently available contaminant, distributed in the environment, where dust storms or any water nearby can disperse it. Once ingested, it releases subatomic particles that slice through DNA.

2. The Depleted Uranium used by NATO was especially radioactive.

Piotr Bein, PhD, "Uranium Weapons Cover-ups in Our Midst," from the World Uranium Weapons Conference at Hamburg, October 16-19, 2003, http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/bein/hamburg.htm.

During the "Kosovo DU" scandal of early 2001, uranium 236, plutonium, neptunium, americum and other transuranic elements turned out to be in DU, contrary to industry specifications. Although these extremely toxic and radioactive substances were present only in trace quantities, their high power significantly increases the toxicity and radioactivity of DU bullets shot in Operation Allied Force. The substances are spent nuclear fuels and nuclear waste recycled into DU stock. Uranium alloys in weapons have a composition and toxic-radioactive properties depending on what nuclear waste materials in what quantities have been blended in.

3. If reports incomplete, it's because of lack of NATO cooperation.

Samir Krilic, AP Writer, "Commission Reports on Effects of Depleted Uranium on Bosnia's Environment," Associated Press, June 2, 2005 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

NATO also should provide more information on the exact bombing locations, members said, though the commission has yet to request the details it needs beyond those it already knows. "We need to continue gathering information in cooperation with the international community, especially NATO, who should let us know what were the locations bombed with munition containing depleted uranium," Alispahic said.

4. Warnings aren't enough.

Piotr Bein, PhD, "Uranium Weapons Cover-ups in Our Midst," from the World Uranium Weapons Conference at Hamburg, October 16-19, 2003, http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/bein/hamburg.htm.

Reminding the invading forces to warn local population, mark off contaminated sites (why "in Arabic" – in the Balkans and Afghanistan?), and clean up DU reads like reminding children to wash hands before meals. The governments and the military concerned know they contaminate illegally, just as they know soldiers must be protected, but are not.

5. The depleted uranium problem has not been dealt with effectively.

Piotr Bein, PhD, "Uranium Weapons Cover-ups in Our Midst," from the World Uranium Weapons Conference at Hamburg, October 16-19, 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/bein/hamburg.htm>.

The Brussels Coalition did not manage to convince the movement otherwise. The structure and process of the Hamburg conference were not conducive to rational argumentation. The workshop had a majority of participants from the coalition, while motions were voted upon by a count of hands. Consequently, the "ban" issue came out of the room in form of two recommendations to the plenary session. Other, valuable proposals – citizens tribunals, requests to governments to guarantee safety of humanitarian workers against contamination by uranium, and occupational liability court cases – did not receive the required number of votes.

HARMS

1. "Alternate causes" to problems caused by DU aren't plausible.

Piotr Bein, PhD, "Uranium Weapons Cover-ups in Our Midst," from the World Uranium Weapons Conference at Hamburg, October 16-19, 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/bein/hamburg.htm>.

Military "science" emphasizes the "other factor" of Gulf and Balkan syndromes instead of uranium. After the Gulf War, which saw a cocktail of poisons used and released – from Iraqi chemical-biological weapons, to DU ammunition – the "other factor" was adopted in cover-ups. It would likely be pursued for the other contaminated areas, once cancers from the use of uranium weapon take a higher toll. Vaccines given to the soldiers could not be a cause of the syndrome among residents; neither there was smoke from burning oil wells in the Balkans, nor chemical weapons used by "Milosevic" against his own people. Apologists of Gulf War syndrome in Iraqi population cited the two latter factors, though no independent epidemiological study was done. Early, numerous cases of "mystery pneumonia" after the newest invasion of Iraq were explained away by smoking, rather than vaccines. Early symptoms of uranium exposure include pneumonitis-like illness.

2. Depleted uranium weapons are low yield nuclear explosives.

A. Gsponer, "Depleted-Uranium Weapons: the Whys and Wherefores," Independent Scientific Research Institute report number ISRI-03-03, May 8, 2003, http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0301059

It is found that depleted uranium weapons belong to the diffuse category of low radiological impact nuclear weapons to which emerging types of low yield (i.e., fourth generation) nuclear explosives also belong.

3. In context: Depleted uranium is safer than atomic bombs, but it is still radioactive.

A. Gsponer, "Depleted-Uranium Weapons: the Whys and Wherefores," Independent Scientific Research Institute report number ISRI-03-03, May 8, 2003, <http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0301059>

Of course, an important reason for the lack of significant early opposition to the military use of depleted uranium is that its radiological impact is very much lower than that of existing types of nuclear weapons: atomic and hydrogen bombs. As is well known, depleted uranium is only about half as radioactive as natural uranium, which is a low radioactive material. But being radioactive means that any uranium based material is *qualitatively* different from any non radioactive material, and therefore means that any use of uranium has important medical, technical, legal, and political implications.

4. Depleted uranium bullets deliver massive radioactive impact.

A. Gsponer, "Depleted-Uranium Weapons: the Whys and Wherefores," Independent Scientific Research Institute report number ISRI-03-03, May 8, 2003, <http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0301059>

The expenditure of one ton of depleted uranium in the form of bullets has a long term radiological impact equivalent to the use of many kilotons of hypothetical pure fusion weapons. This means that between 100 and 1000 precision guided munitions (which today deliver only 10 to 100 kilograms of high explosives), each carrying a pure fusion warhead with a yield of 1 to 10 tons of high explosive equivalent, could be used to produce a similar radiological impact. Since about 400 tons of depleted uranium were used in Iraq, and about 40 in Yugoslavia, the radiological impact in these countries corresponds to that of using tenths of thousands of precision guided munitions tipped with fourth generation nuclear warheads, i.e., many more precision guided delivery systems than were actually used in these countries.

5. Depleted uranium contamination can be present for long periods of time.

Dr. Hari Sharma, "Investigations of Environmental Impacts from the Deployment of DU-Based Munitions," Depleted Uranium Watch Report, September 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/sharma/du-report.htm>

Recently, UNEP found DU in air in two areas in the Balkans (Pijackovica and Cape Arza), where DU munitions were presumably used. Air sampling at the two sites, conducted more than two years later, revealed the presence of DU. However, other sites only showed the presence of NU. This shows that under some conditions DU contamination can be present for a long period.

6. Depleted uranium accumulates in lungs at a rate of .5 milligrams a day.

Dr. Hari Sharma, "Investigations of Environmental Impacts from the Deployment of DU-Based Munitions," Depleted Uranium Watch Report, September 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/sharma/du-report.htm>, brackets added

A person on active duty inhales 33 cubic meters of air per day. It can be seen a person can accumulate 0.5 milligrams of DUOA per day in his/her lungs. It can also be seen that over 90-day period it is feasible for a person to accumulate over 20 milligrams of DUOA [depleted uranium oxide aerosols] in the alveolar tissues in the lungs.

7. The radiation impacts of depleted uranium used in recent wars is equivalent to that of hundreds of thousands of Nagasaki bombs.

Tedd Wyman (UMRC Researcher), "UMRC's Preliminary Findings from Afghanistan & Operation Enduring Freedom," Uranium Medical Research Center, January 2003, <http://www.projectcensored.org/publications/2005/4.html>. Brackets added.

At the Uranium Weapons Conference held October 2003 in Hamburg, Germany, independent scientists from around the world testified to a huge increase in birth deformities and cancers wherever N[on] D[depleted] U[ranium] and DU had been used. Professor Katsuma Yagasaki, a scientist at the Ryukyus University, Okinawa calculated that the 800 tons of DU used in Afghanistan is the radioactive equivalent of 83,000 Nagasaki bombs. The amount of DU used in Iraq is equivalent to 250,000 Nagasaki bombs.

8. Depleted uranium's ability to penetrate and stay in the innermost cells make it worse than natural uranium.

Doug Westerman, "Depleted Uranium – Far Worse Than 9/11," Centre for Research on Globalization, May 3, 2006, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20060503&articleId=2374>

Particles smaller than 10 microns can access the innermost recesses of lung tissue where they become permanently lodged. Furthermore, if the substance is relatively insoluble, such as the ceramic DU-oxide dust produced from burning DU, it will remain in place for decades, dissolving very slowly into the bloodstream and lymphatic fluids through the course of time. Studies have identified DU in the urine of Gulf War veterans nine years after that conflict, testifying to the permanence of ceramic DU-oxide in the lungs. Thus the effects are far different from natural uranium dust, whose coarse particles are almost entirely excreted by the body within 24 hours.

9. If reports incomplete, it's because of land mines.

Samir Krilic, AP Writer, "Commission Reports on Effects of Depleted Uranium on Bosnia's Environment," Associated Press, June 2, 2005 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

Some locations suspected of being contaminated could not be reached because of mines and other unexploded ordinance from the war.

10. Highly radioactive substances were found in depleted uranium.

Piotr Bein, PhD, "Uranium Weapons Cover-ups in Our Midst," from the World Uranium Weapons Conference at Hamburg, October 16-19, 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/bein/hamburg.htm>.

The most hazardous additives are transuranics, which are tens of thousands of times more radioactive than pure DU, or pure, undepleted uranium (virgin uranium). Independent and government analyses of DU penetrators collected from battlefields have detected trace amounts of transuranics, including plutonium 239l.

11. Depleted uranium is permanently radioactive and deadly.

Vince Calder (PhD in physical chemistry from UC-Berkeley), "Depleted uranium poses significant dangers," The Journal Times, September 12, 2003, <http://www.journaltimes.com/articles/2003/09/19/opinion/iq_2452057.txt>.

DU is essentially permanently radioactive. It gives off radioactive particles at a fixed rate on any human time scale - decades, centuries, even millennia. A lump of DU sitting on a table in front of you is harmless. The radioactive particles that DU gives off are stopped by the thin layer of dead skin cells that naturally cover everyone's body, so human tissue cells are said to have a large "stopping power" for these radioactive particles. However, this same large "stopping power" makes DU deadly if it gets inside the body. Besides being a chemically toxic heavy metal, like lead or mercury, a particle of DU inside the body continuously bombards surrounding live tissues with a barrage of subatomic particles capable ionizing nearby cellular material and ripping apart the chemical bonds that hold the cells together

12. Depleted uranium is still in the bodies of those involved in the Balkan conflict.

Asaf Durakoviæ (Georgetown University), "Undiagnosed Illnesses and Radioactive Warfare," Uranium Medical Research Center, 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/durakovic/undiagnosed.pdf>

The excretion of DU isotopes in contaminated and sick military personnel continues beyond ten years after their exposure in GWI and seven years after the Balkan conflict.

13. A substantial amount of depleted uranium is converted into dust particles that are inhaled.

Doug Westerman, "Depleted Uranium – Far Worse Than 9/11," Centre for Research on Globalization, May 3, 2006, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20060503&articleId=2374>

When a DU round or bomb strikes a hard target, most of its kinetic energy is converted to heat " sufficient heat to ignite the DU. From 40% to 70% of the DU is converted to extremely fine dust particles of ceramic uranium oxide (primarily dioxide, though other formulations also occur). Over 60% of these particles are smaller than 5 microns in diameter, about the same size as the cigarette ash particles in cigarette smoke and therefore respirable.

14. Depleted uranium has the same hazards of non-depleted uranium.

Piotr Bein, PhD, "Uranium Weapons Cover-ups in Our Midst," from the World Uranium Weapons Conference at Hamburg, October 16-19, 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/bein/hamburg.htm>.

Bein and Parker [2003] summarized the health hazards of uranium in non-nuclear weapons and civilian applications: radioactivity and toxicity. The hazards are similar, regardless of the type of uranium metal used: depleted, non-depleted or in alloys with other metals.

15. Depleted uranium dust is so fine that it is easily ingested and lodges permanently in the lungs and bloodstream.

Vince Calder (PhD in physical chemistry from UC-Berkeley), "Depleted uranium poses significant dangers," The Journal Times, September 12, 2003, <http://www.journaltimes.com/articles/2003/09/19/opinion/iq_2452057.txt>.

The radioactive dust produced is so incredibly fine, it behaves as if it were a gas. This dust can pass through military gas masks, so gas masks offer troops no protection, and it is deposited permanently in the lungs. If swallowed, the dust particles can be digested and pass into the blood stream, if the dust rubs into a scrape or wound it can enter tissues directly. Most of these dust particles are smaller than red blood cells, the smallest cells in the body, so the radioactive dust freely crosses organ and tissue boundaries. There is no way to remove them from the body. These ultra-fine smoke particles are spread by wind, settle out on surface water, and are redispersed by human activities -- digging, plowing, driving, or even just walking.

16. Exposure is widespread: illness at every bombsite.

Doug Westerman, "Depleted Uranium – Far Worse Than 9/11," Centre for Research on Globalization, May 3, 2006, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20060503&articleId=2374

How widespread and extensive is the exposure? A quote from the UMRC field report reads: "The UMRC field team was shocked by the breadth of public health impacts coincident with the bombing. Without exception, at every bombsite investigated, people are ill. A significant portion of the civilian population presents symptoms consistent with internal contamination by uranium.

17. DU contributed a 10% casualty rate to veterans of the Gulf War.

Piotr Bein, PhD, "Uranium Weapons Cover-ups in Our Midst," from the World Uranium Weapons Conference at Hamburg, October 16-19, 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/bein/hamburg.htm>.

A September 2002 Gulf War report on US veterans shows 0.1% casualty rate in combat, but a 36% post-combat rate for almost 700 thousand troops engaged in the war and shortly after. However, according to a 1998 admission of the military, only some 436 thousand troops entered into areas that were contaminated by DU dust. That boosts the casualty rate to 58% post-combat! Uranium is one of several major causes of the syndrome, so a casualty rate of about ten percent could be attributed to DU.

18 Confirmation of disease shows the risk of uranium.

Asaf Durakoviæ (Georgetown University), "Undiagnosed Illnesses and Radioactive Warfare," Uranium Medical Research Center, 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/durakovic/undiagnosed.pdf>

The confirmation of the incidents of thyroid cancer, hepatocellular carcinoma, leukemia, and risks of acute and chronic exposure to uranium, has emphasized the importance of awareness of somatic and genetic consequences of contamination with uranium isotopes.

19. Depleted uranium is a definite contaminant and contributor to disease.

Asaf Durakoviæ (Georgetown University), "Undiagnosed Illnesses and Radioactive Warfare," Uranium Medical Research Center, 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/durakovic/undiagnosed.pdf>

Depleted uranium, a low-level radioactive waste of the isotopic enrichment of natural uranium, has been identified as a definitive contaminant in the mentioned areas of military conflict. Its etiological role in the genesis of Gulf War disease has been the subject of sustained controversy since Gulf War I. The well-documented evidence of both chemical and radiological toxic properties of uranium isotopes has recently been an area of numerous research studies

20. Depleted uranium causes mutations in the central nervous system.

Asaf Durakoviæ (Georgetown University), "Undiagnosed Illnesses and Radioactive Warfare," Uranium Medical Research Center, 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/durakovic/undiagnosed.pdf>

The studies of depleted uranium in the central nervous system confirmed its retention in the sections of hippocampus, with additional evidence of nervous system electrophysiological changes in rats embedded with DU fragments. The potential mutagenic effects of internal contamination with DU have been recently suggested by the time dependent correlation of implanted uranium and tissue oncogen expression, with genomic instability. Neoplastic transformation of human osteoblasts in a DU containing cell culture confirms the risk of DU mediated cancer induction.

21. Depleted Uranium causes genetic mutations and DNA instability.

Asaf Durakoviæ (Georgetown University), "Undiagnosed Illnesses and Radioactive Warfare," Uranium Medical Research Center, 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/durakovic/undiagnosed.pdf>

These human data reports are of particular importance when viewed in the light of recent evidence of the mutagenic effects of alpha particles on stem cells and alpha-radiation induced chromosomal instabilities in human bone marrow cells. The chromosomal instability as a consequence of DU alpha particles clearly demonstrates mutagenic effects in DU positive British Gulf War veterans, as recently reported from the study of the peripheral lymphocytes from the University of Bremen, Germany.

22. When depleted uranium was used in the Gulf War, it resulted in disease.

Asaf Durakoviæ (Georgetown University), "Undiagnosed Illnesses and Radioactive Warfare," Uranium Medical Research Center, 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/durakovic/undiagnosed.pdf>

Gulf War I in 1991 resulted in 350 metric tons of DU deposited in the environment and 3 to 6 million grams of DU aerosol released into the atmosphere, by most conservative estimates. Its legacy, Gulf War disease, is a complex incapacitating multiorgan system disorder.

23. Depleted uranium results in a body-encompassing disease.

Asaf Durakoviæ (Georgetown University), "Undiagnosed Illnesses and Radioactive Warfare," Uranium Medical Research Center, 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/durakovic/undiagnosed.pdf>

The symptoms of this progressive disease have been as numerous as their names, including incapacitating fatigue, musculoskeletal and joint pains, headaches, neuropsychiatric disorders, affect changes, confusion, visual problems, changes of gait, loss of memory, lymphadenopathies, respiratory impairment, impotence, urinary tract morphological and functional alterations.

24. Depleted uranium may be "mildly" radioactive, but its effects on humans are anything but mild.

Dr. Hari Sharma, "Investigations of Environmental Impacts from the Deployment of DU-Based Munitions," Depleted Uranium Watch Report, September 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/sharma/du-report.htm>

It has been shown unambiguously that the deployment of DU-based munitions leads to contamination of air with aerosols of its ceramic oxides. Inhalation of contaminated air then leads to accumulation of highly insoluble particulate DU oxides in the lungs in milligram quantities. Even such deposition of ‘mildly' radioactive isotope does inflict harm to human health by its attendant radiation insult under certain conditions.

25. Depleted uranium presence in lymph nodes will result in cancer.

Dr. Hari Sharma, "Investigations of Environmental Impacts from the Deployment of DU-Based Munitions," Depleted Uranium Watch Report, September 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/sharma/du-report.htm>

It is evident that the civilian population in Iraq and the veterans are awaiting an epidemic of cancers. The presence of DU in lymph nodes with about 10 times the concentration present in the lungs does affect the immune system.

26. Depleted uranium is linked to cancers.

Paul Brown, "Scientists reject line on depleted uranium," The Guardian, April 19, 2003, <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/04/17/1050172706047.html>

It was adopted as a standard weapon in the first Gulf War despite its radioactive content and toxic effects. It was used again in the Balkans and Afghanistan by the US. Depleted uranium has been suspected by many campaigners of causing the unexplained cancers among Iraqis, particularly children, since the previous Gulf War.

27. Depleted uranium is causing cancers and severe birth defects.

Tedd Wyman (UMRC Researcher), "UMRC's Preliminary Findings from Afghanistan & Operation Enduring Freedom," Uranium Medical Research Center, January 2003, <http://www.projectcensored.org/publications/2005/4.html>.

Depleted uranium (DU), which itself is charged with causing many cancers and severe birth defects in the Iraqi population–especially children–over the past ten years. Four million pounds of radioactive uranium was dropped on Iraq in 2003 alone. Uranium dust will be in the bodies of our returning armed forces.

28. 4 out of 9 men serving when depleted uranium was used were "highly contaminated".

Tedd Wyman (UMRC Researcher), "UMRC's Preliminary Findings from Afghanistan & Operation Enduring Freedom," Uranium Medical Research Center, January 2003, <http://www.projectcensored.org/publications/2005/4.html>

Nine soldiers from the 442nd Military Police serving in Iraq were tested for DU contamination in December 2003. Conducted at the request of The News, as the U.S. government considers the cost of $1,000 per affected soldier prohibitive, the test found that four of the nine men were contaminated with high levels of DU, likely caused by inhaling dust from depleted uranium shells fired by U.S. troops. Several of the men had traces of another uranium isotope, U-236, that are produced only in a nuclear reaction process.

29. Depleted uranium will have a lasting effect on present and future generations.

Depleted Uranium: The Trojan Horse of Nuclear War" by Leuren Moret, World Affairs Journal, July, 2004. <http://www.mindfully.org/Nucs/2004/DU-Trojan-Horse1jul04.htm>

In my research on depleted uranium during the past 5 years, the most disturbing information concerns the impact on the unborn children and future generations for both soldiers serving in the depleted uranium wars, and for the civilians who must live in the permanently radioactive contaminated regions. Today, more than 240,000 Gulf War veterans are on permanent medical disability and more than 11,000 are dead. They have been denied testing, medical care, and compensation for depleted uranium exposure and related illnesses since 1991.

30. A person contaminated with depleted uranium contaminates their spouse and offspring.

Depleted Uranium: The Trojan Horse of Nuclear War" by Leuren Moret, World Affairs Journal, July, 2004. <http://www.mindfully.org/Nucs/2004/DU-Trojan-Horse1jul04.htm>

Even worse, they brought it home in their bodies. In some families, the children born before the Gulf War are the only healthy members.

31. NATO bombing campaigns and the gulf war have given us "Gulf War Syndrome".

Brice Smith, PhD, and Arjun Makijani, PhD, "Costs and Risks of Depleted Uranium from a Proposed Enrichment Facility," Science and Democratic Action, a publication of the Institute for Energy and Environment Research, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 16, 2005, <http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/13-2.pdf>

The science surrounding uranium's effects on the body is rapidly expanding due in large part to the con­cerns that have arisen in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, the 1999 NATO bombing campaign in the former Yugoslavia, and the gradual recognition of the many health problems that have come to be known as Gulf War Syndrome.

32. Chronic exposure to depleted uranium results in serious health concerns.

Brice Smith, PhD, and Arjun Makijani, PhD, "Costs and Risks of Depleted Uranium from a Proposed Enrichment Facility," Science and Democratic Action, a publication of the Institute for Energy and Environment Research, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 16, 2005, <http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/13-2.pdf>

Evidence is amass­ing that raises serious concerns regarding the impact of chronic exposure to DU in relation to a number of other health issues. Studies in humans and animals have shown that uranium can concentrate to varying degrees in the skeleton, liver, kidneys, testes, and brain.

33. Children and unborn babies are especially vulnerable.

Brice Smith, PhD, and Arjun Makijani, PhD, "Costs and Risks of Depleted Uranium from a Proposed Enrichment Facility," Science and Democratic Action, a publication of the Institute for Energy and Environment Research, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 16, 2005, <http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/13-2.pdf>

Children as well as the embryo/fetus are likely to be at higher risk in relation to the mutagenic and carcinogenic nature of uranium.

34. Depleted uranium is the definitive cause of Gulf War syndrome.

Leuren Moret (Geoscientist), "Depleted Uranium: Dirty bombs, dirty missiles, dirty bullets. A death sentence her and abroad," San-Francisco Bay View, June 21, 2006, <http://www.sfbayview.com/081804/Depleteduranium081804.shtml>

Since these soldiers were exposed to vaccines and depleted uranium (DU) only, this is strong evidence for researchers and scientists working on this issue, that DU is the definitive cause of Gulf War Syndrome. Vaccines are not known to cause cancer. One of the first published researchers on Gulf War Syndrome, who also served in 1991 in Iraq, Dr. Andras Korényi-Both, is in agreement with Barbara Goodno from the Department of Defense's Deployment Health Support Directorate, that in this war soldiers were not exposed to chemicals, pesticides, bioagents or other suspect causes this time to confuse the issue.

35. The phenomenon of multiple cancers in one person is associated with depleted uranium.

Leuren Moret (Geoscientist), "Depleted Uranium: Dirty bombs, dirty missiles, dirty bullets. A death sentence her and abroad," San-Francisco Bay View, June 21, 2006, <http://www.sfbayview.com/081804/Depleteduranium081804.shtml>

Soldiers developing malignancies so quickly since 2003 can be expected to develop multiple cancers from independent causes. This phenomenon has been reported by doctors in hospitals treating civilians following NATO bombing with DU in Yugoslavia in 1998-1999 and the U.S. military invasion of Iraq using DU for the first time in 1991. Medical experts report that this phenomenon of multiple malignancies from unrelated causes has been unknown until now and is a new syndrome associated with internal DU exposure.

36. Wherever depleted uranium has been used or tested, serious diseases have been reported.

Leuren Moret (Geoscientist), "Depleted Uranium: Dirty bombs, dirty missiles, dirty bullets. A death sentence her and abroad," San-Francisco Bay View, June 21, 2006, <http://www.sfbayview.com/081804/Depleteduranium081804.shtml>

Women living around these facilities have reported increases in endometriosis, birth defects in babies, leukemia in children and cancers and other diseases in adults. Thousands of tons of DU weapons tested for decades by the Navy on four bombing and gunnery ranges around Fallon, Nevada, is no doubt the cause of the fastest growing leukemia cluster in the U.S. over the past decade.

37. Depleted uranium will result in illness, disease, and shortened life span.

Doug Westerman, "Depleted Uranium – Far Worse Than 9/11," Centre for Research on Globalization, May 3, 2006, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20060503&articleId=2374>

Inhaling the dust will not kill large numbers of Iraqi and Afghan civilians right away, any more than it did Captain Riordan. Rather, what we will see is vast numbers of people who are chronically and severely ill, having their life spans drastically shortened, many with multiple cancers.

38. Even though Kosovo was bombed less than Iraq, the impacts were similar.

Doug Westerman, "Depleted Uranium – Far Worse Than 9/11," Centre for Research on Globalization, May 3, 2006, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20060503&articleId=2374>

Dr. Alim Yacoub of Basra University conducted an epidemiological study into incidences of malignancies in children under fifteen years old, in the Basra area (an area bombed with DU during the first Gulf War). They found over the 1990 to 1999 period, there was a 242% rise. That was before the recent invasion. In Kosovo, similar spikes in cancer and birth defects were noticed by numerous international experts, although the quantity of DU weapons used was only a small fraction of what was used in Iraq.

39. Deformities in Iraq and Kosovo are from depleted uranium.

Chalmers Johnson, "Dirty Weapons - Casualties From Iraq War Will Mount," Pacific News Service, May 5, 2003, <http://news.pacificnews.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=84a8df02a7c1f370c5ca152d5ef14d6b>

The evidence -- including abnormal clusters of childhood cancers and deformities in Iraq and also evidently in the areas of Kosovo where, in 1999, the United States used depleted uranium weapons in its air war against the Serbians – points primarily toward DU.

40. Depleted uranium is essentially a dirty bomb substance that results in deformities.

Chalmers Johnson, "Dirty Weapons - Casualties From Iraq War Will Mount," Pacific News Service, May 5, 2003, <http://news.pacificnews.org/news/view_article.html?article_id=84a8df02a7c1f370c5ca152d5ef14d6b>

DU, or uranium-238, is a waste product of power-generating nuclear reactors. It is used in projectiles such as tank shells and cruise missiles because it is 1.7 times denser than lead, burns as it flies and penetrates armor easily. But it breaks up and vaporizes on impact, which makes it potentially deadly. Each shell fired by an American tank includes 10 pounds of DU. Such warheads are essentially "dirty bombs" -- not very radioactive individually, but nonetheless suspected of being capable in quantity of causing serious illnesses and birth defects. In 1991, U.S. forces fired a staggering 944,000 DU rounds in Kuwait and Iraq. The Pentagon admits that it left behind a bare minimum of 320 metric tons of DU on the battlefield. One study of Gulf War veterans showed that their children had a higher possibility of being born with severe deformities, including missing eyes, blood infections, respiratory problems and fused fingers.

41. Scientists consider Pentagon's claims "baloney".

Helen Thomas, "Depleted Uranium Poses Danger," The Record, a product of the Toronto Star & Hearts Newspapers, Pg. A11, December 14, 2004 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

The Pentagon claims that American forces and Iraqis are not at risk from contact with depleted uranium, which is used in armour-piercing munitions and protective tank plating. That's baloney to some scientists who insist the widespread use of depleted uranium during the American-led invasion and occupation of Iraq poses a grave danger.

42. Medical ailments are still plaguing countries where depleted uranium was used more than a decade ago.

John J. Fialka, "Weighing Claims About Depleted Uranium," The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2003 [accessed via Proquest]

For years, soldiers and civilians in several countries have complained of various medical ailments resulting from the use of "DU" in battles from the Gulf War, Bosnia and Kosovo. Now, as the U.S. prepares for a second war in Iraq, where both U.S. tanks and A-10 aircraft would carry DU rounds, DU complaints are growing. In October, Iraqi doctors in southern Iraq showed U.S. congressmen evidence of almost a tenfold increase in birth defects, which they and Iraqi officials ascribe to the spread of radiation and poisons in the environment from DU weapons used 11 years ago.

43. Depleted uranium results in a progressive and incapacitating organ disorder.

Asaf Durakoviæ (Georgetown University), "Undiagnosed Illnesses and Radioactive Warfare," Uranium Medical Research Center, 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/durakovic/undiagnosed.pdf>

In soil samples from Kosovo, hundreds of particles, mostly less than 5 um in size, were found in milligram quantities. Gulf War I in 1991 resulted in 350 metric tons of DU deposited in the environment and 3-6 million grams of DU aerosol released into the atmosphere. Its legacy, Gulf War disease, is a complex, progressive, incapacitating multi organ system disorder. The symptoms include incapacitating fatigue, musculoskeletel and joint pains, headaches, neuropsychiatric disorders, affect changes, confusion, visual problems, changes of gait, loss of memory, lymphadenopathies, respiratory impairment, impotence, and urinary tract orphological and functional alterations.

45. Depleted uranium spreads in the air and is inhaled by innocent humans.

Helen Thomas, "Depleted Uranium Poses Danger," The Record, a product of the Toronto Star & Hearts Newspapers, Pg. A11, December 14, 2004 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

Once a depleted uranium round strikes its target, the projectile begins to burn on impact, creating tiny particles of radioactive U-238. Winds can transport this radioactive dust many miles, potentially contaminating the air that innocent humans breathe. This inhalation may cause lung cancer, kidney damage, cancers of bones and skin, as well as birth defects and chemical poisoning.

46. Depleted uranium maintains radioactivity and results in horrible health impacts.

Helen Thomas, "Depleted Uranium Poses Danger," The Record, a product of the Toronto Star & Hearts Newspapers, Pg. A11, December 14, 2004 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

Depleted uranium maintains radioactivity for billions of years and can concentrate in the food chain, with children and babies more vulnerable to the carcinogenic effects of ingested radiation than adults. Medical reports from Iraq indicate that childhood malignancies are seven times more than they were before the first Gulf war.

47. Depleted Uranium hurts our soldiers.

Daniel Colbert, "A Radioactive Issue," from the Cavalier Daily, University of Virginia, April 21, 2006 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

In addition to damaging civilian populations, depleted uranium may have harmful effects on American soldiers themselves. American soldiers are exposed to depleted uranium by inhaling uranium dust immediately after a strike or through friendly fire incidents. One would think that the military would encourage further research into possible unintended effects of its munitions on its own soldiers, but it has, in fact, thwarted such efforts, insisting in the face overwhelming evidence to the contrary that depleted uranium is harmless.

49. Cancers that don't normally affect children are becoming common.

Doug Westerman, "Depleted Uranium – Far Worse Than 9/11," Centre for Research on Globalization, May 3, 2006, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20060503&articleId=2374>

Children in particular are susceptible to DU poisoning. They have a much higher absorption rate as their blood is being used to build and nourish their bones and they have a lot of soft tissues. Bone cancer and leukemia used to be diseases affecting them the most, however, cancer of the lymph system which can develop anywhere on the body, and has rarely been seen before the age of 12 is now also common.

50. In areas where Depleted uranium use has been measured, there has been a huge increase in cancers.

Tedd Wyman (UMRC Researcher), "UMRC's Preliminary Findings from Afghanistan & Operation Enduring Freedom," Uranium Medical Research Center, January 2003, <http://www.projectcensored.org/publications/2005/4.html>.

NDU is more radioactive than depleted uranium (DU) which itself is charged with causing many cancers and severe birth defects in the Iraqi population–especially children–over the past ten years.

The same source goes on to say that:

The amount of DU used in Iraq is equivalent to 250,000 Nagasaki bombs. At the Uranium Weapons Conference, a demonstration by British-trained oncologist Dr. Jawad Al-Ali showed photographs of the kinds of birth deformities and tumors he had observed at the Saddam Teaching Hospital in Basra just before the 2003 war. Cancer rates had increased dramatically over the previous fifteen years. In 1989 there were 11 abnormalities per 100,000 births; in 2001 there were 116 per 100,000—an increase of over a thousand percent. In 1989 34 people died of cancer; in 2001 there were 603 cancer deaths. The 2003 war has increased these figures exponentially.

51. For children the risk of DU-related cancer is 6 to 8 times worse.

Brice Smith, PhD, and Arjun Makijani, PhD, "Costs and Risks of Depleted Uranium from a Proposed Enrichment Facility," Science and Democratic Action, a publication of the Institute for Energy and Environment Research, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 16, 2005, <http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/13-2.pdf>

For the three uranium iso­topes present in DU, the risk of developing a fatal cancer per unit of intake for a child under five is roughly six to eight times greater than the age-averaged risk currently used by the EPA for dietary and drinking water intake respectively.

52. 67% of babies born by Gulf War veterans have birth defects.

Depleted Uranium: The Trojan Horse of Nuclear War" by Leuren Moret, World Affairs Journal, July, 2004. <http://www.mindfully.org/Nucs/2004/DU-Trojan-Horse1jul04.htm>

Many are reporting reproductive illnesses such as endometriosis. In a U.S. government study, conducted by the Department of Veterans Affairs on post-Gulf War babies, 67% were found to have serious birth defects or serious illnesses. They were born without eyes (anophthalmos), ears, had missing organs, missing legs and arms, fused fingers, thyroid or other organ malformations.

53. DU = horrible birth defects

Doug Westerman, "Depleted Uranium – Far Worse Than 9/11," Centre for Research on Globalization, May 3, 2006, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20060503&articleId=2374>

By far the most devastating effect is on unborn children. Nothing can prepare anyone for the sight of hundreds of preserved fetuses scarcely human in appearance. Iraq is now seeing babies with terribly foreshortened limbs, with their intestines outside their bodies, with huge bulging tumors where their eyes should be, or with a single eye-like Cyclops, or without eyes, or without limbs, and even without heads. Significantly, some of the defects are almost unknown outside textbooks showing the babies born near A-bomb test sites in the Pacific.

54. In Iraq there are grotesque mutilations of babies because of depleted uranium.

Depleted Uranium: The Trojan Horse of Nuclear War" by Leuren Moret, World Affairs Journal, July, 2004. <http://www.mindfully.org/Nucs/2004/DU-Trojan-Horse1jul04.htm>

In Iraq it is even worse where babies are born without brains, organs are outside the body, or women give birth to pieces of flesh. In babies born in Iraq in 2002, the incidence of anophthalmos was 250,000 times greater (20 cases in 4,000 births) than the natural occurrence, one in 50 million births.

55. Developing babies are especially at risk because of their vulnerable nervous systems.

Brice Smith, PhD, and Arjun Makijani, PhD, "Costs and Risks of Depleted Uranium from a Proposed Enrichment Facility," Science and Democratic Action, a publication of the Institute for Energy and Environment Research, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 16, 2005, <http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/13-2.pdf>

The ICRP elaborated further on why the prenatal pe­riod is of particular concern for radiation damage to the nervous system and why it is so important to consider in assessing risks: Development of the central nervous system starts during the first weeks of embryonic development and continues through the early postnatal period. Thus development of the central nervous system occurs over a very long period, during which it is especially vulnerable.

56. Depleted uranium will result in a dramatic overall reduction of IQ.

Brice Smith, PhD, and Arjun Makijani, PhD, "Costs and Risks of Depleted Uranium from a Proposed Enrichment Facility," Science and Democratic Action, a publication of the Institute for Energy and Environment Research, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 16, 2005, <http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/13-2.pdf>

It is important to note that even relatively small changes in average IQ, spread over a large number of children, will "dramati­cally increase the proportion of children below any fixed level of concern, such as an IQ of 80, and decrease the proportion above any ‘gifted' level, such as 120." Thus the effect of neurotoxic agents, even at very low levels, on an exposed population as a whole can end up being quite significant even if the effect on an "average" or "typical" member of that population does not appear so.

57. Depleted uranium is left behind and is accessible to terrorists.

Vince Calder (PhD in physical chemistry from UC-Berkeley), "Depleted uranium poses significant dangers," The Journal Times, September 12, 2003, <http://www.journaltimes.com/articles/2003/09/19/opinion/iq_2452057.txt>.

Every time a shell misses its target and falls onto soft desert sand, or a DU-plated tank or an armored vehicle is abandoned (both occur frequently) DU is left behind on the battlefield for the taking. These armor-piercing shells were used in the first Gulf War, in the Bosnian conflict, and in the present war against Iraq. The bottom line is: DU is readily and globally available at little or no cost to any terrorists wishing to acquire it.

58. Depleted uranium can be used to make dirty weapons, which have disastrous effects.

Vince Calder (PhD in physical chemistry from UC-Berkeley), "Depleted uranium poses significant dangers," The Journal Times, September 12, 2003, <http://www.journaltimes.com/articles/2003/09/19/opinion/iq_2452057.txt>.

The present danger is that depleted uranium can be used to make so-called "dirty" nuclear devices. There is no need to purify or "weaponize" the uranium. As the makers of the atomic bomb realized in 1943, all one has to do is wrap DU in a conventional explosive charge and detonate it. The DU will almost certainly ignite from the heat of the explosion, and its sub-microscopic radioactive smoke particles will be dispersed by wind, rain, and fallout, potentially contaminating vast land areas, lakes, rivers, streams, and water reservoirs.

59. NATO's use of nuclear weapons signals their acceptability to other countries.

Arjun Makhijani, PhD and Brice Smith, PhD, "NATO'S Nuclear Conflict," Science for Democratic Action, from the Institute for Energy and Environment Research, Vol. 12, No. 1, December 2003, <http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/vol_12/sda12-1.pdf>

By expanding the possibilities for nuclear weapons use, NATO states are also signaling to other countries the strategic desirabil­ity of nuclear weapons under a variety of circumstances. As the Lawyers Alliance for World Security asserts, if NATO continues its policy permitting the first use of nu­clear weapons, "it will be increasingly difficult to convince technologically sophisticated and/or politically ambitious states to continue to forswear the nuclear option.

60. Using depleted uranium has set a dangerous precedent.

A. Gsponer, "Depleted-Uranium Weapons: the Whys and Wherefores," Independent Scientific Research Institute report number ISRI-03-03, May 8, 2003, <http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0301059>

It is indisputable that the use of a radioactive material in Iraq and Yugoslavia has created a military and legal precedent. Similarly, it is indisputable that this use has provided a first test of the acceptability of future weapons that would produce a low level of radioactivity

61. Depleted uranium is preparing the way for nuclear weapons on the battlefield.

A. Gsponer, "Depleted-Uranium Weapons: the Whys and Wherefores," Independent Scientific Research Institute report number ISRI-03-03, May 8, 2003, <http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0301059>

It can be argued that besides its military function, the use of depleted uranium in Iraq and Yugoslavia must have served a political purpose: to prepare for the progressive introduction of fourth generation nuclear weapons whose battlefield use will cause a low (but non negligible) residual radioactive environment. It may even be possible to argue that depleted uranium was used in Iraq — and then in Yugoslavia where there was little military reasons for using it —in order to test the opposition of the Western public opinion to the induction of radioactivity on the battlefield, and to get the world population accustomed to the combat use of depleted uranium and fourth generation nuclear weapons.

62. DU causes environmental contamination

a. Link: Water contaminated during NATO bombings

Samir Krilic, AP Writer, "Commission Reports on Effects of Depleted Uranium on Bosnia's Environment," Associated Press, June 2, 2005 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

According to the Bosnian government, some 10,800 of such rounds were fired in Bosnia. Buried in the soil, such ordinance can contaminate ground water.

b. Impact: Leukemia and birth defects from DU contaminated groundwater

Daniel Colbert, "A Radioactive Issue," from the Cavalier Daily, University of Virginia, April 21, 2006 [accessed via Lexis Nexis] Brackets added.

Once a depleted uranium-coated bullet hits its target, the uranium becomes a mist which may be inhaled. What is not inhaled settles onto the ground and enters the groundwater. According to Trindle [professor in chemistry], it then has long-term effects that include heavy metal poisoning and minor radiation risks. On Friday, Northern Arizona released a study showing that depleted uranium may damage DNA. In Iraq, depleted uranium deposits have already had effects on the population, including a 600 percent increase in both leukemia rates in children and birth defect rates.

SOLVENCY

1. The precautionary principle should preside in matters of health.

Piotr Bein, PhD, "Uranium Weapons Cover-ups in Our Midst," from the World Uranium Weapons Conference at Hamburg, October 16-19, 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/bein/hamburg.htm>.

From the precautionary principle of environmental and health sciences, uncertain but potentially harmful effects should be prevented. Even if there were "no proofs" of a link from DU to illness and death, it behooved the decision makers to discontinue the use of any uranium weapons out of the precautionary principle, given Gulf veteran complaints and scientific uncertainty. Scientific assessment of the effects of uranium metals follows a standard risk analysis chain. Military and contracted "scientists" manipulate every step of the analysis. To criticisms, pseudo-science replies, "No evidence exists". Sufficient evidence does exist, and if not, the precautionary principle should govern. Bein and Parker [2003] present numerous serious flaws in official reports, and further examples of manipulation of science.

2. Dealing with depleted uranium should be high on the priority list.

Asaf Durakoviæ (Georgetown University), "Undiagnosed Illnesses and Radioactive Warfare," Uranium Medical Research Center, 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/durakovic/undiagnosed.pdf>

This growing body of evidence undoubtedly puts the problem of prevention and solution of the DU contamination high on the priority list.

3. The serious health risks of depleted uranium merit banning it.

Brice Smith, PhD, and Arjun Makijani, PhD, "Costs and Risks of Depleted Uranium from a Proposed Enrichment Facility," Science and Democratic Action, a publication of the Institute for Energy and Environment Research, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 16, 2005, <http://www.ieer.org/sdafiles/13-2.pdf>

The pattern of health risks of depleted uranium that is emerging begs caution in managing and disposing of DU. Recent research on the health effects of DU, much of it performed at the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, indi­cates that depleted uranium may be mutagenic, tumorigenic, teratogenic, cyto­toxic, and neurotoxic. That is, it may cause or contribute to genetic mutations, tumors, birth defects, cellular level toxicity, and neurological damage. Uranium may also damage developing bones and cross the placenta and harm the embryo/fetus. The new research indicates that in addition to its impact on the skel­eton, on reproductive success, and on cancer induction and/or promo­tion, uranium may also be function­ing analogous to a kind of radioac­tive lead in relation to its neurologi­cal impacts.

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSE  
  
1. DU weapons are not better or cheaper than alternative options.

Piotr Bein, PhD, "Uranium Weapons Cover-ups in Our Midst," from the World Uranium Weapons Conference at Hamburg, October 16-19, 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/bein/hamburg.htm>.

The US and UK governments claim they deploy DU ammunition because it costs less than tungsten, has an advantage over enemy armour, reduces own casualties and utilizes industrial waste. The claims are not justified. The additional expense on tungsten is negligible both relative to the military value of a destroyed target, and in the total military spending. This is a socially irresponsible reasoning, as it ignores the health costs and clean-up costs over the life-cycle of uranium weapons. Recent announcements about development of tungsten substitutes of DU tank ammunition undermine the claim. The DU weapon systems are not better or cheaper than alternatives. Military applications of DU do not utilize significant quantities of nuclear waste, either.

TAMING THE BEAR: The Case for Eastern European Withdrawal

By Rachel Marie Blum

Since the Cold War ended in 1991 a large majority of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe has joined the traditionally Western alliance, NATO. Many countries - but not Russia. As Russia's neighbors – the Baltic states, the Balkans, and former members or allies of the Soviet Union join NATO, two things are happening, and neither of them are good. The first is that Russia feels antagonized and is on the edge of belligerency. The second is that the NATO alliance itself is losing functionality. It is because we the Affirmative team believe that Russia is a better ally than enemy and because we believe that an alliance like NATO should be functional that we stand

Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

Before we dive into the geopolitical tensions surrounding the alliance, we're first going to

DEFINE

**NATO:** [as the] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, begun in 1949 as a military and political alliance of European nations and the United States and Canada designed to protect Western Europe from a Soviet attack. – from Encyclopedia Britannica. (Encyclopedia of the Cold War, Thomas S. Arms; The Cold War, 1945-1991, Benjamin Frankel, editor; The Cold War: A History, Martin Walker; Cold War Chronology, Soviet-American Relations 1945-1991, Kenneth L. Hill; Encyclopedia Britannica. <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/kbank/glossary/nz.index.html>)

**Significant** "important in effect or meaning." (*Wordnet 2.1 (Published by Princeton University****),*** March 2005

**Reform** "To change or improve." (The Glossary of Judicial and Historical Terms (Published by Old Bailey Online Project), 2003, <http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/history/glossary.html>)

Because many of the countries we'll be talking about in this case are classified as Baltic States or Balkans, we'll also be defining these terms.

**Baltic States:** "Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, on the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea. Formerly Russian provinces, they became independent countries after World War I and were incorporated into the USSR as constituent republics in 1940. They became independent again in 1991."*(The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition, 2000.)*

**Balkans:** *"*the countries in the Balkan Peninsula: Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, and the European part of Turkey." *(Earlham University Glossary, David Chkonia, Steve Forrest, and Aldo Pena Moses, "Glossary," Earlham University, 1996,* <http://www.earlham.edu/~pols/globalprobs/bosnia/glossary.html> )

Next, we're going to examine the current situation in

INHERENCY: NATO is committed to a dangerous expansion policy that threatens Russia

1. NATO expansion is creeping into Russia's backyard.

Justin Logan (Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute) and Ted Galen Carpenter (Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute), "NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear," by the Cato Institute, January 25, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5421>

Over the past several months, NATO has steadily crept into Russia's backyard, romancing the former Soviet republics of Ukraine and Georgia with the prospect of membership in the alliance, and even hinting that NATO may attempt to intervene in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Unfortunately, it seems that poking the Russian bear is back in vogue.

2. NATO added 7 new members in 2004.

Alexander Konovalov (president, Russian Institute of Strategic Assessments, "New Wave of NATO Expansion: How Will it Affect Partnership with Russia?" Center for Defense Information, Russia Weekly (RIA Novosti), March 30, 2004, No. 10, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/300-10.cfm>

On Friday, April 2, without waiting for an Istanbul summit and without much pomp, the alliance will be joined by another seven members - Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia and Slovenia. The procedure for NATO membership is becoming routine.

**3. Russia views this enlargement as a zero-sum game.**

*Harri Tiido (Estonian Ambassador to NATO), "The Pragmatic Relationship of Russia and NATO," BBC Monitoring International Reports, May 27, 2006 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]*

Russia still views NATO's enlargement as a "zero-sum game," that is, all events are linked to the rise or fall of Russia's status.

Now that we've seen that NATO is expanding and antagonizing Russia, let's examine the problems that arise from these two actions in the

HARMS

1. New NATO members reduce the functionality of the alliance

a. Why: because the 7 members just mentioned are being allowed under lower criteria.

Alexander Konovalov (president, Russian Institute of Strategic Assessments, "New Wave of NATO Expansion: How Will it Affect Partnership with Russia?" Center for Defense Information, Russia Weekly (RIA Novosti), March 30, 2004, No. 10, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/300-10.cfm>

NATO's Prague summit in 2002 showed that all seven new members are being admitted under lowered "criteria", even compared with the ones that applied to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The armies of practically all the new members are unable, in terms of equipment and preparation for joint action, to cooperate with the armed forces of the US and its "old" European allies.

b. Impact 1: this expansion is weakening NATO.

Alexander Konovalov (president, Russian Institute of Strategic Assessments, "New Wave of NATO Expansion: How Will it Affect Partnership with Russia?" Center for Defense Information, Russia Weekly (RIA Novosti), March 30, 2004, No. 10, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/300-10.cfm>

An opinion exists that NATO is increasingly being transformed into a "club of friendly European democracies" and is no longer the disciplined alliance with a clearly defined military mission that it once was. So there are no grounds for worrying about the admission of new countries to its membership. On the contrary, this is rather an indicator of the alliance's weakening military significance.

c. Impact 2: NATO in the Baltics is highly vulnerable to Russian aggression.

Yuri E. Federov (Professor of Moscow State of Institute of International Relations of the Russian Foreign Ministry), "The Ratification of the Agreement on Adaption of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe: A Long Overdue Necessity," PIR Center for Public Policy Studies in Russia, published in Yaderny (Nuclear) Control, No. 4, Vol. 10, Winter 2004, <http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/ykd34-2004.pdf>

Moreover, the acceptance of the Baltic States into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization complicates the status of that organization in a military sense—operations have to be planned in a theater which is separated from the main ground forces of the Alliance, and highly vulnerable, given a hypothetical armed conflict with Russia. Another aspect of the problem is connected with the possibility of a deployment of foreign troops in the southern part of the Baltics. This is the only event, in essence, which could affect the interests of Russia's military security.

2. Loss of Russian cooperation on terror

a. Why: NATO expansion antagonizes Russia and will keep them from acting as our ally

Justin Logan (Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute) and Ted Galen Carpenter (Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute), "NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear," by the Cato Institute, January 25, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5421>

We don't need to treat Russia with kid gloves, but reasonable caution and consideration is in order. Russia has a sound right to wonder about NATO's motives: Whom, exactly, would Georgia, Ukraine, and other potential member-states be allying militarily with NATO against? The West can continue to press forward with NATO expansion indefinitely, antagonizing Russia and entering into security guarantees with countries on its border. But that course is unreasonable if we expect Russia's cooperation on nuclear proliferation, terrorism, or other issues vitally important to America. If the United States values those goals, let alone long-term peace with Russia, it needs to engage Moscow, not unnecessarily antagonize it.

b. Impact: A weak relationship with Russia increases risks of terrorism and WMD.

Paul J. Saunders, "The U.S. and Russia After Iraq," Hoover Institution's Policy Review, June 2003, <http://www.policyreview.org/jun03/saunders.html>

A weak relationship with Russia could embolden "rogue states" hostile to the United States, return the United Nations Security Council to its Cold War uselessness, and expose Americans to additional danger from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

3. NATO expansion causes political and financial problems in former Soviet countries

Dr. Steven E. Meyer (Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: The Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, the U.S. Army War College Quarterly, 2003-4.

Enlargement puts the Central and East European members in an unnecessary and rapidly debilitating political and financial position. In particular, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are becoming increasingly enmeshed in a conflict of loyalty between NATO and the European Union. Despite the propaganda that NATO and the EU are two legitimate, complementary avenues of development, in fact they are becoming increasingly competitive—for attention, loyalty, and resources. Although this problem is gaining momentum in Western Europe, it is becoming especially acute in Central and Eastern Europe, where the resource base is considerably smaller and political affiliations more fragile.

With these potentially serious problems confronting our world, it's time for action. This is why we present the following

PLAN

Plank 1 Agency: The governments of the 26 NATO member states and the North Atlantic Council.

Plank 2 Mandates:

Mandate 1: In keeping with Article 10 of the NATO Treaty's requirement that only states that contribute to NATO's security may join, NATO shall cease consideration of Georgia and Ukraine as members.

Mandate 2: In keeping with Article 13 of the NATO Treaty, the 7 states that joined NATO in 2004 shall submit their notices of Denunciation and complete the process of removing themselves from NATO 1 year from now. During the 6 month phase out period, these nations shall be given any necessary training and preparation for their military forces to defend themselves independently of NATO.

Mandate 3: Russia shall be informed of future NATO operations in the Balkans and Baltics and shall be invited to take part.

Mandate 4: NATO shall establish a rule that no new Balkan nor Baltic states nor any nation that borders Russia shall be added to NATO in the future, and that no new nation shall be added to NATO without the signed written agreement of the President of Russia.

Plank 3 Enforcement: Any government official not in compliance with these mandates shall be immediately removed from office.

Plank 4 Mandates 1, 3 and 4 take place 3 days after an Affirmative ballot. Mandate 2 is phased in over 1 year.

Plank 5 Funding comes from the normal military operating budgets of NATO member countries. No increase in funding is needed.

Plank 6 All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

This plan will increase the vital relationships between the US and other NATO countries and Russia, as we see in the major cumulative

ADVANTAGE to our plan.

Advantage: Stronger relationship with Russia

a. Legitimizing the relationship with Russia contributes to security.

Alexander Konovalov (president, Russian Institute of Strategic Assessments, "New Wave of NATO Expansion: How Will it Affect Partnership with Russia?" Center for Defense Information, Russia Weekly (RIA Novosti), March 30, 2004, No. 10, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/300-10.cfm>

The deep interest of Russia and NATO in a genuine partnership going beyond the framework of hackneyed declarations is determined by many real factors. The alliance's enlargement changes nothing here in principle. But the key to achieving a serious partnership is taking account of Russia's legitimate security interests, and the best way of convincing Russia that it need not worry about the alliance's expansion would be to "draw" it into the construction of a new security system.

And as we will see, this gives us two huge impacts.

b. Impact 1: Strong ally on terror

Paul J. Saunders, "The U.S. and Russia After Iraq," Hoover Institution's Policy Review, June 2003, <http://www.policyreview.org/jun03/saunders.html>

Russia could be an important U.S. partner in undertaking particular counter-terrorist operations. Unlike some of America's "old Europe" allies, Russian officials are not squeamish about military action. In many cases, Moscow will probably understand U.S. efforts to disrupt the operations of terrorist groups targeting American citizens and might even provide assistance under certain circumstances. The Kremlin has already essentially accepted the U.S. need to detain and interrogate al Qaeda terrorists; again in contrast to some West European governments, Moscow has been largely quiet about Guantanamo Bay.

c. Impact 2: Increased cooperation on nonproliferation

Paul J. Saunders, "The U.S. and Russia After Iraq," Hoover Institution's Policy Review, June 2003, <http://www.policyreview.org/jun03/saunders.html>

Meaningful collaboration with Russia to combat proliferation could substantially ease American efforts to keep weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of hostile states and groups. This goes far beyond securing Russia's "loose nukes" (and "loose brains"); many so-called rogue states and other would-be proliferators are former Soviet client states where Russia has experience, established contacts, unique sources of information, and political leverage. Effective U.S.-Russian cooperation in this area also denies hostile governments the option of working with or seeking protection from a disaffected Kremlin.

Judge, in conclusion, we've seen that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's expansion to include countries that aren't even part of the North Atlantic region is harming relations with Russia, and that this expansion is not even the answer for improvements in NATO or these countries themselves. In short, it's time to quit prodding the Russia bear and make them our friend instead of our enemy.

2A EVIDENCE: EASTERN EUROPE WITHDRAWAL

INHERENCY

1. Russia has not been consulted or informed about previous Balkan operations.

Dr. Marcel de Haas, "N.A.T.O. – Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities," The Power and Interest Institute, May 29, 2006, <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=498&language_id=1>

NATO's involvement in the former Yugoslavia, with the air attacks on Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 and the air campaign on Kosovo in 1999, in particular. Russia was neither consulted nor informed about these operations prior to their start.

2. Russia puts its interests foremost in issues of NATO cooperation.

News from Russia, "Russia to up Cooperation with NATO if Alliance Meets Moscow's Interests," published in a Weekly Bulletin by the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of India, June 22, 2005, <http://www.india.mid.ru/nfr2005/nf14.html>

Russia will up its cooperation with NATO only if it is in it's interests, a spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry said

3. NATO has protected the Baltic States since 2004.

Dr. Marcel de Haas, "N.A.T.O. – Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities," The Power and Interest Institute, May 29, 2006, <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=498&language_id=1>

N.A.T.O.'s air protection above the Baltic States. Since Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became members of the alliance in 2004, N.A.T.O. has provided aircraft to protect their airspace from violations, corresponding to military assistance provisions of the N.A.T.O. treaty.

4. Ukraine and Georgia are former Soviet Republics.

Dr. Marcel de Haas, "N.A.T.O. – Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities," The Power and Interest Institute, May 29, 2006, <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=498&language_id=1>

The possibility of N.A.T.O. membership for Ukraine and Georgia. This would again add former Soviet republics to N.A.T.O. Ukraine has a large Russian (oriented) population. More importantly, both states provide vital geostrategic and geoeconomic interests, for instance with regard to the Crimea and oil pipelines in the Southern Caucasus.

5. NATO is involved in countries that have traditionally been Russian interests.

Justin Logan (Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute) and Ted Galen Carpenter (Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute), "NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear," by the Cato Institute, January 25, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5421>

Advocates of continued NATO expansion express inexplicable surprise when Russia protests. By taking in the Baltic republics as members, NATO is already deeply involved in countries that have historically been well within Russia's sphere of influence. The alliance seems poised to intrude further, and the Russian bear is beginning to growl. Nikolai Bordyuzha, spokesman for the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, has made Russia's views plain enough, warning that NATO bases surrounding Russia would constitute "a potential threat to Russia's security."

6. No threat exists that justifies NATO expansion or that wouldn't be better addressed in an alliance with Russia.

Alexander Konovalov (president, Russian Institute of Strategic Assessments, "New Wave of NATO Expansion: How Will it Affect Partnership with Russia?" Center for Defense Information, Russia Weekly (RIA Novosti), March 30, 2004, No. 10, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/300-10.cfm>

But what terrorist threat requires the deployment of NATO infrastructure in Poland and the Baltic countries? And if such a threat really exists, why not stand up to it together with Russia? If NATO is really scared stiff by Baltic airspace security, there could be joint patrols with Russian air force planes. And facilities where NATO infrastructure is expected to be deployed in Poland and the Baltic countries could be monitored by Russian groups on a regular basis. It is often repeated that Russia and NATO are partners, not enemies. Why, then, is it necessary to ignore so demonstrably the well-argued Russian case?

7. Europe has no pressing security threats.

Alexander Konovalov (president, Russian Institute of Strategic Assessments, "New Wave of NATO Expansion: How Will it Affect Partnership with Russia?" Center for Defense Information, Russia Weekly (RIA Novosti), March 30, 2004, No. 10, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/300-10.cfm>

One can hardly give a sensible answer today as to why Europe now needs the 20,000 or even 17,000 tanks or 6,000 warplanes permitted within the treaty's limits. Why not cut these numbers by half? No one is going to wage a large-scale war in Europe either now or for the foreseeable future. NATO is planning a rapid deployment force, and the European Union is entertaining similar plans. Russia could well participate in these plans by agreeing the structure and methods of using such forces and developing the weapons required to equip them with other countries. But all this is realistic only if Russia is really considered an essential and important partner in the fight against common threats.

8. The west is encircling Russia.

Alexander Konovalov (president, Russian Institute of Strategic Assessments, "New Wave of NATO Expansion: How Will it Affect Partnership with Russia?" Center for Defense Information, Russia Weekly (RIA Novosti), March 30, 2004, No. 10, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/300-10.cfm>

From the perspective of traditional strategy, the situation in Europe is radically altering for Russia. In the west, the alliance is "pushing" Russia rudely away from the Baltic coast. The Kaliningrad region is encircled by NATO, with access to it blocked by two alliance members - Poland and Lithuania. In the south, when two newcomers, Romania and Bulgaria, join veteran NATO member Turkey, Russia will be fenced in on the Black Sea coast.

9. Unlimited enlargement could continue indefinitely.

Rebecca R. Moore, Ph.D. (Professor of Political Science at Concordia College), "Europe ‘Whole and Free': NATO's Political Mission for the 21st Century," NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship Final Report, June 2003, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/moore.pdf>

A related question concerns the point at which Europe becomes "whole and free." Assuming that NATO remains a European alliance, where does Europe end? Should all states that demonstrate a commitment to democratic values and practices be eligible for membership? NATO has said that its door is open to all states that are "in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and contribute to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area." Yet, concerns persist regarding the notion of unlimited enlargement.

HARMS

1. Suspicion between Russia and NATO is rooted in possibility of a major conflict and complicates more important issues.

Yuri E. Federov (Professor of Moscow State of Institute of International Relations of the Russian Foreign Ministry), "The Ratification of the Agreement on Adaption of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe: A Long Overdue Necessity," PIR Center for Public Policy Studies in Russia, published in Yaderny (Nuclear) Control, No. 4, Vol. 10, Winter 2004, <http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/ykd34-2004.pdf>

Nevertheless, mutual suspicion between Russia and NATO countries has not yet been fully overcome, and military planning is still rooted in the possibility of a major confrontation between the two. This complicates their relations, and diverts intellectual and material resources from confronting truly pressing threats, primarily the fight against international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

2. Russia has drawn a warning line for NATO pertaining to the Baltic states.

John Feffer, "Containment Lite: U.S. Policy Toward Russia and its Neighbors," the International Relations Center Special Report, March 31, 2003, <http://www.fpif.org/papers/russia/recommend_body.html>

NATO remains a key sticking point in U.S.-Russian relations at the moment. Particularly destabilizing from Moscow's viewpoint is NATO's interest in preparing the Baltic states for admission as well as efforts to absorb Ukraine into the alliance. Russia has drawn its version of a line in the sand—a "red line"—which it warns NATO not to cross or risk "destruction of the existing world order." Given Russia's consistent opposition as well as the sheer number of actual and potential crises on Russia's border, the U.S. must consider whether admission to NATO will render the petitioning states more secure or less secure.

3. Russia has historically postponed cooperation with NATO over interference in the Balkans.

Dr. Marcel de Haas, "N.A.T.O. – Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities," The Power and Interest Institute, May 29, 2006, <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=498&language_id=1>

The relationship between N.A.T.O. and Russia is one of ups and downs. Structural cooperation started in 1997 with the Founding Act providing frequent consultations on a number of security issues. As a result of N.A.T.O.'s air attack on Kosovo in 1999, however, Russia postponed all cooperation with N.A.T.O.

4. NATO enlargement annoys Russia.

Dr. Marcel de Haas, "N.A.T.O. – Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities," The Power and Interest Institute, May 29, 2006, <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=498&language_id=1>

Along with conceptual and organizational changes in the 1990s, N.A.T.O. has conducted operations outside of its territory and enlarged its membership. A number of these developments have specifically annoyed Russia

5. Russia is disappointed by and skeptical of NATO.

Dr. Marcel de Haas, "N.A.T.O. – Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities," The Power and Interest Institute, May 29, 2006, <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=498&language_id=1>

Facing N.A.T.O., Russia feels a number of disappointments. For instance, Russia has no influence in N.A.T.O.'s decision-making process on the use of military force. Russia does not have access to the North Atlantic Council -- N.A.T.O.'s primary organ -- and, therefore, has no "veto right" to prevent certain decisions. Participation in decision-making is only offered in so-called "soft security" issues. In addition to this, Russia and N.A.T.O. have different views on the fight against terrorism, for instance pertaining to Russia's actions in Chechnya and the contrasting way both sides consider the Palestinian organization Hamas. Moreover, Russia is still skeptical regarding the intentions of the alliance.

6. Russia's aversion to NATO is well documented.

Dr. Marcel de Haas, "N.A.T.O. – Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities," The Power and Interest Institute, May 29, 2006, <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=498&language_id=1>

Russian feelings of aversion toward N.A.T.O. are expressed in stances in Russia's primary security documents.

7. NATO enlargement requires Russia to increase military spending.

Russian News and Information Agency, "NATO in Ukraine, Georgia to reorient Russia military potentials," April 27, 2006, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060427/46977984.html>.

NATO enlargement and the accession of Ukraine and Georgia to the bloc is a sensitive issue for Russia, which will need to spend considerable sums to reorient its military capabilities, the Foreign Ministry said Thursday. Georgia and Ukraine are now seeking membership in NATO, arousing concerns in Moscow that the alliance will expand its influence in Russia's backyard and further straining relations with the former Soviet republics since "color revolutions" brought Western-leaning governments to power there.

8. NATO enlargement is a sensitive issue to Russia and could influence arms control agreements.

Russian News and Information Agency, "NATO in Ukraine, Georgia to reorient Russia military potentials," April 27, 2006, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060427/46977984.html>.

NATO's further enlargement agenda affects our relations," ministry spokesman Mikhail Kamynin said. "For us, it is an extremely sensitive issue, particularly in relation to Ukraine and Georgia." Kamynin said that the alliance's plans would be a dramatic military and political shift affecting Russia's interests and causing it to reorganize its military industrial ties. "It could influence arms control agreements," the diplomat said.

9. Russia believes NATO expansion is infringing on Russian territorial claims.

Dmitry Mindich and Vladimir Rudakov, "Our Best Enemy," Russian Defense and Security, No. 52, May 17, 2006 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

Relations between Russia and NATO have entered another chill phase. At the Russia-NATO Council meeting last week, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that further cooperation with NATO depends directly on "where the process of NATO transformation and expansion goes, how the principles of international law are observed, and how Russia's interests are taken into account in the context of the changing geopolitical situation." To put it simply, cooperation depends on whether Georgia and Ukraine are accepted as NATO members. Moscow's harsh reaction to the possible appearance of NATO near the borders of the Smolensk region was quite predictable. The threat of Ukraine joining NATO was one of the reasons due to which the Kremlin played an active role in the presidential election in Ukraine 18 months ago. It is possible also to say that the current military doctrine of Russia adopted in 2002 and listing the main threats to security mentions "territorial claims against the Russian Federation" and "broadening of blocs and alliances at expense of security of the Russian Federation," which means that it contains direct hints at the "aggressive bloc."

10. Russia views expansion as hostile.

Dmitry Mindich and Vladimir Rudakov, "Our Best Enemy," Russian Defense and Security, No. 52, May 17, 2006 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

Many people in the Kremlin among the decision-makes are sincerely convinced that the West plans to transform Russia into a raw materials appendix semi-deprived of rights and is trying to establish control over Russian natural resources.

11. NATO enlargement won't encourage democracy.

Prof. Rebecca R. Moore, Ph.D. (Political Science at Concordia College), "Europe ‘Whole and Free': NATO's Political Mission for the 21st Century," NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship Final Report, June 2003, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/moore.pdf>

In at least one respect, the argument in favor of enlargement appeared a bit circuitous. The Clinton administration consistently argued that admitting new members would project stability to the east by allowing fledgling democracies to consolidate internal reforms, which in turn would serve to enlarge the zone of peace in Europe. Yet, prospective members were required to make democratic reforms prior to being admitted.

12. NATO isn't the proper tool for Balkan/Baltic European assimilation.

Rebecca R. Moore, Ph.D. (Professor of Political Science at Concordia College), "Europe ‘Whole and Free': NATO's Political Mission for the 21st Century," NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship Final Report, June 2003, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/moore.pdf>

Those prospective members who have committed themselves to making the reforms necessary to join NATO have tended to characterize membership in both NATO and the EU as part of their "return to Europe." Returning to Europe means rejoining a community rooted in a shared history, common culture and shared values, which preceded and outlived the Cold War. Does NATO have the capacity to enlarge *this* community or influence how those states not traditionally considered part of the West define their interests? In other words, are there essentially cultural and historical limits to the zone of peace NATO seeks to construct?

13. The Russia-US relationship is as bad as it's been since the Cold War.

James M. Goldgeier, interviewee (Adjunct Senior Fellow for Europe Studies) and Bernard Gwertzman, interviewer (Consulting Editor), "Coldgeier: U.S.-Russia Relations at Lowest Point Since Cold War's End," Council on Foreign Relations, July 6, 2006, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11060/goldgeier.html>

The relationship between the United States and Russia "is as poor as it has been since the end of the Cold War." Noting that five years ago, President Bush praised Russian President Vladimir Putin as someone he saw as a soul mate, Goldgeier says "today there is a sense of concern in the White House about who they are dealing with. " The combination of Putin's political crackdown, his support for the fraudulent candidate in Ukraine's elections, and the arrest of leading figures like industrialist Mikhail Khodorkovsky, have all contributed to the negative feelings, he says.

14. Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO is a problem for Russia.

James M. Goldgeier, interviewee (Adjunct Senior Fellow for Europe Studies) and Bernard Gwertzman, interviewer (Consulting Editor), "Coldgeier: U.S.-Russia Relations at Lowest Point Since Cold War's End," Council on Foreign Relations, July 6, 2006, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11060/goldgeier.html>

*Is NATO still a big problem for Russia, the fact that so many of its former clients have joined or want to join?* Well, it still grates on the elite as a sense of what Russia has lost. I think even more so than what has happened to date is the question of whether Ukraine and Georgia will in fact seriously pursue NATO membership and whether NATO will seriously pursue Ukraine and Georgia as NATO members. There is no question that Russia would be extremely unhappy to see Ukraine and Georgia join NATO.

15. NATO-Russia relations have cooled recently because of Baltic and Balkan accession to NATO.

Baltic News Service, "NATO-Russia Relations Effective – Head of Alliance Expands," April 21, 2005 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

NATO-Russia relations have not been very warm recently. Despite Moscow's good relations with some of the Alliance's capitals, especially Paris, Berlin and Rome, Kremlin is still discontent over the recent wave of NATO enlargement, following which, in Moscow's opinion, the Alliance stepped into its sphere of interests -- Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Furthermore, Kremlin is concerned about NATO integration plans of Ukraine and Georgia.

16. NATO expansion alarms Russia for good cause.

Justin Logan (Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute) and Ted Galen Carpenter (Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute), "NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear," by the Cato Institute, January 25, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5421>

Russia -- like any other country -- tends to get alarmed when the world's sole superpower extends security guarantees and military cooperation to countries on its borders. As NATO continues to expand, the United States has been hailing, and in some cases directly supporting, "color revolutions" that have caused instability and chaos in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan. This is a dangerous mix from Moscow's perspective.

17. The relationship between Russia and the West has substantially weakened over the last few years.

Stephen Sestanovich (George F. Kennan Senior Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies), "Testimony to Committee on Foreign Relations to the U.S. Senate," Council on Foreign Relations, June 29, 2006, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11019/testimony_to_committee_on_foreign_relations_us_senate.html>

But something does appear to have gone wrong with the widely-shared expectation of a few years back, that Russia was rejoining the West. Its internal evolution, its foreign policy, and the outlook of its leaders were thought to be creating the basis for a stronger partnership with the United States and the world's leading democratic states. How differently things have turned out is suggested by the very title of Dmitri Trenin's article in the current issue of *Foreign Affairs*: "Russia Leaves the West."

18. Ukraine admission to NATO will cause a crisis with Russia.

Anthony Browne and Jeremy Page (Foreign Correspondents), "Ukraine Bid to Join NATO Threatens Wider Rift with Russia," The London Times, pg. 34, February 23, 2005 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

COLD WAR tensions threatened to flare anew yesterday after Ukraine, once the heart of the Soviet industrial-military complex, declared its intention to join Nato and won the blessing of the United States. Ukraine's admission would bring Russia's Black Sea naval base and much of the former Soviet armaments industry into the embrace of the American-led military alliance, and expand Nato to Russia's southwestern border.

19. Russia feels ignored and has difficulty accepting NATO expansion.

Dr. Marcel de Haas, "N.A.T.O. – Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities," The Power and Interest Institute, May 29, 2006, <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=498&language_id=1>

Russia was not informed prior to most of these decisions and feels ignored as a major power in Europe and even more as a former superpower. Furthermore, considering its traditional security perceptions -- pointing at encirclement by its enemies and an insatiable desire for security, demanding buffer zones such as the former Warsaw Pact satellites -- Russia has difficulty in understanding and accepting N.A.T.O.'s move eastward and conducting operations close to Russia's borders. The result of this is two-fold: disappointment and aversion.

20. NATO enlargement jeopardizes Russia's involvement in strategic issues.

John Steinberg (Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution), Philip Gordon (Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies), "NATO Enlargement: Moving Forward," The Brookings Institution Policy Brief, December 2001, <http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb90.pdf>

NATO enlargement should be put off or stopped altogether, particularly because Russian cooperation in the war on terrorism is now so crucial.

21. America's chance of meeting global challenges reduces as friction between Russia and America increases.

Stephen Sestanovich (George F. Kennan Senior Fellow for Russian and Eurasian Studies), "Testimony to Committee on Foreign Relations to the U.S. Senate," Council on Foreign Relations, June 29, 2006, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11019/testimony_to_committee_on_foreign_relations_us_senate.html>

We should recognize that accumulated frictions between Russia and the United States can over time have consequences that go well beyond a downturn in bilateral relations. They raise the prospect of a broader weakening of unity among the leading states of the international system. If growing consensus among the major powers gives way to a new line of division between democrats and authoritarians, if their energy strategies diverge, or if they respond in different ways to terrorism, America's chances of success in meeting global challenges will be reduced.

**22. NATO expansion is counter productive.**

Alexander Konovalov (president, Russian Institute of Strategic Assessments, "New Wave of NATO Expansion: How Will it Affect Partnership with Russia?" Center for Defense Information, Russia Weekly (RIA Novosti), March 30, 2004, No. 10, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/300-10.cfm>

All these changes suggest that the United States is supporting NATO expansion, which is counter-productive in terms of military efficiency, merely to strengthen its political positions in Europe.

23. Baltic became a threat to Russia by joining NATO.

Alexander Konovalov (president, Russian Institute of Strategic Assessments, "New Wave of NATO Expansion: How Will it Affect Partnership with Russia?" Center for Defense Information, Russia Weekly (RIA Novosti), March 30, 2004, No. 10, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/300-10.cfm>

Before the new seven members joined NATO, what could Russia fear from the small states with token armed forces? Nor, incidentally, did Russia take any steps to be seen as threatening, say, from the viewpoint of the Baltic states' security interests. The situation will look entirely different following their accession.

24. Former members of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet republic joining NATO annoys Russia.

Alexander Konovalov (president, Russian Institute of Strategic Assessments, "New Wave of NATO Expansion: How Will it Affect Partnership with Russia?" Center for Defense Information, Russia Weekly (RIA Novosti), March 30, 2004, No. 10, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/300-10.cfm>

The procedure for NATO membership is becoming routine. It may be assumed that it will not evoke a resentful political reaction from Moscow, although the new wave has some distinctive features that may influence both the domestic political situation in Russia and its relations with the West far more markedly than when Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined the alliance. To begin with, one should not discount the psychological shock for many Russians that not only states from the defunct Warsaw Pact, but also former Soviet republics, have become NATO members.

ADVANTAGES

1. Russia-NATO collaboration will contribute to predictability and stability.

Russian News and Information Agency, "NATO in Ukraine, Georgia to reorient Russia military potentials," April 27, 2006, <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20060427/46977984.html> (ellipses in original)

Russia is not a NATO member but we closely follow debates about its future," he said. "We are convinced that the alliance's reorientation from territorial defense (against the East) to real... security challenges in accordance with international law will definitely contribute to predictability and stability," Kamynin said.

2. A strong relationship with Russia can sustain vital American interests.

Paul J. Saunders, "The U.S. and Russia After Iraq," Hoover Institution's Policy Review, June 2003, <http://www.policyreview.org/jun03/saunders.html>

A strong and sustainable relationship with Moscow can serve important and even vital American interests in many other areas, ranging from the war on terrorism to non-proliferation and international trade and investment.

3. Equipping the Baltic/Balkan States to take care of themselves would be less antagonistic towards Russia.

Dr. Marcel de Haas, 29 May 2006, ''N.A.T.O.-Russia Cooperation: Political Problems Versus Military Opportunities," POWER AND INTEREST NEWS REPORT,  
[www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view\_printable&report\_id=498&language\_id=1](http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_printable&report_id=498&language_id=1)   
  
From N.A.T.O.'s side, by ignoring Russia in its Balkan operations, N.A.T.O. should have expected a negative response from Russia. This also applies to the continuing N.A.T.O. operation of providing air protection to the Baltic States. It would have been better to train and equip these states to perform this task themselves, which would have been less offensive toward neighboring Russia.

4. European countries can stand on their own by rebalancing the transatlantic relationship

David P. Calleo (Professor at John Hopkins and Professor & Director of European Studies at Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies), "Transatlantic Folly: NATO vs. the EU," World Policy Journal, Volume XX, No. 3, Fall 2003, <http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj03-3/calleo.pdf>

To survive the Soviet collapse, the whole transatlantic relationship must be rebalanced. That means that Europe, deprived of its Soviet crutch, must itself become a much more complete power—able to stand on its own.

PUT ON THE BRAKES: THE CASE FOR SABATOGING THE ESDP

By Matthew Baker

Hubert Vedrine, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, famously declared in 1998 that "France cannot accept a politically unipolar world or the unilateralism of a single hyperpower." All that's well and good unless… you happen to be the hyperpower. As a result my partner and I stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

**OBSERVATION I: DEFINITIONS**

NATO "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." (*North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" http://www.nato.int/home.htm#)*

**Significant** "important in effect or meaning." (*Wordnet 2.1 (Published by Princeton University****),*** March 2005

**Reform** "To change or improve." (The Glossary of Judicial and Historical Terms (Published by Old Bailey Online Project), 2003, <http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/history/glossary.html> )

**ESDP** European Security and Defense Policy

**CFSP** Common Foreign Security Policy

OBSERVATION II: INHERENCY

A. The European Union is developing defense capabilities outside of NATO

Kristin Archick (Specialist in European Affairs), "The European Union in 2006 and Beyond," Congressional Research Service, April 6, 2006, <http://vienna.usembassy.gov/en/download/pdf/european_union.pdf>

Since 1999, the EU has sought to develop a defense identity outside of NATO to provide a military backbone for CFSP and to give itself more options for dealing with international crises.

B. The ESDP is becoming involved all over the world

Office of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, "Prospects for the European Union in 2006," January 27, 2006, <http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/FCO_BEU_PDF_EUProspects2006,0.pdf>

The UK Presidency drove a rapid development in ESDP'soperational activity. The EU is now carrying out many missions and other activities in Africa, Asia, Middle East and the Balkans. In particular, the EU responded very rapidly to establish missions to monitor the peace process in Aceh, Indonesia, and to enable the opening of the Palestinian border crossing at Rafah. Actions were also launched to support the development of Palestinian civil policing, to train Iraqi rule of law professionals and to support the African Union mission in Sudan.

OBSERVATION III: HARMS

A. Transatlantic Relations Damaged

i. A common EU defense policy will conflict with NATO

Jeffrey L. Cimbalo, "Saving NATO from Europe," Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2004, Vol. 83, Issue 6 (EBSCO Host: <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=14815894>)

Several conditions practically ensure that any common EU security policy will conflict with NATO policy. Most important, the member nations in the EU and NATO are not coterminous, making it certain that their security policies will not be either. Austria, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden, all EU members that were neutral during the Cold War, do not belong to NATO, and France is not a member of NATO's military organization. None of these countries has a history of cooperation, let alone of coordination, with Washington on pressing security matters such as counterterrorism, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The new international actor the EU will not be a member of NATO, either. Meanwhile, NATO members Norway, Turkey, and the United States are not part of the EU. When EU policy does turn out to be compatible with NATO, it will be a matter more of coincidence than of coordination.

ii. Impact: EU defense plans are one of the greatest threats to transatlantic relations

British American Security Information Council, "NATO Ministerial Meetings in Brussels: Looking Ahead to the Istanbul Summit in 2004," December 3, 2003, <http://www.basicint.org/pubs/NATObref.htm>

During the informal NATO defense ministers' meeting in Colorado back in October, U.S. Ambassador to NATO, Nicholas Burns, called EU defense plans "one of the greatest dangers to the transatlantic relationship.

B. Multipolar World System

i. ESDP and CFSP will cause Europe to Balance the US

Center for Applied Policy Research, "Fifth Transatlantic Roundatable for the Editors of Foreign Policy Journals," June 9, 2005,<http://www.cap-lmu.de/transatlantic/topics/rome.php>

Stephen Szabo**,** Professor for European Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington DC, made a clear case that the former transatlantic alliance is developing towards a transatlantic alignment. The enlarged modern European Union will develop a new psychology and mentality, once its CFSP and ESDP work effectively; this will ultimately result in European balancing rather than band wagoning with the US.

ii. Impact: Harms Europe

Carsten Helmut Jahnel (Lt. Colonel in the German Army with a Masters of Arts in National Security from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey CA), "Transatlantic Relations- Are Alliances A Function Of AN External Threat?," Naval Postgraduate School (Monterey, CA), June 2005, p. 86, <http://stinet.dtic.mil/dticrev/PDFs/ADA435871.pdf>

The creation of strong military competition between the EU and United States in any form would only serve to further marginalize the European Union and cause an international division of force. The idea of balancing the "Hegemon" is not only counterproductive, but also unrealistic for Europe. In addition it would support to endorse the political necessity in unilateral United States foreign policies.

iii. Impact: Harms the World

Joseph S. Nye Jr. (dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and former chairman of the National Intelligence Council and an assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration), "Limits of American Power) Political Science Quarterly, Volume 117, Number 4, Winter 2002-2003,

War was the constant companion and crucial instrument of the multipolar balance of power. The classic European balance provided stability in the sense of maintaining the independence of most countries, but there were wars among the great powers for 60 percent of the years since 1500. Rote adherence to the balance of power and multipolarity may prove to be a dangerous approach to global governance in a world where war could turn nuclear.

OBSERVATION IV: PLAN

The North Atlantic Council will pass a resolution requiring its European member states to:

**Mandate 1** Withdraw all financial, military, technical and other support from a common EU defense policy.

**Mandate 2** Renounce all future policy measures within the EU to facilitate a common EU defense policy separate from NATO.

Enforcement: Any official found in violation of this plan will be removed from office.

Funding: Funding will come from normal NATO operating budgets and general national revenues of NATO members.

Timeline: 30 days after an affirmative vote

The affirmative team reserves the right to further this plan as needed.

OBSERVATION V: ADVANTAGES

Advantage 1: Unipolar World

A. American primacy linked to preponderance on Eurasian continent

John Bellamy Foster, "The New Geopolitics of Empire," The Monthly Review, January 2006,<http://www.monthlyreview.org/0106jbf2.htm> (brackets added)

America's global primacy," [Zbigniew] Brzezinski [Carter's National Security Advisor] argued, "is directly dependent on how long and how effectively its preponderance on the Eurasian continent is sustained.

B. EU integration incomplete without CFSP/ESDP

Elfriede Regelsberger (analyst at the Institute fur Europaische Politik, Berlin), "National Report," Germany, 2003,<http://www.fornet.info/CFSPannualreports/GERMANY%202003.pdf>

European integration would be incomplete without CFSP/ESDP and progress in these highly sensitive fields strengthens the overall integration process;

C. Unipolarity promotes peace

William C. Wohlforth (Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University.), "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5–41 <http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/WohlforthVol24No1.pdf>

Unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers and comparatively low levels of competition for prestige or security for two reasons: the leading state's power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics, and it reduces the salience and stakes of balance-of-power politics among the major states.

Advantage 2: Cooperation can achieve more

Halle Dale (Deputy Director of The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation), "EU Army to the Rescue? Heaven Help Us From Out Friends," Heritage Foundation, October 29, 2003, <http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed102903b.cfm>

And Mr. Powell might suggest that if the EU countries seriously want to field international peacekeeping operation -- which is indeed among the stated goals of European defense cooperation -- American cooperation on logistics and forward projection is invaluable. In other words, if we give the hatchet a rest and work together, much can be achieved.

2A EVIDENCE: SABATOGE EU DEFENSE POLICY

INHERENCY

British have signed up for EU defense force

Hannah K. Strange, "Britian signs up to EU defense force," The Washington Times, November 22, 2004

British Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon took the controversial step of committing British troops to a common European Defense Force at a meeting with ministers in Brussels Monday. In a huge leap forward for European military ambitions, EU defense ministers signed up to the creation of a multinational rapid response force for humanitarian or peacekeeping missions.

Europeans are planning to bypass the US and NATO to establish independent military alliance

Halle Dale (Deputy Director of The Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation), "EU Army to the Rescue? Heaven Help Us From Out Friends," Heritage Foundation, October 29, 2003, <http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed102903b.cfm>

Since last April, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg have talked about the establishment of a European military headquarters outside Brussels, with the British government cautiously and skeptically joining in the discussion. Not coincidentally these same countries also opposed the U.S. war in Iraq, and the U.S. government immediately interpreted this as a strategy to undermine U.S.-European defense cooperation through NATO. This suspicion received confirmation through a German military planning document leaked last week to the press. "A European army legitimized and financed by the European Parliament is the visionary goal of Germany," it states.

EU offer to coordinate with NATO is phony: They're still planning to drive the alliance apart

Kristin Archick (Specialist in European Affairs), 10 June 2005, "CRS Report for Congress - The European Union in 2005 and Beyond," p. 5

Although Washington grudgingly approved this compromise, some U.S. officials still fear that the new EU planning cell of 20 to 30 officers maybe the first step in driving the transatlantic alliance apart. They believe this small cell will grow over time into a larger staff, which could duplicate NATO structures. The EU is working to implement its new planning cell and is collaborating with NATO to establish the EU cell at SHAPE and to finalize the NATO liaison arrangements

HARMS

An EU counterweight would repudiate the factor which has produced two generations of peace

Nicholas Burns (Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and former US Ambassador to NATO), "NATO and the Future of Trans-Atlantic Relations," February 20, 2004, <http://nato.usmission.gov/ambassador/20040220_Milan.htm>

In my view, Europeans would do well to remember the importance of the trans-Atlantic link as a vital feature of your future security. I say this because there are a few leaders on the Continent calling for Europe and the European Union to become a counterweight to the U.S. This suggests that our future should be one of strategic rivalry and competition—the very antithesis of the transatlantic community we have built together since the end of the Second World War. Such a reversal would amount to a colossal strategic error. It would repudiate the primary factor that has produced two generations of peace and unparalleled security and unity in Europe—the presence of the United States military on this continent and the existence of NATO.

Stronger EU would weaken the transatlantic link and sabotage US interests

Kristin Archick (Specialist in European Affairs), 10 June 2005, "CRS Report for Congress - The European Union in 2005 and Beyond," p. 6

As the EU continues to evolve, some U.S. analysts worry that a larger, potentially more confident EU may seek to rival theUnited States and could weaken the transatlantic link. They also contend that a more unified EU would likely lessen Washington's leverage on individual members and could complicate U.S. efforts to rally support for its initiatives in institutions such as the United Nations or NATO.

"EU only" military headquarters wrecks foundation of transatlantic relations

R. Nicholas Burns (Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and former US Ambassador to NATO),, "The New NATO: Healing the Rift," May 27, 2003, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/21241.htm>

A few Europeans, on the other hand, think they can create a continental foreign policy and defense policy designed to check U.S. power. They call for European-only military headquarters that cost precious resources that are better spent on new European military capabilities. Their vision of Europe as a countervailing force to the U.S. is one that would shake the foundations of transatlantic relations, and the trust and loyalty that have been at the heart of European-American relations since the second World War.

EU foreign policy will seek to compete or balance that of the US

Jeffrey L. Cimbalo (, "Saving NATO from Europe," Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2004, Vol. 83, Issue 6 (EBSCO Host: <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=14815894> )

There is considerable evidence that EU foreign policy, led by Paris and Berlin, will actively seek to balance or compete with U.S. power.

Franco-German foreign policy will not be in US or NATO interests

Jeffrey L. Cimbalo, "Saving NATO from Europe," Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2004, Vol. 83, Issue 6 (EBSCO Host: <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=14815894>)

France led a frontal assault on Washington's Iraq policy in 2003, viciously rebuking new EU members in NATO that supported the U.S. position: President Jacques Chirac said they "missed a good opportunity to shut up." France and Germany are outspoken in their desire to lift EU restrictions on weapons sales to China over the strategic and humanitarian objections of the United States. Both also reject any future NATO role in Iraq and Afghanistan. These frequent expressions of hostility toward NATO and U.S. policy demonstrate that the Franco-German formulation of EU foreign policy has already come to mean "not NATO," or, more precisely, "not American.

EU foreign policy will be an extension of Franco-German attitudes

Jeffrey L. Cimbalo, "Saving NATO from Europe," Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 2004, Vol. 83, Issue 6 (EBSCO Host: <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=14815894>)

Recent experience with the EU in foreign affairs strongly suggests that its new foreign policy will be, in significant measure, an extension of existing Franco-German attitudes and policies. Paris and Berlin will continue largely to determine EU security policy. A former French president was the key figure behind the constitution, and Germany continues to be the EU's primary underwriter.

EU pushing defenses systems that are incompatible with the US

Center for Security Policy, "Taking the ‘special' out of the U.S.-U.K. relationship," No. 05-D 48, September 22, 2005, <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=05-D_48>

Despite the absence of any formal acknowledgment that such a move is afoot, and notwithstanding official assurances to the contrary, proof that Europe is effectively creating - via the ERRF - a competitor to NATO can be found in its recent military procurement decisions. The most important of these relate to systems designed for what is called "next generation warfare." At the core of such capabilities is a concept generically known as "net-centric warfare." It is predicated on the melding of the power of military hardware with advanced information and communications technology to gain enhanced battlefield situational awareness and combat lethality. Thanks largely to French and German ambitions to create an alternative to the U.S.-dominated NATO alliance and compete with America's military-industrial capabilities, two competitive and *largely incompatible* systems aimed at implementing net-centric warfare have emerged from the United States and Europe.

GPS system being created by the EU to rival Navastar will be totally incompatible

Center for Security Policy, "Taking the ‘special' out of the U.S.-U.K. relationship," No. 05-D 48, September 22, 2005, <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=05-D_48>

The key to net-centric warfare is a satellite-based system generically known as GPS for "global positioning system." The location, navigation and timing signals sent by multiple GPS satellites makes possible sophisticated, real-time command and control of war fighting units. Currently, effective GPS technology is provided only by the United States through its Navstar program to - among others - NATO. Europe, however, is well advanced in its plans to launch a rival system called Galileo, which the EU intends to use for military as well as civilian purposes. Galileo is currently projected to be fully operational by 2008. Importantly, equipment designed to work solely with Navstar will not be compatible for use with Galileo, and vice versa. Some in Europe have actually wanted Galileo's signals to be set in such a way as to jam those of the American rival. At the very least, as Europe builds its future military force to be Galileo-enabled, it will severely complicate interoperations with militaries that are Navstar-enabled.

The EU Rapid Reaction Force will waste defense resources and may fail without US bailout

Center for Security Policy, "Taking the ‘special' out of the U.S.-U.K. relationship," No. 05-D 48, September 22, 2005, <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=05-D_48>

"It is predictable, moreover, that - having created this Rapid Reaction Force - the Europeans will feel obliged to *use it*, albeit in what Brussels (read, the French and Germans) view as politically correct ways. These will, at best, fritter away precious British and other European defense resources. At worse, the EU may well become embroiled in conflicts from which it is ill-equipped to emerge victorious. Having done so, it may even require American help - which will be hard to provide given the incompatibility with U.S. systems deliberately designed into EU forces.

ESDP causes problems for NATO

EU Institute for Security Studies, "The Future of ESDP," February 6, 2006, <http://www.iss-eu.org/activ/content/rep06-02.pdf>

Cooperation between EU/ESDP and NATO is not satisfactory. With the exception of the Balkans, there is little dialogue between the two organizations, whose relationship is also undermined by a competition fro the same pool of resources and capabilities. The US is not keen on enhancing the cooperation with the Union on defence issues. Problems of standardization complicate things at a practice level.

EU subtracts from NATO capabilities -- they take away NATO assets for their own use

Leslie S. Lebl (former US Foreign Service officer, expert in European defense issues), 24 June 2004, "European Union Defense Policy," CATO POLICY ANALYSIS No. 516, p. 3

The next step, which proved more difficult, was to work out the terms of a framework agreement with NATO--a step that is necessary inasmuch as the Eu would to a great degree call on the same pool of soldires as would NATO. The EU also hoped to gain access to NATo and US assets that it lacked, such as heavy transport, intelligence, reconnaissance, logistics, or strike capabilities. Those arrangements were finally in place by March 2003.

EU will eventually take over NATO

Leslie S. Lebl (former US Foreign Service officer, expert in European defense issues), 24 June 2004, "European Union Defense Policy," CATO POLICY ANALYSIS No. 516, p. 9

As the EU gains confidence in foreign ans security policy, more common decisions will likely be reached in downtown Brussels. And, as EU member states are obliged by treaty to promote common policies in all other forums, with increasing frequency a decision may be postponed in NATO until a common position is reached in the EU.

Independent EU military is a waste of time & money: EU is disintegrating

EURACTIV EU News and Policy Positions, "Transatlantic Relations," updated 27 July 2005, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/Fixed/euractiv/index.htm>

A CIA report on the shape of the world in 2020 sees trouble ahead for EU's ambitions to become a global player: "The current welfare state is unsustainable and the lack of any economic revitalization could lead to the splintering or, at worst, disintegration of the European Union, undermining its ambitions to play a heavyweight international role. The EU's economic growth rate is dragged down by Germany and its restrictive labor laws.

SOLVENCY

19 of the EU's 25 members are in NATO

Leo Michel (Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies), "NATO and the EU: Stop the Minuet; it's Time to Tango," EuroFuture, Winter 2004, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/Repository/Outside_Publications/Michel/Michel_EuroFuture_Winter2004.pdf>

Of 25 EU members, 19 are in NATO and four are in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP). Each has a single army, air force, navy and defense budget to meet NATO, EU, and national commitments. There is no margin for wasteful duplication, and divergent operational doctrines and practices would increase the inherent risks of military operations.

Even just removing the UK would be enough to cripple ESDP

Dr. Alister Miskimmon (Lecturer in European and International Relations at the University of London), "Continuity in the face of upheaval- British Strategic Culture and the impact of the Blair government," European Security, 2004, <http://www.rhul.ac.uk/European-Studies/Research/MiskimmonUKStrategicCulture2004Web.pdf>

What is clear is that without the UK, ESDP is very limited in what it can achieve militarily and more importantly, politically, in world affairs.

ADVANTAGES

Primacy of NATO contributes to the good of the world

Nichols Burns (US Under Secretary for Political Affairs), "A Trans-Atlantic Agenda for the Year Ahead," US State Department, April 6, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/44378.htm>

Because when we work together in common cause, the United States and Europe are a formidable force for good. This is the best reason, I believe, for us to re-dedicate ourselves to the primacy of NATO and a more active relationship between America and the European Union focused on the great challenges of the day. A Trans-Atlantic partnership growing stronger by the day will serve us -- and the world -- well for years to come.

Enormous US power (hegemony) brings numerous benefits

Robert Jervis (The Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics at Columbia University), "The Remaking of a Unipolar World," The Washington Quarterly, 2006, <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/siwps/images/newsletter3/WQ.pdf>

Yet, enormous US power brings unprecedented benefits, ranging from the key role of the US dollar in world finance to the centrality of the English language throughout the world to Washington's ability to block most political initiatives that would bring harm. The current international system, although not necessarily perfect, is certainly satisfactory, partly because the United States has played such a large role in establishing it.

SUPERSIZE IT: THE CASE FOR INCREASED EUROPEAN CAPABILITIES

By Matthew Baker

With the fall of the Soviet Union many European countries have neglected national defense. Yet the challenges of terrorism, rogue states, and nuclear proliferation require greater defense commitments than at any time during the Cold War. As a result, my partner and I stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION I: DEFINITIONS

**NATO** "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." (*North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?"* [*http://www.nato.int/home.htm#*](http://www.nato.int/home.htm)*)*

**Significant** "important in effect or meaning." (Wordnet 2.1, Published by Princeton University**,** March 2005)

**Reform** "To change or improve." (The Glossary of Judicial and Historical Terms (Published by Old Bailey Online Project), 2003, http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/history/glossary.html)

**GDP** Gross Domestic Product. "the official measure of total output of goods and services" (Lincoln Anderson, "Gross Domestic Product," THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, 2002, <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GrossDomesticProduct.html>

OBSERVATION II: INHERENCY

A. EU defense budgets less than half of the US budget

Dr. John C. Hulsman (PhD in International Relations and Modern History and Senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation specializing in European security and NATO affairs), "The Future of NATO," The Heritage Foundation, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/features/issues/issuearea/NATO.cfm>

The collective defense budgets of all 25 EU member states amount to $200 billion—less than half of the U.S. defense budget.

B. European defense spending is slipping

Dr. Philip Gordon (PhD and Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins Unversity), "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," Emirates Lecture Series, #63, Spring 2006, <http://www.brookings.org/views/papers/gordon/emirates20060530.pdf> (All brackets and ellipses in the original)

Since September 11, 2001, defense spending as a share of GDP among non-US NATO allies has fallen from 2.02 percent to 1.8 percent, with the US share has risen from 3 percent to 3.7 percent. As NATO's Supreme Allied Commander General James Jones has remarked, "most nations are slipping behind the… gentlemen's agreement [made at NATO's 2002 summit] in Prague. The percent floor is becoming a ceiling.

C. European politics block increases

Kristin Archick (CRS specialist in European Affairs) and Paul Gallis (CRS specialist in European Affairs), "NATO and the European Union," Congressional Research Service, May 12, 2005, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/47074.pdf>

European leaders are reluctant to ask legislatures and publics for more money for defense given competing domestic priorities and tight budgets.

OBSERVATION III: HARMS

A. Effectiveness of missions is jeopardized

Dr. Philip Gordon (PhD and Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins Unversity), "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," Emirates Lecture Series, #63, Spring 2006, <http://www.brookings.org/views/papers/gordon/emirates20060530.pdf>

These shortfalls have been apparent on the ground in some of NATO's missions. As discussed previously; ISAF forces in Afghanistan are starved for resources and are trying to make do with only a handful of helicopters and transport planes- in a massive country where ground transport is almost impossible. In Pakistan, NATO's earthquake relief mission was severely constrained by the lack of available air assets to deliver aid half-way around the world on short notice.

B. Failure to improve capabilities will harm Europe's ability to protect its interests

Agence France-Presse, "Former NATO Chiefs Warn of Europe Military Weakness," October 12, 2005, <http://www.spacewar.com/news/europe-05zb.html>

US General Joseph Ralston and General Klaus Naumann of Germany said bluntly that European leaders have "lacked the political will" to improve military capabilities. Their warnings were contained in a 97-page study presented to European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization leaders in Brussels, a copy of which was obtained by AFP. "Failure to meaningfully improve Europe's collective defense capabilities in the coming years would have profoundly negative impacts on the ability of European countries to protect their interests," they said. In addition such failure would harm "the viability of NATO as an alliance, and the ability of European countries to partner in any meaningful way with the US," they said. Ralston was NATO's top military commander until 2003, while Naumann is Germany's former chief of defense and head of the 26-member alliance's military committee.

C. Homeland security is threatened

Rowan Scarborough, 15 Feb 2006, "NATO allies cut military since 9/11" THE WASHINGTON TIMES, <http://www.washtimes.com/national/20060215-124602-1890r.htm>

At last week's NATO defense ministers' conference in Munich, Mr. Rumsfeld gently prodded his colleagues to rethink defense spending after he detailed the job ahead. "This commitment cannot be done on the cheap," he said. "It's always easier for all of us to use our scarce tax dollars to meet some of the desires and appetites we have at home. But unless we invest in defense and security, the reality is that our homelands can be at risk." The lack of NATO spending can show up in war. The alliance's 1998 air assault on Serbia was carried out by American warplanes in virtually all strike missions. Other countries had not invested money in the smart munitions needed to hit targets in Belgrade and on the battlefield.

D. Breakdown of the alliance and military capbilities

Chris Lindborg and Ian Davis, Nov 2002, "NATO'S DEFENSE GAP: MORE THAN JUST CAPABILITIES," British American Security Information Council, <http://www.basicint.org/europe/NATO/fall2002defcapgap.htm>

Europe spent $10 billion on military research and development while the United States spent $50 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 2003. In response to the growing capabilities gap between the United States and Europe, one German official has said, "At this rate, we won't be able to communicate with you [the United States], much less fight alongside you.

OBSERVATION IV: PLAN

The North Atlantic Council and the governments of NATO member countries will enact the following plan using all necessary means:

Plank 1 Mandates

1. By 2012 all NATO member states must spend at least 2.5% of GDP on Defense.

2. By 2012 all NATO members must spend 25% of their defense budgets on research, technology, and procurement of equipment.

3. NATO will establish a European Defense Procurement and Research Committee which will facilitate dialogue among NATO members to prevent Research & Development overlap and equipment sharing. NATO member countries will agree to follow its allocation of priorities and responsibilities.

Plank 2 Funding- will come from cutting the European Common Agricultural Program (CAP), welfare cuts, pension reform, and general national revenues.

Plank 3 Enforcement- Government officials in violation of these provisions will be removed from office.

Plank 4 Timeline - This plan is phased in starting 6 months after an Affirmative ballot and ending in 2012. Mandate 3 takes place Jan. 1, 2008.

Plank 5 Legislative intent - The Affirmative Team reserves the right to further explain this plan as needed.

OBSERVATION V: ADVANTAGES

A. Stronger European military creates more effective operations and takes pressure off the US

Michele A. Flournoy and Julianne Smith (Lead Investigators) and Guy Ben-Air, Kathleen McInnis, aand David Scruggs (Contributing Authors) "European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap Between Strategy and Capabilities," Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2005, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/ReportEuropeanDefenseIntegration.pdf>

It is in America's interest for Europe to become stronger militarily. When NATO is engaged, stronger European partners mean more effective operations and a reduced operational burden for the United States. When NATO is not engaged and the European allies take action in a coalition, EU, or UN context, stronger European military capabilities take the pressure off the Untied States when it does not want or is not able to be involved.

B. Transformed military capabilities essential for Alliance to carry out full range of missions

Robert A. Bradtke (State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasion Affairs), "US Initiatives At NATO's Istanbul Summit," June 16, 2004, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/33701.htm>

The continued transformation of NATO's military capabilities is essential if the Alliance is to ensure the collective defense of its members and its ability to carry out the full range of its missions.

C. European Defense Strengthens Transatlantic Relations

James G. Zoulias (US Navy Midshipman and graduate degree candidate at Boston University), "NATO's Utility in US Foreign Policy Within the Greater Middle East," April 8, 2005, <http://www.bu.edu/ir/graduate/current/papers/Sample_policy_paper.pdf>

A serious effort to close the gap in military technology spanning the Atlantic is a good start. Capable allies will bring more to the fight and be of greater utility across the spectrum of armed conflict. This policy is costly up front and will not immediately bear fruit, but over time, will increase allied interoperability and more evenly distribute transatlantic burdens.

2A EVIDENCE: INCREASE EUROPEAN DEFENSE SPENDING

INHERENCY

The US is spending 3.7 % of GDP on defense while Europe averages 1.8 percent

Rowan Scarborough, "NATO allies cut military since 9/11," The Washington Times, February 15, 2006, <http://www.washtimes.com/national/20060215-124602-1890r.htm>

More telling is the share of each countries' gross domestic product (GDP) that is devoted to defense expenditures. The U.S. share has gone from 3 percent to 3.7 percent since September 11, 2001, while other NATO nations collectively have dipped from 2.02 percent to 1.8 percent, according to the Pentagon. Twelve years ago, NATO, excluding the United States, devoted 2.5 percent of GDP to defense.

Widening disparity between US and European defense expenditures

Dr. John C. Hulsman (PhD in International Relations and Modern History and Senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation specializing in European security and NATO affairs), "The Future of NATO," The Heritage Foundation, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/features/issues/issuearea/NATO.cfm>

Perhaps the most alarming statistic with regard to NATO has been the ever-widening disparity in defense expenditures between the United States on the one hand and Canada and Europe on the other. For the fiscal year 2007 defense budget, the United States has allocated $439.3 billion (3.2 percent of GDP) for the Department of Defense—an increase of 7 percent from FY 2006. This sum dwarfs the respective defense budgets of fellow NATO members: United Kingdom $65.25 billion (2.7 percent of GDP); France $45 billion (2.6 percent); Germany $30 billion (1.2 percent); Italy $28.2 billion (1.8 percent); Spain $9.9 billion (1.2 percent).

Europe spending only 1.5% of defense spending on R&D

The Defense Industry Daily, "EDA on European Defense Research Spending," June 2, 2006, <http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2006/06/eda-on-european-defense-research-spending/index.php>

According to data collected by the EU's European Defense Agency, its 24 members (all EU states except Denmark) expect to spend a little under EUR 2.5 billion on defense R&D this year ($3.2 billion at current conversion), with only about one-tenth of the money going on collaborative projects in Europe. Total defense expenditure is estimated to be around EUR 180 billion ($230.16 billion at current conversion). "Collectively we are investing less than 1.5% of defense spending in the future of Europe's defense technological base," said EDA head Javier Solana.

Projected European defense spending flat or decreasing

Michele A. Flournoy and Julianne Smith (Lead Investigators) and Guy Ben-Air, Kathleen McInnis, and David Scruggs (Contributing Authors) "European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap Between Strategy and Capabilities," Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2005, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/ReportEuropeanDefenseIntegration.pdf>

Yet projected defense spending in most European countries is relatively flat or decreasing.

Prague commitments unmet

Rowan Scarborough, "NATO allies cut military since 9/11," The Washington Times, February 15, 2006, <http://www.washtimes.com/national/20060215-124602-1890r.htm>

It was in Prague that Europe, prodded by President Bush, agreed to improve defense spending. But the goals remain unmet today, defense officials say.

Progress on Prague Commitments is modest

Dr. Julian Lindley-French (PhD in Political Science from the European University Institute in Florence), "The Coherence Between ESDP and NATO in the Field of Enhancing Military Capabilities," December 14, 2005, <http://www.clingendael.nl/cscp/events/20051214/speech_Lindley_French.pdf>

The specifics of progress on the Prague Capabilities Commitment is more difficult to come by because most of the material is classified, although I have seen figures that roughly concur with those of the EU. However, if progress on the Headline Goal Force Catalogue is modest there is every reason to believe that the same thing is happening to the PCC.

HARMS

Cuts in European spending hurt war on terrorism

Rowan Scarborough, 15 Feb 2006, "NATO allies cut military since 9/11" THE WASHINGTON TIMES, <http://www.washtimes.com/national/20060215-124602-1890r.htm>

America's major NATO allies have cut military manpower and defense funds as a share of their economies since the September 11 attacks, in sharp contrast with the United States, which embarked on deficit spending to boost arms outlays to fight global terrorists. The downward trend is raising alarms inside the Pentagon, which needs the allies' help to battle al Qaeda and other militants in Afghanistan, Iraq and other trouble spots.

Unequal division of labor creates political disagreements and threatens alliance's viability

Dr. John C. Hulsman (PhD in International Relations and Modern History and Senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation specializing in European security and NATO affairs), and Dr. Nile Gardiner (PhD in History from Yale), "A conservative Vision for US Policy toward Europe," European Affairs, Winter/Spring 2005, <http://www.europeanaffairs.org/current_issue/2005_winter_spring/2005_winter_spring_09.php4>

The present unequal division of labor between the United States and its European allies - with the United States fighting the wars and the Europeans keeping the peace - sets an awful precedent for the future of the alliance. France and Britain apart, Europe's paltry military spending means that the continent's only hope of making a viable contribution to allied security is to modernize and pool resources, in an effort to play niche roles in an overall American-led defense strategy. There is also a vast and growing technological discrepancy, with the United States spending nearly four times more than its European allies on defense research and development. Barely ten percent of Western Europe's 5,000 attack aircraft, for example, are capable of precision bombing, and Europe has almost no independent "lift" capacity to transport an army at will. If the United States continues to be the "mercenary" of the alliance while the Europeans are the "social workers," this functional disparity will lead to constant differences in political views and imperil the viability of the alliance.

NATO's robust and flexible nature threatened by defense spending discrepancies

Dr. John C. Hulsman (PhD in International Relations and Modern History and Senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation specializing in European security and NATO affairs), "The Future of NATO," The Heritage Foundation, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/features/issues/issuearea/NATO.cfm>

Consequently, the United States now represents 85 percent of NATO's military capabilities. As NATO considers the possibility of further enlargement or the emulation of missions in troubled states such as Afghanistan (ISAF), the alliance's robust and flexible nature could well be under threat if these massive discrepancies in defense spending are not addressed adequately.

Only 3% of European military forces are deployable for expeditions

Michele A. Flournoy and Julianne Smith (Lead Investigators) and Guy Ben-Air, Kathleen McInnis, aand David Scruggs (Contributing Authors) "European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap Between Strategy and Capabilities," Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2005, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/ReportEuropeanDefenseIntegration.pdf>

Today, only a small portion of Europe's 1.9 million personnel under arms have the capabilities to meet these requirements. In March 2004, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General James Jones, testified before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee that only 3-4 percent of European forces are "expeditionary deployable.

Europe short on precision-guided weapons, spy planes, and cargo airlift

Rowan Scarborough, "NATO allies cut military since 9/11," The Washington Times, February 15, 2006, <http://www.washtimes.com/national/20060215-124602-1890r.htm>

Defense officials say European countries are short on capabilities for unmanned spy planes, cargo airlift, countermine technology and precision-guided weapons. All these shortfalls can affect U.S. troops relying on NATO forces to complement operations overseas in places such as the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq.

European forces atrophied to irrelevance

Dr. John C. Hulsman (PhD and Research Fellow in European Affairs at Heritage) and Dr. Nile Gardiner (PhD and fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy at Heritage), "A Conservative Vision for US Policy Toward Europe," The Heritage Foundation, October 4, 2004, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=70052>

As Richard Perle bluntly put it, Europe's armed forces have already "atrophied to the point of virtual irrelevance.

Only 10% of European aircraft capable of precision bombing

Dr. John C. Hulsman (PhD and Research Fellow in European Affairs at Heritage) and Dr. Nile Gardiner (PhD and fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy at Heritage), "A Conservative Vision for US Policy Toward Europe," The Heritage Foundation, October 4, 2004, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=70052>

Of the 5,000 attack aircraft available to Western European militaries for deployment, barely 10 percent are capable of precision bombing.

Capabilities gap one of the largest facing the alliance

Gareth Harding, "Analysis: Europe-America defense gap," The Washington Times, January 10, 2005, <http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20050110-011653-8095r.htm>

In a wide-ranging speech to Brussels policy makers Monday, U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns identified the military capabilities gap between Europe and America as one of the biggest challenges facing the transatlantic relationship.

Lack of EU military capabilities could sour EU-US relations for years to come

Gareth Harding, "Analysis: Europe-America defense gap," The Washington Times, January 10, 2005, <http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20050110-011653-8095r.htm>

But there is one issue that is likely to sour EU-U.S. relations throughout 2005 and for years to come – Europe's unwillingness to spend more on defense coupled with its inability to quickly dispatch troops to global hot spots.

Capabilities Gap most tangible fissure in the alliance

Dr. Karl A. Lamers (a German legislator and a member of the NATO Parliament), "Transatlantic Security Perceptions and Europe's Contributions to the Alliance," 2003, <http://www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=355>

What is clear, though, is that the yawning military capabilities gap is the most tangible fissure in the transataltnic alliance.

SOLVENCY

Funding: European countries can increase defense spending if necessary

Charles V. Pena (Director of Defense Policy Studies at CATO, "A Reality Check on Military Spending," Issues, Summer 2005, <http://www.issues.org/21.4/pena.html>

Without a Soviet threat to Europe, the United States does not need to subsidize European defense spending. The European countries have the economic wherewithal to increase their military spending, if necessary.

Funding: Increase needs to come from rich countries

David Keohane (Research Fellow for Security and Defence Policy at the Centre for European Reform), "The European Defence Plan: Filling the Transatlantic Gaps," The International Spectator, 2003, <http://web2003.senato.it/itausa/doc/Keohane.PDF>

Four countries provide roughly 75 percent of EU defence spending- the UK and France (45 percent) and Germany and Italy. Add the Dutch and Spanish defence budgets to the four bigger countries, and those six account for 86 percent of EU spending. Even if smaller countries reprogramme their defence spending and focus on "niche" activities, how the six largest (and richest) spendtheir defence budgets has an enormous impact on overall EU figures.

Europe needs to increase spending to 45 billion euros to prevent falling behind the US

Peter Spiegel, "France says Europe must increase military spending," The Financial Times, June 6, 2005, (Lexis-Nexis Academic)

Europe is at risk of falling severely behind the US in weapons technologies unless it lifts spending on military equipment and research by as much as Euros 45bn (Pounds 30.4bn) a year, a panel appointed by the French defence minister will warn this week. According to people who have read the panel's report, which will be presented at a symposium attended by Miche`le Alliot-Marie, the French defence minister, on Wednesday, it includes a call for increased transatlantic partnerships, urging French industry and officials to overcome past difficulties to work more closely with the US. The report cites the UK as a model for several defence spending initiatives, particularly its recent push to outsource many Ministry of Defence activities - including some front-line missions, such as air-to-air refuelling tankers - to the private sector.

2.5 % GDP (if increase went to modernization) would put Europe on US modernization spending level

David Keohane (Research Fellow for Security and Defence Policy at the Centre for European Reform), "The European Defence Plan: Filling the Transatlantic Gaps," The International Spectator, 2003, <http://web2003.senato.it/itausa/doc/Keohane.PDF>

If Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and Germany could increase their defence spending levels to the Anglo-French share of 2.5 percent of GDP, it would add about 35 billion euros a year to European defence spending. If all of that went on military modernization efforts, it would be comparable to modernisation spending per soldier in the US.

Perfectly feasible: European NATO countries used to spend 2.5% of GDP 12 years ago

Rowan Scarborough, 15 Feb 2006, "NATO allies cut military since 9/11" THE WASHINGTON TIMES, <http://www.washtimes.com/national/20060215-124602-1890r.htm>

More telling is the share of each countries' gross domestic product (GDP) that is devoted to defense expenditures. The U.S. share has gone from 3 percent to 3.7 percent since September 11, 2001, while other NATO nations collectively have dipped from 2.02 percent to 1.8 percent, according to the Pentagon. Twelve years ago, NATO, excluding the United States, devoted 2.5 percent of GDP to defense.

Countries should spend 25% of defense budget on tech to ensure transformational capabilities are adequate

Michele A. Flournoy and Julianne Smith (Lead Investigators) and Guy Ben-Air, Kathleen McInnis, aand David Scruggs (Contributing Authors) "European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap Between Strategy and Capabilities," Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2005, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/ReportEuropeanDefenseIntegration.pdf>

Nations should aim to spend a minimum of 25 percent of their budgets on investments, including research, technology, and procurement.Turning militaries postured for territorial defense into flexible, deployable forces requires significant investment in enabling capabilities. Funds are required to obtain capabilities for expeditionary missions, such as strategic airlift, air-to-air refueling, C4ISR, deployable logistics and so on. Perhaps most importantly, force multipliers such as network-enabled capabilities require significant defense technology investment. Militaries should aim to spend at least 25 percent of their budgets on research, technology and procurement to ensure that investment in transformational capabilities is adequate without placing undue strain on other aspects of the military budget.

Just a 3% of military budget commitment to technology could go a long way toward bridging the gap

Dr. Donald C. Daniel (Research Professor at the National Defense University's Center for Technology and National Security), "NATO Technology: from Gap to Divergence?," Center for Technology and National Security Policy at the National Defense University, July 2004, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/defense_horizons/DH42.pdf>

A commitment by every NATO nation to invest 3 percent of its military budget in research and technology, would go far toward reducing both gaps and keeping NATO military relevant to the new strategic environment.

ADVANTAGES

Stronger defense capabilities are critical for an effective transatlantic relationship

Michele A. Flournoy and Julianne Smith (Lead Investigators) and Guy Ben-Air, Kathleen McInnis, aand David Scruggs (Contributing Authors) "European Defense Integration: Bridging the Gap Between Strategy and Capabilities," Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2005, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/ReportEuropeanDefenseIntegration.pdf>

Building stronger European defense capabilities is also critical for the transatlantic relationship in a world in which both sides of the Atlantic must work closely together to combat common security challenges. Neither Europe nor the United States can meet these challenges alone. Each needs the cooperation of the other to protect and advance its interests.

More European spending is essential for NATO's capabilities to field long term missions

Robert A. Bradtke (State Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasion Affairs), "US Initiatives At NATO's Istanbul Summit," June 16, 2004, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/33701.htm>

If NATO is to field long-term operations in places like Afghanistan, our European Allies will need to spend more wisely on defense and produce more effective militaries.

EU capabilities critical for security and foreign policy objectives

Robin Niblett (D.Phil from Oxford and a former lecturer in politics at Pembroke College, Oxford) (Director and Editor), "Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005, <http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/109/CSIS_Initiative2005.pdf>

Building stronger European defense capabilities will be critical if a renewed transatlantic partnership is to have the capability to support shared foreign and security objectives with military operations as and when necessary.

Bridging the capabilities gap necessary to sustain mission sin Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo

US Ambassador R. Nicholas Burns (Ambassador to NATO), "Transatlantic Relations," April 29, 2004, <http://nato.usmission.gov/ambassador/2004/20040429_Stockholm_B.htm>

One such significant obstacle is the persistent gap in military capabilities between the U.S. and the rest of its Allies. If NATO is to field long-term missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and remain in Kosovo, our European allies will need to spend more – and more wisely -- on defense and produce more effective militaries.

LET MY PEOPLE IN: THE CASE FOR ISRAEL AND JORDAN IN NATO

By David Carter

Today's Middle-East is a dangerous place, but we have a unique opportunity to achieve significant goals with the right plan. That's why my partner and I stand firmly r esolved that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished. We seek to significantly reform NATO to achieve the following goals:

**1) Increased chance for a lasting Mid-East peace**

**2) Increased deterrence of Iran**

**3) Reduce the occurrence of anti-Western terrorism**

We will show you today that if we can achieve these goals better than the Status Quo, then an affirmative ballot is justified.

OBSERVATION 1. DEFINITIONS: In order to bring clarity to this round the affirmative provides the following definitions

**NATO:** "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." *(North Atlantic Treaty* Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" [*www.nato.int/home.htm#*](http://www.nato.int/home.htm))

**Significant:** having or likely to have influence or effect (*Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, 2005*)

**Reform:** to put or change into an improved form or condition (*Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, 2005*)

OBSERVATION 2. INHERENCY and ANALYSIS OF THE STATUS QUO

Related to Goal 1, we observe that NATO currently needs greater engagement with the Middle East

Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-Neb., member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Select Committee on Intelligence), "U.S. & NATO an Alliance of Purpose," U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda Online, June 2004, <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0604/ijpe/hagel.htm>

The threat to NATO today does not come from great powers, but from weak ones. The world does not have the luxury of choosing the challenges that it faces. Terrorism, poverty, endemic disease, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failing states, and protracted conflicts are complex and interrelated. The future success of NATO will be determined by its ability to deepen and expand cooperation in intelligence, law enforcement, economic, diplomatic, and humanitarian action, especially in the Greater Middle East

Related to Goal 2, we observe that the West must develop a new strategy for dealing with Iran

[Ronald D. Asmus](http://www.policyreview.org/authorindex.html) (executive director of the German Marshall Fund of the United States' Transatlantic Center ) and [Bruce P. Jackson](http://www.policyreview.org/authorindex.html) (president of the Project on Transitional Democracies). They have been the Democratic and Republican heads of the U.S. Committee on NATO, Feb 2005, POLICY REVIEW, "Does Israel Belong in the EU and NATO?" [www.policyreview.org/feb05/asmus.html](http://www.policyreview.org/feb05/asmus.html)

Even if we agree that Americans see themselves as defenders of Israel (for reasons of history, faith, and cultural values), it is hard to see why Israel should rely exclusively on America's assurance forever. Few states in history have relied upon a single alliance and an informal one at that. Most have sought to construct a web of interlocking relationships as a strategic insurance policy. It seems only prudent for Israel to seek a multilateral complement to a strong bilateral relationship.

Related to Goal 3, we see that dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is essential to reducing terrorism

Lt Colonel Wesley James Jennings (US Army) 18 Mar 2005, UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE, STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, EXPANDING NATO MEMBERSHIP TO ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST, [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil133.pdf](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil133.pdf) (brackets added)

This [Israeli-Palestinian] conflict is the single biggest source of anti-American moral support for Islamic extremists in the Muslim world and foreign policy discontent among traditional US friends and allies. Reversing the growing anti-Americanism trend is necessary to win the war on terrorism.

And we note a final fact about the Status Quo, and that is simply that Israel and Jordan are not currently members of NATO, as evidenced by the list of 26 countries on NATO's web site. *(*[*www.nato.int/structur/countries.htm*](http://www.nato.int/structur/countries.htm)*)*

OBSERVATION 3. NATO shall implement the following plan by any necessary means

**Plank 1** Agency: NATO member countries and their representatives on the North Atlantic Council and NATO headquarters.

**Plank 2** Mandates:

1. NATO shall extend membership to Israel and Jordan
2. NATO shall make up to 10,000 peacekeeping forces available to secure the borders of Israel, Jordan and/or the Palestinian Authority at the request of the leaders of any of these groups.
3. If and when an Israeli/Palestinian peace settlement is reached, NATO shall intervene to enforce the final borders.

**Plank 3** Funding shall be through existing NATO member country defense budgets supplemented by cuts in European agriculture subsidies and the US federal budget allocations for Head Start and the National Institute On Aging.

**Plank 4**  Implementation shall be 30 days after an affirmative ballot with forces to be available six months later.

**Plank 5** Enforcement: Any government official not in compliance with the plan shall be removed from office.

**Plank 6**  All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

OBSERVATION 4. This plan offers advantages by meeting the goals better than the Status Quo

Advantage 1: Related to both Goals 1 and 3 -- Engaging Israel, Jordan and Palestine in NATO increases stability and the chances for Middle East peace.

Lt Colonel Wesley James Jennings (US Army) 18 Mar 2005, UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE, STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, EXPANDING NATO MEMBERSHIP TO ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST, [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil133.pdf](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil133.pdf)

NATO is the one organization with members trusted by all parties. NATO membership alone will not automatically engineer Israeli-Palestinian friendship and ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will not alone win the war on terrorism. However, formally allying Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Europe and the United States through NATO can establish the basis for long term security and governmental reform. It is a proposal which has the potential to meet each of these parties' expectations, but only once they are tied together.

Advantage 2: Also related to Goal 1 – Israel in NATO makes peace more likely by increasing Israel's security and reducing Israeli isolation

Ronald D. Asmus ( executive director of the German Marshall Fund of the United States' Transatlantic Center in Brussels), and Bruce P. Jackson (president of the Project on Transitional Democracies), Feb 2005, "Does Israel Belong in the EU and NATO?" POLICY REVIEW, [www.policyreview.org/feb05/asmus.html](http://www.policyreview.org/feb05/asmus.html)

Second, a new and upgraded relationship between Israel and the Euro-Atlantic community could become a critical element in helping to provide the security Israel will need to take steps to make peace with a Palestinian state in the Middle East. Anchoring Israel more closely with nato and the eu can reduce the sense of isolation that Israel feels. In a post-Oslo political environment, such a step could be especially important in convincing a skeptical Israeli public to support such a settlement

Advantage 3: Related to Goal 2 -- Israel in NATO is a deterrent to Iran's nuclear threats

John Hulsman (Senior Research Fellow in European Affairs) and Nile Gardiner PhD, "Confounding the Mullahs of Iran: It's Time for Israel to Join NATO," The Heritage Foundation, 24 Jan 2006, [www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm966.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm966.cfm)

More importantly, Israeli accession to NATO would explicitly extend the Western alliance's nuclear deterrent to cover Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Now it will be Tehran, and not the rest of the world, that has a proliferation problem. Any nuclear or conventional attack on Israel, be it direct or through proxies such as Hezbollah or other terrorist groups, would be met by a cataclysmic response from the West that would make the Battle of Omdurman look like a stroll in the park. Israel's accession would leave the Mullahs with no illusions about the West's determination to respond to Iran's strategic threat to the region.

Advantage 4: Related to Goal 3 -- Bringing Israel into NATO improves efforts at fighting terror

John Hulsman (Senior Research Fellow in European Affairs) and Nile Gardiner PhD, "Confounding the Mullahs of Iran: It's Time for Israel to Join NATO," The Heritage Foundation, 24 Jan 2006, [www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm966.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm966.cfm)

Israel's intelligence capabilities have been a vital asset in prosecuting the Global War on Terror, as few understand the conflict so well. Like the U.S. and Great Britain, history has forced Israel into being a genuine warrior nation. Its accession to NATO could only enhance the alliance's capabilities.

2A EVIDENCE: ISRAEL & JORDAN IN NATO

**INHERENCY**

NATO needs to change attitude to accept Israel

FAES (Spanish acronym for [Spanish](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spain) [think tank](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Think_tank) Foundation for Social Analysis and Studies) "NATO: AN ALLIANCE FOR FREEDOM - How to transform the Atlantic Alliance to effectively defend our Freedom and democracies," 2005, [www.fundacionfaes.org/documentos/Informe\_OTAN\_Ingles.pdf](http://www.fundacionfaes.org/documentos/Informe_OTAN_Ingles.pdf)

We are fully aware that Israel's membership of NATO poses greater political problems, for example, than that of Australia. Nevertheless, we believe that the benefits of this expansion would well outweigh any possible disadvantages. What is more, NATO and Israel would not be starting from scratch. In fact, since the Istanbul Summit of 2004, the Alliance's authorities and those of Israel have been drawing up a framework for closer cooperation between the two parties as a part of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue. Unfortunately, the Alliance has not been able to go one step further and grant this important relationship the publicity it deserves, nor has any initiative been designed that goes beyond the narrow framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue. It is time to change this attitude.

Israel and Euro-Atlantic communities face same threats and same values

Dr. Uzi Arad (head of the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Herzlia's Interdisciplinary Center, served with the Israeli foreign intelligence service) 17 Feb 2005, "Israel, NATO and the Euro-Atlantic Community," [www.bitterlemons-international.org/inside.php?id=297](http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/inside.php?id=297)

The broader Middle East is home to the main strategic threats facing the Euro-Atlantic community, namely international terrorism and WMD proliferation. These threats, aimed at Israel as well, position Israel more than ever before on the Euro-Atlantic side. History, and particularly the history of the Euro-Atlantic community, proves that common threats can create ever-closer allies.

Israel's reliance on US for security is inadequate

Ronald D. Asmus ( executive director of the German Marshall Fund of the United States' Transatlantic Center in Brussels), and Bruce P. Jackson (president of the Project on Transitional Democracies), Feb 2005, "Does Israel Belong in the EU and NATO?" POLICY REVIEW, [www.policyreview.org/feb05/asmus.html](http://www.policyreview.org/feb05/asmus.html)

Yet it is not fanciful to raise the question of what might happen in, for example, 20 years' time if the U.S. were embroiled in a conflict in the Pacific and then also faced with a Middle East conflict, one in which protecting Israel could expose us to terrorist attacks in the American homeland. Even if we agree that Americans see themselves as defenders of Israel (for reasons of history, faith, and cultural values), it is hard to see why Israel should rely exclusively on America's assurance forever. Few states in history have relied upon a single alliance and an informal one at that. Most have sought to construct a web of interlocking relationships as a strategic insurance policy. It seems only prudent for Israel to seek a multilateral complement to a strong bilateral relationship.

SOLVENCY

Palestinian homeland secured through NATO would reduce terrorism

Lt Colonel Wesley James Jennings (US Army) 18 Mar 2005, UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE, STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, EXPANDING NATO MEMBERSHIP TO ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST, [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil133.pdf](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil133.pdf)

The first and most pressing is achieving victory in the war on terrorism. Part of the strategy for victory must include a plan for countering Muslim rage, an anger which inevitably includes but is not limited too Israel and Palestine. The way towards achieving this end is by eliminating the single biggest Arab grievance against the United States, namely establishing a secure Palestinian homeland through NATO. It must be clear that while taking this action will not in and of itself end the war on terrorism, it must be taken to end it in the long term.

NATO increases chances of peace in the Middle East

Joseph Braude, THE NEW REPUBLIC online, 29 Apr 2005, **"**THE PROBLEM WITH NATO'S OUTREACH TO THE ARAB WORLD Mixed Message" [www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w050425&s=braude042905](http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w050425&s=braude042905)

For Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority, NATO may prove invaluable to a peace deal--lending international prestige, and the possibility of peacekeepers, to an otherwise shaky proposition.

NATO working with Israel, Jordan and Palestine = Reduction of Islamic extremism

Lt Colonel Wesley James Jennings (US Army) 18 Mar 2005, UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE, STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, EXPANDING NATO MEMBERSHIP TO ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST, [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil133.pdf](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil133.pdf)

However, formally allying Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Europe and the United States through NATO can establish the basis for long term security and governmental reform. It is a proposal which has the potential to meet each of these parties' expectations, but only once they are tied together. For the United States, it is a bold move that reaffirms American global leadership and resolve, and extends the American alliance system of security and stability. It addresses and mitigates the number one source of discontent and American disillusionment in the Arab world which in turn undercuts support for Islamic extremism. Additionally, it does not compromise one of America's vital Interests, the security of Israel.

NATO working with Israel, Jordan and Palestine = good for Jordan and good for Middle East peace

Lt Colonel Wesley James Jennings (US Army) 18 Mar 2005, UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE, STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, EXPANDING NATO MEMBERSHIP TO ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST, [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil133.pdf](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil133.pdf)

It [allying Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Europe and the United States through NATO] draws Europe into active participation using a mechanism which moderates American power while maintaining American leadership. European participation becomes politically possible under NATO and complements the growing support for Palestinian causes. Ideally Israel achieves a vastly improved security and economic situation and moves away from international isolation. Jordan benefits from both a security, social and economic standpoint. This same proposal can be the vehicle to realize Palestinian independence, security and democracy, and for both Israelis and Arabs serve as the physical and psychological foundation for peace.

NATO could perverse security for an interim Palestinian state

Lt Colonel Wesley James Jennings (US Army) 18 Mar 2005, UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE, STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, EXPANDING NATO MEMBERSHIP TO ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST, [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil133.pdf](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil133.pdf)

An interim Palestinian state would have to accept the same conditions facing Israel in addition to building governmental institutions, judicial, police and military forces capable of self rule and free of terrorist influence. In the near term it would be purposely dependent upon NATO for external security both to prevent new conflict with Israel. Any Palestinian issues directly affect Jordan as well. An estimated 70 percent of all Jordanians are Palestinian. Jordan becomes a test case for NATO expansion into a fundamentally stable Arab government.

NATO could help resolve Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Zachary Bernstein, Georgetown University, Summer 2005," A NATO-led Palestinian-Israeli Rapprochement? Following the Greco-Turkish Model," The Jerusalem Fund for Education and Community Development, [www.thejerusalemfund.org/images/informationbrief.php?ID=140](http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/images/informationbrief.php?ID=140)

Instability in the Middle East, caused by a failure to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in a just and comprehensive manner, could have significant spillover effects for the North Atlantic community, particularly given the proximity of the dispute to NATO's southern border. NATO could therefore serve as a military watchdog, ensuring that Israel and Palestine follow through with their agreements and obligations.

NATO membership for Israel is the best deterrence against Iranian nuclear threats

John Hulsman (Senior Research Fellow in European Affairs) and Nile Gardiner PhD, "Confounding the Mullahs of Iran: It's Time for Israel to Join NATO," The Heritage Foundation, 24 Jan 2006, [www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm966.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm966.cfm)

NATO membership is the strongest disincentive to Tehran against its aspirations to join the nuclear club. Iran wants the bomb primarily to intimidate Israel into a lesser role in the Middle East and, in effect, to hold the West hostage to its desire for regional dominance. Extended deterrence, with its proven track record in the Cold War, remains the last, best chance to get the Iranians to back down. Israel's joining NATO is undoubtedly the most effective way to resolve the crisis, short of immediate military action.

Israel in NATO strengthens the war on terror

FAES (acronym for the [Spanish](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spain) [think tank](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Think_tank) Foundation for Social Analysis and Studies), NATO: AN ALLIANCE FOR FREEDOM, How to transform the Atlantic Alliance to effectively defend our Freedom and democracies, FAES Study, 2005 , [www.fundacionfaes.org/documentos/Informe\_OTAN\_Ingles.pdf](http://www.fundacionfaes.org/documentos/Informe_OTAN_Ingles.pdf)

NATO must become the military instrument of our democracies in front of the totalitarian movements that are attacking us. We believe that the best way of doing this is to open up to various countries in their fight against terror. Bringing Israel into the Alliance is an extremely important step in this respect.

Joining NATO is in Israel's and NATO's best interests

Dr. Uzi Arad (head of the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Herzlia's Interdisciplinary Center, served with the Israeli foreign intelligence service) 17 Feb 2005, "Israel, NATO and the Euro-Atlantic Community," [www.bitterlemons-international.org/inside.php?id=297](http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/inside.php?id=297)

Strengthening the ties between Israel and NATO and anchoring Israel in the Euro-Atlantic community are not only a strategic and political issue, important as it may be. Geographically, Israel is located in the broader Middle East, but culturally, politically, and economically it is an advanced western democratic nation. While this does not preclude peaceful cooperation and dialogue with its neighbors, Israel belongs to the Euro-Atlantic community of like-minded nations. Israel would not be coming empty-handed to the table--as its broad economic and technological cooperation with Europe has proven, or as the vast potential for cooperation with NATO holds. The Euro-Atlantic community is Israel's natural habitat.

Israel wants to join NATO

Guy Philippe Goldstein, 2 Nov 2005, "Israel and Palestine both need NATO now!" Newropeans Magizine, <http://newropeans-magazine.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2911&Itemid=85>

Moreover, NATO could offer something Israel has longed for since its creation: by extending its membership to Israel in exchange of a final peace agreement with the Palestinian, it could definitely establish Israel within a collective security system, and forever repeal the risk of international isolation in times of crisis, the very risk that haunted Israel so often over the last sixty years. Not surprisingly then, over the last very few years, it has emerged that Israel has explored both diplomatically (through the Mediterranean dialogue) and military (through participation to NATO exercises) the possibility to cooperate with NATO on the ground – and perhaps join it in the long-term.

Israel wants closer ties to NATO and NATO should move closer to Israel

Dr. Uzi Arad (head of the Institute for Policy and Strategy at Herzlia's Interdisciplinary Center, served with the Israeli foreign intelligence service) 17 Feb 2005, "Israel, NATO and the Euro-Atlantic Community," [www.bitterlemons-international.org/inside.php?id=297](http://www.bitterlemons-international.org/inside.php?id=297)

As the Euro-Atlantic community, NATO particularly, is debating and changing its strategic orientation toward the broader Middle East to confront these threats, and since its actions and policies might well have substantial strategic effects upon Israel, both parties should assess their relationship--as a community consisting of Israel, too. In this respect, the proposal to develop these relations recently submitted by Israel to the secretary general of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, is an important step, as is Scheffer's upcoming visit to Israel on February 24, 2005. NATO is the primary institution of the Euro-Atlantic community. Just as the European Union recently deepened its relations with Israel along the lines of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), NATO member states should also move to deepen relations with Israel following the Istanbul Summit Communique and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

Israel is ready for NATO membership and brings a net benefit

John Hulsman (Senior Research Fellow in European Affairs) and Nile Gardiner PhD (is the Bernard and Barbara Lomas Fellow, Heritage Foundation), "Confounding the Mullahs of Iran: It's Time for Israel to Join NATO," The Heritage Foundation, 24 Jan 2006, [www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm966.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm966.cfm)

Israel meets NATO qualifications: it is a democracy, has a free market economy, and is able to contribute to the common defense. In fact, unlike many new NATO members, it would be a net addition to the alliance, having lift and logistics ability, a second-to-none officer corps, and a first-rate military capable of all aspects of war-fighting. Israel spends nearly 10 percent of its GDP on defense and has active armed forces numbering 167,000 men and women, with 358,000 in reserve. It possesses up to 200 nuclear warheads, as well as a well-equipped Air Force and Navy.

 NATO membership for Israel would be stabilizing influence

Frederick Kempe, WALL STREET JOURNAL online, 14 Feb 2006, "NATO, Israel Draw Closer Mideast Tumult Forces Rethinking Of Alliances, but Hurdles Loom" [www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-707.pdf](http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-707.pdf)

Sen. John McCain (R., Ariz.) has said the only thing worse than using the military option against Iran is a nuclear Iran "By the same token," says Uzi Arad, an Israeli intelligence veteran, "The only thing worse than Israel being a member of NATO may be Israel not being a member of NATO" if one wants a self-confident Israel that acts as a stabilizer instead of an element of risk.

NATO better option than EU or other institution

Lt Colonel Wesley James Jennings (US Army) 18 Mar 2005, UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE, STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, EXPANDING NATO MEMBERSHIP TO ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST, [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil133.pdf](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil133.pdf)

There are a number of answers to the question of why NATO vice the United Nations or some other institution. First, is the issue of legitimacy. NATO brings its own legitimacy and as an institution has a proven record for promoting strategic consensus among its members, particularly in the security and stability arenas among weaker states. Further, it is the only organization containing parties trusted by both Palestinians (Europe) and Israelis (United States) with substantial capabilities. Second, NATO and the whole of Europe's future threats are or will originate from the Middle East.

NATO uniquely positioned to be cornerstone to help Palestine -- better than UN

Guy Philippe Goldstein, 2 Nov 2005, "Israel and Palestine both need NATO now!" Newropeans Magizine, <http://newropeans-magazine.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2911&Itemid=85>

So who could provide such a cornerstone guarantee for Israel, backed on top of that by troops on the ground that would help strengthen the P.A. against militias? A direct US intervention would be both awkward politically, not to say radioactive in Palestine, and perhaps unfeasible in terms of military resources with the US current engagement in Iraq On the other hand, an UN force would never receive the full-backing of the US, since the US still sees itself as the main broker – and realistically nothing can be done without its consent in this region of the world. The EU has no large enough rapid intervention force. At the end of the day, only NATO can provide both the sponsorship of the US, the superior logistics of the US army for projected forces, and EU troops for the sake of diplomatic acceptance on both sides of the fence. And in terms of reputation, NATO remains the largest, strongest military and strategic alliance in the world.

Precedent exists with France and Germany that enemies can become allies

Lt Colonel Wesley James Jennings (US Army) 18 Mar 2005, UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE, STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, EXPANDING NATO MEMBERSHIP TO ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST, [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil133.pdf](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil133.pdf)

This same alliance, in binding past enemies together, has been remarkably successful at ending historical animosities that often led to war. France and Germany shared a rich history of three major wars going back to the Franco-Prussian war where at each war's end the conditions were repeatedly set for the next war's beginning. These past enemies were able to break this cycle and achieve unprecedented peace, stability and prosperity under an American alliance and leadership system manifested through NATO.

Precedent exists with Turkey and Greece that enemies can become allies

Lt Colonel Wesley James Jennings (US Army) 18 Mar 2005, UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE, STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, EXPANDING NATO MEMBERSHIP TO ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST, [www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil133.pdf](http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil133.pdf)

Another and perhaps more relevant example is that of Turkey and Greece. These two nations have been "natural enemies since the 1820s, when Greek nationalists rebelled against the Ottoman Turkish Empire, which then controlled much of southeastern Europe. In modern times, Cyprus has been the issue that symbolized age-old grievances." While the 1974 Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus brought these powers close to conflict, it was this mutual NATO binding that kept them from going to war over it. Overtime, this same institutional system has diminished and diffused this potential flash point among alliance partners to the point that Cyprus recently held a vote on reunification. The message is clear, "institutions can both project and restrain state power."

LOCK THE DOOR: THE CASE FOR HOMELAND SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS

By David Carter

In order to face new challenges relating to domestic security, the [NATO]Alliance must assume an approach in which it enhances the homeland security of its members. (*Foundation for Social Analysis and Studies, 2005, How to transform the Atlantic Alliance to effectively defend our Freedom and democracies, FAES Study, FAES a spanish acronym for the Spanish think tank)*

It is for this reason that my partner and I stand firmly resolved that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished. This case will be a comparative advantage case where the affirmative team sets forth its criteria that if it has shown that after implementation of the plan a comparative advantage will exist over the status quo, then an affirmative ballot is justified.

OBSERVATION 1. DEFINITIONS

**NATO** "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." *(North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?"* [*http://www.nato.int/home.htm#*](http://www.nato.int/home.htm)*)*

**Significant** having or likely to have influence or effect *(Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, 2005)*

**Reform** to put or change into an improved form or condition *(Merriam Webster Online Dictionary, 2005)*

**NBCR/CBRN** Different authors use different acronyms but these letters stand for the same thing in each instance. **C**hemical, **B**iological, **R**adiological and **N**uclear threats

OBSERVATION 2. INHERENCY. The Status Quo is not adequately focused on homeland security

A. NATO is confused about the "war on terror"

José María Aznar (former Spanish prime minister ), Spring 2006, "Reforming NATO: The focus must be terrorism," Europe's World, <http://europesworld.link.be/europesworld/PDFs/Issue2/EW2_2.10_Aznar_Reforming_NATO.pdf>

NATO is in crisis because some of its members believe we are at war, and others do not. The former say we are facing an enemy that has declared war on us in a conflict where stalemate is not an option. But the latter think that the Islamist radicals, extremists, jihadists and terrorists do not represent an existential threat to the Western world. They see political Islam as a phenomenon to be dealt with by intelligence services and police forces because they believe its activists should be seen as criminals rather than warriors.

B. NATO must shift its focus inward

José María Aznar (former Spanish prime minister ), Spring 2006, "Reforming NATO: The focus must be terrorism," Europe's World, <http://europesworld.link.be/europesworld/PDFs/Issue2/EW2_2.10_Aznar_Reforming_NATO.pdf>

So here is the NATO paradox: NATO is perceived to be everywhere, because it is almost everywhere, yet the sense of vulnerability and insecurity among its members' citizens is growing. Put another way, is it acceptable for politicians in Europe to go to the public and argue for the multi-deployment of NATO in far away places, while people are being blown apart in trains and buses on European soil? NATO was created to increase the security of its members and to protect our freedom and prosperity. Then it was somehow re-created and reinvented in the 1990s and its focus was moved beyond European soil to try and keep the peace on our eastern periphery. Now it is time to re-think what NATO is for**.**

C. Operation Active Endeavor is inadequate

Ali M. Köknar (associate fellow at IAGS), 24 Jan 2005, "Maritime terrorism: a new challenge for NATO," Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, <http://www.iags.org/n0124051.htm>

NATO commanders are aware of the holes in the defense of Europe against terrorism, particularly in maritime security, which they view as the "weak link". While OAE has helped cut illegal immigration and smuggling, and enabled NATO to build a unique picture of Mediterranean ship traffic, which could eventually become part of a global database, current inability of NATO members to effectively screen cargo container traffic is worrisome.

OBSERVATION 3. To achieve a comparative advantage over the status quo we offer the following Plan.

NATO shall implement the following plan by any necessary means

**Plank 1** Agency: NATO member governments and their representatives on the North Atlantic Council.

**Plank 2** Mandates

1. Expand Operation Active Endeavor to include inclusion in a global database and addition of CBRN detection teams

2. Implement NATO planning and executing for consequence management to get resources from nations that have capabilities to those that don't have indigenous capabilities.

3. Establish Counter Terrorism Command body and pool Special Operations Forces (SOF) resources

4. Implement annual NAC meetings at home/interior minister level

**Plank 3**. These mandates can be achieved by reallocating resources within NATO, any unforeseen additional funding needed for this plan will come from the existing NATO budget, cuts in European agricultural subsidies and/or grants from the US federal government deducted from the federal budget for Head Start.

**Plank 4.** Enforcement: Any government official not in compliance with the plan shall be removed from office.

**Plank 4** This plan shall take effect immediately upon an affirmative ballot.

**Plank 5**. Affirmative speeches shall have legislative intent for the purposes of clarifying the plan

OBSERVATION 4. The plan we have offered justifies an Affirmative ballot in today's round because it will give the following ADVANTAGES

ADVANTAGE 1. Bolstering Active Endeavor with CBRN detection capabilities improves homeland security

Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Special Report - Transatlantic Homeland Defense, May 2006, National Defense University, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/CTNSP-INSS/spl-rpt.pdf>

NATO member states could also take additional steps to integrate and selectively deploy with *Active Endeavor* and other operations their chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) detection capabilities to diminish further the threat of catastrophic terrorist attacks before they reach their shores. Capabilities in ground, air, and coastal surveillance, port security, airport security, and CBRN detection could be improved to bolster support of civil homeland security authorities

ADVANTAGE 2. Better catastrophic incident management through CBRN planning

Center for Technology and National Security Policy, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Special Report - Transatlantic Homeland Defense, May 2006, National Defense University, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/CTNSP-INSS/spl-rpt.pdf>

Experiences from natural disasters to high-end terrorist attacks indicate that a nation might need to supplement its indigenous capabilities in eight categories: decontamination teams to respond to CBRN attack, local airlift assets (primarily transport helicopters), logistic support assets (primarily trucks and forklifts), communications and intelligence assets, emergency medical teams, constabulary forces and military police engineers, including explosive ordnance disposal, Civil-Military Coordination Group capabilities. Units with these capabilities exist in NATO member forces. The Alliance's capacity would be strengthened by deliberate planning and force execution for consequence management in the event of a catastrophic incident.

ADVANTAGE 3. Better counter-terrorism missions with the Counter-Terrorism Command

Foundation for Social Analysis and Studies, 2005, "NATO: AN ALLIANCE FOR FREEDOM, " How to transform the Atlantic Alliance to effectively defend our Freedom and democracies, FAES Study, FAES a spanish acronym for the Spanish think tank, <http://www.fundacionfaes.org/documentos/Informe_OTAN_Ingles.pdf>

NATO should create a counter-terrorism command whose mission would be to prepare the concepts, doctrines, technologies and staff required to lead anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism missions, as well as to coordinate the organization's entire effort within this field. This command structure should, in turn, have its own evaluation center to assess the terrorist threat both inside and outside the Alliance's political boundaries This counter-terrorism command body would be ultimately responsible for defense plans to combat terrorism and should not only be able to rely on the armed forces of the member countries, but also have access to the domestic resources that the Allies are able to place at the disposal of the collective defense strategy.

ADVANTAGE 4. Pooled SOF would give NATO a flexible response to countering terrorism

Center for Technology and National Security Policy, May 2006, "Transantlantic Homeland Defense: Special Report," Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/CTNSP-INSS/spl-rpt.pdf>

Flexible response to countering terrorism requires a special operations force (SOF) capability. Such forces are expensive to organize, train, and equip, and are in great demand and short supply. NATO could explore a mechanism for nations to pool their SOF assets in order to respond promptly to a major challenge that would require NATO to assist overwhelmed individual nations.

ADVANTAGE 5. Improved NATO cooperation through Home Ministers Level meetings

Foundation for Social Analysis and Studies, 2005, NATO: AN ALLIANCE FOR FREEDOM, How to transform the Atlantic Alliance to effectively defend our Freedom and democracies, FAES Study, FAES a spanish acronym for the Spanish think tank, <http://www.fundacionfaes.org/documentos/Informe_OTAN_Ingles.pdf>

The advantages of home affairs minister meetings are many. First of all, they can provide an initial multilateral forum at which European home affairs ministers can sit down alongside their American and Canadian counterparts. This would not mean reducing the contact levels and cooperation that exist bilaterally between Washington and many European countries. It would simply be a question of promoting a new framework for multilateral agreement. What is more, the European members of the EU already stage meetings of this kind amongst themselves, without diminishing other forms of closer cooperation at a lower level. Their experience would be extremely valuable to NATO.

2A EVIDENCE: HOMELAND SECURITY

INHERENCY

NATO is now committed to going "out of area"

Lord George Robertson(Secretary General of NATO), NATO Review, Spring 2003 , "Transforming NATO," <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue1/english/art1.html>

First of all, we have reached agreement on the character of the new threats and on the best way that NATO and its members should respond to them. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are two of the defining challenges of the 21st century. The NATO Allies acknowledged this by invoking Article 5 in response to the 9/11 attacks. And they did so again by sending forces to Afghanistan to fight *al Qaida* and the Taliban. As a result, in 2002, we effectively buried the perennial debate on whether NATO could or should go "out-of-area".

NATO not treating terrorism as threat

Foundation for Social Analysis and Studies, 2005, NATO: AN ALLIANCE FOR FREEDOM, How to transform the Atlantic Alliance to effectively defend our Freedom and democracies, FAES Study, FAES a spanish acronym for the Spanish think tank

The problem that threatens to destroy NATO is that it has ceased to be an instrument that the organization's members believe effectively ensures their defense and security through joint action. On the one hand, America knows that the War on Terror can be waged more effectively if it does not need to negotiate through collective decision-making mechanisms and if its strategy is not subject to restraints posed by the limited military capability of its allies. On the other hand, a view has gained ground in Europe that Islamist terrorism does not represent an existential threat, which is why there is little recognition of the need to act in accordance with the dimension and intensity of the threat we are really facing

Europe does not see itself "at war" with terrorists

Peter W. Singer, (John M. Olin Post-Doctoral Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies), 26 Nov 2002, "New Thinking on Transatlantic Security: Terrorism, NATO, and Beyond," Brookings Institution, <http://www.brook.edu/views/speeches/singer/20030115.htm>

This leads into the next dynamic shaping transatlantic security, our diverging outlooks towards the world. To put it very bluntly, the United States considers itself at war, while Europe does not. This dynamic carries over in both the way we describe the threats we face and the means we use to respond. One only has to look at the resonance that the phrase "war on terrorism" has in the U.S. versus the way the phrase is viewed among European leaders and peoples. Likewise, the general U.S. concept of how to defeat terrorism has focused on the hard tools of the military and increased security and intelligence, while Europeans have tended to want to look at the motivating causes.

NATO burdened by differing views about war on terror

Peter W. Singer, (John M. Olin Post-Doctoral Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies), 26 Nov 2002, "New Thinking on Transatlantic Security: Terrorism, NATO, and Beyond," Brookings Institution, <http://www.brook.edu/views/speeches/singer/20030115.htm>

While the two sides may not resolve this divergence in viewpoint in the near-term, one thing is certain, its importance must be accounted for in transatlantic relations. This disagreement places incredible burdens and tensions on NATO Simply put, it is hard to maintain a close military alliance when one party sees itself at war and the other partner does not.

Europeans want to see themselves as at peace

Prof. James J. Wirtz (National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Calif.) June 2003, "Confronting Euro-Atlantic Security Challenges" Strategic Insights, Volume II, Issue 6

Second, there is a divergence in European and American views not about today's security challenges (terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), but about the severity and proximity of the threat and about what constitutes an appropriate military and diplomatic response. Europeans are now enjoying a rare moment in their common history: the continent is at peace, cooperation has replaced conflict in their relations, and the threat of war has virtually disappeared from their strategic horizon. After nearly a century of world and cold war, fascism, vicious balance of power politics, arms racing and genocide, Europeans now see diplomacy, cooperation, and multilateralism as the only way forward on the continent. War, once viewed as a necessary evil, is now seen as a uncivilized throwback to far more dangerous times, a period which is still very much within living memory. Europeans desperately want to believe that they have banished war forever from their home, and they do not want to adopt policies that might somehow allow it to reenter through the back door.

The world is not in a quiet post-Cold War peaceful state

José María Aznar (former Spanish prime minister ), Spring 2006, "Reforming NATO: The focus must be terrorism," Europe's World, <http://europesworld.link.be/europesworld/PDFs/Issue2/EW2_2.10_Aznar_Reforming_NATO.pdf>

The alliance is in a very real and deep crisis, despite its hyperactivity. The 1990s were a time of strategic holiday, when we celebrated the demise of the threat that the USSR had represented to all of us. We in NATO became confident that we were powerful enough to intervene and put an end to all civil and ethnic conflicts, if we so decided. The problem as we now know is that the 1990s were also a time when a new enemy was preparing to strike a fatal blow. The 9/11 attacks were not so much the outbreak of hostilities as a revelation that instead of living in a benign world we are now facing a new existential threat. Not just because terror became mass terror, but because this was a brand of Islamist terror that had a clear strategic vision that is incompatible with our way of life.

NBCR attack, sea containers and cyber terrorism are main terrorist threats to NATO

Center for Technology and National Security Policy, May 2006, "Transantlantic Homeland Defense: Special Report," Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/CTNSP-INSS/spl-rpt.pdf>

There are three main terrorist threats that loom over the members of the Alliance today: the threat of a nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological (NBCR) attack, the use of sea freight containers as a support for conventional or non-conventional artifacts and the possibility of cyberterrorism attacks. NATO must have the capacity to combat all these threats

NATO has not currently combined its Special Operations Forces (SOF) into a capable unit

National Defense Industrial Association, June 2006, "NATO Needs a Unified Elite Force, Experts Contend," <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/June/NATONeeds.htm>

What NATO does best — enhancing and melding multilateral capabilities for combined action — it has not done with regard to SOF," write David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith. Gompert is a senior fellow at Rand Corp., and a former ranking advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Smith, a retired rear admiral, is a former deputy commander of the U.S. Special Operations command and one-time commander of the Naval Special Warfare Command.

NATO SOF could succeed if it were organized correctly

National Defense Industrial Association, June 2006, "NATO Needs a Unified Elite Force, Experts Contend," <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/June/NATONeeds.htm>

The value of a NATO SOF force is obvious in light of the ongoing campaign against al Qaeda terrorist groups. In its 2006 quadrennial defense review, the Pentagon noted the heightened importance of SOF for combating the global jihad and other irregular threats. Most NATO allies possess SOF capabilities in one form or another. Some allies also have high-performance commando and elite paramilitary forces that are not assigned to their defense ministries. Within Spain's Guardia Civil, for example, are some of the world's finest counterterrorism forces — reflecting Spain's long struggle with Basque separatists, who use terror tactics. Several allies, such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Italy and Poland, have SOF-type forces in significant numbers that are capable of a wide range of missions. Quantitatively, the combined SOF capabilities of NATO allies are roughly half those of U.S. SOF. This represents a significant capacity for global efforts, provided the forces can be organized to work and fight together against common threats such as al Qaeda, notes the NDU study. However, the SOF of NATO members, including the United States, are not organized to collaborate for the purpose of improving capabilities, increasing preparedness or operating jointly.

NATO command structures need reform

Foundation for Social Analysis and Studies, 2005, NATO: AN ALLIANCE FOR FREEDOM, How to transform the Atlantic Alliance to effectively defend our Freedom and democracies, FAES Study, FAES a spanish acronym for the Spanish think tank, <http://www.fundacionfaes.org/documentos/Informe_OTAN_Ingles.pdf>

Nevertheless, for these forces to be able to play a significant role within the framework of homeland security within the Alliance and for this facet to be effectively brought into play at NATO, it will be necessary to reform Allied command structures. These structures continue to reflect the geo-strategic requirements of the past and are largely based on a geographical distribution of authority. This set-up is simpler than the one that operated throughout the Cold War, but it is derived from the same context. NATO does, in fact, have a command structure whose authority is not based on any specific geographical area: Allied Command Transformation, based in Norfolk, Virginia.

ADVANTAGES

Bolstering Active Endeavor would diminish terrorists threats

Foundation for Social Analysis and Studies, 2005, NATO: AN ALLIANCE FOR FREEDOM, How to transform the Atlantic Alliance to effectively defend our Freedom and democracies, FAES Study, FAES a spanish acronym for the Spanish think tank

To a certain extent, Operation *Active Endeavor*, which takes place in the Straits of Gibraltar, in spite of all its limitations, represents the need for the Alliance to provide a collective answer to the increased vulnerability of international borders and its members' vital sea lines of communication. Whatever the case may be, the Alliance can and must do much more within this field. In our opinion, there are three main terrorist threats that loom over the members of the Alliance today: the threat of a nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological (NBCR) attack, the use of sea freight containers as a support for conventional or non-conventional artifacts and the possibility of cyber-terrorism attacks. NATO must have the capacity to combat all these threats.

NATO can reduce risk by reforming NBCR response

Foundation for Social Analysis and Studies, 2005, NATO: AN ALLIANCE FOR FREEDOM, How to transform the Atlantic Alliance to effectively defend our Freedom and democracies, FAES Study, FAES a Spanish acronym for the Spanish think tank

In order to prevent NBCR attacks, NATO has a number of specialized radioactive material detection units at its disposal that could well be brought together in order to provide an early-warning system on a continental scale. Furthermore, the Alliance must create contingency plans in order to make its NBCR response capability available for managing the consequences of attacks of this kind against civilian targets.

NATO Homeland Defense focus can ensure new threats are addressed

Center for Technology and National Security Policy, May 2006, "Transantlantic Homeland Defense: Special Report," Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/CTNSP-INSS/spl-rpt.pdf>

Homeland defense—that is, the military's role in preventing and defending against terrorist attacks on the territory of Alliance members— is an increasingly important imperative for the United States, Canada and Europe. NATO has the opportunity to articulate a strategic direction and planning process for homeland defense to ensure that relevant Alliance activities and capabilities are adapted and integrated to deal with these new threats

NATO Counter-terrorism Command would improve war on terrorism

Gareth Harding (UPI Chief European Correspondent ). United Press International (UPI) News, 2 Dec 2005, Interview: Former Spanish premier Jose Aznar, , <http://www.washingtonspeakers.com/prod_images/pdfs/AznarJose.Interview.1202.05.pdf>

So if the main threat facing all of us is terrorism and the objective of the alliance is to guarantee our security, the main objective of the alliance today should be fighting terrorism. It is absurd that NATO gives support to the African Union in Darfur but can't define a policy to guarantee the security of its citizens at home. The main objective of NATO is that Spaniards, French, Germans and Britons are secure. That's why I propose the creation of a counter-terrorism command inside NATO and to create a doctrine which renovates NATO's strategic doctrine to fight terrorism.

Cohesive NATO SOF units would be better qualified for counterterrorism

National Defense Industrial Association, June 2006, "NATO Needs a Unified Elite Force, Experts Contend," <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/June/NATONeeds.htm>

While most NATO members have skilled special operations units, the alliance so far has not forged them into a cohesive multinational force. Such a commando formation would be better qualified — particularly in counterterrorism scenarios — to respond to contingencies, avow military experts.

Home Affairs Ministers bring increased capabilities to the table

Foundation for Social Analysis and Studies, 2005, NATO: AN ALLIANCE FOR FREEDOM, How to transform the Atlantic Alliance to effectively defend our Freedom and democracies, FAES Study, FAES a spanish acronym for the Spanish think tank, <http://www.fundacionfaes.org/documentos/Informe_OTAN_Ingles.pdf>

However, in addition to the important political contributions they might make, these home affairs ministers could contribute to the Alliance all of the capacities that many of them have at their disposal as part of their national intelligence services and, in some cases, interior security forces, such as the French Gendarmerie, Italian Carbinieri and the Spanish Guardia Civil. It is essential to involve these forces today in a new joint defense dimension. NATO has traditionally included them when it comes to calculating the budget demands made on its members for defense purposes. The time has now come for them to be fully included in NATO's operational plans and not only as a complement to the armed forces in peace missions abroad.

Interior Minister is right level for counter-terrorism issues

Center for Technology and National Security Policy, May 2006, "Transantlantic Homeland Defense: Special Report," Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/CTNSP-INSS/spl-rpt.pdf>

[brackets added]

[Listed under Counter-terrorism potential areas for improvement:] The reinforced North Atlantic Council at Defense Ministers Level (NAC–D) could hold meetings with interior ministers on counterterrorism issues.

Homeland Defense Capabilities could be used for civil-military missions

Center for Technology and National Security Policy, May 2006, "Transantlantic Homeland Defense: Special Report," Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/CTNSP-INSS/spl-rpt.pdf>

In some cases, capabilities created for homeland defense purposes could be used within and outside the NATO area for such civil-military missions. The four categories are: guarding the approaches and achieving border security for the NATO region, pursuing enhanced/integrated and linked continental early warning and air/missile defense capabilities preventing and managing terrorist incidents, strengthening transatlantic capabilities for consequence management, ranging from terrorist use to large-scale natural disasters.

Defeating terrorism and defending the homeland are the most important tasks NATO has

Prof. Daniel S. Hamilton, (Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns HopkinsUniv., former Deputy Assistant Sec. of State for European Affairs), 2004, "Transatlantic Transformations:Equipping NATO for the 21st Century" <http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/Publications/transatlantic_transformations_natobook.pdf>

To their already full agenda I would add another element: aligning Alliance doctrine, capabilities and civil-military emergency planning with national strategies to defend the "transatlantic homeland." In past years NATO reforms have focused on projecting force and coping with threats beyond the NATO area. But NATO's nations—and their partners—must be equally prepared to prevent, deter and, if necessary, cope with the consequences of WMD attacks on their societies—from any source. Territorial defense in the Cold War sense of protecting sea-lanes from Soviet submarines or guarding the Fulda Gap from Soviet tanks must give way to a new common conception of territorial protection against WMD attacks from any source. Europe cannot assume that it will not be a target of future terrorist attacks. Al-Qaeda has attacked NATO ally Turkey. Al-Qaeda cells have tried to launch attacks in other parts of Europe as well. If Alliance nations fail to defend their societies from a major attack using weapons of mass destruction, the Alliance will have failed in its most fundamental task. It will be marginalized and the security of Europe and North America will be further diminished.

SPEAK UP: THE CASE FOR REFORMING THE MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE

By Matthew Baker

Faced with an alliance that was largely inactive during the Cold War, some commentators relabeled NATO as an acronym for No Action, Talk Only. Even though this label could not accurately be applied to the current Alliance as a whole, it does unfortunately describe NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue program. Because my partner and I see the need for a deeper relationship between NATO and the Mediterranean region we stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION I: DEFINITIONS

**NATO** "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." (*North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" http://www.nato.int/home.htm#)*

**Significant** "important in effect or meaning." (*Wordnet 2.1 (Published by Princeton University****),*** March 2005

**Reform** "To change or improve." (The Glossary of Judicial and Historical Terms (Published by Old Bailey Online Project), 2003, http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/history/glossary.html)

**MD** Mediterranean Dailogue, currently composed of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia

**PfP** Partnership for Peace

OBSERVATION II: INHERENCY

A. MD is all talk - not enough attention and resources

Dr. Helle Malmvig (Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Copenhagen), "The New For NATO In the Middle East?: Assessing Possibilities and Barriers for an Enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue," DIIS Report, 2005

The Mediterranean Dialogue has, in other words, primarily been a political forum for discussions and dissemination of information, and has often been referred to as a mere ‘talking shop'. In general the initiative has not been considered as a critical activity of NATO, and little attention and resources have accordingly been devoted to the programme. Moreover, the Dialogue countries themselves have also been reluctant to participate in the activities and seminars proposed by NATO, and have often viewed the MD with scepticism and mistrust. In comparison with the PfP Programme, the Mediterranean Dialogue has hence only produced relatively modest results.

B. Istanbul reforms inadequate

Dr. Philip Gordon (PhD and Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins Unversity), "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," Emirates Lecture Series, #63, Spring 2006, <http://www.brookings.org/views/papers/gordon/emirates20060530.pdf>

At its June 2004 Istanbul summit, NATO members offered to try to breathe new life into the Mediterranean Dialogue, but it is unclear whether its members will be any more interested in it now than in the past.

OBSERVATION III: PLAN

The North Atlantic Council will enact the following plan by all necessary means:

Mandate 1 NATO will offer a PfP type plan for the Mediterranean Dialogue states meeting the requirements of the PfP Framework Document. Such requirements include progress towards a democratic society, commitment to maintaining international law, repudiation of aggression, transparency, and peacekeeping capacity. A full list of requirements for the PfP will be provided upon request.

Mandate 2 Members will receive access to all traditional benefits of the PfP program outlined in the Partnership Work Program including Crisis Management, Language Training, Medical Services, Meteorological Support, Military Education, Training Exercises, Intelligence Sharing etc.

Mandate 3 Membership for the PfP will be expanded beyond the Mediterranean to Middle Eastern States.

Mandate 4 The Current MD is not abolished by this plan. Current MD members who do not yet meet the requirements of PfP can continue to participate in MD at the current level.

Enforcement: Any official found in violation of this plan shall be removed from office. Any MD-PfP country that slides back from its Framework commitments shall be disciplined with removal from MD-PfP until they again meet the requirements for entry.

Funding: Since a simple policy change is being enacted, no funding outside of normal means is required.

The Affirmative Team reserves the right to further expand on this plan as needed.

OBSERVATION IV: ADVANTAGES

ADVANTAGE 1: Improved Image in the Arab World

A. Significance/Inherency: West's current behavior alienates the Muslim World

Kishore Mahbubani (dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore and former President of the UN Security Council), "Cartoon Riots a Spur to Understand Roots of Anger," Straits Times. February 11, 2006, <http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/religion/article.asp?parentid=38986>

Muslims are convinced that the world, especially the West, shows no moral concern over their plight. The loss of innocent Muslim lives, whether in Iraq or Palestine, Afghanistan or Pakistan, does not stir the world. Nor has the West shown any real interest in supporting the development of Muslim societies.

B. Solvency: PfP will improve Middle East relationships

Chris Donnelly (Senior Fellow at the UK Defence Academy in Shrivenham and former NATO special advisor on Central and Eastern Europe)"Building a NATO partnership for the Great Middle East," NATO Review, Spring 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue1/english/art3.html>

But whereas Central and Eastern Europe saw the Partnership for Peace primarily as an implement to draw information and engagement out of NATO, and to get NATO to inject influence into Central and Eastern Europe, countries of North Africa and the Greater Middle East want first and foremost a means of getting their voice heard, and of influencing Allies' decision-making. This is good because we need to listen and understand before we can reply and formulate policies. Our influence in the region will be directly in proportion to our readiness to listen and to hear.

ADVANTAGE 2: Increased Democracy

A. Significance: Lack of democracy causes Islamic extremism

Thomas Carothers (vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment with a JD from Harvard) , "Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror," Foreign Affairs, January/February 2003, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20030101faessay10224/thomas-carothers/promoting-democracy-and-fighting-terror.html>

On the other hand, U.S. officials and policy experts have increasingly come to believe that it is precisely the lack of democracy in many of these countries that helps breed Islamic extremism.

B. Solvency: PfP helps Build Democracy

Dr. Soner Cagaptay (PhD in History from Yale head of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), "NATO's Transformative Powers," National Review, April 2, 2004, <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/cagaptay200404020907.asp>

Over the past decade, PfP's performance-based membership strategy, whereby countries are given access to the prized goal of higher-level NATO assistance only after demonstrating their deep commitment to democracy, has helped former Communist states in Eastern Europe build strong, working democracies.

C. Impact: Democracies less likely to go to war with one another

Kofi Annan (Secretary General of the UN), "War Less Likely Between Mature Democracies, Says Secretary General," In Lecture at Oxford University, June 19, 2001, <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sgsm7850.doc.htm>

The idea of a connection between democracy and international peace is at least two centuries old. Many would associate it with the work of Immanuel Kant, whose essay "Perpetual Peace" was published in 1795. Kant argued that "republics" -- by which he meant essentially what today we call liberal or pluralistic democracies -- were less likely than other forms of State to go to war with one another. Broadly speaking, the history of the last 200 years has proved him right.

ADVANTAGE 3: Increased Cooperation Towards Solving International Problems

A. Significance: International Cooperation vital in the war against terrorism

Ellen Margrethe Løj, (Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations), "Strengthening the basics of counter terrorism," April 20, 2006, <http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/ddct20april06.shtml>

As the Security Council has stressed terrorism is not purely a domestic affair. To combat terrorism effectively, international cooperation is vital.

B. Solvency: Enhancing MD is a major step towards formulating common response

NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, "Secretary General's Speech in Jordan at the World Affairs Council," January 13, 2005, <http://www.solongroup.org/NATO%20SecGen%20speech%20to%20World%20Affairs%20Council%20in%20Jordan.htm>

Today, the role of the Mediterranean as a bridge is more evident than ever. Because demographics, economics, and energy needs create an ever closer interdependence between us. And because new threats -- such as terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and transnational organised crime -- affect us all and require a common response. Enhancing the Mediterranean Dialogue, and developing it into a genuine partnership, is one major step in this process.

2A EVIDENCE: REFORM MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE

INHERENCY

Unlike PfP, MD has not been successful

Chris Donnelly (Senior Fellow at the UK Defence Academy in Shrivenham and former NATO special advisor on Central and Eastern Europe)"Building a NATO partnership for the Great Middle East," NATO Review, Spring 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue1/english/art3.html>

Unlike the Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue has not been a great success. It has played no significant role in stabilising the region or in helping and promoting the evolution of participating countries.

MD has not played major role since its launch

Dr. Philip Gordon (PhD and Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins Unversity), "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," Emirates Lecture Series, #63, Spring 2006, <http://www.brookings.org/views/papers/gordon/emirates20060530.pdf>

The Mediterranean Dialogue has not played a major role since its launch. Unlike NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) with Central and East European countries, the MD was never linked to potential NATO accession for its participants, and while the contacts between NATO and MD countries were useful, the discussions rarely touched on the key security issues of the day.

No NATO strategy for entire Mediterranean and Middle East

Thomas Papenroth (defense expert at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs), "Israel and NATO," The German Institute for International and Security Affairs, September 2005, <http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?id=1399>

In this context, the lack of a joint American-European approach to the entire region is a handicap. There is no NATO strategy referring to the entire Mediterranean region and the Near and Middle East.

MD has simply existed for consultation not practical cooperation

Dr. Helle Malmvig (Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Copenhagen),, "The New For NATO In the Middle East?: Assessing Possibilities and Barriers for an Enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue," DIIS Report, 2005

Until now the main activities of the Dialogue have taken the form of political consultation and information exchange, whereas the practical cooperative activities have been minimal.

SIGNIFICANCE

Except Israel, no MD country is a true democracy

Professor Bent Erik Bakken (NATO Research Fellow at the NATO DefenseCollege), "NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue," NATO Defense College, 2003

Indeed, with the exception of Israel, no MD nationis democratic in the strictly Western sense of the world, i.e. where all political power is derived from the people in regular elections. In NATO headquarters and capitals, this is viewed as politically, morally and practically problematic.

Arabs feel trampled upon by the West

Kishore Mahbubani (dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore and former President of the UN Security Council), "Cartoon Riots a Spur to Understand Roots of Anger," Straits Times. February 11, 2006, <http://www.asiamedia.ucla.edu/religion/article.asp?parentid=38986>

The open bewilderment of the Danes and Europeans at the global Muslim reaction to the Danish cartoons only reflects the widespread ignorance of the existential conditions of the Muslim world. It is no great secret that the Muslim world feels trampled upon by the West.

Cooperation in the Mediterranean is essential for security

Dr. Hassan Rahmouni (Professor of Public Law and Constitutional Law at Hassan II University in Morocco), "The Perspective of Democratization in Mediterranean Regional Cooperation," January 2006, <http://www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/lang-de/page-mc-index-1/xdocs/conf/2006-conferences/static/xdocs/conf/2006-conferences/0611/Democratization-in-the-Mediterranean-Region.pdf>

Security cooperation between countries of the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean Sea has grown to become of utmost priority for all peoples of this region. Increasing security threats of all natures impart, more than ever before, a need for the development of closer partnership links between these neighboring nations.

Confidence building is needed in the Mediterranean/NATO relationship

Dr. Helle Malmvig (Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Copenhagen), "From Diplomatic Talking Shop to Powerful Partnership?: NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the democratization of the Middle East," Danish Institute for International Studies, May 2004

Confidence building is a prerequisite for a more cooperative partnership and should not be underestimated. Given the often conflictual relationship between North and South, as well as among the Mediterranean members states themselves, it is an important achievement to increase levels of trust and to gain an understanding of each other's security perceptions.

SOLVENCY

PfP successfully reconstructed the divided Post-Cold War World

Alain Faupin (Major General (Ret) and Senior Fellow at the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces), "Towards a Trans-Mediterranean Partnership for Peace?," PfP Consortium Quaterly Journal, June 2005, <http://cms.isn.ch/public/docs/doc_10939_290_en.pdf>

The PfP has contributed to the reconstruction of a region that was divided during the Cold War into two different worlds, and has helped to recreate a homogeneous region: the Euro-Atlantic area. This is a region characterized by real geographic continuity and a genuine identity, built out of cultural, economic, monetary, and conceptual (not to say political) elements. The reconciliation processes that are so important to reunifying the region, with very few exceptions (Cyprus being an ugly one), have been achieved.

Several elements of PfP are attractive for Middle Eastern Countries

NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, "Secretary General's Speech in Jordan at the World Affairs Council," January 13, 2005, <http://www.solongroup.org/NATO%20SecGen%20speech%20to%20World%20Affairs%20Council%20in%20Jordan.htm>

But several elements of PfP appear very valuable to our southern neighbors, as they have proven to be to our neighbours to the east. This applies, for example, to cooperation on defence reform and joint training; to cooperation in intelligence sharing in the fight against terrorism; but also to actual operational cooperation to defend against terrorism such as possible participation in NATO's maritime operation in the Mediterranean. Basically an anti-terrorist operation.

NATO is clearly welcomed in Middle East as several states are enthusiastic about expanded dialogue

Dr. Philip Gordon (PhD and Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins Unversity), "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," Emirates Lecture Series, #63, Spring 2006, <http://www.brookings.org/views/papers/gordon/emirates20060530.pdf>

In some cases, it is clear that NATO is welcome. The Pakistani government wanted as much help as possible with earthquake relief and asked NATO to contribute, while in Sudan the African Union is asking for NATO support. Several Gulf states have enthusiastically welcomed NATO's offer of more extensive political dialogue and in Afghanistan, the Karzai government values NATO's contribution, as apparently do many Afghan citizens.

NATO can influence movement to democracy through meetings with military leaders

Joseph Braude (degree in Near Eastern Language from Yale and degree in Arabic and Islamic History at Princeton), "Mixed Message: The Problem with NATO's Outreach to the Arab World," The New Republic, March 29, 2005, <http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w050425&s=braude042905> (brackets in original)

In a half-hour *Al Jazeera* program on NATO's Arab agenda broadcast this week, Sa'd Jabbar, a Moroccan-born professor at the Center for North African Studies at the University of Cambridge, had this to say: "As an organization, [NATO] has the ability to play an active and positive role--if it convinces the military regimes, by way of the military personnel with whom they meet, that it is in the interest of their governments and peoples to establish democracy--which is what happened in eastern Europe.

Expanding dialogue and Cooperation will help liberalize Mediterranean states

Dr. Ariel Cohen (PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University) "NATO's Frontiers: Eurasia, the Mediterranean, and the Greater Middle East," The Heritage Foundation, January 9, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl919.cfm>

The Southern Mediterranean political systems are desperately in need of fresh air. Decision-makers need to be exposed to new ideas in the realms of security. Militaries need to come under stricter civil­ian control and assume a role in fighting terrorism. Bringing missions from the Greater Middle East to Brussels, exposing them to NATO's ways, expand­ing dialogue and cooperation will go a long way toward familiarizing these future allies with NATO's norms and Western culture.

Renewed commitment to MD could encourage liberalization/democratization

Dr. Soner Cagaptay (PhD in History from Yale, head of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy), "NATO's Transformative Powers," National Review, April 2, 2004, <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/cagaptay200404020907.asp>

Second, NATO's renewed commitment to the Mediterranean Dialogue countries could influence greater emphasis on liberalization/democratization initiatives.

Adding PfP to MD will help solve problems in the region

Chris Donnelly (Senior Fellow at the UK Defence Academy in Shrivenham and former NATO special advisor on Central and Eastern Europe)"Building a NATO partnership for the Great Middle East," NATO Review, Spring 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue1/english/art3.html>

Wags have sometimes joked that NATO stands for "No Action, Talk Only." It is, however, precisely the Alliance's ability to provide a forum for dialogue where members can argue out their problems rather than coming to blows over them that has been the basis of its success. This is what the Partnership for Peace did for those nations that wanted to join the NATO club, and what the Mediterranean Dialogue has to date failed to do, despite its name.

PfP/MD could create valuable cooperation in a number of areas

Peter Faber (Associate Researcher, Academic Research Branch of the NATO Defense College), "NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue: Options for the Future," Research Paper, No. 6, May 2004

Despite the recent departure of once-active NATO candidate nations, the PfP Program remains a viable forum for regional and international cooperation. It is a highly effective "soft power" tool and force multiplier for the Alliance. It is also an ideal way to expand Alliance cooperation and dialogue into the former Yugoslavia and – as part of a combined/integrated PfP/Mediterranean Dialogue Program – the Maghreb and Mashrek. The latter option would not only provide economies of scale, it would also provide an opportunity for states like Syria and Lebanon to join the greater European security space.

A combined program would also stimulate mutually beneficial cooperation in the following common areas: counterterrorism, asymmetric threats, energy security, defense reform, improved transparency and interoperability, organized crime prevention, migration, arms export control, and procurement practices.

Plan Advocate: Former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar

Jose Maria Aznar, "Reforming NATO: The Focus must be terrorism," Europe's World, Spring 2006, <http://europesworld.link.be/europesworld/PDFs/Issue2/EW2_2.10_Aznar_Reforming_NATO.pdf>

Other proposals include the idea that NATO should transform its Mediterranean Dialogue into a Partnership for Freedom, where cooperation would be linked to the promotion of political freedom, economic liberalisation and religious tolerance in North Africa and the Middle East.

Partnership For Peace Framework Document summary

NATO, "The Partnership for Paece," 2006, <http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp/index.html>

The formal basis for the Partnership for Peace is the Framework Document, which sets out specific undertakings for each Partner country. Each Partner country makes a number of far-reaching political commitments to preserve democratic societies; to maintain the principles of international law; to fulfil obligations under the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act and international disarmament and arms control agreements; to refrain from the threat or use of force against other states; to respect existing borders; and to settle disputes peacefully. Specific commitments are also made to promote transparency in national defence planning and budgeting to establish democratic control over armed forces, and to develop the capacity for joint action with NATO in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The Framework Document also enshrines a commitment by the Allies to consult with any Partner country that perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence or security – a mechanism which, for example, Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia made use of during the Kosovo crisis.

IMPACTS

Cooperation essential on terrorism

Eben Kaplan (research associate for the Council on Foreign Relations), "Tracking Down Terrorist Financing," Council on Foreign Relations, April 4, 2006,[**http://www.**cfr.org/publication/10356/](http://www.cfr.org/publication/10356/)

Because terrorist networks transcend national boundaries, improving international cooperation is essential."

International Cooperation essential to stopping terrorists funding

E. Anthony Wayne (Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs), "The State Department Role in Combating the Financing of Terrorism" April 4, 2006, <http://www.senate.gov/~banking/_files/ACFFE09.pdf>

International cooperation remains fundamental to our common endeavors for the simple reason that most of the funds used to support terrorism are located outside the jurisdiction of the United States. International cooperation is essential to initiatives in fields ranging from intelligence and law enforcement coordination to targeted financial sanctions to norms and standards of financial regulation.

NO NUKES: THE CASE FOR ENDING NUCLEAR SHARING AGREEMENTS

By Matthew Baker

President Bush has clearly established that "…the biggest threat facing this country is weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist network." However, deployment of NATO tactical nuclear weapons not only threatens this very reality but flagrantly flaunts international law and undermines the moral credibility of non-proliferation efforts. As a result, my partner and I stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION I. Definitions

**NATO** "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." (*North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?"* , http://www.nato.int/home.htm#*)*

**Significant** "important in effect or meaning." (Wordnet 2.0, Published by Princeton University 2003)

**Reform** "To change or improve." (The Glossary of Judicial and Historical Terms, Published by Old Bailey Online Project, 2003, http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/history/glossary.html

**TNW** Tactical Nuclear Weapons

**NPT** Non-Proliferation Treaty

OBSERVATION II. Inherency: There is No Plan to Remove Nuclear Weapons in the Status Quo

Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, "Policy Briefs on the Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," April 2005, <http://www.nupi.no/IPS/filestore/PolicyBriefsApril2005.pdf>

NATO has no plans to remove its dual-capable aircraft or the approximately 500 US gravity bombs that remain in Europe.

OBSERVATION III. NATO's Maintenance of Tactical Nuclear Weapons Cause Multiple Harms

HARM 1) Undermines the Rule of International Law

A) The Treaty on Non Proliferation bans transfers of nuclear weapons

Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" Article II, (Ratified by the US on March 5, 1970), <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/text/npt2.htm>

Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly;

B) NATO nuclear sharing agreements allow transfer of nukes and violate NPT

Arjun Makhijani, (Ph.D. and president of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research)and Nicole Deller, (J.D.) "NATO and Nuclear Disarmament: An Analysis of the Obligations of the NATO Allies of the United States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, October 2003, <http://www.ieer.org/reports/nato/ch2.html>

The second component of nuclear sharing is the operational sharing of nuclear weapons whereby the United States maintains control of the weapons, which are free fall bombs in dual-use aircraft, until such time that a decision to use them has been made. At that point, control of the weapons is transferred to those other NATO members on whose territory they are stored. As a result of this policy, non-nuclear weapon states "have the capability to conduct a nuclear attack, using U.S. nuclear weapons and national delivery means during times of war." Estimates tally the number of weapons between 150 and 180 weapons in thirteen bases in seven NATO countries - Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey and Britain. All except Britain are non-nuclear parties to the NPT. Most if not all of the weapons are B-61 free fall nuclear bombs. Both aspects of nuclear sharing are intended to allow non-nuclear weapon countries to be able to use weapons at a time of war. There is a strong argument that the operational aspect, that is the physical placement of nuclear weapons on non-nuclear weapon territory, violates the non-transfer and non-acquisition provisions of the NPT, even though the NATO arrangement pre-dated the entry into force of the NPT.

HARM 2) Undermines Diplomacy and International Relations

A) NATO nuke sharing undermines Iranian negotiations and Russian Relations

Matthew Martin, (program officer in policy analysis and dialogue at the Stanley Foundation), "NATO Nuclear Weapons: The International Face of US Nuclear Policy," The Stanley Foundation, February 2006, <http://www.wagingpeace.org/menu/programs/international-law/annual-symposium/2006_papers/martin-matthew_napf-2006-international-law-symposium.pdf>

In the challenging realm of international influences on US nuclear policy, changing US policy through NATO may be one of the more attainable goals. Prominent European government officials are already sympathetic and activated; significant portions of European populations are uncomfortable with the current posture; the current policy is hampering non-strategic reductions in Russia and harming our overall relationship with Russia; nuclear sharing makes broader negotiations on nonproliferation (i.e., Iran) more difficult; forward-based nuclear weapons have little or no strategic value in the current political environment; and even US military officials have questioned the continued utility of NATO nuclear sharing.

B) Keeping Tactical Nuclear Weapons harms Russian relations and increases risk of nuclear terrorism

Major Brian Polser (USAF and candidate for Masters in National Security Affairs from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School), "Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe: The Contemporary Debate," Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 9, September 2004, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/sep/polserSept04.asp>

NATO's adherence to TNW utility complicates relations with Russia as well, and could continue to hinder prospects for cooperation on arms control and nonproliferation. This is particularly troublesome when the security and stability of Russia's nuclear complex is an area of deep concern with respect to the threat of nuclear terrorism.

HARM 3) Unnecessary Risks

A) TNW could start an unintended Nuclear War

General Sir Hugh Beach (former Master General of the Ordnance for the British Army) "Disarmament Diplomacy, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Europe Redundant WMD," Issue No. 77, May/June 2004, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77hb.htm> [Note: Jozef Goldblat is PhD and Senior Lecturer and Research Fellow, Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies at the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies]

In the 1994 edition of his compendium on arms control Jozef Goldblat said of these developments: "Because of their small size, large numbers and widespread dispersion, tactical nuclear weapons cannot be kept under strict supervision. Maintaining command and control over such weapons in a wartime situation would be particularly difficult: the fear that they may be overrun by an enemy early in a conventional armed conflict could prompt local commanders to resort to their early use and start a nuclear war unintended by political leaders.

B) A TNW dispute could split the alliance

Major Brian Polser (USAF and candidate for Masters in National Security Affairs from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School), "Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe: The Contemporary Debate," Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 9, Sept 2004, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/sep/polserSept04.asp>

This policy also threatens Alliance cohesion due to differing positions on the actual role of forward-based U.S. TNWs in NATO counter proliferation policy. One senior European diplomat has strongly staked out the European position on the issue: "If you think we are going to let the Americans throw nuclear weapons around on Europe's periphery, then you must be crazy." During a recent NATO exercise, however, this is precisely the issue that divided the Allied participants.The lack of cohesion actually forced NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson to end the exercise early "to prevent open conflict emerging between allies."

OBSERVATION IV. We offer the following Plan:

**Agency:** The North Atlantic Council, the Nuclear Planning Group, and member state governments.

**Mandates**:

1) Revoke all nuclear-sharing agreements

2) remove all Tactical Nuclear Weapons to their home nation or to a location in compliance with the NPT.

**Enforcement:** Member states will ensure the cooperation of their armed forces. Any government official not in compliance with this plan shall be removed from office.

**Funding:** This plan will free funds currently used for facilities, deployment, and training. No expenditures outside of the regular operating budget will be added.

**Legislative Intent:** The affirmative team reserves the right to further explain this plan as needed.

**Timeline:** All TNWs will be removed within 6 months following an Affirmative ballot.

OBSERVATION V. Advantages:

ADVANTAGE 1) Strengthened NPT

Otfried Nassauer, (the director of the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security), "NATO's Nuclear Posture Review: Should Europe end nuclear sharing?," BITS Policy Note 02.1 ISSN 1434-3274, April 2002, <http://www.bits.de/public/policynote/pn02-1.htm#5>

It would mean a considerable strengthening of the NPT if the non-nuclear members of NATO were to take the initiative to remove these obstacles to the credibility of the NPT by renouncing their capability to use nuclear weapons in times of war. They could remove any doubts about their willingness to comply with NPT regulations. The need to forge agreement among the NPT members about whether nuclear sharing constitutes breach of the treaty or not would disappear. Even more importantly, the credibility of the non-proliferation regime would be seriously strengthened at a time when many fear that the results of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review will – in the mid to longer term – seriously weaken world-wide non-proliferation efforts by enhancing the likelihood of pro-liferation. As a case in point, members of the Bush administration have publicly discussed whether the U.S. should stick to its politically binding obligations under the Negative Security Assurances, which were both crucial and instrumental to obtaining the unconditional and unlimited extension of the NPT in 1995. A non-proliferation regime with different rights and obligations cannot be stable in the longer term. Therefore a renunciation of the technical aspect of nuclear sharing presents an unequivocal signal that NATO member states recognize the universal validity of the NPT. Their voluntary renunciation would be a strong indication to all parties to the NPT that the role of nuclear weapons within NATO strategy is being reduced, not expanded."

ADVANTAGE 2) Strengthened International Relations

General Sir Hugh Beach (former Commandant of the UK Army Staff College and former Director of the Council for Arms Control with an honorary Doctorate of Civil Laws from the University of Kent in Canterbury), "Tactical nuclear weapons: Europe's redundant weapons of mass destruction," International Security Information Service Europe. April 2004, <http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/Download/WMDBriefing.pdf>

If the six non-nuclear members of NATO who currently train for a tactical nuclear role were ready to give this up it could open the way for repatriating all the remaining US TNW. This would meet Russia's longstanding wish to rid European territory of nuclear weapons within range of its territory. It could act as an important confidence-building measure, and encourage further mutual reductions in TNW. In view of the US's acute reluctance to enter into fresh treaty commitments, an exchange of unilateral announcements might again be the best method.

ADVANTAGE 3) Decreased Risks

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, "US tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe," October 2005, <http://www.cnduk.org/pages/binfo/nato2005.pdf>

Finally, on a lesser scale but still important, withdrawal would virtually eliminate the risks of accident or hostile attack for areas surrounding the bases where US bombs are deployed.

2A EVIDENCE: END NUCLEAR SHARING AGREEMENTS

TOPICALITY

Nukes Fall Under NATO

Oliver Meier, "Belgium, Germany Question US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe," Arms Control Association, June 2005, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_06/Belgium_Germany_Tactical.asp>

Under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, an estimated 480 tactical nuclear weapons remain deployed in five NATO nonnuclear- weapon states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey) and in the United Kingdom, which also possesses an independent nuclear arsenal.

INHERENCY

US favors Status Quo

Oliver Meier, "Belgium, Germany Question US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe," Arms Control Association, June 2005, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_06/Belgium_Germany_Tactical.asp>

Apart from Germany, no NATO member state has officially taken a position on the future of NATO nuclear sharing in the context of the recent debate. However, U.S. spokesmen have made clear their preference for the status quo.

Declassified Documents indicate 480 nukes in 6 NATO countries

Hans M. Kristensen (Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists), "US Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning." National Resource Defense Council, 2005, <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/euro/euro.pdf>

Piecing together evidence from an array of sources, the Natural Resources Defense Council has determined that the United States is still deploying 480 nuclear weapons in Europe. That should come as a surprise. Until now, most observers believed that there were no more than half of those weapons still left on the continent. Declassified documents obtained under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, military literature, the media, non-governmental organizations, and other sources show that the 480 bombs are stored at eight air bases in six NATO countries – a formidable arsenal larger than the entire Chinese nuclear stockpile.

US aggressively pursuing Nuclear Weapons development

Matthew Martin, (program officer in policy analysis and dialogue at the Stanley Foundation), "NATO Nuclear Weapons: The International Face of US Nuclear Policy," The Stanley Foundation, Feb 2006, <http://www.wagingpeace.org/menu/programs/international-law/annual-symposium/2006_papers/martin-matthew_napf-2006-international-law-symposium.pdf>

Far from reducing the role of nuclear weapons, the United States is now pursuing the development of new nuclear weapons under the aegis of the Reliable Replacement Warhead program and enhancing the role of nuclear weapons in counter-proliferation and preventive war strategies. The United Kingdom is scheduled to announce a decision on whether to replace their sole nuclear platform—Trident—and preparations would seem to indicate a path closely hewing to the US position. Indeed, the US and UK were scheduled to conduct a sub-critical nuclear test at the Nevada Test Site on February 23, 2006 as part of ongoing cooperative efforts.

HARMS

US only state that deploys Nuclear Weapons on Foreign Soil

Matthew Martin, (program officer in policy analysis and dialogue at the Stanley Foundation), "NATO Nuclear Weapons: The International Face of US Nuclear Policy," The Stanley Foundation, Feb 2006, <http://www.wagingpeace.org/menu/programs/international-law/annual-symposium/2006_papers/martin-matthew_napf-2006-international-law-symposium.pdf>

In 2006, the United States is the only nuclear weapons state that bases any portion of its nuclear arsenal on foreign soil.

NATO nuclear weapons violate NPT Article VI

Arjun Makhijani Ph.D. (president of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research)and Nicole Deller, (J.D.) "NATO and Nuclear Disarmament: An Analysis of the Obligations of the NATO Allies of the United States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, Oct 2003, <http://www.ieer.org/reports/nato/ch2.html>

Viewed in the context of the increasingly specific commitments to disarmament, the continuation of this policy where NATO state may receive control of nuclear weapons is certainly violating the spirit of Article VI, and is also inconsistent with the NPT's non-acquisition provisions.

The International Court of Justice question legality of NATO nuke sharing

Otfried Nassauer, (the director of the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security), "NATO's Nuclear Posture Review: Should Europe end nuclear sharing?," BITS Policy Note 02.1 ISSN 1434-3274, April 2002, <http://www.bits.de/public/policynote/pn02-1.htm#5>

According to the legal opinion published by the International Court of Justice, the present operational plans for nuclear sharing violate international law. This 1996 decision not only categorizes any use of nuclear weapons as a grave violation of international law, it includes already the threat of nuclear strikes. This ruling by the ICJ delegitimizes the nuclear policy of the past 50 years."

Perceptional link: 100 nations have expressed concerned about NATO compliance with the NPT

Martin Butcher, Otfried Nassauer, Tanya Padberg and Dan Plesch, "Questions of Command and Control: NATO, Nuclear Sharing and the NPT," Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation 2000, <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nuclear/PENN0300.html>

More than 100 nations including South Africa, Egypt and the entire Non-Aligned Movement, have consistently expressed concern that members of NATO, especially Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey, as well as the United States, are themselves nuclear proliferators, acting against the intent and even the letter of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."

NATO nukes encourage global nuclear proliferation

Nicola Butler ( research associate and web manager for the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy), May/June 2004, "NATO's Istanbul Challenge:Transformation or Irrelevance?" DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY, Issue No. 77, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77nb.htm>

By describing nuclear weapons as providing "the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies" and by insisting that they are "essential to maintain the peace" for the "foreseeable future", the Strategic Concept sends entirely the wrong message to potential proliferators. Within months of its publication, India announced a nuclear doctrine based closely on the concepts advocated by NATO. As long as NATO continues to assert so publicly that it requires these weapons for its security, other countries will try to follow suit.

NATO nukes encourage terrorism

Nicola Butler ( research associate and web manager for the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy), May/June 2004, "NATO's Istanbul Challenge:Transformation or Irrelevance?" DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY, Issue No. 77, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77nb.htm>

Foreign Secretary Robin Cook write, more must be done by the nuclear-weapon states to reduce their nuclear arsenals: "A failure in this regard would encourage states that do not have nuclear weapons to rebel against nonproliferation norms out of dissatisfaction with what they perceive to be a double standard."Nuclear weapons cannot play a role in deterring terrorism, and their continued presence merely acts as a block on efforts to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

NPT signatories didn't know about NATO nukes when treaty was signed

Martin Butcher, Otfried Nassauer, Tanya Padberg and Dan Plesch, "Questions of Command and Control: NATO, Nuclear Sharing and the NPT," Project on European Nuclear Non-Proliferation, 2000, <http://www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/nuclear/PENN0300.html>

However, both the argument that NATO's sharing arrangements were approved by NPT signatories in 1970, and that 'general war' ends the validity of the NPT have been challenged by non-nuclear-weapon states. It is far from clear that most NPT signatories even knew of the NATO arrangements when signing the Treaty."

Some states might not have signed the NPT if they knew of NATO nuke sharing

Arjun Makhijani, (Ph.D. and president of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research)and Nicole Deller, (J.D.) "NATO and Nuclear Disarmament: An Analysis of the Obligations of the NATO Allies of the United States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, October 2003, <http://www.ieer.org/reports/nato/ch2.html>

The rationale relied upon by the United States that it may transfer its weapons to NATO non-nuclear weapon states raises several concerns. First, the negotiating record of the NPT reveals that many countries may not have been aware that the United States maintained this interpretation of its NPT obligations. According to the U.S. Senate hearings on ratification of the NPT, the Question and Answer document was presented to the Soviet Union and "key members" of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee prior to the time that the NPT opened for signature on July 1, 1968,61 but there is no indication that other states were similarly apprised. While the document reportedly received no objection from the Soviet Union or the unspecified "key members" of the ENDC, the remainder of states may not have known the U.S. interpretation until long after they had signed the treaty, when the document was made public as part of the Senate ratification hearings."

Time of War: No international legal basis for revocation of treaties

Arjun Makhijani, (Ph.D. and president of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research)and Nicole Deller, (J.D.) "NATO and Nuclear Disarmament: An Analysis of the Obligations of the NATO Allies of the United States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty," Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, October 2003, <http://www.ieer.org/reports/nato/ch2.html>

However, the Vienna Convention makes no specific reference to suspension of any treaties in time of war. It does permit suspension of operation of a treaty if a material breach has occurred,but it is not clear that U.S. policy for declaring the NPT as "not controlling" requires a material breach of the NPT by another state. The Vienna Convention also requires unanimous agreement for the suspension of operation to apply to all parties. Moreover, there are specific provisions that any state must follow to invoke a suspension of the operation of a treaty, which include three months' written notice allowing all parties to raise objections.68 In order to maintain the stability and credibility of the regime, both the NPT and the laws governing treaty making place restraints on states' ability to terminate their obligations.

Impact: NATO sharing undermines NPT legitimacy

Otfried Nassauer, (the director of the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security), "NATO's Nuclear Posture Review: Should Europe end nuclear sharing?," BITS Policy Note 02.1  
ISSN 1434-3274, April 2002, <http://www.bits.de/public/policynote/pn02-1.htm#5>

NATO nuclear sharing undermines the credibility of the NPT. The doubts of the non-aligned states can only be put aside if one were to share the conviction of NATO that the cryptic formulations in additional interpretations which some NATO partners produced when signing the treaty, and which the U.S. stated in the national ratification process, can justify the lawfulness of nuclear sharing. In that case the NPT would be even more seriously weakened: The legality of the NPT ratification process could be called into question by many parties to the treaty, since they were unaware of these interpretations, their relevance, and their true meaning when they signed and ratified the NPT.

TNWs undermine European Security and NATO moral credibility

Major Brian Polser (USAF with Candidate for Master in National Security Affairs from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School), "Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe: The Contemporary Debate," Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 9, September 2004, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/sep/polserSept04.asp>

NATO's continued reliance on forward-based TNWs for political power limits the success of confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) designed to promote cooperation in nonproliferation because it undermines NATO's moral credibility in influencing other states to forego nuclear weapons programs of their own. Contrary to NATO doctrine, which assigns political and military utility to U.S. TNWs in Europe, these weapons are actually counterproductive for European security.

SOLVENCY

Conventional weapons could be used at a small expense to accomplish TNW goals

General Sir Hugh Beach (former Commandant of the UK Army Staff College and former Director of the Council for Arms Control with an honorary Doctorate of Civil Laws from the University of Kent in Canterbury), "Tactical nuclear weapons: Europe's redundant weapons of mass destruction," International Security Information Service Europe. April 2004, <http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/Download/WMDBriefing.pdf>

The Taleban blocking approaches to Kabul, and the Iraqi Republican Guard defending Baghdad could be said to be suitable for attack by F-15 or F-16 aircraft using B61 bombs; or by the mini-nukes believed to be under consideration for attacking mobile and re-locatable targets, with improved accuracy and less collateral damage (see earlier). But in every such case modern precision weapons coupled with 'carpet bombing' by B-52s, tank-busting runs by A-10s and the use of C-130 gun-ships offer a far more cost-effective solution, ‘minus the fallout'. And it need hardly be pointed out that the capture of a city that is being defended from house to house is as unsuitable a task for TNW as it is possible to imagine.

TNW retaliation against WMD attack makes no sense

General Sir Hugh Beach (former Commandant of the UK Army Staff College and former Director of the Council for Arms Control with an honorary Doctorate of Civil Laws from the University of Kent in Canterbury), "Tactical nuclear weapons: Europe's redundant weapons of mass destruction," International Security Information Service Europe. April 2004, <http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/Download/WMDBriefing.pdf>

Still more implausible is the notion of using TNW in response to enemy use of chemical or biological weapons, as discussed in the previous section of this report. If the aim were to retaliate upon the source of these weapons one would either have to trace the missile launchers (a notoriously difficult task in regard to shorter range missiles) or, in the case of bombs or crop-spray aircraft, to attack their bases, which are not a lucrative target for TNW. If, more plausibly, the aim is simply to punish the regime by ‘making the strongest possible response' then of course anything goes. If there is no call for accuracy or minimal fallout – why not a megaton strike on the seat of government or the power base of the ruler?

Nuclear Deterrence not dependent on having nuclear weapons in country

General Sir Hugh Beach (former Master General of the Ordnance for the British Army) "Disarmament Diplomacy, Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Europe Redundant WMD," Issue No. 77, May/June 2004, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77hb.htm>

Clearly, however, just as any decision by NATO to use nuclear weapons would be subject to unanimity in the alliance, so nuclear deterrence equally protects all member states. It does not depend on a member state storing nuclear weapons on its territory or being able to launch them in time of war. Canada ended its participation in nuclear sharing in 1989. Iceland, Denmark, Norway and Spain have always refused to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime.

Dozens of additional aircraft available to support conventional operations and replace nukes

Otfried Nassauer, (the director of the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security), "NATO's Nuclear Posture Review: Should Europe end nuclear sharing?," BITS Policy Note 02.1  
ISSN 1434-3274, April 2002, <http://www.bits.de/public/policynote/pn02-1.htm#5>

If the European states capable of providing nuclear capable delivery aircraft renounce this capability, they could offer dozens of additional aircraft for NATO's conventional operations.

Funding: Cost of nuke deployment extremely high

Otfried Nassauer, (the director of the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security), "NATO's Nuclear Posture Review: Should Europe end nuclear sharing?," BITS Policy Note 02.1  
ISSN 1434-3274, April 2002, <http://www.bits.de/public/policynote/pn02-1.htm#5>

The associated costs for both, the U.S. Air Force providing the weapons and for the European Air Forces, providing the delivery systems, are extraordinarily high.

ADVANTAGES

Huge symbolic value in withdrawing nukes

Otfried Nassauer, (the director of the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security), "NATO's Nuclear Posture Review: Should Europe end nuclear sharing?," BITS Policy Note 02.1  
ISSN 1434-3274, April 2002, <http://www.bits.de/public/policynote/pn02-1.htm#5>

Despite their relatively small number, the tactical nuclear warheads still deployed in Europe do have a high symbolic value in this context. This would also apply to their withdrawal. To facilitate it will be a signal that European security after the end of the East-West conflict does no longer depend on the deployment of American nuclear weapons in Europe. This would be an important confidence-building measure and might open the perspective to de-nuclearize NATO-Russia relations.

Withdrawing US TNW would go a long way in alleviating fears and could lead to parallel initiatives

Dr. William Potter (director of the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies) and Dr. Nikolai Sokov (former Russian arms control negotiator) "Tactical Nuclear Weapons: The Nature of the Problem," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, January 4, 2001, <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/tnw_nat.htm>

The argument can be made that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact has removed whatever security rationale there was for the deployment of TNWs in Europe. The political justification for retaining TNWs in Europe also may be outdated. If so, it may be desirable for the United States to declare its intention unilaterally to return to US territory all of its air-based TNWs currently deployed in Europe. This pronouncement, which would lead to the elimination of all US TNWs in Europe, could go a long way towards dispelling Russian fears about NATO and could help to revive the spirit of the parallel 1991 initiatives.

Withdrawal would pave the way for Russian Reductions

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, "US tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe," October 2005, <http://www.cnduk.org/pages/binfo/nato2005.pdf>

In addition, withdrawal is a precondition for TNW negotiations with Russia, which has a longstanding desire to rid Europe of nuclear weapons. On June 2nd this year Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov said, *"We* *are prepared to start talks about tactical nuclear weapons only when all countries possessing them keep these weapons in their own territory. Russia stores its TNW on its own territory, which cannot be said about other countries."* This would pave the way for further reductions in Russian and US tactical nuclear weapons. A US/Russian arms control and reduction agreement would provide more secure storage and effective monitoring and verification. This would greatly reduce the opportunities for terrorist acquisition and the spread of nuclear equipment and technology around the world.

Withdrawal could help secure Russian Nukes from Terrorists

Major Brian Polser (USAF with Candidate for Master in National Security Affairs from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School), "Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe: The Contemporary Debate," Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 9, September 2004, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/sep/polserSept04.asp>

The Russian refusal to share information on TNWs hinges on the continued deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Removing these weapons could, in fact, lead to increased transparency on the Russian TNW arsenal, and provide greater opportunities to improve the safety and security of these weapons and keep them out of the hands of rogue states and terrorists.

Still worthwhile even if Russia doesn't reciprocate

Major Brian Polser (USAF with Candidate for Master in National Security Affairs from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School), "Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe: The Contemporary Debate," Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 9, September 2004, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/sep/polserSept04.asp>

Even if abandoning the long-standing policy of forward basing U.S. TNWs in Europe proves insufficient to induce Russia to eliminate all of its theater nuclear weapons, this step could remove an obstacle to further cooperation on arms control at relatively little strategic cost, given the nature of the transatlantic link today, NATO's conventional superiority, and the general deterrent of U.S. strategic nuclear forces.

Withdrawal enhances efforts to stop WMD proliferation

Major Brian Polser (USAF and candidate for Masters in National Security Affairs from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School), "Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe: The Contemporary Debate," Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 9, September 2004, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/sep/polserSept04.asp>

By making NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements irrelevant, withdrawal would increase the credibility of Allies' commitments to the NPT and enhance international efforts to stop the proliferation of WMD.

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

ALLIES: Japan, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia prove ‘no nukes-no troops' false

General Sir Hugh Beach (former Commandant of the UK Army Staff College and former Director of the Council for Arms Control with an honorary Doctorate of Civil Laws from the University of Kent in Canterbury), "Tactical nuclear weapons: Europe's redundant weapons of mass destruction," International Security Information Service Europe. April 2004, <http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/Download/WMDBriefing.pdf>

Another traditional argument linked the deployment of US troops to the presence of US nuclear weapons on the basis of ‘no nukes – no troops'. If this argument ever had any merit other than as a slogan, it certainly has none now. As explained above, there are no longer any US nuclear weapons in Japan or South Korea, and yet their troops remain. Nor was there (in public at least) any discussion of deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia as a condition for deploying US forces there.

ALLIES: Economic interdependence and conventional commitment is sufficient even without nukes

Major Brian Polser (USAF and candidate for Masters in National Security Affairs from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School), "Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe: The Contemporary Debate," Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 9, September 2004, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/sep/polserSept04.asp>

Yet the transatlantic link now reaches far beyond the symbolic basing of a few hundred nuclear gravity bombs on European soil. Deep economic interdependence and dense institutional integration, combined with U.S. conventional commitments and the ultimate security guarantee of U.S. strategic nuclear deterrence in the background characterize the nature of the transatlantic link today. As former Supreme Allied Command Europe, Wesley Clark, properly asserts, "evolution and adaptation of the comfortable security fixtures of the past should be no cause for concern, for through such prudent adjustments we equip ourselves to confront the flux of events that time shall surely bring."[21] The time in which U.S. TNWs played a pivotal role in European security is long past; these weapons are now in some ways irrelevant and counterproductive in others."

DETERRENT: NATO doesn't need nuke sharing to deter

Otfried Nassauer, (the director of the Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security), "NATO's Nuclear Posture Review: Should Europe end nuclear sharing?," BITS Policy Note 02.1  
ISSN 1434-3274, April 2002, <http://www.bits.de/public/policynote/pn02-1.htm#5>

However, given the enormous conventional superiority of NATO as well as the continued reliance on strategic nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes, it is very difficult to imagine what a non-nuclear nation's capability to employ nuclear weapons could add to the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent.

DETERRENT: Strategic strike from the US is faster than tactual strike from NATO

Major Brian Polser (USAF and candidate for Masters in National Security Affairs from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School), "Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe: The Contemporary Debate," Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 9, September 2004, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/sep/polserSept04.asp>

Withdrawing the TNWs from Europe could be seen as a reduction in U.S. capability and removal of an option for the president in a crisis situation. In reality, this is unlikely to be the case. Given that the readiness of NATO's dual-capable aircraft for nuclear missions is now measured in months rather than minutes or hours, response time is now shorter for a strategic strike launched from the United States than it is for a tactical strike launched from NATO territory, should the worst possible scenario actually arise.

EXIT STRATEGY: THE CASE FOR ELIMINATING NATO PEACEKEEPING

By Matthew Baker

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has been an organization in search of a mission. Regrettably, it has increasingly shifted away from what it does best to something it shouldn't be doing at all. As a result, my partner and I stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION I: Definitions

**NATO** "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." (*North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" http://www.nato.int/home.htm#)*

**Significant** "important in effect or meaning." (Wordnet 2.0 (Published by Princeton University), 2003)

**Reform** "To change or improve." (The Glossary of Judicial and Historical Terms (Published by Old Bailey Online Project), 2003, http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/history/glossary.html)

OBSERVATION II: Inherency

A) Peacekeeping is a significant part of the transformed NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Public Diplomacy Division, "NATO Transformed," 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/nato-trans/nato-trans-eng.pdf>

One of the most significant aspects of NATO's transformation has been the decision to undertake peace-support and crisis management operations in the Euro-Atlantic area and further afield.

B) NATO has multiple peacekeeping missions

David Lightburn (former official in NATO's Division of Defense Planning and Policy and analyst at the Pearson Peacekeeping Center), "Should NATO support UN peacekeeping operations?" NATO Review, Summer 2005, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/english/debate.html>

Today, NATO is conducting two peace operations (Kosovo and Afghanistan), experimenting with the concept of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (Afghanistan), engaging in peace-building (security sector reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and contributing to conflict prevention (the training mission in Iraq).

OBSERVATION III: Harms

HARM 1) Peacekeeping hurts military training, equipment, and morale

Nina M. Serafino (Specialist in International Security Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division at the Congressional Research Service), "Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of US Military Involvement," Congressional Research Service, Updated May 18, 2006, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IB94040.pdf>

The increased "optempo" demanded by peacekeeping takes time from necessary maintenance, repairs, and combat training, and can shorten the useful life of equipment. The "perstempo" problem is regarded as particularly severe for the Army. For several years, the Army was deploying the same units over and over to peacekeeping operations, and the pace of deployment was viewed as too demanding, affecting morale by keeping personnel away from families for too long, and, some argue, affecting recruitment.

HARM 2) Peacekeeping decreases NATO's clout

A. NATO Overstretched

Dr. Philip Gordon (PhD and Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins Unversity), "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," Emirates Lecture Series, #63, Spring 2006, <http://www.brookings.org/views/papers/gordon/emirates20060530.pdf>

While all NATO militaries are admittedly overstretched, it is a disconcerting sign that NATO governments are hoping to conduct the Afghanistan mission "on the cheap," which will limit its prospects for success.

B. Overstretch decreases NATO Clout

Peter Ford, "NATO Struggles as Global Cop," Christian Science Monitor, June 28, 2004, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0628/p06s01-woeu.htm>

NATO cannot give more than a political signal because there are no troops to be deployed," adds Burkhard Schmitt, an expert at the EU Center for Security Studies in Paris. That is partly because Europe's small armies find themselves already overstretched by peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Africa, and partly because governments simply have not budgeted for more peacekeeping activities.

HARM 3) NATO Peacekeeping Fails

A. NATO failed to protect ethnic minorities in the Balkans

The Economist, "The audit of war," Vol. 372, Issue 8392, 9/11/2004, (EBSCO Host: <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=14396071>)

Human Rights Watch, an international pressure-group, concluded in July that NATO's mission, known as K-FOR, had failed to protect ethnic minorities, too often turning a blind eye to Serb homes being attacked and to UN police officers calling for help.

B. NATO peacekeepers encourage insurgents in Afghanistan

Carlotta Gall, "Taliban Threat is Said to Grow in Afghan South," The New York Times, 3 May 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/03/world/asia/03afghan.html?ei=5088&en=17846c093aa4fcc4&ex=1304308800&pagewanted=print>

The fact that American troops are pulling out of southern Afghanistan in the coming months, and handing matters over to NATO peacekeepers, who have repeatedly stated that they are not going to fight terrorists, has given a lift to the insurgents, and increased the fears of Afghans.

OBSERVATION IV: Plan

All Necessary Steps will be taken by the North Atlantic Council and members states to implement the following plan.

**Mandate:** A new clause shall be added to the North Atlantic Treaty which prohibits future peacekeeping, nation building, or foreign military intervention outside of Article 5 obligations.

**Enforcement:** Enforcement shall be through the NATO member governments. Any government official not in compliance with this plan shall be removed from office.

**Funding:** No funding outside of the normal operating budget will be required since funds will be saved through decreased deployments

**Timeline:** This plan takes effect 30 days after an Affirmative ballot.

**Legislative Intent:** The affirmative team reserves the right to further explain this plan as needed.

OBSERVATION V: Advantages

Advantage 1. Improved Relations

Martin Yant, "The high cost of an attack on Iraq," The Free Press, 26 Jan 2003 , [www.freepress.org/journal.php?strFunc=display&strID=20&strJournal=8](http://www.freepress.org/journal.php?strFunc=display&strID=20&strJournal=8)

The best way to minimize anger toward America, at least, is for the United States to stop sticking its nose in every crisis and its troops into almost every country. American intervention breeds resentment in hostile nations.

Advantage 2. Improved military readiness

Dr. William Ruger (Ph.D. in Politics from Brandeis University), "52. Moving on in the Balkans," CATO Handbook for 108th Congress, 2003, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-52.pdf>

The departure of US troops will also stop the drastic readiness slide suffered by units tasked with peacekeeping. No longer would units be so strained by their peacekeeping duties that they are deemed practically unfit for war fighting, as recently was the case with the Army's Third Infantry Division.

Advantage 3. Decreased US peacekeeping increases protection from China, nukes, and terrorists

Major John P. Cogbill (West Point Graduate with Masters in Public Administration from Harvard), "Crafting a Sustainable Transatlantic Security Partnership: Focusing on Comparative Advantages," Kennedy School Review, 2004, Vol. 5, p85-97, (EBSCO Host: <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=15323115>

By minimizing involvement in peace operations, the United States can allocate more resources to military transformation and longer-term, but costly, programs such as national missile defense and space-based operations, so that it can protect itself and its allies from the growing threat of terrorism and loose nukes or from a longer-term threat from rising powers such as China.

2A EVIDENCE: ELIMINATING PEACEKEEPING

INHERENCY

1. NATO experiencing pressure to become involved in Sudan

Judy Dempsey, "Pressure rises over NATO's Darfur role," International Herald Tribune, 19 Feb 2006, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/02/19/news/darfur.php>

NATO is coming under increasing pressure from the Bush administration to play a much bigger role in Sudan, with President George W. Bush telephoning the NATO secretary general, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, during the weekend and US senators lobbying NATO to support efforts to stop the war, starvation and abuse of human rights.

2. NATO most experienced global peacekeeper

Military Technology "NATO in the 21st Century," Vol. 30 Issue 3, Mar 2006, (AN 20903617) p38-42, 5p, (EBSCO: <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=20903617>)

Since 1990, NATO has rapidly established itself as the world's most experienced peacemaking and peacekeeping force, and is becoming a major enabler for the United Nations.

3. NATO has missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and Darfur

Military Technology "NATO in the 21st Century," Vol. 30 Issue 3, March 2006, (AN 20903617) p38-42, 5p, (EBSCO: <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=20903617>)

To illustrate the way in which the Alliance is now focused on "taking the problem to the source", NATO has more than 30,000 troops deployed under command, engaged in operations and missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and Darfur.

4. NATO still has some presence in Bosnia

The Economist, "Back to Bosnia," Vol. 374, Issue 8418, 3/19/2005 (EBSCO Host: <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=16480484>)

Although a large contingent of American troops has been replaced by Finns, some 80% of EUFOR's troops previously served in the NATO force. They simply took off their old NATO badges and replaced them with EU insignia. Nor has NATO left Bosnia completely; it retains a small force under an American general, and it even shares a headquarters building and facilities with EUFOR.

HARMS

1. Stability operations don't motivate soldiers to sacrifice

Peter F. Herrly (Retired US Army Colonel and adjunct professor at the French National Institute of Political Studies) , "The Impact of Peacekeeping and Stability Operations on the Armed Forces," The Heritage Foundation, Heritage Lecture #915 December 2, 2005, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl915.cfm>

Thus, Western militaries confronted with the necessity of stability operations are actually faced with an acute sort of crisis: The very motives that drive them to these interventions are less and less motivating for the soldiers who must conduct them. This is exacerbated by the differences in val­ues and norms between intervening countries and their militaries and the societies in which they are intervening. It is dangerous to try to impose one's own norms on another culture, and it is certainly not something that intrinsically motivates soldiers to sacrifice, especially with the excessive contractu­al perspective of today's service.

2. Peacekeeping interferes with training and discourages re-enlistment

Ambassador Bob Barry (a retired US foreign service officer and Ambassador, had experience in nation-building as head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina and as coordinator of US assistance to Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism) "Discussion Papers: The United States and Nation-building: Path to Democracy or Hegemony?," 5 Sept 2003, <http://www.basicint.org/iraqconflict/Pubs/Discussion%20Papers/DS040903.htm>

In fact the military despises peacekeeping and nation-building as a tasks that interferes with their primary goal of fighting wars. When Bosnia was in the headlines, military planners claimed that assigning brigades to peacekeeping duties interfered with the training cycle, discouraged re-enlistment and in general hollowed out the Army.

3. A pure military peacekeeping approach creates development time lapse, reactivating conflict

Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge (former South African Deputy Defense Minister) and Sybert Liebenberg (Associate at the Council for Scientifice and Industrial Research), "Development Peacekeeing: What are the advantages for Africa?," 2004, <http://www.iss.org.za/pubs/ASR/13No2/CMadlala.pdf>

Therefore, a purely military approach ignores the developmental and economic nature of peace building and the contemporary definition of human security. Current peacekeeping approaches are characterised by long time lapses before developmental and peace-building interventions can be implemented in war torn zones. This leads to inadequate capacity to dismantle war economies, the inability to both absorb ex-combatants and to destroy conflict systems. Lacking focus to accelerate economic, industrial and social growth through post-conflict reconstruction inhibits a post-conflict society from being absorbed into the global economy. In turn, the inability to be integrated into the global economy sets the war economy into motion resulting in the reactivation of the conflict system.

4. Foreign military power is unlikely to hold a state together

Dr. Ivan Eland (Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University and the Director of the Center on Peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute), "The Failure of Nation-Building in Bosnia and Iraq," The Independent Institute, November 21, 2005, <http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1620>

Instead, the real lesson of Bosnia is that the creation of a peaceful multiethnic state with a strong central government is a dangerous mirage. Holding together an artificial state with ethnic or religious cleavages using foreign military power is unlikely to be successful anywhere.

5. Peacekeeping cannot resolve Africa's resource based conflicts

Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge (former South African Deputy Defense Minister) and Sybert Liebenberg (Associate at the Council for Scientifice and Industrial Research), "Development Peacekeeing: What are the advantages for Africa?," 2004, <http://www.iss.org.za/pubs/ASR/13No2/CMadlala.pdf>

Current peacekeeping interventions are unable to resolve resource-based conflicts or conflicts that are being sustained by war economies. The main causes of conflict in Africa are resource-based. Whether it is a struggle to control, access or to exploit scarce resources, it is inherently economic and political in nature.

6. NATO is overstretched

Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon (Weissinger-Baylon), "Overview: Rethinking Global Security After the London Bombings on 7 July," Center for Strategic Decision, June 2005, <http://www.csdr.org/2005book/weissingerbaylon.htm>

In these critical times, many key actors (U.S., EU, NATO and UN) are overstretched.

7. NATO peacekeepers didn't prevent destruction of Bosnian Serbs

Ambassador Bob Barry (a retired US foreign service officer and Ambassador, had experience in nation-building as head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina and as coordinator of US assistance to Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism) "Discussion Papers: The United States and Nation-building: Path to Democracy or Hegemony?," September 5, 2003, <http://www.basicint.org/iraqconflict/Pubs/Discussion%20Papers/DS040903.htm> (brackets added)

Reflecting their experience with pacification efforts in Vietnam, they [the military] shied away from "mission creep", which they defined as any effort to involve them in civilian-led nation -building activities. Citing mission creep, the US-led NATO force in Bosnia stood by while Bosnian Serbs destroyed large sections of Sarajevo in 1996 and forced Serb Orthodox families to leave and burn their apartments behind them.

8. Humanitarian intervention will come too late for most victims

Dr. J. Peter Pham (PhD and Assistant Professor of Justice Studies in the Center for Liberal and Applied Social Sciences at James Madison University and Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs at James Madison University), "The Limits of Intervention- Humanitarian or Otherwise," Human Rights and Human Welfare, Volume 6, 2006, <http://www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/volumes/2006/pham-2006.pdf>

Since most violence is perpetrated more quickly than commonly realized, an intervention will almost inevitably come too late for many, if not most, victims. Even if a consensus about intervention were to be achieved as soon as news of the humanitarian crisis reaches the international community—an almost impossible task—the record suggests that, sadly, the killers will still almost always be faster than the would-be rescuers.

9. In Rwanda and East Timor genocide occurred before peacekeepers could agree to mobilize

Dr. J. Peter Pham (PhD and Assistant Professor of Justice Studies in the Center for Liberal and Applied Social Sciences at James Madison University and Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs at James Madison University), "The Limits of Intervention- Humanitarian or Otherwise," Human Rights and Human Welfare, Volume 6, 2006, <http://www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/volumes/2006/pham-2006.pdf>

In Rwanda, an estimated 500,000 of the 800,000 victims were killed in the first three weeks of the hundred days of the 1994 genocide (Khadiagala 2004). In East Timor, Indonesian-backed militias displaced most of the population in the weeks leading up to and following the vote for independence in August 1999, even as it took months before governments were persuaded to contribute personnel and material to what became the UN peacekeeping force (Weiss and Collins 2000: 174-176).

10. Intervention simply addresses symptoms not underlying causes of conflict

Dr. J. Peter Pham (PhD and Assistant Professor of Justice Studies in the Center for Liberal and Applied Social Sciences at James Madison University and Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs at James Madison University), "The Limits of Intervention- Humanitarian or Otherwise," Human Rights and Human Welfare, Volume 6, 2006, <http://www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/volumes/2006/pham-2006.pdf>

*Intervention addresses symptoms rather than underlying causes.* While a humanitarian intervention might indeed stop human rights abuses, refugee flows, and material insecurity, these symptoms are usually manifestations of underlying pathologies—including the failure of the state, the breakdown of the civil society institutions, the arming of militias, the division of society along ethnic or sectarian lines—that do not lend themselves to remedy by armed outsiders. Military force can bring warring parties to the negotiating table, as it did during the Bosnian conflict, but it cannot secure societal transformation as the ongoing tensions between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo demonstrates.

11. Intervention may simply empower the victimized group to persecute their perscecuters

Dr. J. Peter Pham (PhD and Assistant Professor of Justice Studies in the Center for Liberal and Applied Social Sciences at James Madison University and Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs at James Madison University), "The Limits of Intervention- Humanitarian or Otherwise," Human Rights and Human Welfare, Volume 6, 2006, <http://www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/volumes/2006/pham-2006.pdf>

Interventions will have significant, possibly unintended, effects on the value to particular individuals of positional and distributional goods. Michael Ignatieff has observed that the NATO intervention in Kosovo "was defended as a human rights operation, to put a stop to Slobodan Milošević's ethnic cleansing…It stopped Milošević, but it has not stopped the Kosovars attempting to drive out the remaining Serbs," and asks, "What is the point of assisting people to be free if they use their freedom to persecute their former persecutors?" (Ignatieff 2003: 51-52).

12. Intervention promotes warlords in Afghanistan

Dr. J. Peter Pham (PhD and Assistant Professor of Justice Studies in the Center for Liberal and Applied Social Sciences at James Madison University and Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs at James Madison University), "The Limits of Intervention- Humanitarian or Otherwise," Human Rights and Human Welfare, Volume 6, 2006, <http://www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/volumes/2006/pham-2006.pdf>

*Intervention may foster warlordism.* In Afghanistan, for example, the hasty withdrawal the bulk of U.S. forces for the then-looming war in Iraq and the inability of the European powers who assumed responsibility to deploy substantive resources left a vacuum that could only be filled by warlords whose "power comes out of the barrel of a gun" and who function simultaneously as "businessmen, tax collectors, tribal authorities and clan leaders" (Ignatieff 2003: 81) in fiefdoms they carve out and maintain by predatory extraction of resources.

13. Humanitarian military intervention may actually prolong conflicts

Dr. J. Peter Pham (PhD and Assistant Professor of Justice Studies in the Center for Liberal and Applied Social Sciences at James Madison University and Director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs at James Madison University), "The Limits of Intervention- Humanitarian or Otherwise," Human Rights and Human Welfare, Volume 6, 2006, <http://www.du.edu/gsis/hrhw/volumes/2006/pham-2006.pdf>

*Intervention can exacerbate, rather than reduce, the humanitarian crisis.* In fact, an ill-timed humanitarian military intervention can cause the very tragedies it was supposed to prevent, intensifying the level of violence within a conflict and thus increasing the domestic security threat and spreading regional instability. As I argued in my study of the Liberian civil war, the 1990 Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervention in the conflict fell right into this ethical dilemma and contributed to prolonging the conflict by over a decade.

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

1. Failed states not inherently threatening

Justin Logan (foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute ) and Christopher Preble (director of foreign policy studies), "Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case against a Standing Nation-Building Office," CATO Institute, 11 Jan 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa560.pdf>

Although failed states can present threats, it is a mistake to argue that they frequently do. The few attempts that have been made to quantify what "state failure" means demonstrate that it is not inherently threatening.

2. Turn: Failed states make it easier to combat terrorism

Justin Logan (foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute ) and Christopher Preble (director of foreign policy studies), "Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case against a Standing Nation-Building Office," CATO Institute, 11 Jan 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa560.pdf>

In fact, dealing with terrorist threats in failed states can in some ways be easier than dealing with them in cohesive modern states. As Gary Dempsey pointed out in 2002: Failed states are where the terrorists are most vulnerable to covert action, commando raids, surprise attacks, and local informants willing to work for a few dollars. Failed states are not "safe havens"; they are defenseless positions.

MERCHANTS OF DEATH: THE CASE FOR DISCIPLINE OF SLOVAKIA

By Matthew Baker

In 2002, former NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson made it clear that "Support for arms control is an indispensable component of the [NATO] Alliance's security." *(Voice of America News, "Focus on Arms Trafficking," March 19, 2003, brackets in original)*

Despite this declaration, NATO has turned a blind eye to illicit arms traffic in Slovakia. As a result, my partner and I stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION I: Definitions

**NATO** "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." (*North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?"* [*http://www.*nato.int/home.htm*#*](http://www.nato.int/home.htm) *)*

**Significant** "of a noticeably or measurably large amount" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*http://www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com)*)*

**Reform** "to put an end to (an evil) by enforcing or introducing a better method or course of action" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*http://www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com)*)*

**SALW** Small Arms and Light Weapons

OBSERVATION II: Inherency: NATO Today Has No Disciplinary Measures in Place

Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz (Senior fellow at the Centre for International Relations and former Minister of National Defence of Poland), "The Central Issues For Nato," Baltic Defence Review, No. 11, Volume 1, 2004 (EBSO- <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=13727446>)

As things are at this moment, NATO membership is a one-way street. There is no way of getting rid of a country which challenges basic principles of the Alliance or can paralyse functioning of its structures.

OBSERVATION III: Analysis

A. Slovakia is a hub for trafficking illicit arms to human rights abusers

International Alert (international human rights advocacy organization) "Monitoring the Implementation of Small Controls (MISAC): Small Arms Control in the Slovak Republic," 2005, <http://www.international-alert.org/publications/getdata.php?doctype=Pdf&id=208&docs=589>

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, various reports and allegations have emerged highlighting improper Slovak arms transfers. Reports suggest the main airport in Bratislava serves as a ‘hub for illicit … arms trafficking'. With government support, the Slovakian arms industry has traded with ‘dubious clients' all over the world, including serious human rights abusers, and has also been linked to illegal arms deals that violate international embargoes.

B. Slovak government promotes arms sales

Human Rights Watch, "Case Study 3: Carelessness Uncovered: The Licensing Mix-Up," 2004, <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/slovakia0204/4.htm#_Toc61081338>

Indeed, Slovakia cultivated arms trading ties with Angola. The Slovak government went to considerable length to promote arms sales to Angola, arranging state visits and even using diplomatic channels to press Angola to follow through on its contract with Hermes after the client indicated it wanted to withdraw from the contract. Angola maintains an embassy in Slovakia, one of few diplomatic outposts in the region for the African country. Both countries have declared trade ties as a priority in bilateral relations.The Angolan embassy in Bratislava also reputedly serves as the local office of Simportex, the arms procurement wing of the Angolan government.

C. Slovak legal loopholes and poor arms monitoring make it vulnerable to trafficking

Human Rights Watch, Feb 2004, "Ripe for Reform: Stemming Slovakia's Arms Trade with Human Rights Abusers," Vol. 16, No. 2(D), <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/slovakia0204/slovakia0204.pdf>

This case demonstrates that transnational arms trafficking networks seek out countries with lax controls to carry out their deals, and that Slovakia, with its legal loopholes and poor monitoring of the arms trade, made a particularly vulnerable target. Suspected traffickers were able to carry out repeated deals without interference, even with assistance from government officials, by using the false pretext that they represented legitimate clients.

**OBSERVATION IV: Implications**

A. SALW undermine peace and hinder development

United Nations, "Small arms, as deadly as WMD," 2006, <http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/backgrounder.pdf>

Illegal small arms and light weapons are used every day to kill, maim and terrorize people in countries in conflict and elsewhere, notably through street crime. By fuelling conflict, crime and terrorism, the proliferation of such weapons undermines peace and greatly hinders development.

B. Human rights abuse legitimized

Debbie Hillier (Oxfam International policy advisor on small arms) and Brian Wood (Amnesty International Arms Adviser), 2003, "Shattered Lives: The Case for Tough International Arms Control," Amnesty International and Oxfam International, <http://web.amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/index/ACT300012003ENGLISH/$File/ACT3000103.pdf>

International arms supplies to those responsible for gross human rights abuses send a message that the behaviour of such groups is tolerated, even supported, by the international community. Weapons shipments to such abusers of human rights may actually encourage further atrocities by reinforcing the impunity with which they operate.

C. Moral responsibility neglected

Amnesty International, International Action Network on Small Arms, and Oxfam International, "Towards an Arms Trade Treaty: Next steps for the UN Programme of Action," June 2005, <http://www.controlarms.org/documents/ATT-BMS-final-en.pdf>

The moral and human rightsarguments against unregulated arms transfers are unambiguous: there is an overwhelming case for greater constraint. In a study by Amnesty International of 12 countries in different world regions, 40–90 per cent of the documented incidents of grave abuses of human rights over a 10-year period were perpetrated with small arms and light weapons. It is never right to supply weapons to recipients who are likely to use them to commit atrocities, even if other, less responsible, states are willing to do so.

OBSERVATION V: Plan

The North Atlantic Council and NATO member countries will enact the following plan using all necessary means:

Plank 1 Mandates:

NATO's charter shall be amended to allow for a two year probation of member states by a unanimous vote of all members except the one being sanctioned. Either 1) violating human rights or 2) allowing or engaging in illicit international arms trafficking will be considered grounds for probation.

During probation, all arms transfers, aid, and Article V responsibilities from fellow NATO countries will be suspended. Countries on probation will not be allowed to participate in NATO missions or decision making.

If a member on probation fails to adequately reform within two years it will be permanently expelled.

Slovakia will be placed on probation.

Plank 2 Funding: will be through the NATO operating budget.

Plank 3 Enforcement: Individual member states will enforce this plan. Any government official not in compliance with the plan will be removed from office and fined up to $1 million.

Plank 4 Timeframe: This plan will take effect, 30 days after an affirmative ballet.

OBSERVATION VI: Advantages

In addition to washing our hands of human rights abuses, disciplining Slovakia will produce several advantages:

Advantage 1: Increase in Alliance Cohesion

A. Arms Control is a common value

Voice of America News, "Focus on Arms Trafficking," March 19, 2003,[**http://www.**globalpolicy.org/security/smallarms/articles/2003/0325nato.htm](http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/smallarms/articles/2003/0325nato.htm) (brackets in original)

NATO's secretary-general, Lord George Robertson, has highlighted the importance of arms trade controls. In a December 2002 letter to Human Rights Watch, he identified "responsible arms trading practices" as a component of the common values NATO embodies and noted: "Support for arms control is an indispensable component of the [NATO] Alliance's security.

B. Discipline necessary for cohesion

Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz (Senior fellow at the Centre for International Relations and former Minister of National Defence of Poland), "The Central Issues For Nato," Baltic Defence Review, No. 11, Volume 1, 2004 (EBSO- <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=13727446>)

To preserve the cohesion of the Alliance of 26 or more member states, it seems necessary to introduce some disciplinary measures.

C. Maintaining membership criteria is the only thing that can keep the alliance strong

Dr. Celeste A. Wallander (PhD from Yale, former associate professor of government at Harvard University and Director of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program), "NATO's Price," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, Issue 6, Nov/Dec 2002

Unless NATOestablishes some way to hold members accountable for their commitments, it cannot escape the inherent threat of weakened membership standards, incentives for pathological and destructive behavior, and ultimately its own decline into irrelevance. For NATO to remain strong and effective -- an asset to American security interests rather than a liability -- membership criteria have to be maintained, not only for aspirant countries but for members themselves.

Advantage 2: Reforms Will Happen

Dr. Celeste A. Wallander (PhD from Yale, former associate professor of government at Harvard University and Director of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program), "NATO's Price," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, Issue 6, Nov/Dec 2002

In all likelihood, the very possibility that it could be made would create a strong incentive for NATOmembers to never find themselves in a position to face expulsion*.* Faltering members who waver in their commitment would face the same incentive that proved so effective when they were prospective members; most would find the resources to support their progress.

**Advantage 3: International Message**

*Ms. Savitri Kunadi (Ambassador to the United Nations), "Statement by Ms. Savitri Kunadi," February 29, 2000,* [*http://www.un.int/india/ind434.htm*](http://www.un.int/india/ind434.htm)

The scourge of illicit flow of arms and weapons affects a large number of countries. And this list is ever growing. It is time for the international community to reverse this trend and send a message to all traffickers - be they states or other entities - that the international community is united in its resolve to prevent and combat such activities. This resolve should be reflected in a strong political declaration and an agreed programme of action, concluded on the basis of consensus.

2A EVIDENCE: DISCIPLINE SLOVAKIA

ANALYSIS/INHERENCY

Despite NATO admission, concerns remain

Human Rights Watch, "Ripe for Reform: Stemming Slovakia's Arms Trade With Human Rights Abusers," Vol. 16, No. 2(D), February 2004, <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/slovakia0204/5.htm#_Toc61081341>

Even with its admission to NATO and the E.U., Slovakia has not shed its image as an irresponsible arms trader. To the contrary, key NATO allies and the E.U. have maintained that this is an area of continued concern. The E.U., in an October 2002 report that concluded Slovakia was ready for E.U.

Slovakia has a record for supplying arms to Afghanistan, Sudan, Sierre Leone, Angola, Algeria, and Liberia

International Alert (An International Organization Human Rights with nearly 100 employees) "Monitoring the Implementation of Small Controls (MISAC): Small Arms Control in the Slovak Republic," 2005, <http://www.international-alert.org/publications/getdata.php?doctype=Pdf&id=208&docs=589>

In 1996, the Slovak Republic was accused of shipping huge amounts of ammunition to Afghanistan. In 1998, Slovak arms, ammunition, and explosives destined for Chad were reportedly diverted to Sudan. Slovak weapons have also allegedly made their way to Sierra Leone, Angola, and Algeria. In the most publicised report of questionable Slovak arms deals, a United Nations 2001 publication implicated the country in arms transfers to Liberia, via Uganda and Guinea, in violation of a UN arms embargo.

EU Code of Conduct for SALW does not appear in Slovak arms law

International Alert (An International Organization Human Rights with nearly 100 employees) "Monitoring the Implementation of Small Controls (MISAC): Small Arms Control in the Slovak Republic," 2005, <http://www.international-alert.org/publications/getdata.php?doctype=Pdf&id=208&docs=589>

Regarding export criteria that guide the arms-licensing process in the Slovak Republic, government officials stress that they adhere to the EU Code of Conduct on SALW. These criteria, however, do not appear in the country's arms trade law and were not added to the recent amendments being considered by the parliament.

Slovak licensing commission afflicted by disagreement and corruption

International Alert (An International Organization Human Rights with nearly 100 employees) "Monitoring the Implementation of Small Controls (MISAC): Small Arms Control in the Slovak Republic," 2005, <http://www.international-alert.org/publications/getdata.php?doctype=Pdf&id=208&docs=589>

Nonetheless, serious problems have emerged regarding the licensing commission. Officials and experts report, for example, that there continues to be a great deal of debate within the commission about what exactly does or does not constitute a legal arms sale. There is also substantial disagreement, according to officials, about which destinations and what kinds of end-users are or are not appropriate for receipt of Slovak weapons. More serious, perhaps, is the report that nine members of the licensing commission were arrested and charged with ‘abuse of public powers and legalisation of income from criminal activity'. These officials are also suspected of money laundering.24

Slovak enforcement mechanism underfunded and misplaced

International Alert (An International Organization Human Rights with nearly 100 employees) "Monitoring the Implementation of Small Controls (MISAC): Small Arms Control in the Slovak Republic," 2005, <http://www.international-alert.org/publications/getdata.php?doctype=Pdf&id=208&docs=589>

The Ministry of the Economy is responsible for checking, investigating, inspecting, and verifying arms transfers – their comings and goings as well as their supporting documentation.29 What authority does exist in this area, however, often does not translate into action, as officials report that a lack of resources hampers their work. Verification of weapons deliveries, for example, is rarely if ever conducted, as Slovak embassies abroad are not necessarily always in existence in the right locations – and when they are, they too are subject to poor resources.

Slovak arms proliferation occurs due to disguise and inadequate licensing controls

International Alert (An International Organization Human Rights with nearly 100 employees) "Monitoring the Implementation of Small Controls (MISAC): Small Arms Control in the Slovak Republic," 2005, <http://www.international-alert.org/publications/getdata.php?doctype=Pdf&id=208&docs=589>

The key arms related challenges Slovakia faces today are: illegal arms deals being disguised as legitimate transactions, the use of deceptive practices by arms brokers and transport agents, and inadequate licensing controls.

Between 2001 and 2010, 200 tanks and 300 armored combat vehicles will be phased

Human Rights Watch, "The NATO Summit and Arms Trade Controls in Central and Eastern Europe," November 15, 2002, <http://hrw.org/backgrounder/arms/nato1115-bck.htm>

Slovakia's military modernization program was expected to generate further surplus weapons. For example, from 2001 to 2010, the country planned to reduce its military holdings by more than 200 tanks and more than 300 armored combat vehicles.

Slovakia reports it sold thousands of rockets to Egypt and Uganda

Wade Boese, "Global Arms Exports Climbed in 2004," The Arms Control Association, November 2005, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_11/NOV-GlobalArms.asp>

Slovakia also went beyond its reporting obligations, noting that it exported 4,000 122-millimeter rockets to Egypt and 1,000 122-millimeter rockets to Uganda. Countries are called on to report their exports of launchers of this type but not the rockets themselves.

State Department reports corruption in Slovakia

US State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "Slovak Republic: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005," March 8, 2006, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61674.htm>

Corruption in the legislative and executive branches was reported and publicly perceived as a problem. The judiciary and the health care and education sectors were perceived to be the most corrupt.

No license required for transshipments of arms

Human Rights Watch, "Ripe for Reform: Stemming Slovakia's Arms Trade with Human Rights Abusers," Vol. 16, No. 2(D), <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/slovakia0204/slovakia0204.pdf>

The case also usefully illustrates the potential for abuse inherent in a major loophole in Slovak law: currently no license is required for weapons shipments that transit via Slovakia.

Slovakia has trade arms with the Great Lakes region of Africa, Angola, and Uganda

Human Rights Watch, "Ripe for Reform: Stemming Slovakia's Arms Trade with Human Rights Abusers," Vol. 16, No. 2(D), <http://hrw.org/reports/2004/slovakia0204/slovakia0204.pdf>

Slovakia, like many Central and Eastern European countries, has serious and longstanding problems with its weapons trade controls. It has been a source of arms supplies to regions of conflict marked by gross human rights abuses, such as the Great Lakes region of Africa, and to armed forces with a record of serious violations of international humanitarian law ("the laws of war"), such as Angola and Uganda.

IMPLICATIONS

Small arms are WMD

United Nations, "Small arms, as deadly as WMD," 2006, <http://www.un.org/events/smallarms2006/pdf/backgrounder.pdf> (Quoting UN Secretary General Kofi Annan)

The death toll from small arms dwarfs that of all other weapons systems- and in most years greatly exceeds the toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In terms of the carnage they cause, small arms, indeed, could well be described as ‘weapons of mass destruction'".

ADVANTAGES

Commonality is the only thing that holds alliance together in absence of enemy

Dr. Janusz Onyszkiewicz (Senior fellow at the Centre for International Relations and former Minister of National Defence of Poland), "The Central Issues For Nato," Baltic Defence Review, No. 11, Volume 1, 2004 (EBSO- <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=13727446>)

The process which may have a negative effect on the cohesion of the Alliance is the process of expansion. The common defence in a situation when there is no obvious well-defined enemy can be permanently, structurally organized in reliable fashion is only when there is a strong bond of common values, perceptions, interests, and shared political culture between member countries.

BREAKING UP: THE CASE FOR U.S. PULLOUT

By David Carter

The time has come for Europe and the United States to go their separate ways on military policy, and my partner and I will show you why as we affirm: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

First, We offer the following DEFINITIONS & ANALYSIS

A. Definitions

**NATO** "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" http://www.nato.int/home.htm#)

**Significant** "of a noticeably or measurably large amount" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*http://www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com)*)*

**Reform** "to put an end to (an evil) by enforcing or introducing a better method or course of action" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*http://www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com)*)*

B. Analysis We will offer a goals case that argues a comparative advantage over the Status Quo by meeting 3 goals that are not met in the current system.

We think you'll agree with us that a military alliance should meet all 3 of the following

GOALS:

1. An alliance should work well together on common missions

2. An alliance should increase the chance of military success for all participants

3. An alliance should meet the political objectives and further the global strategies of its members

The Status Quo has numerous

FAILURES when measured against these goals

Failure 1: NATO fails to work together effectively.

Ahmed Rashid , 6 Jan 2006, EURASIA INSIGHT, "AFGHAN OFFICIALS CONCERNED ABOUT PENDING US TROOP PULLOUT ," <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav010606.shtml>

US officials suggest that NATO is capable of filing any security gap created by the departure of American troops. However, many Afghans consider NATO as a hesitant and reluctant substitute for US forces. While the 9,000 NATO forces already in Afghanistan are carrying out peace-keeping functions, most NATO's members are refusing to allow their troops to conduct combat operations aimed at containing the Taliban insurgency.

Failure 2: Involving NATO "allies" fails to increase the chances of military success. This was shown in the disastrous "warfare by committee" fiasco when NATO intervened in Kosovo

Prof. Sven Biscop (European Security at Ghent University, Senior Researcher at the Royal Institute for International Relations), ESDP and The Riga Summit: No Transformation Without Re-Equilibration , 2006, <http://www.irri-kiib.be/paperegm/ep11-v1.pdf>

At the same time when it comes to actual military operations the United States seems to prefer ad hoc coalitions of the willing over NATO-led operations. The aversion to "warfare by committee" goes back to US complaints over cumbersome decision-making during the Kosovo campaign.As a senior Pentagon official explained, "If anyone thinks that the United States is ever going to use the North Atlantic Council to run another major military campaign, they must be smoking pot" (quoted in Grant 2004, p. 67).

Failure 3: NATO allies fail to support common global objectives

Prof. Sven Biscop (European Security at Ghent University, Senior Researcher at the Royal Institute for International Relations), ESDP and The Riga Summit: No Transformation Without Re-Equilibration , 2006, <http://www.irri-kiib.be/paperegm/ep11-v1.pdf>

Of this the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was rejected by a number of key EU member states and by public opinion almost throughout the EU, provides an evident example. In the wake of the invasion and the upsurge of global terrorism that it has provoked, there is a lingering fear that a US administration that considers itself engaged in a "long war" (DoD 2006, p. v) could draw its allies into further risky adventures with negative consequences for the security and the image of the EU. Linked to that is the concern that NATO would be instrumentalized in function of a US policy that is not shared by all allies, a fear to which the recent tendency to put all NATO activities under the heading of the fight against terrorism, even when the link is not very obvious, might be seen to lend credibility. Europe does not feel at war.

INHERENCY: The Status Quo is committed to US participation in NATO

CATO Institute news release, 13 Aug 2003, "Iraq War Demonstrates NATO's Impotence," <http://www.cato.org/new/08-03/08-13-03r.html> (Brackets added)

Although NATO is obsolete as a military alliance, many will resist the retraction of U.S. power from Europe," writes [Christopher] Layne, a Cato visiting fellow in foreign policy studies and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. "As long as there is a consensus among the American foreign policy elite that the United States should be a global hegemon, NATO will continue to be perceived as an indispensable instrument of U.S. geopolitical preeminence.

To fix these failures and achieve our advantages, we offer the following

Plan

**Plank 1** Agency: All the NATO member governments and their representatives at NATO headquarters and the North Atlantic Council.

**Plank 2** Mandates:

The United States shall withdraw from NATO six months after an Affirmative ballot.

All existing NATO countries shall continue their membership.

After US withdrawal, NATO will place its forces at the disposal of the European Union to combine their defense efforts under a European-lead NATO alliance.

This plan shall not preclude the US from entering into any bilateral or multilateral agreements with any countries in NATO or from forming "coalitions of the willing" for any missions it might engage in.

**Plank 3** Funding shall come from existing military operating budgets. No increase in spending is needed.

**Plank 4** Enforcement shall be through NATO member governments. Any public official not in compliance with the plan shall be removed from office.

**Plank 5** All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

ADVANTAGES

Advantage 1. Achieving Goal 1, the Europeans will work together better without the US

Colonel William S. deCamp, Jr. United States Army, 18 Mar 2005, United States Army War College, STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, "ESDP: NATO'S DEMISE OR OPPORTUNITIES FOR NATO?" <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil117.pdf>

The European Security Strategy states that it should be able to conduct multiple operations simultaneously. Recognizing existing limitations, its policy implications section points to the need for more capabilities across the board and the need to use pooled and shared assets. What the Europeans desire is a NATO-like command and force structure with modern capabilities that is unshackled by the dominance of the United States. Upon adoption of the EU Security Strategy in December 2003, the EU agreed in 2004 to set a new goal for ESDP called Headline Goal 2010. This called for the establishment of: a European Armaments Agency, development of a European Airlift Command by 2010, the development by 2007 of rapidly deployable battlegroups that can meet initial operating capability within ten days of execution orders, availability by 2008 of an aircraft carrier with an air wing and combat escort ships, development by 2010 of a compatible network and communications capability, and a the creation of a civil-military cell within the EU Military Staff capable of rapidly establishing an operations center.

Advantage 2: Achieving Goal 2, US pullout allows more effective military response without resources wasted on uncooperative allies

Barbara Conry (associate policy analyst for the Cato Institute), 18 Sep 2001, "From 911 to 9/11: Obligations of U.S. Allies," <http://www.cato.org/current/terrorism/pubs/conry.html>

And what happens if America's allies-whether in Europe, East Asia or the Persian Gulf-fail to come to the aid of the United States? The United States should simply withdraw from NATO if the alliance withholds support, or remove U.S. troops from recalcitrant countries in East Asia or the Middle East. That should happen immediately because the United States faces its own national security threat and cannot afford to waste a single soldier, aircraft or ship on fair-weather allies.

Advantage 3. Achieving Goal 3, European NATO would allow the US to better pursue its own global security needs

Doug Bandow (Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute), 14 Oct 2002, "Arrogant Americans vs. Irresponsible Germans: Why Europe needs to show some backbone," REASON ONLINE, <http://www.cato.org/research/articles/bandow-021014.html>

Expanding NATO will offer no benefits to America. Rather, doing so will extend U.S. security guarantees to peripheral regions without augmenting Western military power. And there is no doubt that it would be Washington that would be expected to resolve any new security problems. The membership might be in NATO, but the security guarantee would be American. It's not likely to be German troops confronting Russian forces in, say, any dispute with Latvia. Washington's goal should be to turn NATO into a European- manned and European-run alliance while concentrating its own resources on genuine threats to its own security.

Advantage 4. Europe united militarily without the US will have economic growth and contribute to world peace

Marian L. Tupy (assistant director of Project on Global Economic Liberty at Cato), "Worse Than Useless?," the Cato Institute, May 1, 2003, <http://www.cato.org/research/articles/tupy-030501.html>

An American withdrawal from the European security guarantee would galvanize serious economic reform. Instead of remaining defenseless, the European states would find it necessary to raise more revenue by cutting the size of the welfare state and increasing their economic growth. A vibrant Europe with a strong economy and a credible military force could then contribute to making the world more prosperous - and safe.

2A EVIDENCE: U.S. PULLOUT

INHERENCY

Europe will only be responsible for their own security if they stop depending on the US

Wayne Merry (former State Dept. & Pentagon official, is a Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), ‘‘Therapy's End: Thinking beyond NATO,'' National Interest, no. 74, Winter 2003–4 <http://www.personal.utulsa.edu/~robert-donaldson/merry.html>

In the 21st century, Europe can neither become a responsible power center nor a competent partner for the United States so long as Europeans remain dependent on a non-European power for their security--or even for the appearance of their security.

Attitudinal inherency: Policy makers won't consider US pullout

CATO Institute news release, 13 Aug 2003, "Iraq War Demonstrates NATO's Impotence," <http://www.cato.org/new/08-03/08-13-03r.html> (Brackets added)

Layne recommends that U.S. policy makers revisit their attachment to a hegemonic grand strategy in Europe. The NATO alliance, the principal expression of this strategy, will remain in place despite its flaws unless and until the United States adopts a new grand strategy directed to the defense of vital U.S. interests, says [Christopher] Layne.

FAILURE 1 - Failing to work together well

Turkey failed to cooperate with the U.S. mission in Iraq

Jürgen Gottschlich , 25 Feb 2005, "AMERICA AND TURKEY: A Marriage Gone Sour," SPIEGEL ONLINE; <http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/0,1518,343611,00.html>

The American frustrations with Turkey have been especially apparent in the Pentagon. In a recent appearance on "Larry King Live," US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld gave an indication of just how irritated he is with Turkey. The continuing resistance in the Sunni Triangle, said Rumsfeld, is partially a result of the fact that the 4th Infantry Division was not able to attack Iraq from the north over the border with Turkey. The Turkish parliament, in March 2003, denied the American military the right to station troops in Turkey prior to the attack on Iraq.

US / EU differences botched NATO's Balkan intervention in the '90s

Colonel William S. deCamp, Jr. United States Army, 18 Mar 2005, United States Army War College, STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, "ESDP: NATO'S DEMISE OR OPPORTUNITIES FOR NATO?" <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil117.pdf>

A European security identity has been in the making since 1948 under the auspices of the Brussels Treaty. The U.S. has supported more advanced European military capabilities and increased defense expenditures for decades and supported the Western European Union. But it was the Balkan experiences in the early 1990's that provided the Europeans with the political impetus to move forward on creating a security capability outside of the U.S.-dominated NATO. Europeans watched in 1991 as civil war created humanitarian disasters in the Balkans and mass migrations into Western Europe. The initial attempts to use the European Commission structures to diffuse the crisis proved futile and the Europeans sought the capabilities of the U.S. through NATO. Attempts by the European Allies to use NATO to intervene directly failed to achieve the required unanimous consent, since U.S. policy was basically to contain the conflict, work through the United Nations, and pressure the Europeans to diffuse the crisis.

NATO endorsement sometimes even harder than getting UN cooperation

Prof. Seyom Brown (InternationalCooperation at Brandeis University), Mar 2006, MULTILATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE USE OF FORCE: A REASSESSMENT, Strategic Studies Institute, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB647.pdf>

NATO, after all, was supposed to be America's prime multilateral institution for obtaining legitimation and support of military action when the UN Security Council was paralyzed because of the veto. But as it has turned out, especially with the enlargement of NATO's membership, the ability of Washington to obtain a Brussels imprimatur for U.S-led multilateral military operations, let alone for its unilateral military actions, has become almost as hard as (and in some cases even harder than) obtaining UN endorsement.

FAILURE 2 - Reduced military success when US cooperates with NATO

US spending on NATO harms long term US military preparedness

Wayne Merry (former State Dept. & Pentagon official, is a Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), ‘‘Therapy's End: Thinking beyond NATO,'' National Interest, no. 74, Winter 2003–4 <http://www.personal.utulsa.edu/~robert-donaldson/merry.html>

While U.S. operational and logistical capabilities are today supreme, America's overall force structure is little more than half the size it was a generation ago, and its reserves are seriously overcommitted. The best forces can cover only limited tasks, especially for a democratic nation that employs only volunteers. Stated plainly, NATO is a luxury the United States can no longer justify. This vast subsidy for Europe is in direct conflict with the procurement and development budgets required to maintain the American technological lead in an ever-competitive world. Today's precision weapons will be commonplace tomorrow, and even the Pentagon's immense budget cannot always keep up.

US doesn't use NATO forces in war -- too much hassle

Colonel William S. deCamp, Jr. United States Army, 18 Mar 2005, United States Army War College, STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, "ESDP: NATO'S DEMISE OR OPPORTUNITIES FOR NATO?" <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil117.pdf>

Another problem besetting NATO is the reluctance of the U.S. to seriously consider using NATO forces in a warfighting event. Partially due to the mismatch in capabilities, but more due to the fact that the necessity to achieve consensus at the level of political decision making will derive the lowest common denominator approach to warfighting. Operation Enduring Freedom is a prime example, where the U.S. did not consider a NATO operation, but rather only sought contributions from allies.

FAILURE 3 - Different political/strategic goals

EU constitution incompatible with old NATO

Jeffrey L. Cimbalo, 2004. "Saving NATO from Europe," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, vol. 83, no. 6: 111-120., <http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/research/Saving%20NATO.pdf>

Given that such tendencies already exist in European foreign policy, the passage of the constitution in its current form would have dire implications. Because of the document's inherent incompatibility with the North Atlantic Treaty, even member states favorably inclined toward NATO would soon find it impossible to satisfy both the EU duty of loyalty in national security policy and the NATO duty of strategic coordination. For those incipient "mini-alliance" members that are also NATO signatories, NATO would play nothing more than a tertiary role, behind their new defense agreement and the EU common national security policy.

France supported Libya while the US was bombing them

John J. Miller & Mark Molesky, 7 Oct 2004, "**The Age of Terror:** Confronting France," NATIONAL REVIEW Online, <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/miller_molesky200410070836.asp> (brackets in original)

The French were not so cooperative. President Francois Mitterand flatly denied permission for U.S. warplanes to fly over his country on their way to Libya. "The refusal upset me," wrote Reagan in his memoirs, "because I believed all civilized nations were in the same boat when it came to resisting terrorism." Others remembered the incident with more anger: "Everyone connected with the attack was furious with [Mitterand's] casual refusal," wrote Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. Reagan believed that economics lay behind the rebuff: "France conducted a lot of business with Libya and was typically trying to play both sides.

Political wrangling blocks effective response to global threats

John J. Miller & Mark Molesky, 7 Oct 2004, "The Age of Terror: Confronting France," NATIONAL REVIEW Online, <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/miller_molesky200410070836.asp>

What would happen if a man like Qaddafi got his hands on a nuclear device? Surely the result would be much worse than a Berlin disco bombing. During the post-Cold War era, however, the Americans and the French would spend much of their time not arguing about how to confront these menaces, but whether to confront them at all. In the end, they would find themselves bitterly confronting each other.

Europeans don't want to support US in the future

Frank Biancheri, "A US Attack of Iran Will Break NATO in Pieces," Newropeans, 18 Apr 2006, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=7273>

There is also this growing feeling among Europeans that European defense and security interests are not any more converging with the US ones. In the case of a US attack on Iran, Washington should not expect to divide the Europeans and NATO will fall apart. Europe 2020 will publish next week in its GlobalEurope Anticipation Bulletin, a very interesting series of indicators regarding the Europeans and the Iran/Usa crisis, such as:

* 58% think the current Iran crisis is an indicator of a weakening US influence on worldwide affairs.
* 59% of them think that the UN Security council will be unable to agree on any sanctions concerning Iran.
* 78% believe that NATO has become weaker during the past three years.
* 93% of them think that their fellow countrymen within EU Member States will not support a US attack on Iran.

Therefore, I am even more convinced today of what I wrote on this topic in Newropeans-Magazine in December 2004 ("A US unilateral military move concerning Iran will break NATO in pieces"): "… But Washington should not expect to divide the Europeans on that issue (attacking Iran). Leaders commitment and populations' concern are too strong and converging here, throughout the whole of Europe, to expect any significant change in coming months or years.

SOLVENCY

EU can use NATO forces

Prof. Sven Biscop (European Security at Ghent University, Senior Researcher at the Royal Institute for International Relations), ESDP and The Riga Summit: No Transformation Without Re-Equilibration , 2006, <http://www.irri-kiib.be/paperegm/ep11-v1.pdf>

Because each country has but a single set of forces, there is much less debate on the armed forces themselves, contrary to the strategic debate on when and how to deploy them (Binnendijk, Gompert and Kugler 2005, p. 3). All countries agree that transformation from territorial defence to expeditionary operations must continue, and that it will automatically strengthen both ESDP and NATO, as these national capabilities can be deployed for both, as well as in a UN, national or ad hoc framework. Making Europe more capable thus certainly will not be at the expense of NATO as some observers fear (Cimbalo 2004).

The EU can pick up NATO's role

Bettina Hunoid, "Future Prospects for EU and NATO," Munich Conference on Security Policy, 2005, <http://www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/2005/solana.php?menu_2005=&menu_konferenzen=&sprache=en&>

Besides, the two alliances were already cooperating, he added, since the forces earmarked for the EU battle groups came from the same contingent as the units of the NATO Response Force. Mr. Solana, the former NATO Secretary General, also affirmed that the cooperation of the two alliances had been significantly enhanced since his term of office. While in former times it had been impossible to organize just one single meeting, now there were meetings every week.

Europe has the second largest armed force in the world

Radek Sikorski, European Defense Reform The Beginning of the Beginning, 1 Sept 2004, EUROPEAN OUTLOOK, American Enterprise Institute, <http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.21227/pub_detail.asp>

Non-U.S. NATO members own 13,000 tanks, 30,000 armored infantry vehicles, 11,000 air-craft, and numerous ships, including aircraft carriers. Europe keeps about two million men and women in uniform and spends close to $200 billion annually on defense, making it--if it were a country--the second military power in the world after the United States by a long stretch.

Europe is ready to be responsible for their own security

Wayne Merry (former State Dept. & Pentagon official, is a Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), ‘‘Therapy's End: Thinking beyond NATO,'' National Interest, no. 74, Winter 2003–4 <http://www.personal.utulsa.edu/~robert-donaldson/merry.html>

Many Europeans admit they want to maintain NATO so that the Americans will pay a large share of Europe's security costs. This is a classic problem of welfare dependency--the mentality of the dole. Few refuse a subsidy, even when they recognize they would be more independent and productive without it. Free money has a narcotic effect on governments, especially finance ministers, but narcotic dependency is widely recognized to be unhealthy, producing lethargy and leading to gradual deterioration of the organism. The reality stands in sharp contrast. Europe has a larger population than America, a total economy of comparable size, a modern industrial and technological base often very competitive with America's (and certainly beyond those of any other part of the world), and a vast wealth of relevant military and political experience. The notion that, somehow, Europe is "not ready" for security independence is nonsense.

ADVANTAGES

Stronger EU military increases European ability to cooperate militarily

Prof. Sven Biscop (European Security at Ghent University, Senior Researcher at the Royal Institute for International Relations), ESDP and The Riga Summit: No Transformation Without Re-Equilibration , 2006, <http://www.irri-kiib.be/paperegm/ep11-v1.pdf>

A fully-fledged EU operational HQ would offer all member states, including those incapable of setting up a national structure, the chance to participate, stimulating the harmonization of doctrine, a sense of joint ownership, and the emergence of a European esprit de corps, while avoiding additional unnecessary intra-EU duplication.

Europeans can pursue policies that are important to them without the US

Colonel William S. deCamp, Jr. United States Army, 18 Mar 2005, United States Army War College, STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, "ESDP: NATO'S DEMISE OR OPPORTUNITIES FOR NATO?" <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil117.pdf>

First, the early 1990's are still a recent memory for Europeans and will continue to drive their will for a capability external to NATO. Add Rwanda and the Congo which saw comparatively little U.S. involvement and they have more examples of their need to further develop an autonomous capability.

Europeans can develop cohesive foreign policy without the US

Philip Gordan (Director of the Brookings Institution's Center on the United States and Europe, Senior Fellow of Brookings Foreign Policy Studies, Member of Council on Foreign Relations and the Board of the US Committee on NATO), "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2006, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/gordon/emirates20060530.pdf>

A number of Europeans – in France, Belgium, Spain (under the government elected in spring 2004), and some in Germany – believe that an overly strong and active NATO is an impediment to the development of the European Union as a global political and strategic actor. In contrast to more "Atlanticist" NATO member states such as Britain, Italy, Poland and the Netherlands, they see the NATO–EU relationship as essentially competitive and want Europeans to have more control over their own fate than they would in the US-dominated NATO.

US can save $380 billion in NATO bills

CNN Student News, "Debate over defending Turkey takes center stage at NATO," 10 Feb 2003 <http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/2003/fyi/news/02/10/nato.turkey/>

The United States pays the biggest defense bills in the organization, spending more than all other member countries combined. This year, the U.S. spent $380 billion on NATO bills. Other countries' contributions totaled $160 billion.

NATO / EU cooperation saves money

Roxana Tiron , Aug 2004, European Defense Agency Raising Hackles in U.S., National Defense Magazine, <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2004/Aug/European_Defense.htm>

With a combined defense budget of 160 billion euro and 1.6 million troops, EU countries together boast the world's second- largest military force. While the EU spends just under half of what the U.S. invests in defense, it has been reported that its military capability amounts to only a tenth of what the U.S. gets for its money because of duplicate and incompatible equipment. By pooling defense efforts, the EU saves up to five billion euros a year, according to experts. Europe, however, will have to come up with ways to split funds between the alliance and the agency.

US pullout solves coming EU/NATO conflict

Colonel William S. deCamp, Jr. United States Army, 18 Mar 2005, United States Army War College, STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT, "ESDP: NATO'S DEMISE OR OPPORTUNITIES FOR NATO?" <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil117.pdf>

Future military operations in NATO will have to take into account the continuing policy rows with France. Another elephant in the room is a potential EU Caucus within NATO. If this is codified within the EU so that the 19 allies who are also EU members present a EU position at NATO, then the dynamics at NATO will certainly change. Unfortunately, NATO allies still aspiring to membership in the EU may be put in the awkward position of choosing between a United States and European Union position, as was the case in the run up to the Iraq war.

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

No loss of US influence: Merely shifts influence to EU instead of NATO

Wayne Merry (former State Dept. & Pentagon official, is a Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), ‘‘Therapy's End: Thinking beyond NATO,'' National Interest, no. 74, Winter 2003–4 <http://www.personal.utulsa.edu/~robert-donaldson/merry.html>

The transatlantic relationship will not disappear or become marginal for either side, but it will increasingly become dominated by economic issues. Despite the frequent assertion that NATO gives the United States leverage over European economic policy, this rarely proved true during the Cold War. It certainly is not the case today, when the single transatlantic relationship possesses mixed political, economic and security strands. This is the result of our Cold War success. We can afford to haggle over steel tariffs because steel is not needed for battle tanks. Brussels will continue to be the focus of U.S. concerns in Europe, but at European Union offices rather than at NATO headquarters.

US maintaining forces in Afghanistan to hunt al-Qaida

Rice visits Afghanistan to bolster Karzai, The Associated Press, 28 June 2006, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13586077/>

The U.S. is hoping to reduce its troops numbers this year from 19,000 to 16,000. Many of the remaining U.S. troops will be incorporated into the NATO force, notably in the eastern region, where Americans will be the lead nation under the NATO command. Britain is taking command in the south, Germany commands the north, and Italy the west. However, the U.S. will also maintain a smaller combat force independent of NATO with the aim of hunting down Taliban and al-Qaida remnants

Weak NATO" disad not unique: EU is on the rise while old NATO is on the decline in Status Quo

Jeffrey L. Cimbalo, 2004. Saving NATO from Europe. Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 6: 111-120., <http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/research/Saving%20NATO.pdf>

The proposed European federation is unprecedented: no democracy has ever merged with another to form such an entity. The constitution, which purports to integrate the 25 nations of the European Union, would create a new international actor with its own foreign minister and its own foreign policy. This development would have profound and troubling implications for the transatlantic alliance and for future U.S. influence in Europe. By structure and inclination, the new Europe would focus on aggrandizing EU power at the expense of NATO, the foundation of the transatlantic security relationship for more than half a century.

Strong EU/Weak NATO disad not unique: EU constitution already forsees EU defense policy outside of NATO

Jeffrey L. Cimbalo, 2004. Saving NATO from Europe. Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 6: 111-120., <http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/research/Saving%20NATO.pdf>

Article 40 of the constitution starkly states that, "until such time" as the common defense policy materializes, "the participating Member States shall work in close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." No provision is made for cooperation after that time. As a whole, the constitution makes clear that NATO is ultimately superfluous to EU security policy. Various provisions of the constitution cannot be reconciled with the existing obligations of NATO membership. Under Article 8 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO member states "are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence" and "undertake not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty."

WHEN A PLAN COMES TOGETHER: THE CASE FOR INTEGRATED SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF)

By David Carter

NATO must have the ability to rapidly and effectively respond to terrorism, anywhere and anytime. It is for this reason that my partner and I stand firmly resolved that NATO should be significantly reformed or abolished. We offer the following very simple goal/criteria case:

Goal: NATO must become better at fighting terrorism

Criterion: The team that demonstrates the best capabilities to combat terrorism will deserve the ballot at the end of today's round.

OBSERVATION 1: We offer the following DEFINITIONS

**NATO** "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." *(North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" http://www.nato.int/home.htm*#)

**Significant** "of a noticeably or measurably large amount" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*http://www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com) *)*

**Reform** "to put an end to (an evil) by enforcing or introducing a better method or course of action" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*http://www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com)*)*

**SOF** "Special Operations Forces (SOF) are small, elite military units with special training and equipment that can infiltrate into hostile territory through land, sea, or air to conduct a variety of operations, many of them classified. SOF personnel undergo rigorous selection and lengthy, specialized training." *(Andrew Feickert (Specialist in National Defense), 17 Apr 2006, "U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service, p. 1)*

OBSERVATION 2. INHERENCY: NATO currently does not have an integrated SOF structure

Special Operations Technology Online, Interview with Major General Thomas R. Csrnko, Commanding General Special Operations Command Europe, Oct 2, 2005, <http://www.special-operations-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1172> [brackets added]

As a NATO member and NRF Framework Nation, SOCEUR [Special Operations Command Europe] has been actively engaging NATO to transform its SOF staff to be a more effective, streamlined and relevant organization in today's operational environment. NATO currently does not possess a robust and dedicated special operations plans, policy or advisory arm, nor does it possess a standing Special Operations Component Command (SOCC).

OBSERVATION 3. SIGNIFICANCE. The Status Quo is missing opportunities for increased anti-terrorism capabilities

1. SOF is vital to combating terrorism and WMD

David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Jan 2006, Restructuring Special Operations Forces for Emerging Threats, Strategic Forum, No. 219, <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/sf219/sf_219.pdf>

Special Operations Forces (SOF) are vital for combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. SOF prominence in these missions has only grown since September 11, 2001, when the Nation realized its unprecedented power did not shield it from devastating unconventional attacks.

2. NATO needs SOF

National Defense Magazine, June 2006 , "NATO Needs a Unified Elite Force, Experts Contend," <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/June/NATONeeds.htm>

While most NATO members have skilled special operations units, the alliance so far has not forged them into a cohesive multinational force. Such a commando formation would be better qualified — particularly in counterterrorism scenarios — to respond to contingencies, avow military experts.

OBSERVATION 4. We offer the following Plan

**Plank 1** Agency: All the NATO member governments and their representatives at NATO headquarters and the North Atlantic Council.

**Plank 2** Mandates:

NATO shall establish a dedicated NATO SOF command (the "NSOF") with a force of 300 core troops plus 700 support troops and any necessary administrative staff at NATO headquarters. Any necessary equipment, including unmanned aerial vehicles, shall be supplied.

NATO members agree to share any intelligence information necessary to the fulfillment of any NSOF mission.

NSOF shall coordinate the goals and execute the missions for all NATO special operations activity.

**Plank 3** Funding shall come from cuts in European agricultural subsidies, cuts in the US federal budget including Head Start and the National Institute on Aging, and general US federal revenues.

**Plank 4**Timeline. This plan shall be implemented starting 30 days after an Affirmative ballot with complete NSOF readiness targeted for 2011.

**Plank 5** Enforcement shall be through NATO member governments. Any public official not in compliance with the plan shall be removed from office.

**Plank 6** All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

OBSERVATION 5. SOLVENCY. A 300-man NATO SOF is the right way to improve NATO's capabilities

Hans Binnedijk, David Gompert and Richard Kugler, May 2005, "A New Military Framework for NATO," DEFENSE HORIZONS, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense niversity, p. 6

What steps should NATO take to capitalize on this opportunity? An attractive possibility is to create an NSOF command with responsbility for the coordination of Alliance-wide SOF goals and collaborative programs. This would require multinational agreements on intelligence sharing and other matters. Despite national senbitivieis, such agreements can be forged. The actual NSOF should have a small inner core and a larger outer network. The iner core could be as small as 300 troops with specialized technology, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), focused on one or two vital missions, such as counterterrorism and counter-WMD.

OBSERVATION 6. The plan creates significant ADVANTAGES

1. SOF is more effective in fighting terrorists

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

The urgency of the idea of NATO SOF lies in the particular relevance of SOF in the fight against transnational terrorism and the benefits of conducting this fight multilaterally, a declared goal of the United States and its allies. Generally speaking, SOF are more useful than regular military forces for finding and eliminating terrorists. They were successful against al Qaeda in Afghanistan immediately after 9/11 and continue to play an important role in Iraq, the Philippines, and other areas.

2. Combined NATO SOF would enhance total capabilities compared to the Status Quo

Hans Binnedijk, David Gompert and Richard Kugler, May 2005, "A New Military Framework for NATO," DEFENSE HORIZONS, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense niversity, p. 6

There is much to be gained by sharing know-how through multilateral training and exercises. Beyond this, most contingencies in which NATO allies may operate together will require SOF. While such forces often operate in small groups and in isolation, much can be gained by improving their interoperability in such areas as communications and networking, doctrine, tactics, weapons, and logistics. British and French SOF, for example, should be able to work together using information networking to guide precision strikes of American, German, and Italian aircraft.

3. SOF would provide a powerful force multiplier to NATO

Hans Binnedijk, David Gompert and Richard Kugler, May 2005, "A New Military Framework for NATO," DEFENSE HORIZONS, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense niversity, p. 6

Because they are easily networked with other forces, they can be powerful force multipliers. In addition, SOF are highly flexible and adaptable.

He goes on to say in the same context:

Pressures are mounting to enlarge SOF assets because of their capacity to perform so many important missions and to work closely with other forces, including large ground and air forces conducting major combat operations. NATO and Europe would be well served by a similar capability.

4. NATO SOF forces enhance linguistic and cultural capabilities

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

In particular, allied SOF can expand the available linguistic skills inventory. NATO SOF also would enhance the ability of U.S. SOF to operate in cultural settings known better to allies. Deep cultural awareness and access can be essential for SOF effectiveness in operations and in developing indigenous antiterror forces. This would apply anywhere in Europe, but also in parts of Africa and the Middle East, thus covering the three regions of main concern to NATO.

5. NATO SOF action gives political benefits

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

The ultimate goal of NATO SOF should be to expand the capacity, improve the capability, and multiply the options for combined action, ranging from surveillance, to working with local forces, to direct assault. Although the United States has significant national SOF capabilities that can be used worldwide, operating with allied SOF could be advantageous. Certainly in Europe, and arguably in much of Africa and the Middle East, combined U.S.-allied SOF action is politically more acceptable and supportable than U.S.-only action.

2A EVIDENCE: SOF

INHERENCY

NATO SOF not organized to work together

National Defense Magazine, June 2006 , "NATO Needs a Unified Elite Force, Experts Contend," <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/June/NATONeeds.htm>

However, the SOF of NATO members, including the United States, are not organized to collaborate for the purpose of improving capabilities, increasing preparedness or operating jointly.

Status Quo level of cooperation not good enough: integrated NATO SOF is needed

Hans Binnedijk, David Gompert and Richard Kugler, May 2005, "A New Military Framework for NATO," DEFENSE HORIZONS, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense niversity, p. 6

Most European militaries grasp the value of SOF, and many have well-trained SOF units in their ranks, such as the fabled British Special Air Service. But these national units are not organized into a multilateral entity that could operate under NATO command. A new SOF command could be built upon existing U.S.-UK-French SOF units imbedded in Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) and on SOF units operating in Afghanistan.

NATO SOF capabilities would increase if they collaborated

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

While most allies have small forces to perform missions for which the United States has SOF, several larger allies, such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Poland, have SOF-type forces in significant numbers capable of a wide range of missions. Quantitatively, the combined SOF-type capabilities of NATO allies are roughly half those of U.S. SOF. This represents significant capabilities, increasing preparedness, or operating jointly. NATO has on occasion requested U.S. and allied national SOF for specificity for global efforts, provided the forces can be organized to work and fight together against common threats such as al Qaeda. However, the SOF of NATO members, including the United States, are not organized to collaborate for the purpose of improving Alliance contingencies, such as those in Bosnia and Kosovo

NATO has not made SOF capability a top priority

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

But, other than allied SOF embedded in the NATO Response Force (NRF), NATO has no SOF capability, nor has the Alliance made it a top priority to expand, improve, and fit together member SOF capabilities.

NATO SOF lacks manning, structure and emphasis

Testimony by Daniel P. Fata, Deputy Assistant Sec. of Defense for European and NATO Policy, House International Relations Committee, Sub-Committee on Europe & Emerging Threats, 3 May 2006, <http://www.a.house.gov/international_relations/109/fat050306.pdf>

SOF are usually a closely held national asset. NATO members have a number of on-going bilateral and multilateral SOF relationships, but overall SOF direction at the Alliance is hindered by a lack of manning, structure and emphasis. We could benefit, both as an Alliance and as individual members of the Alliance, by creating the means to harmonize these scarce assets.

Occasional contacts are not enough: SOF must train together and be organized together

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

In other words, for NATO to be able to achieve both unity and effectiveness in combating transnational terrorism militarily, its members' SOF must prepare together and be organized to act together. Occasional contacts will not suffice. Herein lies the biggest challenge, given the national value and sensitivity of SOF.

SOF better than NRF: Faster reaction and better counterterrorism capability

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

Unlike the NRF and NATO high-readiness forces, SOF may well be needed in far less than the time it takes to cobble together earmarked national forces. While the United States could, technically speaking, meet the need with its own SOF, to be able to do so with allies, and as an ally, is much more advantageous, especially if overall counterterrorism capacity is increased by developing U.S. and allied SOF to common standards and making them interoperable.

Formal commitment to NATO SOF better than Status Quo cooperation

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

By formally assigning NATO SOF to missions that U.S. SOF would most likely support or perhaps carry out, the United States and NATO both can increase available SOF capacity as well as their access to it. On balance, the concept of formal commitment is better than that of practical commitment, though the latter is well worth gaining.

SIGNIFICANCE

SOF forces are important in the struggle against global jihad

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

The recent Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report reveals a growing recognition in U.S. defense circles of the heightened importance of SOF for combating the global jihad and other irregular threats. Most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies of the United States appreciate the value of SOF capabilities for such missions and possess them in one form or another and under one name or another.

SOF is most important military counter terrorism capability

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

Indeed, because terrorists are unlikely to congregate as they did under the Taliban in Afghanistan, conventional forces may not be as effective against them, making SOF the most important military counterterrorism capability. Counterterrorism is, in fact, now the number one SOCOM mission. 3

[as cited by the author] 3 U.S. Special Operations Command Mission, available at <h t t p : / /www. s o c om.mi l /Do c s /Command\_Mission-060214.pdf>. See "Vision Statement" in the U.S. Special Operations Command Vision 2004, available at <http://www.socom.mil/Docs/Command\_Vision-060214.pdf>.

SOF has proven an indispensable asset in the post 9/11 security environment

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

Special operations forces (SOF) have proven invaluable over past decades and have become indispensable in the post-9/11 security environment. They can be used to prevent terrorist attacks, rescue hostages, train foreign forces for unconventional operations, seize critical facilities, scout in hostile territory and forbidding terrain, and pave the way for intervention by regular forces. Such versatility is possible because SOF combine physical fighting prowess with technological dexterity. They can use lasers, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and global positioning system devices to spot enemy targets and then transmit the data to precision-strike air forces

SOLVENCY

Allies have SOF capabilities that could be contributed to NATO SOF

National Defense Magazine, June 2006 , "NATO Needs a Unified Elite Force, Experts Contend," <http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2006/June/NATONeeds.htm>

The value of a NATO SOF force is obvious in light of the ongoing campaign against al Qaeda terrorist groups. In its 2006 quadrennial defense review, the Pentagon noted the heightened importance of SOF for combating the global jihad and other irregular threats. Most NATO allies possess SOF capabilities in one form or another. Some allies also have high-performance commando and elite paramilitary forces that are not assigned to their defense ministries. Within Spain's Guardia Civil, for example, are some of the world's finest counterterrorism forces — reflecting Spain's long struggle with Basque separatists, who use terror tactics.

Creating NATO SOF capability is practical and affordable

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

This argues for making U.S. and allied SOF assets readily available, not as disparate and disjointed ad hoc national contributions, but as a coherent, combined force. Because many allies have SOF, because SOF can be effective in small numbers, and because U.S. SOF have a tradition of working well with friends, creating a NATO SOF capability is a practical and affordable option.

SOF meets the demands of counterterrorism force

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

Given the changing threat and operational problems it poses, counterterrorism action demands a particular package of qualities: readiness, deployment range and speed, inconspicuousness, stealth, daring, sensor-shooter integration, sure but discriminating lethality, initiative, ingenuity, opportunism, cognitive speed, comfort with local forces, flexibility (antidoctrinaire), and adaptability. Among military forces, SOF match up especially well with these demands.

Total of 1,000 troops needed for integrated NATO SOF

Hans Binnedijk, David Gompert and Richard Kugler, May 2005, "A New Military Framework for NATO," DEFENSE HORIZONS, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense niversity, p. 6

The entire posture of inner core and outer network likely would include no more than 1,000 troops, which could be one-third US forces and two-thirds European. Although an NSOF would not be a big consumer of logistic support and airlift, it must have assets that enable it to move quickly and sustain itself at long distances.

Low cost and no additional troops needed: NATO SOF would use existing forces

Hans Binnedijk, David Gompert and Richard Kugler, May 2005, "A New Military Framework for NATO," DEFENSE HORIZONS, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, p. 6

Such a two-part NSOF offers the potential to add significantly to the NATO warehouse of usable capabilities. Ample national SOF already exist, so additional forces do not have to be created, nor do individual skills have to be greatly improved. The cost of an NSOF headquarters, training facilities, new equipment, and exercises would be modest, and certainly much less than the NRF.

NSOF = Big enhancement of capabilities in just a few years

Hans Binnedijk, David Gompert and Richard Kugler, May 2005, "A New Military Framework for NATO," DEFENSE HORIZONS, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, p. 7

This proposal could be adopted at a NATO ministerial session and implemented in a few years. Within a short time, NATO would have a superbly trained NSOF that could operate independently or with the NRF and other NATO forces. Alliance capacity to handle situations demanding swift application of small amounts of SOF power would be greatly enhanced.

ADVANTAGES

NATO SOF forces would enhance available skills and make U.S. SOF better

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

Though excellent, U.S. SOF are not superior in every mission or skill-set. They would be the first to admit how impressed they are when exposed to their allied counterparts, from British tropical commandos to Norwegian arctic rangers to French undersea divers. Collaboration with NATO forces would better enable U.S. SOF to examine alternative approaches, innovations, and niche capabilities. It also might permit specialization, in that U.S. SOF would know where certain allied capabilities exist that they need not duplicate.

SOF can benefit from NATO's enhanced multilateral capabilities

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

Thus, what NATO does best—enhancing and melding multilateral capabilities for combined action—it has not done with regard to SOF. These scarce, high-value forces are increasingly essential to the shared security interests of members on both sides of the Atlantic, and SOF of all allied countries could benefit from working together. NATO can improve in this area and should.

National SOF assets would be improved if they worked with other NATO allies

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

In the post-9/11 security environment, special operations forces (SOF) have proven indispensable. SOF units are light, lethal, mobile, and easily networked with other forces. While the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have extensive SOF capabilities, these forces are not formally organized to collaborate with one another. There would be much to gain if U.S. and allied SOF trained to work together: national SOF assets would be improved, obstacles to effective combined operations would be removed, and a coherent Alliance capability would be readily available for NATO.

NATO SOF would advance unity and effectiveness

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

From NATO's least powerful member to its most powerful, all countries are better served operating within an alliance compared to operating alone or with just one or two other powers, provided effectiveness is maintained. Done right, NATO SOF could advance both unity and effectiveness.

**NATO SOF would also enhances NATO capability against other state and non-state threats**

*David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006,* [*http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense\_horisons/Dh\_52.pdf*](http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf)

Although counterterrorism is the most compelling reason for a SOF capability in NATO, such a capability would serve the Alliance in many other ways as it increasingly faces irregular, elusive, nonstate threats, as well as some state threats.

NATO SOF would create multiple advantages for the US and its allies

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

The United States and its allies can gain in three ways from creating a SOF capability in NATO: by enhancing allied (specifically, non-U.S.) SOF capabilities available for use against common threats; by expanding and regularizing the access of U.S. SOF to valuable and complementary experiences, techniques, and perspectives of allied SOF; and by creating the option of decisive NATO action using SOF.

NATO SOF forces would provide more options

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

In addition, having high-quality allied SOF readily available to NATO would provide options to act against al Qaeda or other enemies if U.S. SOF are otherwise engaged or, for some reason, not ideal for the need at hand. While the United States may not wish to count absolutely on the availability of NATO SOF, it is an option well worth having. By the same token, it would be advantageous for allies to have SOF capability of enough quality and quantity to join counterterrorism operations with the United States or to conduct such operations of their own when U.S. assets are unavailable.

NATO SOF action would garner greater public support than large scale operations

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

NATO SOF would permit the Alliance to take swift, precise, proportional, and collective military action against terrorists, as well as other unconventional threats. Depending on circumstances, use of SOF in surgical operations may enjoy greater public support and international acceptance than large scale intervention by regular ground and air forces.

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

Intelligence sharing among NATO allies is not a problem

David C. Gompert and Raymond C. Smith, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "Creating a NATO Special Operations Force ", Defense Horizons, March 2006, <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnspldefense_horisons/Dh_52.pdf>

It is inherent in networking that whenever information is shared— whether to allies or among U.S. forces—the risks of compromise increase. However, this consideration should not interfere with the creation or use of NATO SOF capabilities. Any ally that is trusted enough to participate in a critical and sensitive special mission is surely to be trusted with information that bears on mission success. Allied SOF are hardly likely to imperil themselves by mishandling intelligence. Moreover, tactical information in fast-moving special operations is fleeting, thus it is not easily exploited by the enemy. In any case, tactical SOF commanders are in the best position to decide whether the operational risks of sharing information outweigh the benefits. Any constraints imposed on them only limit their options. Sharing intelligence information may involve some risk that sources and methods will be compromised, but SOF typically generate their own intelligence and are able to judge whether the risk of compromise outweighs the consequences of not providing and receiving tactically critical information.

Visit <http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/defense_horizons/DH_52.pdf> for complete plan outline and advocacy

Source credentials

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LET FREEDOM RING: THE CASE FOR A TRANSATLANTIC FREE TRADE AREA

By Matthew Baker

The evidence in recent years has become increasingly persuasive that the greater is the degree of openness in cross-border trade in goods and services, the faster will be the rate of growth of an economy and eventually the higher its standard of living." *(Alan Greenspan, "Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan," July 12, 2000, http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2000/20000712.htm)*

Because my partner and I agree with this statement from Dr. Alan Greenspan and support a Transatlantic Free Trade Area we stand: Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION I: Definitions

**NATO** "The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." (*North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?" http://www.nato.int/home.htm#)*

**Significant** "important in effect or meaning." (Wordnet 2.0 (Published by Princeton University), 2003)

**Reform** "To change or improve." (The Glossary of Judicial and Historical Terms (Published by Old Bailey Online Project), 2003, http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/history/glossary.html)

**TAFTA** Transatlantic Free Trade Area

OBSERVATION II. Goal: reduce economic conflict and strengthen Free Institutions

The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 2, April 4, 1949, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm>

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

OBSERVATION III. Inherency: The EU blocks trade liberalization

Simon J. Evenett, Professor of International Trade at the University of St. Gallen, American Enterprise Institute, "The WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting: A Postmortem," Jan 2006, <http://www.aei.org/events/filter.all,eventID.1235/summary.asp>

The European Union has an entrenched opposition to agricultural trade reform. The opponents of liberalization have instituted a series of Common Agricultural Policy trade reforms that go from 2003-2013, and most E.U. states firmly hold that this is Europe's contribution to the Doha Round. Further, there is an intense opposition to reducing export subsidies. Another obstacle is that the European Union is now under the leadership of Austria, a country that is not supportive of free trade.

OBSERVATION IV. Plan

All Necessary Steps will be taken by the North Atlantic Council and members states to implement the following plan.

**Mandate 1** A new clause shall be added to the North Atlantic Treaty which states "Member states agree to the elimination of all tariff and quota barriers on imports from member states and further agree to abolish all agricultural subsidies.

**Mandate 2** Member states will take all necessary steps to bring themselves into compliance with this new article.

**Enforcement:** Enforcement shall be through the NATO member governments. Any government official not in compliance with this plan shall be removed from office.

**Funding:** Suspension of subsidies will save member states billions, covering any necessary implementation costs

The affirmative team reserves the right to further expand on this plan as needed.

OBSERVATION V. Advantages

Advantage 1: More unified NATO

A. Inherency: Trade Disputes Intensifying

Raymond J. Ahearn (Congressional Research Service Specialist in Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade), "U.S.-European Union Trade Relations: Issues and Policy Challenges," Congressional Research Service, Updatee May 1, 2006, <http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/IB10087.pdf>

Over the last 5-6 years, however, trade relations are being strained by the nature and significance of the disputes. Former EU Commissioner for Trade, Pascal Lamy, stated on November 20, 2000 that the "problems seem to get worse, not better." Richard Morningstar, then U.S. Ambassador to the EU, said in a January 23, 2001 speech that the inability of our two sides "to resolve our list of disputes, which are growing in both number and severity, is beginning to overshadow the rest of the relationship." Moreover, some of the efforts at dispute resolution have led to escalation and "tit-for-tat" retaliation with the potential to harm the multilateral trading system.

B. Significance: Protectionism threatens to widen the transatlantic rift

Dr.h.c. Klaus Naumann, General (ret'd), former Chairman of NATO Military Committee "Euroatlantic and Regional Perspective," Center for the Study of Democracy, November 2005, <http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=6776>

The EU is not much better off. It is divided and appears to be in a deadlock. Moreover, its stubborn defence of an undefendable agricultural protectionism will most probably widen the transatlantic rift should the Doha Talks fail.

C. Solvency: TAFTA essential to pre-empt trade disputes

Jamie Glazov "The End of the West?," American Enterprise Institute, November 29, 2002, http://www.aei.org/research/nai/publications/pubID.16825,projectID.11/pub\_detail.asp [NOTE: QUOTING Radek Sikorski, Former executive director of the American Enterprise Institute's New Atlantic Initiative, and former Polish Deputy minister of Defense and Foreign Affairs]

The task of American statesmanship is to make sure that Europe adds rather than subtracts from American power. That's why it is so vitally important to sustain NATO, the defense arm of our civilization, and to supplement it with the Transatlantic Free Trade Area composed of EU and NAFTA - so as to pre-empt trade disputes from endangering a split.

Advantage 2: Economic Prosperity

A. Significance: International Economy hinges on transatlantic economy

John Hancock (Counsellor in the Trade and Finance Division, World Trade Organization) and William BP Robson (president of the C.D. Howe Institute), "Building New Bridges: The Case for Strengthening Transatlantic Economic Ties," British-North American Committee, May 2003, <http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/bnac_46.pdf>

It has also created an economic link that now serves as the main artery of an increasingly integrated and interdependent global economy. In a very real sense, international economic stability and security hinge on the health of the transatlantic economy.

B. Solvency: TAFTA creates €100 billion of economic growth in Europe + $75 billion in growth in the US

Joshua Livestro, (Masters in the History of Political Thought at the University of Cambridge Official in the Research Department of the British Conservative Party's Central Office in Westminster), "Time for TAFTA?," Tech Central Station, December 1, 2004, <http://www.techcentral.be/120104A.html> (brackets added)

On more than one occasion, [British Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon] Brown has pleaded for a transatlantic free trade area as a solution to Europe's economic problems, citing enormous potential benefits for all parties involved. According to a British Treasury study, the elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers could boost Europe's economic growth by as much as €100 billion annually. The US would stand to profit by a further $75 billion."

Advantage 3: Peaceful World

A) Link: Eliminating subsides will boost income by $150-400 billion

Stefania Bianchi, "US, EU joust over farm subsidies," Inter Press Service, July 29, 2003, <http://www.cyberdyaryo.com/features/f2003_0729_03.htm>

Such statements mark the latest round in a high-profile battle between the EU and the United States over the elimination of generous farm subsidies. Even as several recent studies have called for the elimination of farm subsidies, each party has insisted that the other side take the first step. The World Bank says that ending all the subsidies, worth 350 billion dollars, mainly in North America and Europe, would boost the income of developing countries by 150 to 400 billion dollars within five years.

B) Impact: Economic growth decreases conflicts

Edward Miguel, UC Berkeley, Shanker Satyana, New York University, and Ernest Sergenti, New York University, "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach," June 2003, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/SITE/Miguel.pdf>

We next explore how economic growth shocks affect the onset of conflict. Conflicts – using both definitions, 25 and 1000 battle deaths – are significantly less likely to start as economic growth increases (Table 5, regressions 1 and 2), and once again we cannot reject the hypothesis that effects are the same for current and lagged economic growth.

2A EVIDENCE: TRANSATLANTIC FREE TRADE AREA

INHERENCY

In the absence of reform, EU-US economic dispute likely

John Peterson (Professor of International Politics at the University of Edinburgh) and Alasdair Young (Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Glasgow) , "Trade and Transatlantic Relations: New Dogs and Old Tricks," Preliminary Outline, 2005, <http://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/Peterson%20Young%20Memo.pdf>

Finally, in the absence of institutional reforms, both sides are likely to see their trade policies experience legitimacy crises as economic diplomacy becomes subject to new domestic and transnational pressures as part of the more general changing politics of foreign policy in the 21st century (Hill 2003). In short, we have arrived at a moment of powerful system frictions in the US-EU relationship.

EU blocks purchase of US agricultural products

Office of the US Trade Representative, "2006 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers," European Union, 2006, <http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_NTE_Report/asset_upload_file814_9243.pdf>

In general, barriers to access for U.S. agricultural exports continue to be a source of frustration for the United States. Even where formal EU agricultural tariff barriers may be relatively low, U.S. exports of leading commodities such as corn, beef, poultry, and pork are significantly restricted or excluded altogether due to restrictive non-tariff barriers or regulatory approaches that often do not reflect a sound assessment of actual risks posed by the goods in question and/or that rely on ill-defined concepts of precaution.

EU-US Trade Disputes are becoming increasingly serious and difficult to resolve

Raymond J. Ahearn (Congressional Research Service Specialist in Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade), "U.S.-European Union Trade Relations: Issues and Policy Challenges," Congressional Research Service, Updatee May 1, 2006, <http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/IB10087.pdf>

Resolution of U.S.-EU trade disputes has become increasingly difficult in recent years. Part of the problem may be due to the fact that the U.S. and the EU are of roughly equal economic strength and neither side has the ability to impose concessions on the other. Another factor may be that many bilateral disputes now involve clashes in domestic values, priorities, and regulatory systems where the international rules of the road are inadequate to provide a sound basis for effective and timely dispute resolution.

Numerous current EU-US Trade Disputes

Raymond J. Ahearn (Congressional Research Service Specialist in Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade), "U.S.-European Union Trade Relations: Issues and Policy Challenges," Congressional Research Service, Updatee May 1, 2006, <http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/IB10087.pdf>

The two sides face difficult challenges in keeping the relationship on an even keel in 2006. A number of bilateral trade disputes have been carried over from 2005 and are expected to be considered by the World Trade Organization (WTO). These include disputes on production subsidies for aircraft manufacturers, the EU's treatment of bio-engineered foods, compliance in the long-running battle over tax breaks for U.S. exporters, and the continuing ban on beef treated with growth hormones.

SOLVENCY

US-EU trade relationship has important global impact on world trade

Natalie Kuehler, "EU-US Economic Disputes: There is More to Trade than Goods and Services," The European Policy Centre July 22, 2002, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-us-economic-disputes-trade-goods-services/article-116971>

The US-EU trade relationship draws wider circles, however, and also serves an important signalling effect to the world trading system as a whole. Indeed, it is difficult to move the global trade agenda forward when the EU and US pull on opposite strands.

Reducing EU and US agriculture protectionism + Indian and Brazil cooperation = 50% increase in world trade

Gordon Brown (Chancellor of the Exchequer, United Kingdom), "How to Embrace Change," NEWSWEEK, 12 June 2006, p. 69

The starting point -- the most powerful anti-protectionist signal we can send -- is breaking the world-trade deadlock. The prize is a 50 percent increase in world trade. And the key that will unlock that door is Europe and America offering progress by reducing protectionism in agriculture, and India and Brazil being willing to respond with liberalization of services and greater market access."

India and Brazil will cooperate on subsidies if the US and EU do the same

CNN News, "Trade summit opens: Nine protesters hurt in minor scuffles with police," December 13, 2005, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/BUSINESS/12/13/wto.summit/index.html>

But developing nations like India want wealthier countries to cut the billions of dollars allocated for farm subsidies. Poorer countries say their farmers cannot compete against subsidized industries. The United States says it will cut subsidies if other nations follow suit. But the European Union so far isn't budging. India and Brazil, for their part,say they'll cooperate, but only if richer nations do the same."

Unilateral trade liberalization creates reciprocation

Pravin Krishna (Professor of Economics at Brown University) and Devashish Mitra (Professor of Economics at Syracuse University), "Reciprocated Unilateralism: A Political Economy Approach," Journal of International Economics, 2004, <http://www.econ.brown.edu/~pk/urp-pk-dm-I.pdf>

We find that such unilateral liberalization *induces* reciprocal tariff reductions by the partner country. Intuitively, unilateral liberalization by one country has the effect of increasing the incentives for the export lobby in the partner country to form and to lobby effectively against the import competing lobbies there for lower protection. The results stand in contrast to the policy arguments that suggest that closing (or threatening to close) one's markets would help pry open the markets of others as well as some recent results in the literature which emphasize institutional reciprocity as an essential means of getting to efficient outcomes.

TAFTA Plan Advocates include Thatcher, Kissinger, and Havel

David Smith, "Brown flies the flag for a transatlantic trade pact," The American Enterprise Institute, July 29, 2001, <http://www.aei.org/research/nai/publications/pubID.16991,projectID.11/pub_detail.asp>

The idea of a transatlantic free trade area -Tafta -is not a new one. Malcolm Rifkind, when Tory foreign secretary, called for it. In Washington, the New Atlantic Initiative (NAI) was founded five years ago. Its patrons include Baroness Thatcher, Henry Kissinger, the former American secretary of state, and the Czech president Vaclav Havel.

TAFTA would create economic policies that could become globally dominant

Dr. Rolf J. Janghammer (PhD in economics from Christian-Albrechts-University), Dr. Daniel Piazolo (PhD from the University and Kiel and researcher at the Kiel Institute of World Economics), and Horst Siebert (PhD and Professor in European Integration and Economic Policy) "Assessing Proposals for a Transatlantic Free Trade Area," Kiel Institute for World Economics, 2002

TAFTA would probably set common rules for many trade-related policy areas, including the rights of establishment of companies, capital mobility, environmental standards, and perhaps even for competition policies and investment codes. Given TAFTA's economic weight and scale economies of rules, TAFTA rules would become globally dominant and binding.

EU Counterplan Responses:

1. Most EU members are NATO members

Fatima Kukeyeva (Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations and Foreign Policy at Kazakh National University), "The Idea of Eurasian Union and Transatlantic Partnership," Peabody Center for Education Policy, Spring, 2004, <http://peabody.vanderbilt.edu/pcep/papers/kukeyeva.pdf>.

That fact is that almost all EU member states are also members of NATO, and the US has performed its role as guarantor of European security for more than half a century.

2. Free Trade works better without the EU

William A. Niskanen, 13 Dec 2005, "Alternative Political and Economic Futures for Europe," M.R. STEFANIK CONSERVATIVE INSTITUTE LECTURES, <http://www.institute.sk/article.php?826>

The major problem specific to the European Union trade area, however, is that it is difficult for a government to join this area without bearing a proportion of the costs of all EU activities. The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), for example, has about the same aggregate GDP as the European Union, but it has operated smoothly with only a few dispute settlement committees – no budget, no bureaucracy, and no Brussels! Most of the governments that had been in the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), however, choose to join the European Union – decisions, I suggest, that may not have been in their interests. If I were an official in a European government, one of my priorities would be to restore or maintain membership in a European-wide free trade area that does not require membership in the European Union.

ADVANTAGES

I. Advantage: More Unified NATO

Significance: US-EU differences threaten progress in Doha Round

Raymond J. Ahearn (Congressional Research Service Specialist in Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade), "U.S.-European Union Trade Relations: Issues and Policy Challenges," Congressional Research Service, Updatee May 1, 2006, <http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/IB10087.pdf>

In addition, critical U.S.-EU differences, particularly over agriculture, now complicate and threaten progress in the ongoing Doha Round of world trade negotiations.

Significance: Trade competition conflicting with ideological sympathies

Henry C K Liu (chairman of the New York-based Liu Investment Group), "The coming trade war and global depression," Asia Times, June 16, 2005, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/GF16Dj01.html>

When the US was ruled to have unfairly supported its steel industry, tariffs were slapped by the EU on Florida oranges to make a political point in a politically important state in US politics. Trade competition between the EU and the US is spilling over into security areas, allowing economic interests to conflict with ideological sympathy.

Solvency: Economic integration promotes world peace

President Bush, "Remarks by the President in Signing Ceremony for Chile and Singapore Free Trade Agreements," September 2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030903-3.html>

Economic integration through trade can also foster political cooperation by promoting peace between nations.

II. Advantage: Economic Prosperity

Speeds up European economic recovery

Joshua Livestro, (Masters in the History of Political Thought at the University of Cambridge Official in the Research Department of the British Conservative Party's Central Office in Westminster), "Time for TAFTA?," Tech Central Station, December 1, 2004, <http://www.techcentral.be/120104A.html>

A clean break with Europe's recent protectionist past would serve more than one purpose. First, and most obviously, it would help the EU area to speed up its economic recovery. History shows that significant increases in trade volumes in both import and export usually coincide with periods of strong economic growth. Since 2000, however, transatlantic trade has been slack, to say the least. At the same time - or perhaps: as a result - the main EU economies have ground to a halt. Protectionism has led to a vicious economic cycle of zero growth, rising unemployment and falling consumer spending. Cutting yourself off from the world's most important marketplace simply doesn't make any economic sense."

Free trade would dramatically increase transatlantic trade

Grant Aldonas (US Under Secretary for International Trade) "Remarks by Commerce Under Secretary for International Trade Grant Aldonas before the German Marshall Fund's Transatlantic Center, Brussels," US Mission to Europe, November 24, 2003, <http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=80681729-50AC-49CC-B9E5-986BD64F4101>

Even within our very successful transatlantic economic partnership, further liberalizing our markets and trade will benefit workers and their families. British Chancellor Gordon Brown and Secretary John Snow have recently proposed an independent study to quantify the benefits of a more liberalized EU-U.S. economic partnership. This study will surely be valuable. Existing studies estimate that in a world of free trade, U.S. exports to the EU would increase by about $48 billion annually. EU exports to American consumers would expand by about $44 billion. Transatlantic flows of foreign direct investment --- already at very high levels -- would grow by an additional 19 percent.

Current transatlantic economy accounts for 12-14 million US jobs and 2/5ths of World Trade

European Commission, "Bilateral Trade Relations," updated February 2006, <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/usa/index_en.h>

The EU and US are responsible together for about two fifths of world trade. Trade flows across the Atlantic are running at around €1.7 billion a day. In the year 2003, the total amount of two-way investment was over €1.5 trillion, composed of €731 billion of EU Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the US and around €772 billion of US FDI in Europe. The overall "transatlantic workforce" is estimated at 12 to 14 million, of which roughly half are Americans who owe their jobs directly or indirectly to EU companies.

US exports would increase $48 billion, EU exports would increase $44 billion, investments would increase $227 billion

Gary Clyde Hufbauer (formerly the Marcus Wallenberg Professor of International Finance Diplomacy at Georgetown University) and Frederic Neumann (adjunct professor at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies) "US-EU Trade and Investment: An American Perspective," Institute for International Economics, April 2002, <http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=460>

In a world of free trade, US imports of merchandise and services would expand by 14 percent, based on the model created by Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2001). Assuming that the European Union shared pro rata in this expansion, EU exports to the United States would increase by about $44 billion annually. Conversely, in a world of free trade, EU imports would expand by about 13 percent, again based on the model created by Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2001). Assuming that the United States shared pro rata, US exports to the European Union would increase by about $48 billion annually. Table 4 also calculates the potential increment in foreign direct investment stock, assuming a fixed ratio between FDI stock and two-way trade in merchandise and services. US owned FDI stock placed in the European Union might expand by $109 billion (some 19 percent), whereas EU owned FDI stock placed in the United States might expand by $118 billion (some 15 percent).

III. Advantage: Peaceful World

5% negative growth shock increases likelihood of a civil war

Edward Miguel, UC Berkeley, Shanker Satyana, New York University, and Ernest Sergenti, New York University, "Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach," June 2003, <http://www.stanford.edu/group/SITE/Miguel.pdf>

We have found that economic growth shocks have a dramatic causal impact on the likelihood of civil war: a five percentage negative growth shock increases the likelihood of a civil war the next year by nearly one-half.

Free Trade strengths democracy and decreases war

Daniel T. Griswold (associate director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies.), "Peace on Earth?: Try Free Trade among Men," Cato Institute, December 28, 2005, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5344>

First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend toward democracy, and democracies don't pick fights with each other. Freedom to trade nurtures democracy by expanding the middle class in globalizing countries and equipping people with tools of communication such as cell phones, satellite TV, and the Internet. With trade comes more travel, more contact with people in other countries, and more exposure to new ideas.

Free Trade has played a major role in the reduction in conflict deaths

Daniel T. Griswold (associate director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies.), "Peace on Earth?: Try Free Trade among Men," Cato Institute, December 28, 2005, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5344>

The death toll from war has also been falling. According to the AP story, "The number killed in battle has fallen to its lowest point in the post-World War II period, dipping below 20,000 a year by one measure. Peacemaking missions, meanwhile, are growing in number." Those estimates are down sharply from annual tolls ranging from 40,000 to 100,000 in the 1990s, and from a peak of 700,000 in 1951 during the Korean War. Many causes lie behind the good news -- the end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy, among them -- but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role.

Trade creates a disincentive for war

Daniel T. Griswold (associate director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies.), "Peace on Earth?: Try Free Trade among Men," Cato Institute, December 28, 2005, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5344>

Second, as national economies become more integrated with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war."

DISADVANTAGE RESPONSES

Free Trade = democratization and environmental protection

Daniel T. Griswold (Associate Director of the Cato Institute's Center for Trade Policy Studies), "A Six-Step Plan for US Trade Policy," CATO Institute, February 17, 2001, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4369>

Free trade is not in fundamental conflict with higher standards. In reality, by promoting economic development and a freer flow of ideas, technology, and people, sustained trade liberalization encourages democratization and higher environmental and labor standards.

TEAM PLAYERS: THE CASE FOR USING NATO TO IMPROVE UN PEACEKEEPING

By Vance Trefethen

Making NATO a better team player in cooperation with the UN can generate multiple advantages over the Status Quo, and that's why my partner and I stand resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

OBSERVATION 1. DEFINITIONS and ANALYSIS

A. Definitions

**NATO** "The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is an alliance of 26 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949." *(North Atlantic Treaty Organization Official Homepage, 2006, "What is NATO?"* [*http://www.nato.int/home.htm#*](http://www.nato.int/home.htm)*)*

**Significant** "of a noticeably or measurably large amount" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*http://www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com)*)*

**Reform** "to put or change into an improved form or condition" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*http://www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com)*)*

**UNSAS** "the UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS), a voluntary roster of capabilities that UN member states might be willing to commit to a future peacekeeping operation, if asked by the Secretary-General." (*William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, Moira K. Shanahan, December 2003, The Henry L. Stimson Center, "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations," p. 71)*

**UN Peacebuilding Commission** "That is why, last December, as part of a broader and wider effort at modernization and reform, the United Nations established a new Peacebuilding Commission. Just as U.N. peacekeepers try to prevent war from re-erupting in the aftermath of a peace agreement or cease-fire, U.N. peacebuilders try, over the longer run, to help fledgling countries develop the institutions that allow them to grow into adulthood." (*Richard Foster, 25 Feb 2006, "Haiti would be a perfect laboratory for U.N. peacebuilding," MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL,* [*http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=403970*](http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=403970)*)*

**NRF or NATO Response Force** "The NRF, he [General James L. Jones, NATO's supreme allied commander] explained, is an integrated, combined force of 25,000 land, sea, air and special operations troops, all under one command, certified to handle seven distinct missions from forcible entry to humanitarian assistance." *(U.S. Department of State, Feb 2006, "NATO To Be Proactive on Security but Not Become Global Policeman," INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PROGRAMS,* [*http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2006/Feb/09-488494.html*](http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2006/Feb/09-488494.html) *, brackets added)*

B. Analysis

We will present a comparative advantage case today that shows that the total benefits of adopting our plan will be better than staying with the Status Quo. We will be changing only the structure of NATO, not any current missions, but the changes will have impact on future missions and thus produce the advantages of our case.

OBSERVATION 2. INHERENCY: NATO's current cooperation with UN peace-building efforts is inadequate

A. NATO is AWOL: Forces are redirected from UN peacekeeping to NATO peacekeeping

William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, Moira K. Shanahan, December 2003, The Henry L. Stimson Center, "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations," p. 73

Since the mid 1990s, developed states have substantially reduced their contribution of troops to UN operations, particularly in Africa. Most contributions went instead to the NATO-led Implementation Force (1995-96) and Stabilization Force (1997- ) in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and later to the NATO-led force in Kosovo (1999- ). Several NATO states have also contributed forces to the UN-mandated (but not UN-run) International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, Afghanistan, which became a NATO operation as of 11 August 2003.

B. Brahimi Recommendation Gaps: Lack of UN forces leaves stability operations short-handed

UN General Assembly, Dept of Public Information, 20 Oct 2005, "CURRENT PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AFFECT LIVES OF 200 MILLION PEOPLE WORLDWIDE,UNDER-SECRETRY-GENERAL SAYS IN ADDRESS TO FOURTH COMMITTEE," <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/gaspd324.doc.htm> (brackets added)

Notwithstanding all those innovations, the Department [of Peacekeeping Operations] remained seriously over-stretched, he [Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations] pointed out, adding, "We run the leanest field operations organization in the world. Our personnel in the field – your troops and police – operate in many instances on a more or less permanent state of shortfall." That was possible due to improvements generated by the Brahimi Report and to the dedication and quality of United Nations peacekeeping personnel. Yet, gaps in the Brahimi reform process continued to weaken operations as not all its recommendations had been implemented, including the development of a system for the rapid deployment of brigade-sized forces.

C. Funding and attitudinal barriers hamper the UN Peace Building Commission

Richard Foster, 25 Feb 2006, "Haiti would be a perfect laboratory for U.N. peacebuilding," MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, <http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=403970> (brackets added)

Also - and this is even more worrisome - the U.N.'s administrative and budgetary organs have refused to approve funds for the [UN Peace-Building] commission from the regular budget, the result of the world body's perennial financial woes. As a result, the commission must depend on "existing resources" within the U.N. and on voluntary contributions from U.N. member states. This is a very risky proposition. Many U.N. members are already in a financial bind. How many of them will want to invest their precious resources into a new and untested U.N. bureaucracy? The U.S. can contribute, but the Bush White House has never made a secret of its distaste for the U.N. As Annan and others have noted, there is no shortage of countries that need help getting on their feet. They include post-war Iraq, Afghanistan, Liberia, Burundi and Sierra Leone. Another needy candidate is a close-by neighbor of the U.S.: Haiti.

OBSERVATION 3. We offer the following plan, to be implemented by any necessary legal means through NATO member governments and the North Atlantic Council:

Plank 1 Mandates:

The NATO Response Force (NRF) shall be reformed into a UN peacekeeping support force committed to active service or permanent stand-by status to UNSAS.

NATO shall observe all meetings of the UN Peace-Building Commission and cooperate with its recommendations and any request for deployment of the NRF in any peace-keeping mission approved by the Commission or the UN Security Council.

NATO shall provide any necessary training needed for NRF to fulfill these mandates.

NATO will amend its charter to require all future peacekeeping/nation-building efforts to be done through UN-controlled operations.

NATO will donate 1 billion Euros per year to the UN Peace Building Commission

Plank 2 Funding shall come from existing NRF funding, general revenues of NATO member governments, cutting the US National Institute on Aging, and cutting 1 billion Euros per year from European agricultural subsidies.

Plank 3 Enforcement shall be through NATO member governments. Any public official not in compliance with the plan shall be removed from office.

Plank 4 This plan takes effect 30 days after an Affirmative ballot.

Plank 5 All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

OBSERVATION 4. This plan produces significant ADVANTAGES over the Status Quo.

ADVANTAGE 1. The Peace Building Commission increases the effectiveness and success of peacekeeping missions

Dr. Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of NATO's Secretary General, 14 Oct 2005, "NATO going global - or almost," NATO ATA Eduction, <http://www.ataedu.org/article_new.php?id=109> (brackets added, parentheses in original)

There is also no reason why NATO should not be part of the UN Peace Building Commission that Kofi Annan is seeking to establish where it can share [its] lessons learned and experience from areas such as the Balkans or Afghanistan. At a time when a record low number of American and European troops are involved in the UN's current 14 peacekeeping operations (as most of these troops are now involved in NATO or EU operations), we have to avoid a system of "robbing Peter to pay Paul". If NATO support can make a UN operation more effective, that is one less operation which the Alliance will need to do.

ADVANTAGE 2. Cooperation with the UN reduces costs and improves peacekeeping experience and capabilities

James Dobbins (former Asst. Sec. of State for Europe, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center), 2006, "NATO's Role in Nation-building," <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html>

Western troops form a much smaller share of UN forces today than 40, or even ten years ago. As a result, Western militaries are denying themselves invaluable experience in the conduct of stability operations, reducing the United Nations' prospects of success and thereby making more costly and more controversial Western-led interventions more likely.

ADVANTAGE 3. Converting NRF to support the Brahimi requirements will strengthen UN peacekeeping

A. The Brahimi Report recommends a response force volunteered to UNSAS

William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, Moira K. Shanahan, December 2003, The Henry L. Stimson Center, "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations," p. 74

Building "Brigade-Sized Forces" for UN Operations - The Brahimi Report's remedies encouraged developed and developing states to collaborate in training and equipping peacekeepers, and urged that states volunteer -- or collaborate -- to create "brigade-size forces, with the necessary enabling forces" able to meet the 30/90-day rapid deployment guidelines, and to associate them with UNSAS.

B. The NRF is perfect for the job

Dr. Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of NATO's Secretary General, 14 Oct 2005, "NATO going global - or almost," NATO ATA Eduction, <http://www.ataedu.org/article_new.php?id=109>

Kofi Annan has set out an ambitious agenda for the reform of the UN which involves a considerable boost to the UN's crisis management and peace support activities. The UN recognizes that NATO can be a useful partner in this endeavour by offering help in areas such as the planning of operations, logistics and transport, training of UN Headquarters' staff, help with doctrine and interoperability issues and offering extraction capabilities for Blue Helmet forces in the field. The NATO response force would seem perfectly suited to the latter role. NATO could also help to secure a given area and establish a bridgehead while UN peacekeepers deploy.

ADVANTAGE 4. UN peacekeeping is more effective than NATO peacekeeping

Rand Corporation, 2005, James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, Anga Timilsina, "The UN's Role In Nation-Building - From the Congo to Iraq," p. xxxvii

Assuming adequate consensus among Security Council members on the purpose for any intervention, the United Nations provides the most suitable institutional framework for most nation-building missions, one with a comparatively low cost structure, a comparatively high success rate, and the greatest degree of international legitimacy. Other possible options are likely to be either more expensive (e.g., coalitions led by the United States, the European Union, NATO) or less capable organizations (e.g., the African Union, the Organization of American States, or ASEAN).

2A EVIDENCE: UN PEACEKEEPING IMPROVEMENT

INHERENCY/FAILURES OF STATUS QUO

NATO is mistakenly committed to using NRF for big military assaults rather than more-needed peacekeeping

NATO official web page, NATO REVIEW, Spring 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html>

The same NATO communiqués that go on to talk about nothing but peacekeeping assert that the Alliance remains the basis for collective defense. Instead of embracing the obvious changes in the strategic environment, politically correct thinking ties the Alliance to the mantra contained in its latest Strategic Concept from 1999 that "the maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common defence remain central to Alliance security objectives" and that the capabilities for war-fighting are also "the basis of the Alliance's ability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management". The structure, procedure, language and culture of the organization continue to convey the message that it must meet the highest dangers of military aggression. Deficiencies in capabilities are still largely defined by this standard, just as the command structures, though considerably adjusted, remain designed for the old model, not the new task. The most recent innovations, the NRF and Allied Command Transformation, were created specifically to deal with NATO's supposed deficit in high-end military power.

UN peacekeeping missions need more support

Rand Corporation, 2005, James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, Anga Timilsina, "The UN's Role In Nation-Building - From the Congo to Iraq," p. xxix

UN operations have almost always been undermanned and underresourced. This is not because UN managers believe smaller is better, although some do. It is because member states are rarely willing to commit the manpower or the money any prudent military command would desire. As a result, small and weak UN forces are routinely deployed into what they hope, on the basis of best-case assumptions, will prove to be post-conflict situations. Where such assumptions prove ill founded, UN forces have had to be reinforced, withdrawn, or, in extreme cases, rescued.

Lack of Western support hurts UN peacekeeping missions

Rand Corporation, 2005, James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, Anga Timilsina, "The UN's Role In Nation-Building - From the Congo to Iraq," p. xxxvii

Despite the United Nations' significant achievements in the field of nation-building, the organization continues to exhibit weaknesses that decades of experiences have yet to overcome. Most UN missions are undermanned and underfunded. UN-led military forces are often sized and deployed on the basis of unrealistic best-case assumptions. Troop quality is uneven and has even gotten worse as many rich Western nations have followed U.S. practice and become less willing to commit their armed forces to UN operations.

US and Europe have abandoned UN peacekeeping duty

James Dobbins (former Asst. Sec. of State for Europe, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center), 2006, "NATO's Role in Nation-building," <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html>

The United States has led the way in this form of burden shirking. Many European governments have followed suit. Of the more than 58,000 UN peacekeeping troops currently deployed around the world just eleven are American. Thirteen are German. Seven are Belgian and two are Dutch.

Brahimi Report identified need for increased support for UN peacekeeping

William J. Durch, Victoria K. Holt, Caroline R. Earle, Moira K. Shanahan, December 2003, The Henry L. Stimson Center, "The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations," <http://www.stimson.org/fopo/pubs.cfm?ID=90>

Three years ago the Panel on UN Peace Operations challenged the international community to strengthen and revitalize UN peace operations. The "Brahimi Report," a landmark document, recommended sweeping changes in the way that UN peacekeeping and associated post-conflict peacebuilding are conceived, planned, and executed. The Report identified serious shortcomings in the UN's ability to "confront the lingering forces of war and violence," and helped launch an ongoing effort for institutional change within the United Nations that continues today.

Military intervention alone is not effective: Need nation building and civil admistration

Dr. Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of NATO's Secretary General, 14 Oct 2005, "NATO going global - or almost," NATO ATA Eduction, <http://www.ataedu.org/article_new.php?id=109>

Security these days is therefore all about risk management. This requires not only a willingness to deploy forces virtually anywhere in the world, but also a much higher degree of interaction among international organisations and NGOs to ensure that we are working on all facets of a risk at any given moment. For instance we have discovered in the Balkans and now in Afghanistan that crisis management is of little use if it does not make way for nation building and democratisation; a military stabilisation force is of little use if it cannot interact with a vigorous civil administration and programme of economic reforms.

Status Quo isn't going to improve NATO's peacekeeping capabilities

James Dobbins (former Asst. Sec. of State for Europe, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center), 2006, "NATO's Role in Nation-building," <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html>

In theory, NATO might develop its own capabilities for civil implementation. However, in practice, after having poured so much effort into building up the European Union's capacities in this sphere, the European Allies are unlikely to invest in a similar effort to build up NATO's.

NATO peacekeeping is not as effective as it could be/should be

Rand Corporation, 2005, James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, Anga Timilsina, "The UN's Role In Nation-Building - From the Congo to Iraq," p. 134

In its management of nation-building missions, NATO has followed the American pattern, assuming responsibilities only for military tasks, usually rather narrowly conceived, and leaving governance and the promotion of political and economic reform to other institutions and the promotion of political and economic reform to other institutions, including the United Nations, the OSCE and the European Union. In Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, this division has led to less-than-optimal integration of international efforts.

SOLVENCY/ADVANTAGES

UN peacekeeping is more effective than NATO

Rand Corporation, 2005, James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, Anga Timilsina, "The UN's Role In Nation-Building - From the Congo to Iraq," p. 134 (brackets added)

The United Nations adopted a different model [from NATO]. Beginning with its first major nation-building operation in the Belgian Congo, the United Nations has emphasized civilian control of the military at the local level, this control effected by a representative of the Secretary-General. In Eastern Slavonia, as elsewhere, this arrangement has helped ensure better coordination between the security and political aspects of the operation.

UN will put new peacekeepers to good use and US unilateral alternative will not work

Rand Corporation, 2005, James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, Anga Timilsina, "The UN's Role In Nation-Building - From the Congo to Iraq," p. xxxix

Demand for UN-led peacekeeping operations nevertheless far exceeds the available supply, particularly in sub-Saharan African. American armed forces, the world's most powerful, also find themselves badly overstretched by the demands of such missions.

UN operations are cheaper than NATO operations

Dr. Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of NATO's Secretary General, 14 Oct 2005, "NATO going global - or almost," NATO ATA Eduction, <http://www.ataedu.org/article_new.php?id=109>

UN operations are also cheaper than NATO operations. For instance the UN currently spends 3 billion dollars a year running 14 operations which is less than what NATO is spending running five. Thus now is certainly the time to bring NATO and the UN closer given that the old political inhibitions about working with NATO inside the UN community have thankfully dissipated.

UN involvement is essential to successful peacekeeping

James Dobbins (former Asst. Sec. of State for Europe, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center), 2006, "NATO's Role in Nation-building," <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html>

UN-led interventions in Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, East Timor, El Salvador, Mozambique, Namibia and Sierra Leon were all successful in moving war-torn societies away from renewed conflict and, with the exception of Cambodia, towards sustained democratic governance. The United Nations also plays a significant role in all nation-building missions that other institutions lead. There are many UN operations with no EU, NATO or US involvement. There are no EU, NATO or US operations without some, often quite important UN involvement.

NATO troops should be redirected to support UN missions and the Brahimi Report

James Dobbins (former Asst. Sec. of State for Europe, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center), 2006, "NATO's Role in Nation-building," <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html>

Western governments can strengthen UN capabilities through a variety of means. First, they can support full implementation of the 2001 Brahimi Report, the more recent recommendations of the Secretary-General's Panel of Eminent Persons and of the Secretary-General himself. Second, they can redirect bureaucratic energies at NATO and EU headquarters away from the endless refinement of contingency forces for hypothetical operations towards finding practical ways for NATO and the European Union to contribute to ongoing operations being conducted under UN leadership. And third, they can commit Western national contingents to UN operations with greater frequency.

NATO support will help the Peace Building Commission

James Dobbins (former Asst. Sec. of State for Europe, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center), 2006, "NATO's Role in Nation-building," <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue1/english/military.html>

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's proposal to form a Peace-Building Commission joining the various UN and Bretton Woods institutions with a role to play in nation-building offers a vehicle for establishing a more regular link between New York and Brussels. Both the European Union and NATO have much to offer in support of UN-led peace-building missions, and both organisations should seek to associate themselves with this proposed Commission.

UN peacekeeping is effective and essential to democracy and economic recovery

Rand Corporation, 2005, James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, Anga Timilsina, "The UN's Role In Nation-Building - From the Congo to Iraq," p. xxv

Peace is the most essential product of nation-building. Without peace, neither economic growth nor democratization are possible. With peace, some level of economic growth becomes almost inevitagle and democratization at least possible. As Table S.1 illustrates, among the 16 countries studied in this and the preceding volume, eleven remain at peace today, five do not. of the eight UN-led cases, seven are at peace. Of the eight U.S.-led cases, four are at peace; four are not -- or not yet -- at peace.

International peacekeepers are essential to economic recovery of failed states

Rand Corporation, 2005, James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, Anga Timilsina, "The UN's Role In Nation-Building - From the Congo to Iraq," p. xxviii - xxix

The presence of international peacekeepers and their success in suppressing renewed conflict, rather than the level of economic assistance, seem to be the key determinants of economic growth. As the present situation of Iraq illustrates, security is a prerequisite for growth, and money is no substitute for adequate manpower in providing it. Indeed, security without economic assistance is much more likely to spur economic growth than is economic assistance without security.

**UN intervention is better than u**n**ilateral intervention**

Rand Corporation, 2005, James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, Anga Timilsina, "The UN's Role In Nation-Building - From the Congo to Iraq," p. xxx

The United Nations has an ability to compensate, to some degree at least, for its "hard" power deficit with "soft" power attributes of international legitimacy and local impartiality. The United States does not have such advantages in situations where America itself is a party to the conflict being terminated, or where the United States has acted without an international mandate.

Peacekeeping missions are highly successful and cost-effective for promoting peace democracy

Rand Corporation, 2005, James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, Anga Timilsina, "The UN's Role In Nation-Building - From the Congo to Iraq," p. xxxv - xxxvi

A study by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler looked at the cost and effectiveness of various policy options to reduce the incidence and duration of civil wars. It found that post-conflict military intervention is highly cost-effective--in fact, the most cost-effective policy examined. Our study supports that conclusion. The UN success rate among missions studied -- seven out of eight societies left peaceful, six out of eight left democratic -- substantiates the view that nation-building can be an effective means of terminating conflicts, insuring against their reoccurrence, and promoting democracy.

NATO cooperation with UN peacekeeping increases success of UN operations - proven by Bosnia experience

Rand Corporation, 2005, James Dobbins, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, Anga Timilsina, "The UN's Role In Nation-Building - From the Congo to Iraq," p. 124 (UNTAES=United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium)

NATO's success in stabilizing Bosnia is often compared unfavorably with the United Nations' earlier failure there. A more valid contrast is between the pre-1995 failure of all international institutions to halt the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and the post-1995 success of those same organizations. As noted above, the key variable was Washington's willingness to back international diplomacy with American military force. Although the United States did not commit troops to UNTAES, the presence of a former American diplomat (and general officer) at its head, combined with the stated willingness of NATO forces in neighboring Bosnia to intervene on UNTAES's behalf, provided the capable and comparatively numerous UN force on the ground with an additional element of escalation dominance. This deterrent effect proved enough to secure compliance from local potential spoilers and cooperation from reluctant neighboring states.

What the Peace Building Commission is

Richard Foster, 25 Feb 2006, "Haiti would be a perfect laboratory for U.N. peacebuilding," MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, <http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=403970>)

The new Peacebuilding Commission will comprise 31 member-countries, seven of which will be drawn from the U.N. Security Council. Another five will be selected from the top 10 contributors to the U.N.; five more from the 10 nations that supply peacekeeping troops to the world body; seven more from the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council, and the remaining seven will be chosen by the General Assembly from a list of nations "that have experience post-conflict recovery.

What the Peace Building Commission can do

French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005, "Adjusting our reponses to threats," <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/article-imprim.php3?id_article=1652>

The establishment of a peace-building commission would enable broad coordination of the action in this area. The commission would be composed of representatives of thee main actors involved in peace-building : Security Council, Ecosoc and specialized UN agencies, international financial institutions (IFIs), regional organizations, donors and troop contributors, concerned countries and other countries in the region, etc. The commission would frame the drafting of a consistent strategy by the international community and mobilization when that strategy is applied, with a view to avoiding the resurgence of crises. The commission could also decide to draw on a peace-building fund, set up at the same time, to rapidly fund urgent post-crisis spending, so as to start actions for which the normal financing procedures- IFIs, donor conferences and trust funds- cannot be activated immediately.

Peace Building Commission essential to promote democracy in failed states

Richard Foster, 25 Feb 2006, "Haiti would be a perfect laboratory for U.N. peacebuilding," MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, <http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=403970>

A country ravaged by years of war, foreign exploitation and poverty finally wins its independence. But expecting such a country, one with virtually no experience in self-governance, to develop into a reasonably democratic, stable and prosperous nation without a lot of sustained help from other countries and international organizations is like expecting a newborn baby to get behind the wheel of a high-powered race car and drive it around the track. No chance.That is why, last December, as part of a broader and wider effort at modernization and reform, the United Nations established a new Peacebuilding Commission.

DISAD RESPONSES

UN is solving sexual abuse by peacekeepers

Michael J. Jordan, 21 June 2005, "UN Tackles Sex Abuse by Troops," CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/2005/0621sexabuse.htm>

Since Jan. 1, 2004, the UN has investigated 152 cases of alleged sexual violations - dismissing five UN staff and sending home 77 military personnel and national police from their missions, including six commanders. The UN Security Council held its first-ever meeting on May 31 to hold countries that contribute troops more accountable, urging them to end impunity and prosecute perpetrators at home. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan will now track the progress in these countries.

HOMECOMING: THE CASE FOR REMOVING U.S. TROOPS FROM EUROPE

By Rachel Marie Blum

The massive amount of American troops stationed in Europe was, "Certainly good in '49. It seems to be good in about the early sixties," according to the *Hoover Institution in 1999*. What happened? The Hoover Institution concludes by answering, "Basically, Europe recovered economically and our troops were no longer needed in Europe.

(Peter Duignan (Hoover Institution Senior Fellow) and Melvyn Krauss(William L. Clayton Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution), "Veto NATO? The Future of NATO," The Hoover Institution, January 12, 1999, <http://www.uncommonknowledge.org/99winter/322.html>)

It is because the presence of American troops in Europe is no longer needed, and in fact is causing more harm than good, that we stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished. Before we take more of a look at the problems confronting NATO, let's

DEFINE our key terms:

**NATO** as found in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. [NATO is the] "North Atlantic Treaty Organization, begun in 1949 as a military and political alliance of European nations and the United States and Canada designed to protect Western Europe from a Soviet attack." *(Encyclopedia of the Cold War, Thomas S. Arms; The Cold War, 1945-1991, Benjamin Frankel, editor; The Cold War: A History, Martin Walker; Cold War Chronology, Soviet-American Relations 1945-1991, Kenneth L. Hill; Encyclopedia Britannica.* [*http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/kbank/glossary/nz.index.html*](http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/kbank/glossary/nz.index.html)*)*

**Significant** "important or noticeable" (Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dict., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006, http://dictionary.cambridge.org)

**Reform** "to put an end to (an evil) by enforcing or introducing a better method or course of action" *(Merriam-Webster Online Dict., 2006,* [*www.m-w.com*](http://www.m-w.com)*)*

We will be focusing on the main issues through the viewing lens of the

**CRITERION** of **Independent Military Actions**. We believe that the ability of each country to be able to defend itself independently and in the most efficient manner possible should be the goal of each country's foreign policy. If any alliance or organization hinders the ability of countries to look out for their own interests, that alliance should be reformed.

Next, we need to look at the

FACTS of the status quo.

Fact 1: The US has 109,000 troops in Europe.

Hans Binnendijk, David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, May 2005, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "A New Military Framework for NATO," DEFENSE HORIZONS, p. 12

Since the early 1990s, the United States has deployed about 109,000 troops in Europe in multiple headquarters staffs, 4 heavy Army brigades and an airborne contingent in Italy, and over 2 U.S. Air Force fighter wings and suppot aircraft at various bases, plus Navy bases, mostly in the Mediterranean, to support regular deployment of a carrier battle group and an amphibious ready group.

Fact 2: The US bears a disproportionate burden of NATO

NATO Transformed," from the NATO Online Library, 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/nato-trans/html_en/nato_trans02.html>.

The United States continues to assume a disproportionate share of the costs of Alliance security and an inequitable share of the responsibility for Alliance actions, as a result of the imbalance between the United States and other Allies in terms of their military capabilities. Having benefited from the post- Cold War peace dividend in the early 1990s, the European Allies and Canada have not made the investments needed to adapt their military capabilities to new security challenges. They remain dependent on the United States in many key areas, such as the airlift capabilities required for rapid deployment of military forces, satellite communications and other areas of advanced technological capability.

Fact 3: Fewer than half of NATO countries are fulfilling their defense spending commitments.

Sebeysten L.v. Gorka (executive director of the Institute for Transitional Democracy and International Security and adjunct professor for Terrorism Studies at the George C. Marshall Center), "Global War on Terror and Future of NATO," Human Events, January 9, 2006, <http://www.humaneventsonline.com/article.php?id=11374>

.At Prague, the then NATO 19 committed themselves to spending at least 2% of their GDPs on defence. Today, less than half of the 26 members of the expanded Alliance spend close to that figure.

With these facts in mind, we need to examine the

FAILURES – or the harms in the current system.

Failure 1: The European Welfare State

Weekly Intelligence Briefing, "The Iraqi Transition Two Days Early," published by the Energy Security Analysis, Inc., June 28, 2004, <http://www.esai.com/pdf/Wb062804.pdf>.

Saddled with generous social welfare spending, European governments have found it impossible to shift resources from butter to guns--meaning that they will find it difficult to close the gap in military capabilities exposed during the 1999 Kosovo campaign, when U.S. forces, operating in Europe's backyard, ended up carrying out the vast majority of precision strikes and combat air sorties. Now as then, the United States is generally the sole provider of key capabilities such as electronic warfare aircraft and precision arms. Things have not improved noticeably since the Kosovo war. Indeed, of 1.4 million military personnel under NATO arms in October 2003, the non-U.S. members of the Alliance contributed only 55,000.

From these piece of evidence we see that since 1949 America has been paying for and providing for Europe's defense. This has kept Europe from having to invest in its own military and has kept it from being militarily independent, instead fostering irresponsibility and inefficient welfare spending. We see more consequences of American military presence in Europe through…

Failure 2: European defense abilities inhibited

Wayne Merry (former State Dept. & Pentagon official, is a Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), ‘‘Therapy's End: Thinking beyond NATO,'' National Interest, no. 74, Winter 2003–4 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

This dynamic has progressed quite far in many areas but remains inert in defense policy because NATO has remained the primary security instrument for most EU members. The Alliance, however, is not a mechanism of European defense integration, nor has it ever been. NATO is a mechanism to integrate American power into Europe. Yet its very success has inhibited significant military integration within Europe.

What this means is that because the American troops are stationed in Europe, providing for all of Europe's needs, the European countries have never had to invest any time or resources in establishing independent militaries, meaning that Europeans countries are not able to perform independent military actions. The presence of American troops in European NATO countries hurts the US, as well, as we see in…

Failure 3: America's global presence makes it vulnerable to terrorism.

Rep. Ron Paul (R-Tx.), 14 July 2005, "Suicide Terrorism," Before the US House of Representatives, <http://www.lewrockwell.com/paul/paul262.html>

Between 1995 and 2004, the al Qaeda years, two-thirds of all attacks came from countries where the U.S. had troops stationed. Iraq's suicide missions today are carried out by Iraqi Sunnis and Saudis. Recall, 15 of the 19 participants in the 9/11 attacks were Saudis. The clincher is this: the strongest motivation, according to Pape, is not religion but rather a desire "to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from the territory the terrorists view as their homeland." The best news is that if stopping suicide terrorism is a goal we seek, a solution is available to us. Cease the occupation of foreign lands and the suicide missions will cease.

Beyond increasing the risk to Americans, American military presence in NATO countries means that we see…

Failure 4: America is overburdened

Wayne Merry (former State Dept. & Pentagon official, is a Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), ‘‘Therapy's End: Thinking beyond NATO,'' National Interest, no. 74, Winter 2003–4 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

For better or worse, the United States has global responsibilities and unique global capabilities. At the same time, Washington's diplomatic and political capacities are already overburdened. While U.S. operational and logistical capabilities are today supreme, America's overall force structure is little more than half the size it was a generation ago, and its reserves are seriously overcommitted. The best forces can cover only limited tasks, especially for a democratic nation that employs only volunteers. Stated plainly, NATO is a luxury the United States can no longer justify. This vast subsidy for Europe is in direct conflict with the procurement and development budgets required to maintain the American technological lead in an ever-competitive world. Today's precision weapons will be commonplace tomorrow, and even the Pentagon's immense budget cannot always keep up.

Judge, this shows us that beyond the strain that the lack of independent military actions places on Europe and the United States, the continued presence of American troops in Europe and the subordination of European military forces to the United States contributes to…

Failure 5: The unequal division of power is crippling NATO.

Wayne Merry (former State Dept. & Pentagon official, is a Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), ‘‘Therapy's End: Thinking beyond NATO,'' National Interest, no. 74, Winter 2003–4 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

IT SHOULD go without saying that Europe and America need to be partners in world affairs. The question is, how best to practice partnership? NATO represents the model of a dominant senior partner and various junior partners. The growth of European identity and of European integration makes this approach obsolete, even abstracting from the end of the Cold War and the lack of an external threat.

This article goes on to say:

The essence of a true transatlantic partnership is mutual respect of a type now absent. Such an attitude can come about only when Europe respects itself as an independent actor on the world stage and when America sees in Europe a partner worthy of respect. If both sides continue trying to resuscitate NATO, the mutual resentment, hostility and contempt characteristic of the recent transatlantic relationship will only get worse over time. Mutual respect will not guarantee a successful alliance between America and Europe, but it will establish a much more solid foundation for partnership than currently exists.

So we're seeing that because the current functions of NATO have impaired the independent military capabilities of all of its member states, we present the following

PLAN

Plank 1 Agency: shall be the governments of the 26 NATO member states.

Plank 2 Mandates

Mandate 1 Over the next 5 years, America shall withdraw its troops from all European NATO countries.

Mandate 2 During this 5 year withdrawal, the European NATO countries shall each establish additional military forces independent of NATO, much like the United States currently has.

Mandate 3 America will not provide funding for any further peacetime military endeavors within the borders of European NATO member states.

Mandate 4 Every NATO country shall spend at minimum 2% of their total GDP on defense, as agreed to at Prague.

Plank 3 Enforcement: Any government official not in compliance shall be removed from office.

Plank 4 Funding: European NATO member states will fund this plan by redirecting existing military budgets to combat ready defense purposes, cutting welfare spending, public education, and through general governmental revenues.

Plank 5 The affirmative team reserves legislative intent and the right to clarify for the purpose of this plan in following speeches.

Now that we've given you a blueprint for change, let's examine how our plan will truly solve for the failures in the status quo by looking at two

FUNCTIONALITY points.

1. Wiser European defense spending will increase military capabilities

Economist, "Stay together, fight together," May 2, 2002, <http://economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1109858>

More must be done and more quickly to find the mobile, readily deployable forces NATO needs, and the ships and aircraft to move them. The Europeans need not do everything that America does, but one way or another they all need to be ready to do their bit—and pay for it. Spending their defense budgets more wisely, pooling this and bolting together that, can help Removing American troops is cited as a measure to improve transatlantic relations.

2. Removing American troops will mean an increase in efficient allocation of European resources.

Wayne Merry (former State Dept. & Pentagon official, is a Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), ‘‘Therapy's End: Thinking beyond NATO,'' National Interest, no. 74, Winter 2003–4 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

The problem is not really one of money.

The article goes on to state that:

The problem in Europe is that the bulk of defense spending has little to do with defense, but is allocated to create direct and indirect employment and to retain a pattern of redundant, if ineffective, "balanced" national force structures.

Finally, what are the Advantages produced by the affirmative plan? The affirmative plan increases the

**FUNCTIONS** of the European NATO members and increases military independence in 5 ways:

1. By reducing the incentive for a European welfare state through forcing Europe to pay for its own expenses.

2. By increasing Europe's defense capabilities.

3. By reducing America's unnecessary overseas military presence and reducing the incentive for terrorism.

4. By decreasing the financial burden of NATO on the United States.

5. By increasing the cooperation of NATO through making its member states equally effective countries.

Today you have seen a NATO that is functioning improperly because of the lack of independent military action fostered by the continued and unnecessary presence of American troops in Europe. You have seen a plan to correct the imbalance of America's defense responsibilities. And you have seen the workability and benefits of such a plan. I urge the judge to vote for increased military independence and cast an affirmative ballot.

2A EVIDENCE: REMOVE U.S. TROOPS FROM EUROPE

INHERENCY

1. NATO causes US to maintain troops in Europe

Hans Binnendijk, David C. Gompert, Richard L. Kugler, May 2005, Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, "A New Military Framework for NATO," DEFENSE HORIZONS, p. 12

The United States maintains military forces in Europe both for national purposes and to meet NATO commitments and to help influence how NATO military forces undergo transformation. Careful attention must be paid to the future U.S. military commitment -- not only U.S. forces in Europe but also NATO-committed forces stationed in the United States -- because of the changes that will be taking place during the coming years.

2. The operations currently performed by NATO further European interests and are best left to European forces.

Christopher Layne (visiting fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato), "Casualties of War - Transatlantic Relations and the Future of NATO in the Wake of the Second Gulf War," the Cato Institute Executive Summary No. 483, 13 Aug 2003, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa483.pdf>

At the same time, Washington has little need, or interest, in becoming mired in the kinds of missions now performed by the alliance on the European continent. For example, American troops have more important things to do than Balkan peacekeeping—specifically, defending Americans against genuine threats to U.S. security. No doubt, preventing ethnic and national conflicts from spiraling into war is an important *European* interest, but it is an interest for which the Europeans themselves should be responsible. Similarly, consolidating free market democracy in East Central Europe may, indeed, be a key objective for the United States. But it is a task that is better left to the European Union than to a military alliance like NATO.

3. NATO is irrelevant because there's no need to stabilize or keep peace in Europe.

Christopher Layne (visiting fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato), "Casualties of War - Transatlantic Relations and the Future of NATO in the Wake of the Second Gulf War," the Cato Institute Executive Summary No. 483, August 13, 2003, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa483.pdf>

The "new" NATO is an empty vessel. The new NATO—like the old NATO—is merely the embodiment of American hegemony. From every other perspective it has become an irrelevant alliance. The United States derives no added value militarily from NATO. Without the Soviet Union, the new NATO advances no compelling vital American interest. The advocates of offshore balancing are correct: in the absence of a rival hegemonic threat, the United States does not need to be present in Europe militarily. There is no need to stabilize an already stable Europe; there is no need for peacekeeping in a peaceful Europe. The United States does not need to play the role of Europe's stabilizer (or "pacifier') and peacekeeper.

4. Europeans suffer from the psychology of dependence.

Wayne Merry (former State Dept. & Pentagon official, is a Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), ‘‘Therapy's End: Thinking beyond NATO,'' National Interest, no. 74, Winter 2003–4 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

UNDERLYING all other problems is the European psychology of dependence on the United States. This is now so much a matter of habit and experience that few diplomats or soldiers on either side of the Atlantic can recall a time when the sense of inferiority in the security realm was not pervasive among Europeans, or when Americans did not automatically assume they must take the lead to get anything done. Both sides have forgotten why the dependency began and that it was never intended to become permanent. European capabilities already far exceed European self-confidence. Europe will remain inferior to the United States in power projection and logistics, but that would only be important if Europe were to emulate America's global role.

5. The US pays for Europe's share in NATO.

John C. Hulsman, PhD, "The Future of NATO," The Heritage Foundation – Issues 2006: The Candidate's Briefing Book, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/research/features/issues/pdfs/NATO.pdf>

The European allies as a whole spend roughly two-thirds of what the U.S. spends on defense while accounting for only 15 percent of NATO's overall capacity. This is not a politically sustainable situa­tion. At present, only Great Britain and France are capable of perform­ing all military missions with the U.S., from high-end, high-intensity war fighting through low-end peacekeeping. Germany, Italy, Spain, and Poland are nowhere near capable of performing the full range of missions.

6. The US maintains more than 100,000 troops in a network of European bases for no justifiable reason.

Christopher Layne (visiting fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato), "Casualties of War - Transatlantic Relations and the Future of NATO in the Wake of the Second Gulf War," the Cato Institute Executive Summary No. 483, August 13, 2003, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa483.pdf>

NATO was America's strategic response to the concern that the Soviet Union would establish hegemony in Europe following World War II. Neorealist alliance theory also made a very clear prediction about NATO's post–Cold War fate: without the Soviet threat to bind the United States and Western Europe strategically, the alliance would dissolve. Similarly, the offshore balancing interpretation of U.S. grand strategy predicts that once the Soviet Union was no longer a contender for European hegemony, American military power would have been withdrawn from Europe. Of course, that did not happen: NATO is still in business, and the United States still maintains a sizable military presence in Europe including more than 100,000 personnel, and an extensive network of bases.

Phillip Carter (former Army officer who writes on Legal/Foreign Affairs), "We Have How Many Troops in Europe?" from Slate, a publication of the Washington Post, August 18, 2004, <http://www.slate.com/id/2105295/>

Currently, the United States has 116,400 military personnel from all four services assigned to its European Command.

7. The US has been quick to use force because Europe is unable to act independently.

Nicola Butler (research associate), "NATO's Istanbul Challenge: Transformation or Irrelevance?" from the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 77, May/June 2004, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77nb.htm>

Because US military capabilities dwarf those of its allies6 the US has often been quick to resort to the use of armed force. In contrast, many NATO allies recognise that they no longer have the military resources to act independently and, therefore, tend to attach a higher priority to multilateralism, diplomacy, and international legal constraints.

8. US troops do not serve security function in Europe.

Dr. Michael Weinstein (Senior Analyst), "US Troop Redeployment: Rational Adjustment to an Altered Threat Environment," from the Power and Interest New Report, September 1, 2004, <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=203&language_id=1>.

The redeployment plan is based on a realistic assessment of where emerging threats to U.S. interests are likely to arise in the future. It is clear that large troop deployments in Europe have not served a security function since the fall of the Soviet Union.

9. Because of European trade ties, no losses will occur from removing troops.

Dr. Michael Weinstein (Senior Analyst), "US Troop Redeployment: Rational Adjustment to an Altered Threat Environment," from the Power and Interest New Report, September 1, 2004, <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=203&language_id=1>.

Little of value is lost from withdrawal from Western Europe, so long as the major European powers remain tied to the globalized economy and do not want to pay the economic price of post-industrial military might.

SIGNIFICANCE

1. Comparison of defense budgets of NATO countries – America is bearing the burden.

Transatlantic Relations," from the CATO Handbook on Policy, December 8, 2004

Comparison of Defense Budgets, 2002

Total Defense

Expenditures Spending per (millions of U.S. $) Capita (in U.S. $) % of GDP

United States 329,616/1,138/3.3

France 38,005/636/2.5

United Kingdom 35,249/590/2.4

Germany 31,465/383/1.5

Italy 24,210/421/1.9

Turkey 8,727/127/5.1

Spain 8,253/206/1.2

Netherlands 7,330/459/1.6

Greece 6,154/579/4.4

Belgium 3,435/332/1.3

Norway 3,434/759/1.9

2. The US has a combined total of 60,000 troops on 294 bases in Europe.

BBC News, "US Troops to Remain in Europe," February 23, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4292269.stm

The US has 26,000 combat personnel and 34,000 military support and administration personnel on 294 military installations in Europe.

3. The US funds 64 percent of NATO military expenses even though its population and GDP are less than Europe's.

Weekly Intelligence Briefing, "The Iraqi Transition Two Days Early," published by the Energy Security Analysis, Inc., June 28, 2004, <http://www.esai.com/pdf/Wb062804.pdf>.

The United States dedicates some 3.3 percent of its gross domestic product to defense. While this makes for a modest budget by Cold War standards--6 percent of GDP was a more typical figure during that protracted struggle --it dwarfs defense spending by the European nations, which has dwindled since the demise of the Soviet Union. Indeed, 12 of the 19 pre-2004 Alliance members devote less than 2 percent of GDP to defense. The United States funds 64 percent of NATO military expenditures, while Europe, with a larger population and comparable GDP, accounts for only 36 percent.

4. Europe spends very little on military capabilities because America pays.

Jim Jordan (Business Writer), "Europe Seen as Threat to U.S. Power," from the Lexington Herald-Leader, June 8, 2006, <http://www.kentucky.com/mld/kentucky/business/14766892.htm>.

They also do relatively little military spending because "American taxpayers are paying for Europe's defense," he said. The United States pays 70 percent of the cost of NATO, the alliance that protects Europe from military threats.

5. Global presence makes America vulnerable to terrorism

Peter W. Singer (Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies) and John M. Olin (Post-Doctoral Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies), "New Thinking on Transatlantic Security: Terrorism, NATO, and Beyond," from Weltpolitik, a publication of the Brookings Institute, January 15, 2003, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/speeches/singer/20030115.htm>

America is just as vulnerable to terrorism as any other state, perhaps even more so, and that this vulnerability is linked to a responsibility to play a role in the world.

SOLVENCY

1. European defense establishments are sadly lacking because of a waste of resources. (Solvency 2 extension: when they are forced to more efficiently allocate their resources, their defense capabilities will improve)

Wayne Merry (former State Dept. & Pentagon official, is a Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), ‘‘Therapy's End: Thinking beyond NATO,'' National Interest, no. 74, Winter 2003–4 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

The consequence is grotesque: a European defense establishment in which the whole is significantly less than the sum of its parts. Many of the parts are excellent, with Europe fielding high quality units and capabilities that, in some cases (such as paramilitary units), are superior to those of the United States. Yet, except for Britain and France (and increasingly even for them), the lack of scale, the fragmentation and duplication, and the sheer waste of resources within European defense establishments vitiate what could be the world's second-strongest concentration of military power.

2. Europeans favor gaining defense capabilities.

Economist, "NATO versus the European Union," April 10, 2003, <http://economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1699200>

When the Union launched its first small military operation in Macedonia earlier this month, taking over from NATO peacekeepers, top officials from both organisations were on hand to grant their blessing. The EU's senior military man (a German admiral), now overseeing the Macedonian operation, is actually based at NATO. But France has always believed that in the long run the EU must assert its independence of NATO, an organisation it regards as ultimately an instrument of American foreign policy. Without an independent European defence force, the French believe there can be no independent European foreign policy.

3. Withdrawing troops from Europe is cited as a policy to improve transatlantic relations (plan advocate)

Transatlantic Relations," from the CATO Handbook on Policy, December 8, 2004

Policymakers should

● support the Bush administration's plan to redeploy U.S. forces from Western Europe to the continental United States and implement a plan to withdraw all U.S. forces from Europe during the next five years;

● refuse to appropriate funds to construct new U.S./NATO bases in East Central and Southeastern Europe;

● forge a new, balanced transatlantic relationship based on recognition of the European Union as an independent ‘‘pole of power'' in the international political system and a geopolitical equal of the United States;

● refrain from interfering in decisionmaking areas—membership and enlargement, for example—that are properly within the EU's province; and

● endorse the EU's efforts to forge an independent foreign and security policy.

4. Historical precedent: the U.S. has never made a habit of leaving its forces overseas for no reason.

Stephen M. Walt (Prof. of Political Science at U. of Chicago),‘‘The Ties That Fray: Why Europe and America Are Drifting Apart.'' National Interest, no. 54 Winter 1998–99 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

Similarly, the United States withdrew most of its armed forces from Europe after World War II, and agreed to bring them back only when it became clear that the European powers were in no position to stand up to the Soviet Union. Yet, even then, U.S. leaders never envisioned the permanent deployment of American troops in Europe and actively sought to bring them home throughout the 1950s.

5. The EU limit on budget deficits guarantees that to increase defense spending, the European countries will have to cut social welfare.

Michel Chossudovsky (for Global Research), "New Undeclared Arms Race: America's Agenda for Global Military Domination," the Peace and Neutrality Alliance, March 17, 2005, <http://www.pana.ie/idn/170305.html>

The European Union's 3% limit on annual budget deficits implies that the expansion in military expenditure will be accompanied by a massive curtailment of all categories of civilian expenditure, including social services, public infrastructure, not to mention government support to agriculture and industry

LAST TRAIN TO LONDON: THE CASE FOR A US/UK ALLIANCE

By Rachel Marie Blum

The United States and Britain have always had what Winston Churchill termed a "Special Relationship". Despite changing times, the relationship between the US and the UK is as strong and relevant – and perhaps the only relevant relationship in the bloated North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Recognizing the need to build on this relationship, my partner and I stand Resolved: That the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should be significantly reformed or abolished.

Most terms in the resolution are easily understood and operationally defined, but for the sake of clarity we provide the following

DEFINITIONS of

**NATO** "North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an international defense alliance between the United States, Great Britain, and others formed in 1949 as a response to the spread of communism" – from *Regents Prep Vocabulary, 2005,* <http://www.regentsprep.org/Regents/global/vocab/topic.cfm>

**Significant** "important in effect or meaning." (Wordnet 2.1, Published by Princeton University, March 2005)

**Reform** "To change or improve." (The Glossary of Judicial and Historical Terms (Published by Old Bailey Online Project), 2003, <http://www.oldbaileyonline.org/history/glossary.html>)

Before we present our reform, we need to first examine the

HARMS in the current system.

Harm 1: NATO impedes European security

Dr. Steven E. Meyer (Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. M.S. in political science from Fordham University and a Ph.D. from Georgetown University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: the Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, pp. 83-97, Winter 2003-04, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/03winter/meyer.htm>

In addition, NATO membership—including vulnerability to Western arms merchants—damages the ability of these countries to deal with genuine emerging security issues. Issues of social and economic justice, crime and corruption, environmental degradation, and ethnic reconciliation bear more directly on the security futures of these countries than does their struggle to satisfy NATO's arcane demands for membership. Consequently, instead of pressing these countries to spend scarce resources on NATO, Washington should encourage them to focus exclusively on European and regional organizations that are better geared to help address the real, pressing interests of the countries.

Harm 2: NATO harms poorer European countries struggling to fulfill EU and NATO obligations.

Dr. Steven E. Meyer (Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. M.S. in political science from Fordham University and a Ph.D. from Georgetown University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: the Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, pp. 83-97, Winter 2003-04, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/03winter/meyer.htm>

Since their accession on March 12, 1999, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have all experienced integration difficulties," because the real demands of economic and social issues lead to "economic constraints" and "a failure of political will." And still, NATO and EU authorities continue to press these strapped economies to live up to difficult and at times mutually exclusive commitments that undermine pressing economic and social programs.

Harm 3: NATO growth provokes Russian aggression

James Klurfeld, 5 May 2006, "We need to repair our relationship with Russia," NEWSDAY, <http://www.newsday.com/news/columnists/ny-opklur4729429may05,0,4271470.column>

And Russia's foreign policy has frequently been antagonistic to the West. Putin has not been cooperative in the effort to discourage Iran from pursuing its nuclear weapons program, has said that he will send aid to Hamas when the United States and even Europe have vowed to withhold it, and has been aggressively hostile toward the new nations that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. The decision to temporarily shut down a gas pipeline to Ukraine over a price dispute has had a terribly chilling effect on all nations that must depend on energy supplies coming from Russia. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations have ignored deep-seated Russian insecurities caused by the expansion of NATO to Russia's borders. The warning from the legendary American diplomat George Kennan that expansion of NATO was the single biggest blunder of the post-Cold War period might yet prove true, unfortunately. The claim that the Russians didn't really care about NATO expansion because Putin didn't vocally oppose it was misleading. Putin, a realist, knew expansion was a fait accompli and didn't care to appear impotent to stop it. But his behavior speaks louder than words.

Harm 4: NATO is too big to function effectively, losing lives as a result

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs; Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), "NATO's Decision Making Process," Congressional Research Service report for Congress, RS21510, May 5, 2003, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21510.pdf>

There can be political costs due to the sparring and the time involved in reaching consensus. NATO's decision to go to war against Serbia in 1999 was an example of such an instance. Military action against Serbia had been postponed for a number of days, while civilians were losing their lives in Kosovo.

Next we examine why the Status Quo is not able to deal with these issues as we look at

INHERENCY

1. NATO is large and still growing

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, 2 Apr 2004, "NATO: Foreign Ministers Celebrate Expansion At Alliance Headquarters," RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/04/8279b503-fdc2-41fd-9998-dadf0085eef9.html>

We are a 26-nation alliance, and you know the NATO door is open, because there are more countries aspiring and having the ambition to share those same values in the Atlantic alliance.

2. Britain is aligning its defense apparatus with the European Union

The Center for Security Policy, Decision Brief, "Taking the ‘Special' out of the U.S.-U.K. Relationship," No. 05-D 48, September 22, 2005, <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=05-D_48>

The likelihood of a complete breakdown in common standards between the U.S. military and those of EU member states is very real. Should Britain continue to realign its defense apparatus with that of the European Union through a procurement policy that excludes and is incompatible with America's, the implications for the United States, Great Britain and perhaps even the EU would be nothing less than devastating: The United States will lose a formidable ally and partner in the British military.

Because there is a definite need to redefine the dysfunctional alliance and because a more functional alliance will be demonstrated by the combined forces of the US and the UK, we present the following

PLAN

Plank 1 Agency: shall be the governments of the 26 current NATO member states.

Plank 2 Mandates:

Mandate 1: The NATO charter and governing treaties shall be reformed to make NATO an alliance solely between the United States and the United Kingdom. Britain will discontinue military cooperation with the European Union.

Mandate 2: All other existing members shall be freed from their NATO obligations 6 months after an affirmative ballot and shall instead devote their resources to the European Union or other organizations.

Plank 3 Enforcement: Any government official not in compliance with this plan shall be immediately removed from office.

Plank 4 Funding shall come from existing NATO and member nation defense budgets. No increase in spending is mandated by this plan.

Plank 5 All Affirmative speeches have legislative intent for the purpose of clarifying the plan.

Finally, we come to the most exciting part of our case. The four

ADVANTAGES

Advantage 1: European economic reform.

Marian L. Tupy (assistant director of Project on Global Economic Liberty at Cato), "Worse Than Useless?," the Cato Institute, May 1, 2003, <http://www.cato.org/research/articles/tupy-030501.html>

An American withdrawal from the European security guarantee would galvanize serious economic reform. Instead of remaining defenseless, the European states would find it necessary to raise more revenue by cutting the size of the welfare state and increasing their economic growth. A vibrant Europe with a strong economy and a credible military force could then contribute to making the world more prosperous - and safe.

Advantage 2: American and British strategic interests furthered by a partnership

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

The Anglo-American Special Relationship is of great mutual benefit to both parties and should be strengthened. The United States has in Britain its only militarily effective and politically reliable global ally—a fact confirmed by past attempts to find an alternative. The Special Relationship with Britain does not complicate, but rather supports, America's operation as a global superpower. The U.K. gains even more. Its economy gets a boost; its interests are protected; its security is increased (through vital intelligence sharing); and its standing in the world is immeasurably enhanced.

Advantage 3: Stable relationship with Russia.

Dr. Steven E. Meyer (Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. M.S. in political science from Fordham University and a Ph.D. from Georgetown University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: the Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, pp. 83-97, Winter 2003-04, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/03winter/meyer.htm>

The collapse of the Stalinist system has resolved the "Soviet Question" that dominated much of the second half of the 20th century. Although we can't predict Russia's future exactly, it is highly unlikely that the Stalinist system will be reestablished, and by including Russia as an equal we greatly enhance her prospects for a stable political order and a more traditional, non-antagonistic relationship with the United States and the rest of the West.

Advantage 4: Greater unilateral breathing room: The declining centrality of NATO will make consensus easier.

Pierre Chao (Director of CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives) and Robin Niblett (Executive Viec Preident and Director of CSIS Europe Program), "Sharing Technology Within the U.S.-UK Security Relationship," Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership Working Paper, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 26, 2006, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/USUKSecurity.pdf>

Some U.S. leaders have bemoaned the declining centrality of NATO's North Atlantic Council for U.S.-European dialogues about new strategic threats to their common security and the rise of alternative region- or issue-specific transatlantic "dialogues." Others have recognized that this might offer an easier way to get things done, especially given the difficulty of establishing consensus positions in a NATO of 26 countries.

Judge, our world – NATO's world – is certainly changing, and we should be prepared to change with it. Currently, NATO is the cause of a myriad of problems. By reforming NATO around the two remaining functional countries in the alliance, we will create a solution and a world that is beneficial for everyone involved.

2A EVIDENCE: US/UK ALLIANCE

INHERENCY

1. Recent security coalitions have used NATO as little more than a truck stop.

Dr. Steven E. Meyer (Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. M.S. in political science from Fordham University and a Ph.D. from Georgetown University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: the Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, pp. 83-97, Winter 2003-04, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/03winter/meyer.htm>

Occasionally, the United States and specific European countries or groups of countries may need to engage in joint military activities—the Gulf War in the early 1990s and the more recent war in Afghanistan provide two excellent examples. In both cases coalitions were put together to deal with specific issues and, during both, NATO was little more than a "truck stop."

2. Most of Europe's NATO soldiers are useless.

John C. Hulsman, PhD (Research Fellow in Foreign Affairs), and Nile Gardiner, PhD (Fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy), "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe," by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, published by the Heritage Foundation, No. 1803, October 4, 2004, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=70052>

Of 1.5 million soldiers available to NATO's European members, fewer than 100,000 can actually be deployed.

3. Europe has outgrown the NATO alliance.

Dr. Steven E. Meyer (Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. M.S. in political science from Fordham University and a Ph.D. from Georgetown University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: the Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, pp. 83-97, Winter 2003-04, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/03winter/meyer.htm>

The whole nature of contemporary European politics has changed so fundamentally that it has outgrown NATO-type alliances. For the first time in about 1,800 years, there is no world-class threat to or from any European state or combination of European states that requires a wide-ranging, comprehensive alliance such as NATO.For the most part, borders are set, uncontested, and peaceful. Aggressive nationalism (although not nationalism itself) and the race for arms and empire that so dominated the politics of every major power from the 16th through the early 20th centuries are gone.

4. The US and Europe have different beliefs and missions in the world.

Dr. Steven E. Meyer (Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. M.S. in political science from Fordham University and a Ph.D. from Georgetown University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: the Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, pp. 83-97, Winter 2003-04, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/03winter/meyer.htm>

As Robert Kagan argues, the differences between the United States and Europe go to much deeper philosophical and anthropological levels. As the US view of engaging the world has become increasingly ideological, that of the Europeans has become increasingly pragmatic. Both sides retain a sense of superiority and arrogance when dealing with the third world. For the Europeans, however, this tends to be more cultural, while for the United States it is a divine mission.

5. There is no threat from which to protect Central/Eastern European countries.

Dr. Steven E. Meyer (Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. M.S. in political science from Fordham University and a Ph.D. from Georgetown University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: the Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, pp. 83-97, Winter 2003-04, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/03winter/meyer.htm>

Expansion to the east actually damages the legitimate interests of the new NATO members. NATO membership does not protect the countries of Central and Eastern Europe from any recognizable security threat. The usual argument advanced by NATO enthusiasts is that the new members will become "consumers" of security rather than "providers" of security. But, again, security against or from what? What, for example, is the security threat to Hungary, or Slovenia, or the Czech Republic, or even Poland that requires NATO membership? There is no traditional security threat to these countries that could not be handled by the Europeans themselves—if they have the political will to do so.

6. NATO was not meant to be a permanent commitment by the US to all of Europe.

Wayne Merry (former State Department and Pentagon official, is senior associate at the American Foreign Policy Council), "Trans-Atlantic Illusions," from the National Review, March 12, 2003, <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-merry031203.asp>

NATO was not intended, by Americans at least, to be a permanent commitment, but an interim measure while Western Europe recovered from the War. When the first Supreme Allied Commander, Dwight Eisenhower, obtained congressional consent to station U.S. divisions in Europe, he promised and believed they would be there only a few years. But, like Marx's "withering away of the state," Europe proved resilient in allowing America to shoulder Europe's burden long after its prosperity dwarfed the laggard socialist economies and even after the Soviet collapse.

7. Europe is more than able to look after itself.

Wayne Merry (former State Department and Pentagon official, is senior associate at the American Foreign Policy Council), "Trans-Atlantic Illusions," from the National Review, March 12, 2003, <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-merry031203.asp>

The European Union today integrates everything except defense, lest it make too obvious that Europe is more than able to look after itself. Behind NATO slogans of "shared values," European governments share the value of American manpower and money, while their own defense efforts approach the vanishing point. In Germany, conscription supplies more men to the welfare system than to the military. Applicants for NATO membership make impressive defense efforts until they get in, at which point they see no need.

8. Britain and Turkey are the only significant NATO allies

Wayne Merry (former State Department and Pentagon official, senior associate at American Foreign Policy Council), "Trans-Atlantic Illusions," from National Review, 12 Mar 2003, <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-merry031203.asp>

At bottom, NATO is a one-way alliance. Only Turkey and Britain really keep up their end of the bargain.

9. US spent $100 billion more than European NATO.

Marian L. Tupy (assistant director of Project on Global Economic Liberty at Cato), "Worse Than Useless?," the Cato Institute, May 1, 2003, <http://www.cato.org/research/articles/tupy-030501.html>

U.S. military spending actually went up from $277 billion in 1995 to $283 billion in 1999. By contrast, the defense spending of all European members of NATO put together declined from $183 to $174 billion during that same period.

10. Europeans are rational – they will take US security handouts as long as they're offered.

Marian L. Tupy (assistant director of Project on Global Economic Liberty at Cato), "Worse Than Useless?," the Cato Institute, May 1, 2003, <http://www.cato.org/research/articles/tupy-030501.html>

Yet there is no use complaining about European complacency. The Europeans behave in a rational manner. As long as the United States guarantees their security through NATO, the Europeans lack the incentive to invest more in their defense. Instead, they can use the money they save to preserve their inefficient welfare states. Even so, the budgets of some European states are stretched to the breaking point.

11. Europe doesn't need NATO; bilateral defense treaties suffice.

Jonathan Steele, "Nato is a threat to Europe and must be disbanded," The Guradian, November 8, 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1345790,00.html>

In other parts of the world, a handful of countries have bilateral defence treaties with the US. Some in Europe might want the same if Nato didn't exist. In contrast, a few members of the European Union who chose to take the considerable risk of staying neutral during the cold war - such as Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden - see no need to join Nato in the much safer world we live in today. So it makes no sense that the largest and most powerful European states, those who are most able to defend themselves, should cling to outdated anxiety and the notion that their ultimate security depends on the US.

12. Most of Europe favors making the EU, not NATO, stronger.

Deutsche Welle (German newspaper), "Money Problems Hobble NATO's Rapid Responses Force," February 10, 2006, <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,1899166,00.html?maca=en-Newsisfree_englishpolitics-39-rdf>

Europe's ideas of forging a security and defense policy that could supplement some of NATO's tasks has been a sticking point between some EU members and the United States for some time. France, for example, favors making the European Union ever stronger in defense matters, part of a grander strategy of providing a counterweight to the United States in the world.

13. There needs to be a clear establishment of the Special Relationship with Britain

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

America needs to establish clearly what it expects from the Special Relationship and how that arrangement should function in the service of U.S. global interests. No such clarity at present exists. Britain is essentially treated as an ally in wartime but just one of the other European powers when, as occasionally happens, peace breaks out. U.S. policy needs to grasp the fact that Britain is not, in any sense that matters, part of Europe, but rather a distinct entity with which the U.S. has a separate relationship that needs to be conducted according to separate rules.

HARMS

1. NATO is currently blocking collective European security.

Dr. Steven E. Meyer (Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. M.S. in political science from Fordham University and a Ph.D. from Georgetown University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: the Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, pp. 83-97, Winter 2003-04, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/03winter/meyer.htm>

In those sections of the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties that deal with a "common foreign and security policy," NATO is not mentioned, but several references are made to the Western European Union. Neither treaty envisions NATO as an integral part of Europe's security future, and a major reason it has been so difficult to implement the "common foreign and security policy" parts of these treaties is because NATO stands as both an impediment and an intimidation to Europe's future.

2. Fragile European economies are damaged by expensive EU and NATO obligations.

Dr. Steven E. Meyer (Professor of Political Science at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. M.S. in political science from Fordham University and a Ph.D. from Georgetown University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: the Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, pp. 83-97, Winter 2003-04, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/03winter/meyer.htm>

Enlargement puts the Central and East European members in an unnecessary and rapidly debilitating political and financial position. In particular, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are becoming increasingly enmeshed in a conflict of loyalty between NATO and the European Union. Despite the propaganda that NATO and the EU are two legitimate, complementary avenues of development, in fact they are becoming increasingly competitive—for attention, loyalty, and resources. Although this problem is gaining momentum in Western Europe, it is becoming especially acute in Central and Eastern Europe, where the resource base is considerably smaller and political affiliations more fragile.

3. Russia is opposed to NATO enlargement.

Paul E. Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs; Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), "NATO Enlargement," Congressional Research Service report for Congress, RS21055, May 5, 2003, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21055.pdf>

The Duma and much of Russia's military and intelligence bureaucracy remain adamantly opposed to enlargement, which they view as a U.S.-led effort to move a military alliance closer to their territory.

4. Diversity of NATO viewpoints creates constant wrangling.

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs; Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), "NATO's Decision Making Process," Congressional Research Service report for Congress, RS21510, May 5, 2003, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21510.pdf> , [brackets added]

The diversity of viewpoints in the NAC [North Atlantic Council] means that constant negotiation is necessary in providing authority to the SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander of Europe] to plan and execute a military operation. Wrangling over precise phrasing of a document can be a means to provide clarity for decision-makers; in contrast, it can also be meant to provide vagueness that gives political cover to a member government that may give its own interpretation to its populace about the purpose of a NATO decision.

5. Kosovo demonstrated difficulties of consensus.

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs; Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), "NATO's Decision Making Process," Congressional Research Service report for Congress, RS21510, May 5, 2003, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21510.pdf>

The Kosovo conflict illustrated some of the difficulties involved in maintaining consensus. Some critics of management of the conflict, including some Members of Congress, criticized the target-selection process. Press reports indicated that all governments in the NAC had to approve NATO's individual targets for Serbia. France, in particular, was singled out in press reports for criticism for objecting to specific targets.

6. The US and European governments differ on ideas of defense, making consensus difficult.

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs; Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), "NATO's Decision Making Process," Congressional Research Service report for Congress, RS21510, May 5, 2003, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21510.pdf>

The Kosovo conflict underscores the political pressure placed on the NAC in maintaining consensus when military action comes into play, and the fact that the French government has often been singled out when disagreements arise. Different governments place varying degrees of emphasis on civilian control of the military, and on the reactions of their own populations when there are civilian casualties. The United States government tends to have more confidence in its armed forces in target selection and in making decisions on the battlefield than do most allied governments. Some allies, given the recent history of their militaries stepping into political affairs or using excessive force against civilians, place greater restraints on their armed forces.

7. A united European foreign policy would remove the UK, the US's strongest ally.

John C. Hulsman, PhD (Research Fellow in Foreign Affairs), and Nile Gardiner, PhD (Fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy), "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe," by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, published by the Heritage Foundation, No. 1803, October 4, 2004, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=70052>

Indeed, the most prominent major casualty of a united European foreign policy would be the Anglo–U.S. special relationship, forcibly consigned to the scrapheap of history. America's closest ally in the war on terrorism would be unable to operate its own foreign policy and stand alongside America when and where it chooses to do so. A neutralized Britain would be forced to remain on the sidelines while America confronted rogue states such as Iran, North Korea, and Syria. The consequences for American foreign policy would be hugely damaging. In fact, it is highly conceivable that in such circumstances, the United States would have to wage its next major war on its own, with no significant military ally present.

8. UK must not integrate with the EU- They could never work with the US again.

The Center for Security Policy, Decision Brief, "Taking the ‘Special' out of the U.S.-U.K. Relationship," No. 05-D 48, September 22, 2005, <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=05-D_48>

Citizens on both sides of the "pond," therefore must view with the greatest of concern what is, arguably, the most significant development in the history of the special relationship: a largely stealthy, or at least unpublicized, yet systematic move by the United Kingdom to integrate its armed forces with those of the European Union. The cumulative effect of this endeavor, if brought to fruition, cannot be overstated. In the future, it will become extraordinarily difficult - if not, as a practical matter *impossible* - for the UK to fight without permission from the EU. Even then, it will be problematic whether British forces will be able ever again to fight effectively alongside the US.

9. Entanglement in Europe is harming the UK.

The Center for Security Policy, Decision Brief, "Taking the ‘Special' out of the U.S.-U.K. Relationship," No. 05-D 48, September 22, 2005, <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=05-D_48>

The political, as opposed to the practical, impetus for these procurement decisions is made even more evident by the fact that Britain is building a force inferior to that which could mesh with America's - and doing so at a far greater cost than would be required for the more capable force. It is estimated that the UK has squandered some 10 billion pounds on projects aimed at Europeanization.

10. A European relationship will not serve Britain's interests.

The Center for Security Policy, Decision Brief, "Taking the ‘Special' out of the U.S.-U.K. Relationship," No. 05-D 48, September 22, 2005, <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=05-D_48>

Britain's security interests will not be well served, either. After all, the Franco-German aspiration to create a European army - which cannot, as a practical matter, amount to much without Britain's highly professional military personnel and resources, is not really aimed at producing a formidable fighting force. Rather, it is but an instrument for furthering European integration and bringing the British, whose independence has long been a thorn in the side of continentals, under discipline.

11. Europeans, excepting Britain are strongly divided on matters of war and peace.

John C. Hulsman, PhD (Research Fellow in Foreign Affairs), and Nile Gardiner, PhD (Fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy), "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe," by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, published by the Heritage Foundation, No. 1803, October 4, 2004, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=70052>

Politically, contrary to any number of misleading European Commission communiqués, the Europeans remain critically divided on the seminal issue of war and peace. Regarding what to do about Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the fundamental issue of the past 18 months, one sees a complete lack of coordination at the European level. Initially, the U.K. strongly supported the U.S.; Germany's militant pacifists were against any use of force (whether sanctioned by the U.N. or not); and France held a wary middle position, favoring intervention only if the U.N. (i.e., Paris) retained a veto over American actions.

12. European armies are inefficient and spending is ¼ that of the US.

John C. Hulsman, PhD (Research Fellow in Foreign Affairs), and Nile Gardiner, PhD (Fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy), "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe," by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, published by the Heritage Foundation, No. 1803, October 4, 2004, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=70052>

There is no doubt that Europe's armies are top-heavy. Staggeringly, out of around 1.5 million European personnel in arms, only around 100,000 are deployable. Evidently, there are a lot of European colonels wandering around Brussels. Technologically, there is also a vast and growing discrepancy. The U.S. spends nearly four times as much as its European allies on defense research and development.

13. NATO members inherited inefficiencies from their communist legacies.

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

The newer NATO members have inherited from their communist past inefficient conscript armies.

14. Greece, Turkey, and France are not reliable allies

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

For their part, Greece and Turkey are more likely to fight each other than they are to fight anyone else; and Turkish opinion is now dangerously hostile to the U.S., so Turkey can hardly be regarded as a reliable ally at all (something which should perhaps have had an impact before now on American enthusiasm to bring the Turks into the EU). France, though a member of NATO and a serious military power, also defines its policies against America rather than otherwise.

15. There is no strategic partnership between NATO and the EU.

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

The NATO Web site proudly boasts that there is a "strategic partnership" between NATO and the EU. There is no such thing, only an incipient strategic competition between America and Europe. The seeds of this were sown first within NATO through misguided emphasis on the so-called two pillars of implicitly equal solidity on each side of the Atlantic and next through elevation of the role of the Western European Union (WEU); but then, as was always predictable, the drive for European military autonomy broke through the framework of NATO altogether.

16. NATO diverts East European resources from the real threats.

Wayne Merry (former State Department and Pentagon official, is senior associate at the American Foreign Policy Council), "Trans-Atlantic Illusions," from the National Review, 12 Mar 2003, <http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-merry031203.asp>

Are there not still dangers from Russia to justify NATO? Dangers, yes, in the form of drug-resistant disease strains, organized crime, demographic and environmental collapse, and the potential of a failed state. Here, NATO is worse than useless, encouraging East European governments to buy fighter aircraft rather than learn how to protect their frontiers against non-traditional enemies, including terrorism.

17. America's bearing of the NATO burden is causing European welfare states

a. Europe is bearing a disproportionately small share of the burden.

John C. Hulsman, PhD (Research Fellow in Foreign Affairs), and Nile Gardiner, PhD (Fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy), "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe," by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, published by the Heritage Foundation, No. 1803, October 4, 2004, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=70052>

Despite a market that is slightly larger than that of the United States, Europe spends only two thirds of what the U.S. spends on defense and produces around 20 percent of America's deployable fighting strength.

b. This is because American provision of European security perpetuates their welfare states.

Marian L. Tupy (assistant director of Project on Global Economic Liberty at Cato), "Worse Than Useless?," the Cato Institute, May 1, 2003, <http://www.cato.org/research/articles/tupy-030501.html>

There are also compelling economic grounds for American withdrawal. Simply, the American security guarantee perpetuates the continuation of the European welfare states and thus encourages economic sclerosis across the European continent. NATO is not only useless, it's harmful.

18. NATO reaches decisions through absolute consensus.

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs; Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), "NATO's Decision Making Process," Congressional Research Service report for Congress, RS21510, May 5, 2003, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21510.pdf>

The North Atlantic Council (NAC)**.** The NAC achieves consensus through a process in which no government states its objection.

SOLVENCY

1. The US needs to engage European states on an individual basis.

John C. Hulsman, PhD (Research Fellow in Foreign Affairs), and Nile Gardiner, PhD (Fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy), "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe," by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, published by the Heritage Foundation, No. 1803, October 4, 2004, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=70052>

These European powers rarely agree on the majority of the great global issues of the day. As a result, the U.S. must engage European states on an issue-by-issue, case-by-case basis to maximize its diplomatic effectiveness, gaining the greatest number of allies for the largest number of missions. The U.S. must use the widest range possible of diplomatic, political, and military tools to advance its general interests in Europe.

2. The U.K. is unique in its ability to maintain a sustained global military.

John C. Hulsman, PhD (Research Fellow in Foreign Affairs), and Nile Gardiner, PhD (Fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy), "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe," by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, published by the Heritage Foundation, No. 1803, October 4, 2004, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=70052>

The U.K. is one of only three NATO powers capable of a sustained global military presence in terms of both lift and logistics. They are the only Atlantic allies that can participate in the entire military spectrum, from high-end, technologically intricate major war fighting through low-end peacekeeping.

3. The U.K. is unique in its ability to maintain a sustained global military.

John C. Hulsman, PhD (Research Fellow in Foreign Affairs), and Nile Gardiner, PhD (Fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy), "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe," by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, published by the Heritage Foundation, No. 1803, October 4, 2004, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=70052>

The U.K. is one of only three NATO powers capable of a sustained global military presence in terms of both lift and logistics. They are the only Atlantic allies that can participate in the entire military spectrum, from high-end, technologically intricate major war fighting through low-end peacekeeping.

4. The U.K. and U.S. share a long history of diplomacy and an identical political slant.

John C. Hulsman, PhD (Research Fellow in Foreign Affairs), and Nile Gardiner, PhD (Fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy), "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe," by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, published by the Heritage Foundation, No. 1803, October 4, 2004, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=70052>

Even beyond its vital economic ties to the U.S. and its military prowess, the U.K.'s proven political slant toward America is perhaps the single greatest asset in the relationship for the United States. The U.K. and the U.S. have a unique, longstanding tradition of diplomatically siding and working intimately with one another, as demonstrated in World Wars I and II, the Cold War, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the fight against al-Qaeda. This political affinity—the product of a common cultural heritage, a common commitment to free markets and free elections, and a common geopolitical view of the world—means that the two great nations have an ingrained habit of working together. This political closeness, reinforced by common economic and military ties, is without parallel in the world. It illustrates why the U.K. is so vital to U.S. coalition-building and is likely to remain so in the future.

5. An alliance between the US and UK is natural.

Matthew Riemer (former Senior Analyst), "The US-UK Alliance," The Power and Interest News Report, January 14, 2004, <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=133&language_id=1>

In many ways, a U.S.-U.K. alliance is natural. It was, after all, residents of the monarchical island nation that settled in North America and began a new country and created the political body that would become the United States; there obviously exists a shared language and history, as well as a philosophical vision -- but there are also strategic reasons for both parties involved.

6. Britain is set apart from the rest of Europe by its relationship with the US.

Matthew Riemer (former Senior Analyst), "The US-UK Alliance," The Power and Interest News Report, January 14, 2004, <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=133&language_id=1>

London's loyalty to Washington nets it a certain place in the global order, fosters a certain image, and sets it apart from the other leading powers in Europe, such as France and Germany. Throughout recent history, London has largely distanced itself from the states on the European continent, only intervening when it needed to reset the balance of power.   
  
7. The UK-US relationship has been the most reliable for a century and will continue to be so.

The Center for Security Policy, Decision Brief, "Taking the ‘Special' out of the U.S.-U.K. Relationship," No. 05-D 48, September 22, 2005, <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp?section=papers&code=05-D_48>

For nearly a century, the United States has had no more militarily potent and reliable ally than the United Kingdom. From the First World War to the current conflict in Iraq, the U.S. and U.K. have operated intimately and with unprecedented success in numerous theaters under diverse conditions. Over these past nine decades, much more than the security of both nations has been assured by this closest of ties, known as the "special relationship." It is no exaggeration to say that the world has been a far freer and safer place because of it. In all likelihood, moreover, the future safety of these two democratic allies, and a great many besides, will be determined by the viability of their partnership at the strategic and military levels. Just as British participation in American-led campaigns has been indispensable in the past, so it will surely be in the future.

8. Bilateral cooperation between the UK and US is unprecedented.

Pierre Chao (Director of CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives) and Robin Niblett (Executive Viec Preident and Director of CSIS Europe Program), "Sharing Technology Within the U.S.-UK Security Relationship," Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership Working Paper, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 26, 2006, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/USUKSecurity.pdf>

Bilateral U.S.-UK cooperation in the fields of intelligence, nuclear defense, and military deployments is unprecedented in U.S. alliances. And the U.S. and UK defense industrial bases have become increasingly intertwined through investment and trade.

9. The US and UK face similar threats and share similar perspectives.

Pierre Chao (Director of CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives) and Robin Niblett (Executive Viec Preident and Director of CSIS Europe Program), "Sharing Technology Within the U.S.-UK Security Relationship," Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership Working Paper, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 26, 2006, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/USUKSecurity.pdf>

The UK and U.S. governments have also drawn similar conclusions about the new threats of the twenty-first century. Both sides have suffered attacks first-hand by radical Islamist terrorists. Both have demonstrated their determination to confront the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and not permit terrorism and WMD to form a new and lethal nexus. Both have a global perspective of the scope of the threat, and both have the military capacity to confront the threat wherever it may emerge.

10. The UK will and should continue to be the US's partner of choice.

Pierre Chao (Director of CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives) and Robin Niblett (Executive Viec Preident and Director of CSIS Europe Program), "Sharing Technology Within the U.S.-UK Security Relationship," Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership Working Paper, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 26, 2006, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/USUKSecurity.pdf>

In this context, the UK is likely to continue to be America's partner of choice, especially from the U.S. military's standpoint. And for U.S. military commanders, UK forces are most useful when they have equipment that can communicate and interact with U.S. forces as seamlessly as possible. In addition, the UK can bring – as it already has brought – valuable technologies to the table for the United States. The UK's track record of useful military technology innovation includes the contemporary examples of the vertical, short take-off and landing engine system and the anti-IED capabilities now deployed in Iraq.

11. The US-UK relationship is enduring and close, with the UK being the leading contributor to US security.

Pierre Chao (Director of CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives) and Robin Niblett (Executive Viec Preident and Director of CSIS Europe Program), "Sharing Technology Within the U.S.-UK Security Relationship," Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership Working Paper, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 26, 2006, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/USUKSecurity.pdf>

The United Kingdom and the United States possess one of the closest bilateral security relationships in the world today. It is a relationship that has endured and thrived despite the coming and going of administrations in Washington and governments in London for over a half century. More than just flowery rhetoric underpins this alliance; it is built on tangible structures such as the highly strategic and sensitive U.S.-UK cooperation in intelligence and in nuclear weapons and policy. Furthermore, it is an alliance that has produced tangible action. For example, the UK has been the leading contributor to U.S.-led multilateral troop deployments in hot-spots around the world, from the Gulf War of 1990-91 to Iraq and Afghanistan today.

12. The US-UK share interests that are not common to their other allies.

Pierre Chao (Director of CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives) and Robin Niblett (Executive Viec Preident and Director of CSIS Europe Program), "Sharing Technology Within the U.S.-UK Security Relationship," Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership Working Paper, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 26, 2006, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/USUKSecurity.pdf>

The United States and the UK share a philosophy towards the development and use of intelligence that is not common in their dealings with other allies. Intelligence that the United States develops with its UK counterparts is used in a more empirical fashion and has a greater influence on policy than is the case with other European countries.

13. The UK is the leading supported of the US's NATO reforms.

Pierre Chao (Director of CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives) and Robin Niblett (Executive Viec Preident and Director of CSIS Europe Program), "Sharing Technology Within the U.S.-UK Security Relationship," Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership Working Paper, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 26, 2006, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/USUKSecurity.pdf>

The UK government has continued to be a leading supporter of U.S.-led reforms for the Atlantic Alliance. As U.S. policymakers have encouraged NATO to take on a more assertive international role beyond its members' borders, the UK has been a willing participant, sending major deployments to serve with American troops under the NATO flag in Bosnia and later in Afghanistan. And the UK has taken a leading role in making the NATO Response Force (NRF) operational.

14. US and UK forces have trained together for years, making deployments easy.

Pierre Chao (Director of CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives) and Robin Niblett (Executive Viec Preident and Director of CSIS Europe Program), "Sharing Technology Within the U.S.-UK Security Relationship," Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership Working Paper, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 26, 2006, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/USUKSecurity.pdf>

These deployments were made easier by the close operational relationships between U.S. and UK armed forces. Years of U.S. and UK forces training together translated into real benefits in the 1991 Gulf War.

15. The UK has the largest non U.S. contingent in Iraq.

Pierre Chao (Director of CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives) and Robin Niblett (Executive Viec Preident and Director of CSIS Europe Program), "Sharing Technology Within the U.S.-UK Security Relationship," Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership Working Paper, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 26, 2006, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/USUKSecurity.pdf>

Currently, the United Kingdom has the largest non-U.S. contingent deployed in Iraq, with roughly 8,500 troops in country, and a further 3,500 in the Gulf Theater of operations. The only other European contributions to Iraq close to this scale are the 2,600 Italian troops and 1,500 Polish troops, both of whose governments have indicated their intention to withdraw these levels in 2006.

16. Britain is the first and foremost US ally in the war on terror.

Nile Gardiner, Ph.D. (Fellow in Anglo–American Security Policy) and John Hulsman, Ph.D. (Research Fellow in European Affairs), "The President's State Visit to Europe: Advancing the Anglo-U.S. Special Relationship," researched by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, published by the Heritage Foundation, No. 1707, November 14, 2003, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=52471>

Since the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001, Britain has stood steadfastly with the United States in the war against terrorism. The U.K. was the first country to join with America in launching military strikes against the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the British Prime Minister played an outstanding role in helping to build the international coalition in the fight against al-Qaeda.

17. The US has no similar track record of friendship with any other country.

Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart, Editors, U.S.-UK RELATIONS AT THE START OF THE 21st CENTURY, a collection of essays on foreign policy, published by the Strategic Studies Institute (Pennsylvania, 2006), <http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/Articles/McCauslandStuart.pdf>.

The U.S.-UK partnership flourished during World War II, deepened during the long twilight struggle with the Soviet Union, and has prospered further since the end of the Cold War. It is likely to survive any new challenges that may loom on the horizon. The United States has the same track record with no other state, even those who were also once part of the British Empire. America's relations with Canada, our neighbor and largest trading partner, and with Australia, with whom we share a common heritage of mass immigration and frontier-taming, are robust, yet do not attain quite the same scope and depth as the U.S.-UK special relationship.

18. The US and UK invest $250 billion in each other's economics, more than any other two countries.

Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart, Editors, U.S.-UK RELATIONS AT THE START OF THE 21st CENTURY, a collection of essays on foreign policy, published by the Strategic Studies Institute (Pennsylvania, 2006), <http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/Articles/McCauslandStuart.pdf>.

Today, Britain and America invest over $250 billion in each other's economies, more than any two other countries, and they lead in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. This relationship did not begin yesterday. For over 300 years, the prosperity of Britain and America has always been closely linked.

19. Britain has proved itself the best ally to the US in international crises.

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

In any case, as in the First Gulf War, Britain proved by far the best ally America could find in an international crisis. Blair alone was prepared to collaborate in or even openly support American attempts to force Saddam Hussein into line or to punish the early manifestations of Islamic terrorism. In one instance, Britain actually took the lead in a major foreign policy initiative involving the U.S.: the NATO campaign of 1999 against Serb forces ethnically cleansing Kosovo.

20. Europeans are failing as strategic partners.

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

If the first assumption—that Europe has the ability be a partner to the U.S.—is flawed, the second—that it will want to—is equally so. The U.S. has persisted in the idea that Europe would be prepared to pay more toward its own defense if, as a quid pro quo, the Europeans were given a stronger voice in NATO. Why America ever believed this is unclear. It may result from a difference of political culture. Americans still honor the connection between power and responsibility. Europeans, by and large, do not; they simply want power—in this case, above all, the power to stand up to America.

21. Britain is reliable, but won't be if they integrate with Europe

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

The British have not made much of an effort in terms of spending either; but at least they are reliable—a reliability that was always a given fact but is only likely to be lessened, not increased, by further integration into Europe. That, indeed, is why Britain's growing European orientation poses a threat to U.S. interests.

22. This Special Relationship will not keep the US from having other allies as well.

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

This does not, of course, preclude the U.S. from having other one-to-one relationships with other powers, even other European ones. Heritage Foundation scholars have sensibly urged on the Bush Administration the need to adopt a pragmatic approach toward individual European states rather than try to do business with them through EU institutions. This would allow the U.S. to take advantage, for example, of Angela Merkel's genuine warmth toward America, in contrast to her predecessor's hostility. It would also allow the U.S. to achieve at least a private understanding with the French government on a range of interests, France being the most independent-minded of the EU countries, except for Britain.

23. The US and UK have a unique relationship in the sharing of intelligence.

Liam Fox, PhD (Member of Parliament and Minister at the Foreign Office), "Security and Defense: Making Sense of the Special Relationship," Heritage Foundation, Lecture #939, April 27, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/hl939.cfm>

First and foremost, we share a unique relationship with America in the ever more important sphere of intelligence. When left-wing critics of our closeness to the U.S. in the war against terrorism complain that this puts our citizens at risk, the honest answer is that without the intelligence cooperation we enjoy, British citizens would be at greater risk still. Even this is a two-way street. We enjoy this cooperation because we are rightly deemed trustworthy, where some other countries are not; and, of course, we contribute by the collection and sifting of intelligence as well.

24. Britain is the main proponent of US leadership in NATO.

Liam Fox, PhD (Member of Parliament and Minister at the Foreign Office), "Security and Defense: Making Sense of the Special Relationship," Heritage Foundation, Lecture #939, April 27, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/hl939.cfm>

Within NATO, it is Britain, now supported by the East Europeans, which is the main proponent of American leadership. Within the Security Council, it is Britain, among the veto-wielding permanent members, which prevents America's isolation. In battle, it is, above all, British troops who risk their lives and demonstrate their professionalism to support American-led operations.

25. The US could still benefit from European relationships without their involvement in NATO.

Jonathan Steele, "Nato is a threat to Europe and must be disbanded," The Guradian, November 8, 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1345790,00.html>

Ending Nato would not mean that Europe rejects good relations with the US. Nor does it rule out police and intelligence collaboration on issues of concern, such as the way to protect our countries against terrorism. Europe could still join the US in war, if there was an international consensus and the electorates of individual countries supported it.

26. The US and UK need to solidify their friendship – relying on a framework rather than personal relationships.

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

The United States should also rethink its systematic approach to dealings with the British government of the day. It needs to rely less on personalities and to concern itself more with trends, structures, interests, and opinion. The weakness of a Special Relationship based on what passes for "friendship" between leaders has already been described, and it is well exemplified by the Bush–Blair contacts. Too much faith is placed in individuals, and too little attention is paid to whether other factors are in place to strengthen the alliance.

27. Britain needs to be given another option to keep it from participating in European enlargement.

Liam Fox, PhD (Member of Parliament and Minister at the Foreign Office), "Security and Defense: Making Sense of the Special Relationship," Heritage Foundation, Lecture #939, April 27, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/hl939.cfm>

Put these impulses together and you have a dangerous combination. Unless a new direction is given to British policy--one which reduces the obligation to look always to European procurement options rather than simply the best available option for British military needs--America may not be able to count on Britain if the rest of the EU refuses support for U.S. policy.

28. It's time to turn commonalities of views into a common defense strategy.

Liam Fox, PhD (Member of Parliament and Minister at the Foreign Office), "Security and Defense: Making Sense of the Special Relationship," Heritage Foundation, Lecture #939, April 27, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/hl939.cfm>

In the end, what makes any relationship special is trust. Britain and America trust one another because we look at the world in the same way. We share the same roots, nourish the same aspirations, thrill to the same ideals. The challenge now is to turn that commonality of views and interests into a common strategy for our defense.

29. The UK and the US need to work together.

Pierre Chao (Director of CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives) and Robin Niblett (Executive Viec Preident and Director of CSIS Europe Program), "Sharing Technology Within the U.S.-UK Security Relationship," Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership Working Paper, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 26, 2006, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/USUKSecurity.pdf>

The United States needs to work "with or through others" to confront future security crises, and the United Kingdom is the principal U.S. ally that, at the same time as sharing a similar security perspective, can also bring armed forces to bear with a global reach and modern capability. The UK currently spends 2.4% of GDP on defense, a figure well above the EU average of 1.5%, even if below the current U.S. 4% level. Furthermore, the UK's ability to deliver real capability is supported by procurement and defense R&D expenditures that are the highest in Europe, representing 30% of total European defense equipment spending.

30. The US-UK alliance must remain the cornerstone.

Nile Gardiner, Ph.D. (Fellow in Anglo–American Security Policy) and John Hulsman, Ph.D. (Research Fellow in European Affairs), "The President's State Visit to Europe: Advancing the Anglo-U.S. Special Relationship," researched by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, published by the Heritage Foundation, No. 1707, November 14, 2003, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=52471>

The Anglo–U.S. alliance must remain the cornerstone of strategic thinking in both Washington and London, as it has been since the Second World War. The world's two most powerful nations must remain united in their determination both to achieve lasting peace in a free Iraq and to deal with the twin global threats of state-sponsored terrorism and the production of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states.

ADVANTAGES

1. Nationally sovereign European states would further European and American security.

John C. Hulsman, PhD (Research Fellow in Foreign Affairs), and Nile Gardiner, PhD (Fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy), "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe," by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, published by the Heritage Foundation, No. 1803, October 4, 2004, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=70052>

A Europe in which national sovereignty remains paramount, where states can react flexibly, suits the American national interest. The U.S.–British alliance must remain pivotal to long-term American strategic thinking.

2. A relationship with the US enhances the UK's clout in Europe.

Nicola Butler, "UK White Papers on Defence and Foreign Policy," the Acronym Institute, Issue No. 75, January/February 2004, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd75/75news01.htm>

The FCO indicates its desire to influence US policy, nudging it in the direction of participation in international institutions and multilateralism. "No state - not even the US - will be able to pursue its objectives in isolation," the White Paper states. The UK will use the relationship with the US to "advance UK and wider international interests, and to enhance our influence, in part through multilateral channels, particularly the EU, NATO and the UN. We will encourage effective US leadership in strengthening international institutions.

3. UK offers opportunities for major defense contracts.

Pierre Chao (Director of CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives) and Robin Niblett (Executive Viec Preident and Director of CSIS Europe Program), "Sharing Technology Within the U.S.-UK Security Relationship," Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership Working Paper, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 26, 2006, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/USUKSecurity.pdf>

The UK defense market does offer opportunities for major defense contracts.

4. The UK represents an attractive market to the US.

Pierre Chao (Director of CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives) and Robin Niblett (Executive Viec Preident and Director of CSIS Europe Program), "Sharing Technology Within the U.S.-UK Security Relationship," Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership Working Paper, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 26, 2006, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/USUKSecurity.pdf>

The UK also represents an attractive market in and of itself. The UK defense market, although by no means a match in terms of size to that of the United States, is capable of demanding major defense imports, and, over the past fifty years, the United States has been a leading beneficiary of this demand. Recognizing this opportunity, U.S. defense firms have made significant investments in the UK in recent years with the encouragement of a UK government that is seeking to maintain as competitive a domestic defense market as possible. Involvement in the UK market not only allows U.S. firms to gain access to technologies that strengthen their overall base of expertise but provides an opportunity to extend production runs and leverage technological resources.

5. The US-UK alliance is a successful partnership culturally, strategically, and economically.

Nile Gardiner, Ph.D. (Fellow in Anglo–American Security Policy) and John Hulsman, Ph.D. (Research Fellow in European Affairs), "The President's State Visit to Europe: Advancing the Anglo-U.S. Special Relationship," researched by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, published by the Heritage Foundation, No. 1707, November 14, 2003, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=52471>

The U.S.–British alliance is a strikingly successful partnership of two great nations built on the solid foundations of a common heritage, culture, and vision. The two nations have fought alongside each other in seven major wars in the past 90 years, from World War I to the second Gulf War. The U.S. and U.K. are also powerfully linked by trade and investment. The U.S. is by far the largest foreign direct investor in the U.K., and vice versa. Forty-three percent of all British direct investment overseas goes to the United States, compared to 35 percent invested in the entire European Union. In addition, two-fifths of all American direct investment in the EU is in Britain, and more than 5,600 U.S. companies operate in the U.K.

6. The US and UK sharing of intelligence is one of the single greatest benefits.

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

In all probability, however, the single most important benefit enjoyed day by day by the citizens of the United Kingdom from Anglo–American collaboration is almost unsung and, necessarily, for the most part unpublicized. This is the privileged position accorded by America to Britain in the sharing of intelligence. It is also the one area where there has been an unbroken line of cooperation. Having begun with the need to penetrate the plans of the Axis Powers, the intelligence services of the two allies soon moved to monitoring the activities of the Warsaw Pact. Today, within a well-established framework, the agencies of the U.K., the U.S., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand continue to share intelligence. U.S. representatives even attend part of the weekly sessions of the JIC.

7. An alliance-free Europe furthers security for all.

John C. Hulsman, PhD (Research Fellow in Foreign Affairs), and Nile Gardiner, PhD (Fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy), "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe," by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, published by the Heritage Foundation, No. 1803, October 4, 2004, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=70052>

The second conservative principle that should drive America's new transatlantic relationship centers on the importance of national choice and sovereignty. A Europe in which states react flexibly according to their unique interests, rather than collectively according to some utopian ideal, best suits American interests. Clearly, a Europe exercising supranational imperatives regarding foreign and security policy means that a lack of unanimity would hamstring American efforts to form coalitions, be the issue political, military, or economic.

8. Shared US/UK common vision can get things done

Pierre Chao (Director of CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives) and Robin Niblett (Executive Viec Preident and Director of CSIS Europe Program), "Sharing Technology Within the U.S.-UK Security Relationship," Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership Working Paper, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 26, 2006, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/USUKSecurity.pdf>

The UK has been the leading contributor to U.S.-led multilateral troop deployments in crises around the world, from the Gulf War of 1991 to Iraq and Afghanistan today. U.S.-UK cooperation in the highly strategic and sensitive areas of intelligence and nuclear planning and weapons has transcended the coming and going of governments in Washington and London for the past half century. The two sides share a common vision of the future importance and vital roles of the Atlantic Alliance in upholding global security.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: Against Abolish NATO

By Rachel Marie Blum

INHERENCY

1. NATO will wither if it is truly irrelevant

Chris Capra, Reporter, "The Absurdity of the U.N. Security Council," Indepentent Media Center, March 3, 2003, <http://india.indymedia.org/en/2003/03/3531.shtml>.

The grotesque performance of France, Germany and Belgium in blocking aid to Turkey marks the end of NATO's useful life. Like the U.N., it will simply wither of its own irrelevance.

SIGNIFICANCE

1. NATO is not useless

Philip Gordan (Director of the Brookings Institution's Center on the United States and Europe, Senior Fellow of Brookings Foreign Policy Studies, Member of Council on Foreign Relations and the Board of the US Committee on NATO), "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2006, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/gordon/emirates20060530.pdf>

Over the past several years, this once entirely "North Atlantic" institution has:

* invoked its Article 5 defense clause for the first time ever, following the September 11 attacks in the United States;
* deployed a peacekeeping force of nearly 9,000 troops to Northern Afghanistan and committed to expand that mission geographically (to the south) and quantitatively (by another 6,000 troops);
* launched a 9 million euro training operation for Iraqi forces involving contributions from all 26 NATO members;
* created the NATO Response Force (NRF), a grouping of some 20,000 forces and equipment that can be called together at short notice and deployed anywhere around the world;
* deployed the NRF in an earthquake relief operation in Pakistan;
* established an air-bridge to supply soldiers from the African Union (AU) to a peacekeeping mission in Sudan;
* launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) to develop its political and military relations with members of the GCC;
* expanded its Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) to facilitate political dialogue with Middle Eastern countries including Egypt;
* enlarged the scope of political discussions in the North Atlantic Council to include briefings on a range of Middle Eastern and global issues; and
* established a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response (CBRNR) team to help deal with possible weapons of mass destruction contingencies.

2. The trend in NATO is for greater involvement.

Philip Gordan (Director of the Brookings Institution's Center on the United States and Europe, Senior Fellow of Brookings Foreign Policy Studies, Member of Council on Foreign Relations and the Board of the US Committee on NATO), "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2006, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/gordon/emirates20060530.pdf>

Many of these operations are limited in scope and political discussions in and about the Greater Middle East are still in their early stages. Nonetheless, the trend toward greater Alliance involvement in the region is clear and NATO's role in this area is likely to continue to grow. NATO is in the process of fitfully transforming itself into a global security organization in terms of its missions, its participation and possibly even its future membership.

3. Europe continues to support NATO.

Philip Gordan (Director of the Brookings Institution's Center on the United States and Europe, Senior Fellow of Brookings Foreign Policy Studies, Member of Council on Foreign Relations and the Board of the US Committee on NATO), "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2006, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/gordon/emirates20060530.pdf>

Europe wants more defense autonomy but is not willing to pay for it. Whereas the US defense budget continues to rise – so much so, that it will soon be spending more than the rest of the world combined –European defense budgets remain stagnant.Moreover, Europeans realize that the United States will be driving the security agenda in the Greater Middle East – as is the case in Iraq – and would prefer to have some say over US actions within NATO than to drop out of the picture altogether. Finally, as much as they resent unilateral US leadership, a number of the smaller and more Atlanticist European states have no interest in exclusive membership of an EU defense force dominated by their larger European neighbors. The result of all this is continued European support for a significant NATO role.

4. Even skeptics are realizing NATO is still necessary

Philip Gordan (Director of the Brookings Institution's Center on the United States and Europe, Senior Fellow of Brookings Foreign Policy Studies, Member of Council on Foreign Relations and the Board of the US Committee on NATO), "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2006, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/gordon/emirates20060530.pdf>

Far from fading away into irrelevance after its original Cold War mission ended, NATO has proven remarkably resilient. Over the past several years, those in the US who believed that NATO was unnecessary – because the United States was powerful enough to accomplish its goals without having to compromise with nettlesome allies – have come around to accepting that a standing Alliance might actually be necessary after all.

5. European Union cannot handle security: Europeans still want NATO

Philip Gordan (Director of the Brookings Institution's Center on the United States and Europe, Senior Fellow of Brookings Foreign Policy Studies, Member of Council on Foreign Relations and the Board of the US Committee on NATO), "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2006, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/gordon/emirates20060530.pdf>

Also, many Europeans who thought that security was no longer an issue – or that the European Union could handle security challenges on its own – have also come around to the view that transatlantic security cooperation, particularly through NATO, is still necessary. This mutual agreement on NATO's enduring utility has proven particularly relevant in the Greater Middle East, where NATO now finds itself conducting even more active missions on the ground than it was in Europe during the Cold War.

6. NATO gives legitimacy and credibility to vital missions.

Philip Gordan (Director of the Brookings Institution's Center on the United States and Europe, Senior Fellow of Brookings Foreign Policy Studies, Member of Council on Foreign Relations and the Board of the US Committee on NATO), "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2006, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/gordon/emirates20060530.pdf>

NATO's growing activity in the Greater Middle East should not, however, be surprising. The region remains beset by a wide range of security, humanitarian and developmental challenges, and it is still in the national interests of Europeans and North Americans to assist in dealing with them. Unilateral US approaches without European support lack legitimacy and resources, while European approaches without the United States lack unity and military credibility.

7. NATO can cooperate with Russia and grow at the same time

John Steinberg (Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution), Philip Gordon (Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies), "NATO Enlargement: Moving Forward," The Brookings Institution Policy Brief, December 2001, <http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb90.pdf>

Far from backing away from NATO enlargement, the Bush administration should welcome all those European democracies whose political stability, military contributions, and commitment to NATO solidarity would be assets to the Alliance. Now more than ever, Alliance leaders can and should pursue a wider, integrated NATO and a strong and cooperative relationship with Russia at the same time.

8. The US and Europe share the common threat of terrorism.

Economist, "Stay together, fight together," May 2, 2002, <http://economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1109858>

But though the dangers facing Americans and Europeans have changed, the need for collective defence against them has not. The next terrorist attack could strike Berlin or Paris as easily as New York or Washington. These and other threats, in an age of far-flying missiles, could come from anywhere. So NATO needs to be better prepared to deal with them, ready at times to venture beyond its European stomping grounds.

9. Europe is the only place where we can find a solid cluster of allies.

John Hulsman (Senior Research Fellow in European Affairs) and Nile Gardiner (Fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation in Washington), "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy toward Europe," European Affairs, Winter/Spring 2005 Issue, <http://www.europeanaffairs.org/current_issue/2005_winter_spring/2005_winter_spring_09.php4>

Both now and well into the future there is and will be only one place to find those allies. Europe is the sole area of the world where political, diplomatic, military, and economic power can be generated in sufficient strength to support American policies effectively. The cluster of international powers in Europe - led by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Poland - has no parallel.

10. The US/Europe need each other more now in the war on terror than they did in the cold war.

Robert E. Hunter (Senior Advisor, RAND Corporation), "NATO's Next Century," Brookings Institute Policy Briefs, September 2004, <http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cuse/analysis/hunter20040901.pdf>

Nevertheless, following the war, the allies, virtually without exception, are now faced with circumstances closer in terms of common challenge than has been true of any circumstances since the end of the Cold War. The war in Iraq shattered the existing system of security within the Middle East—whatever its virtues or inadequacies—and the United States and Europe have no choice but to put something effective in its place. Whether they like it or not, the allied countries on the two sides of the Atlantic must work to inhibit the spread of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, must do whatever is possible to prevent the growth of terrorism originating from the region, and must promote a "stable" form of government and society in Iraq.

11. Threats still exist: Europe needs NATO to protect democracy.

Rep. Doug Bereuter and John Lis, "Reorienting Transatlantic Defense," The National Interest, Summer 2004 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

The reality is that NATO is not a Cold War institution in search of a mission to keep itself alive, but remains an indispensable tool for the democracies of the Euro-Atlantic region to ensure their security against common threats. For a few heady years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it appeared that the long-held dream of a Europe at peace had become a reality. The newly freed nations of central and eastern Europe aligned themselves definitively with the West, and even Russia developed a peaceful, non-adversarial relationship with its former rivals. Today, there is no risk of an invasion of western Europe, and it is tempting to conclude that a united Europe is now secure. However, the terrorist bombings in Madrid on March 11 horribly demonstrated the error of that belief. Europe still faces threats to its territory and to its citizens from international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, states that sponsor terrorism and proliferate WMD, and the conjunction of these challenges: the horrifying prospect of these states providing WMD to terrorist groups. These are the same threats confronting North America, and the defense of our two continents remains indivisible.

12. NATO is superior to US unilateral action and the European Union

Julian Lindley-French (senior scholar at Centre for Applied Policy, University of Munich, "Big world, big future, big NATO," Center for Applied Policy and Research, January 18, 2006, <http://www.cap-lmu.de/aktuell/positionen/2006/nato.php>

The focus of Europeans on low politics has affected almost every instrument and institution the West has to offer the world. In the wake of the constitutional debacle, the European Union appears unable to confront the high politics of world security. Meanwhile, Afghanistan and Iraq are demonstrating the limits rather than the extent of US power in this world. Both Europeans and North Americans, therefore, need an institution able and willing to confront high politics. For the foreseeable future, that institution has to be NATO because it provides the only mechanism for closing the gap between instability and capability.

13. NATO is not without a role – its role simply changes to mirror its environment.

Julian Lindley-French (senior scholar at Centre for Applied Policy, University of Munich, "Big world, big future, big NATO," Center for Applied Policy and Research, January 18, 2006, <http://www.cap-lmu.de/aktuell/positionen/2006/nato.php>

NATO's destiny, however, is to play the macro-stabilisation role for which the Alliance was created. NATO must always be a mirror of the environment it serves and transform itself again, if it is to address the needs of the big security environment.

14. NATO's role is now that of a global security enabler.

Julian Lindley-French (senior scholar at Centre for Applied Policy, University of Munich, "Big world, big future, big NATO," Center for Applied Policy and Research, January 18, 2006, <http://www.cap-lmu.de/aktuell/positionen/2006/nato.php>

The great enlargement mission of the 1990s is over. NATO has by and large fulfilled its promise to make Europe whole and free. In the big new world, in addition to its Article-5 responsibilities, NATO must now become the global security enabler.

15. The EU needs NATO in order to have any legitimacy or capabilities.

Julian Lindley-French (senior scholar at Centre for Applied Policy, University of Munich, "Big world, big future, big NATO," Center for Applied Policy and Research, January 18, 2006, <http://www.cap-lmu.de/aktuell/positionen/2006/nato.php>

Since legitimacy is as important as capability in generating effectiveness, the European Union needs NATO and NATO needs the European Union. The European Union can never be strong without a strong NATO and NATO can never be strong without a strong European Union.

16. Peace is never guaranteed -- NATO is necessary for security.

Michele Alliot-Marie (French Minister of Defense), "NATO/European Defense," NATO Parliamentary Assembly, published by the French-American Embassy, May 30, 2006, <http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2006/mam_speech_nato_assembly053006.asp>

Peace is never guaranteed. Who can say for certain that in 20 to 30 years' time none of us will need the solidarity of our allies, in the face of a vital threat? While there's no immediate threat, we have to confront very many risks, starting with terrorism. So we have to be capable of preventing it and fighting it wherever it is hiding. This is the purpose of our collective commitment in Afghanistan. We also have to deal with regional crises, the case today in the Balkans. Finally, NATO is a necessary forum for reflection on our security.

SOLVENCY

1. The US cannot act effectively without help from European allies.

John C. Hulsman, PhD (Senior Research Fellow for European Affairs at the Davis Institute for International Studies, the Heritage Foundation, "HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EMERGING THREATS," Statement for the House, February 16, 2005, <http://www.c.house.gov/international_relations/109/hul021605.pdf>

Whatever the global issue -- be it tracking down al-Qaeda, the Doha free trade round, Iran's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction, the Arab-Israeli conflict, or Iraq -- the United States simply cannot act effectively without the support of at least some European powers.

2. EU cannot replace NATO  
  
Judy Dempsey (reporter), "Nato Must Modernise and Rethink its Strategy: Is That Mission Impossible?" The Financial Times, June 25, 2004 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

Some of the Union's members believe Europe will over time drift away from the transatlantic alliance and form its own defence policies. The reality is that in many cases Nato will be in the background of many EU operations. Because the EU still lacks crucial military capabilities such as logistics and heavy air transport it will have to rely on Nato, as it is doing over Bosnia.

3. Russia response: Russia is progressing towards democracy because of money and openness. (Extension: NATO doesn't affect either money/openness, so abolishing it won't increase Russian democracy)

Russian News and Information Agency, "Russia Will Not Join Europe, But Will Become New West," 26 May 2006, <http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20060525/48657667.html>

Russia is proceeding along a traditional path of gradual reforms that was cut short by the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, a deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center told business newspaper Kommersant. Dmitry Trenin said Russia's main objective now was to change, not fight other states for influence and power. The main factors of such transformation are the role of money and openness to the world, which gives Russia a chance to attain qualitative Parity with societies that are traditionally termed the West. The future of Russia is tied to the expansion of not so much Europe as the West as a whole. Unlike Europe, the West is not a geographical term but a sum total of institutions that make society competitive, such as personal freedom, private property, the supremacy of law, a government that is accountable to voters, and civil society.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Europe without NATO and the US will lose security and the world will eventually have to re-invent NATO

Radek Sikorski, NATO Has Not Perished Yet While We Are Still Alive, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Spring 2004, pp. 69-71 <http://www.uspolicy.be/aa/aa041604.asp>

A non-Atlantic Europe with its own army might be a more confident partner for the United States, but it would not necessarily add to America's--or Europe's--ability to achieve its objectives. And then--either because of shared values and interests, or because common enemies bring us together--if these two powers tried to fight together, what would their military cooperation look like? Without standardized communications, friend-or-foe codes, intertwined lines of military and political authority, they would no longer be a workable coalition. Instead, they would resemble armies of Napoleon's time camped on opposite sides of the river with the European and American emperors sulking in their tents and never sure whether, at the crucial moment, the other would come to their assistance or stab them in the back. If they really wanted to collaborate, they would find that joint staffs, standardized procedures and compatible communications would be indispensable. Pretty soon, they would be working to re-invent NATO.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: DEPLETED URANIUM

By Rachel Marie Blum

INHERENCY

1. Hype about depleted uranium is reducing its use already.

John J. Fialka, "Weighing Claims About Depleted Uranium," The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2003 [accessed via Proquest]

But the controversy may be having an effect nevertheless. The Defense Department, after spending millions in studies to prove that DU doesn't cause illness, is slowly drifting away from its use despite its advantages. The Marines and the Navy have replaced DU with other types of armor-piercing ammunition. The Air Force's next generation tank killer won't use DU, and the Army is experimenting with alternative armor-penetrating tank shells.

SIGNIFICANCE

1. Risks posed by depleted uranium are minimal and small compared to normal risks.

Dr. Hari Sharma, "Investigations of Environmental Impacts from the Deployment of DU-Based Munitions," Depleted Uranium Watch Report, September 2003, <http://www.stopnato.org.uk/du-watch/sharma/du-report.htm>

The radiological hazard to the veterans and to the civilians after the cessation of hostilities is minimal. It is concluded in the report that based on 'their' estimates of intakes of DU, except in extreme circumstances any extra risk of developing fatal cancers as a result of radiation from internal exposure to DU arising from battlefield conditions are likely to be small compared to general risk of dying from cancer over a normal life. Overall conclusions that are drawn in the report, amount to very low hazard from ingestion of DU to veterans exposed to DU-oxides dust in the battlefield area. The greatest exposures will apply to a small fraction of soldiers during the conflict, for example, those who survive in vehicles struck by a DU penetrator.

2. There is no proven link between Balkan diseases and depleted uranium.

BBC Worldwide Monitoring, "Bosnian experts: Link Between Exposure to Depleted Uranium, Deaths not Proven," June 12, 2005, [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

No-one has yet proven the Balkan syndrome, i.e. diseases linked to the use of depleted uranium bombs. The media have reported on the increased number of malignant diseases in regions where these weapons were used.

**3. Bosnian experts assert that there is no link.**

*BBC Worldwide Monitoring, "Bosnian experts: Link Between Exposure to Depleted Uranium, Deaths not Proven," June 12, 2005, [accessed via Lexis Nexis]*

Professors Zovko and Kljuic of the Sarajevo Faculty of Natural Sciences assert that an increased rate of malignant diseases cannot be linked to exposure to depleted uranium.

4. Links between depleted uranium and death have not been proven – all the reports show no link.

BBC Worldwide Monitoring, "Bosnian experts: Link Between Exposure to Depleted Uranium, Deaths not Proven," June 12, 2005, [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

Professor Emira Zovko: I say that everything that is asserted should be proven as well. I have the report by a Portuguese scientific mission as well as a report by UNEP [United Nations Environment Programme], which confirmed the findings of the Portuguese scientific mission. So far a link between exposure to depleted uranium and death has not been proven.

5. Animal studies inadequate

A. Studies of Uranium risks are based on animals, not humans.

J.P. Leider, "Study Rethinks Uranium Danger," Minnesota Daily, publication of the University of Minnesota, April 21, 2006, [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

Michael Kilpatrick, deputy director for Deployment Health Support in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, said there is no evidence to support depleted uranium affecting human health. He said studies conducted on animals suggest uranium's toxicity should not be tied directly to humans. "The information is based on animal studies where, if you give an animal a very high blood level of uranium or depleted uranium in a very short period of time, it will cause kidney failure," he said.

B. Conclusions from animal study on depleted uranium "should not be applied to humans

J.P. Leider, "Study Rethinks Uranium Danger," Minnesota Daily, publication of the University of Minnesota, April 21, 2006, [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

Stearns said conclusions from the study should not be directly applied to human health. "We're not trying to terrify everybody -- this is what we found, so we reported it," she said. "These are mammalian cells grown in the lab, not human."

6. No evidence of illness even when Uranium is embedded in the body.

J.P. Leider, "Study Rethinks Uranium Danger," Minnesota Daily, publication of the University of Minnesota, April 21, 2006, [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

To date, she said, there is no evidence that depleted uranium could be responsible for Gulf War illnesses. McDiarmid's program has followed 74 veterans of the Gulf War who were exposed to depleted uranium by friendly fire. The main finding of the program is that people who have been exposed to depleted uranium or have embedded depleted uranium fragments will have greater levels of uranium in their urine. The veterans in the program are separated statistically into those with high urine-uranium levels and those with low levels. To date, McDiarmid hasn't seen adverse health effects in either category of veterans caused by depleted uranium. She said researchers do not see statistical differences in organ systems, which she called "a good thing.

7. Risks from inhaling depleted uranium particles are very low.

Department of Defense, "Study Finds Little Risk from Depleted-Uranium Particles," Regulatory Intelligence Data from the Federal Department and Agency Documents, published in the Congressional Quarterly, October 19, 2004 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

A new study finds the health risks from inhaling airborne particles of depleted uranium are very low. The Capstone Study found that even soldiers in armored vehicles hit by depleted-uranium munitions would still not suffer health risks from inhaling the particles.

8. Even extreme exposures don't pose a health risk.

Department of Defense, "Study Finds Little Risk from Depleted-Uranium Particles," Regulatory Intelligence Data from the Federal Department and Agency Documents, published in the Congressional Quarterly, October 19, 2004 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

The five- year, $6 million study, analyzed for the Army and the DoD Deployment Health Support Directorate by Batelle Memorial Institute, found that even in extreme cases exposure to "aerosolized" depleted uranium did not pose a health risk.

9. Radiation doses are within peacetime standards and the risks are low.

Department of Defense, "Study Finds Little Risk from Depleted-Uranium Particles," Regulatory Intelligence Data from the Federal Department and Agency Documents, published in the Congressional Quarterly, October 19, 2004 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

What we found is the radiation doses for people in that situation are below peacetime safety standards," he continued. "We also found that the chemical risks of breathing in uranium dust is so low that it won't cause any long-term health risks." Melanson, who holds a doctorate in radiation health sciences, is the program manager of the Health Physics Program at the Army's Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.

10. The only health problems are from actual battle-field wounds.

Department of Defense, "Study Finds Little Risk from Depleted-Uranium Particles," Regulatory Intelligence Data from the Federal Department and Agency Documents, published in the Congressional Quarterly, October 19, 2004 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

The study is further proof that DU poses little danger. Since 1993, the Department of Veterans Affairs has been assessing the health of American soldiers wounded in 1991's Operation Desert Storm by depleted- uranium rounds. These individuals have particles of depleted uranium remaining inside them. "There are no health affects attributable to DU," Melanson said. "There are health problems from their wounding, but nothing from depleted uranium.

11. Even veterans have only 1% higher risk of radiation-induced lung cancer.

Albert C. Marshall, "An Analysis of Uranium Dispersal and Health Effects Using a Gulf War Case Study," Sandia Report prepared by Sandia National Laboratories for the National Nuclear Security Administration, July 2005, <http://www.sandia.gov/news-center/news-releases/2005/def-nonprolif-sec/snl-dusand.pdf>

Veterans inhaled sufficient quantities of DU to incur about a 1% risk of radiation-induced lung cancer. (This is the incremental risk, that is, in addition to the risk for someone not exposed to DU.) For comparison, about 7% of all U.S. civilian fatalities result from lung cancer. Because lung cancer is the dominant DU radiological risk, the total radiation-induced cancer risk for these maximally exposed veterans is also about 1%. For perspective, the U.S. national average for all cancer fatalities makes up about 24% of civilian fatalities. Ingested DU did not have a significant impact on the radiological or chemical dose for veterans.

12. Even maximum exposure cases show risks of only 0.03% of leukemia and birth defects.

Albert C. Marshall, "An Analysis of Uranium Dispersal and Health Effects Using a Gulf War Case Study," Sandia Report prepared by Sandia National Laboratories for the National Nuclear Security Administration, July 2005, <http://www.sandia.gov/news-center/news-releases/2005/def-nonprolif-sec/snl-dusand.pdf>

Even when DU fragment contributions are included for the maximum exposure case, the risk of radiation-induced leukemia is only about 0.03%, and the risk of radiation-induced genetic birth defects is also about 0.03%.

13. The net cancer risk for children exposed to uranium is miniscule

Albert C. Marshall, "An Analysis of Uranium Dispersal and Health Effects Using a Gulf War Case Study," Sandia Report prepared by Sandia National Laboratories for the National Nuclear Security Administration, July 2005, <http://www.sandia.gov/news-center/news-releases/2005/def-nonprolif-sec/snl-dusand.pdf>

A nominally exposed child playing in DU-destroyed vehicles for 300 hours and playing outside the vehicle for 700 hours is predicted to incur a nominal radiation-induced lung cancer risk of about 0.04%. The predicted risk of radiation induced leukemia and colon cancer, for this nominally exposed child, is about 0.0004% and 0.06%, respectively. Thus, the net radiation-induced fatal cancer risk for the nominally exposed child is about 0.1%. The net fatal cancer risk for the maximally exposed child is about 0.3%. Calculations indicate that the DU-related health risks to downwind civilians (including genetic effects) are extremely small (<0.0001%). Furthermore, genetic effects from DU exposure are predicted to be extremely small for civilians.

14. Analysis of veterans does not support claims of health risks.

Albert C. Marshall, "An Analysis of Uranium Dispersal and Health Effects Using a Gulf War Case Study," Sandia Report prepared by Sandia National Laboratories for the National Nuclear Security Administration, July 2005, <http://www.sandia.gov/news-center/news-releases/2005/def-nonprolif-sec/snl-dusand.pdf>

Veteran medical statistics do not support assertions of significant increases in cancers for DU-exposed veterans and that the statistics do not support assertions of significant increase in birth defects for their progeny. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that no significant health risks are posed by normal handling and processing of uranium within the weapons complex, if standard safety guidelines are followed.

15. Depleted uranium decreases likelihood of leukemia.

Albert C. Marshall, "An Analysis of Uranium Dispersal and Health Effects Using a Gulf War Case Study," Sandia Report prepared by Sandia National Laboratories for the National Nuclear Security Administration, July 2005, <http://www.sandia.gov/news-center/news-releases/2005/def-nonprolif-sec/snl-dusand.pdf>

However, the very low specific activity of DU significantly reduces the likelihood of induced leukemia.

16. No radiation birth defects have been observed at any level.

Albert C. Marshall, "An Analysis of Uranium Dispersal and Health Effects Using a Gulf War Case Study," Sandia Report prepared by Sandia National Laboratories for the National Nuclear Security Administration, July 2005, <http://www.sandia.gov/news-center/news-releases/2005/def-nonprolif-sec/snl-dusand.pdf>

No clear evidence of radiation-induced genetic birth defects has been observed in humans at any radiation exposure level.

17. Alternate cause of health problems: Changing standards of living in Iraq – not uranium exposure

Albert C. Marshall, "An Analysis of Uranium Dispersal and Health Effects Using a Gulf War Case Study," Sandia Report prepared by Sandia National Laboratories for the National Nuclear Security Administration, July 2005, <http://www.sandia.gov/news-center/news-releases/2005/def-nonprolif-sec/snl-dusand.pdf>

Before the Gulf War, Iraq had a high standard of living with high levels of education, access to potable water and sanitation, and low infant mortality rates. The standard of living dropped dramatically following the war and the imposition of economic sanctions. Access to food, water, health care, and education deteriorated to substandard levels. Poor post-war sanitation may have contributed to the spread of disease. Chronic malnutrition among children reached 30% by the year 2000. Malnutrition declined somewhat after 2000. This drastic change in living conditions must be considered when assessing post-war health effects for Iraqi civilians.

18. Environmental uranium exposure causes no significant problems.

Albert C. Marshall, "An Analysis of Uranium Dispersal and Health Effects Using a Gulf War Case Study," Sandia Report prepared by Sandia National Laboratories for the National Nuclear Security Administration, July 2005, <http://www.sandia.gov/news-center/news-releases/2005/def-nonprolif-sec/snl-dusand.pdf>

DU may be ingested by civilians as a result of eating contaminated food, drinking contaminated water, or by hand-to-mouth contact if their hands are contaminated with DU particulate. In general, however, none of these exposure mechanisms are likely to contribute to significant internalization of DU by downwind civilians. The deposited downwind DU concentrations are much less than the natural uranium concentrations in the soil.

19. Risks are only theoretical and are fractions of those that come naturally.

Albert C. Marshall, "An Analysis of Uranium Dispersal and Health Effects Using a Gulf War Case Study," Sandia Report prepared by Sandia National Laboratories for the National Nuclear Security Administration, July 2005, <http://www.sandia.gov/news-center/news-releases/2005/def-nonprolif-sec/snl-dusand.pdf>

With the exception of crews of military vehicles having been hit by DU penetrators, no body burdens above the range of values for natural uranium have been found. Therefore, observable health effects are not expected and residual cancer risk estimates have to be based on theoretical considerations. They appear to be very minor for all post-conflict situations; i.e., a fraction of those expected from natural radiation.

20. No significant Uranium contamination in Kosovo.

Albert C. Marshall, "An Analysis of Uranium Dispersal and Health Effects Using a Gulf War Case Study," Sandia Report prepared by Sandia National Laboratories for the National Nuclear Security Administration, July 2005, <http://www.sandia.gov/news-center/news-releases/2005/def-nonprolif-sec/snl-dusand.pdf>

The health effect from DU ingestion by human consumption of grazing animals or their milk should be extremely small. A UNEP report concluded as follows: In Kosovo, the mission did not find any widespread contamination of the soil or ground surface, though some localized points of contamination were identified at some of the sites where the use of DU had been reported. The major part of the ground contamination was found in the upper 10-20 cm directly below the penetrator. No DU contamination of water or domestic cow milk was found during the mission or subsequent laboratory testing, and there was no evidence to suggest immediate health problems.

21. No environmental uranium contamination in Serbia and Montenegro

Albert C. Marshall, "An Analysis of Uranium Dispersal and Health Effects Using a Gulf War Case Study," Sandia Report prepared by Sandia National Laboratories for the National Nuclear Security Administration, July 2005, <http://www.sandia.gov/news-center/news-releases/2005/def-nonprolif-sec/snl-dusand.pdf>

In terms of groundwater contamination arising from DU at contamination points or from more widespread ground contamination, the consequences in Serbia and Montenegro were insignificant.

22. Exposure of citizens to depleted uranium is insignificant for 4 reasons.

Albert C. Marshall, "An Analysis of Uranium Dispersal and Health Effects Using a Gulf War Case Study," Sandia Report prepared by Sandia National Laboratories for the National Nuclear Security Administration, July 2005, <http://www.sandia.gov/news-center/news-releases/2005/def-nonprolif-sec/snl-dusand.pdf>

We conclude (1) mathematical estimates of DU transport to water and food supplies are unlikely to be highly reliable; (2) ground-deposited DU particulate downwind of the battlefield is only a small fraction of the natural uranium soil concentrations; (3) because of the low solubility of uranium metal, significant DU contamination of food and water from buried munitions is unlikely; and (4) no significant DU contamination of the environment was observed in Kosovo, Kuwait, or DU test areas in the United States. Given these observations, the exposure of downwind civilians to DU from contaminated food and water is considered to be insignificant, and a mathematical analysis will not be undertaken for this potential pathway.

23. Depleted uranium is not toxic or radioactive enough to be a health risk.

New York Times, "Uranium in Weapon Is Not Seen as a Risk," Pg. 13, October 19, 2004, [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

A Pentagon-sponsored study of weapons made from depleted uranium, a byproduct of nuclear weapons production whose use has attracted environmental protests, has concluded that it is neither toxic enough nor radioactive enough to be a health threat to soldiers in the doses they are likely to receive. In a five-year $6 million study, researchers fired depleted uranium projectiles into Bradley fighting vehicles and Abrams tanks, in a steel chamber at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland, and measured the levels of uranium in the air and how quickly the particles settled. The conclusion, said Dr. Michael E. Kilpatrick, deputy director of the Deployment Health Support Directorate of the Defense Department, is that ''this is a lethal but safe weapons system.''

24. DU is a political irritant – not a medical risk.

John J. Fialka, "Weighing Claims About Depleted Uranium," The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2003 [accessed via Proquest]

Specialists at the Veterans Administration in Baltimore who have tested Col. Hedges and 70 other U.S. veterans exposed to DU in the Gulf War, have accumulated a small mountain of medical evidence that hasn't demonstrated any connection between DU and serious human diseases. "I think what's been proven by all these methodical studies is that DU is a political irritant," not a medical one, says William M. Arkin, a former Army intelligence officer. Mr. Arkin has studied the issue for Harvard University, Human Rights Watch and Greenpeace.

25. Everyone is exposed to uranium.

World Health Organization Report, "Depleted Uranium Mission to Kosovo," January 2001, <http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/pub_meet/en/Report_WHO_depleted_uranium_Eng.pdf> (brackets added)

Everyone is exposed to external radiation from naturally occurring and man-made radionuclides in the environment. These radionuclides emit, in varying proportions, depending on the radionuclide, three forms of radiation: alpha, beta and gamma. Uranium isotopes emit mainly alpha particles, a type of radiation which can only travel about 30 µm [micrometers] in soft tissue and cannot penetrate dead superficial skin layers, paper or glass.

26. Uranium is excreted from the body anyway

World Health Organization Report, "Depleted Uranium Mission to Kosovo," January 2001, <http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/pub_meet/en/Report_WHO_depleted_uranium_Eng.pdf>

Most of the small amount of uranium that is absorbed in the body (about 70%) will be filtered out by the kidneys and excreted in urine within 24 hours. The remaining part will be distributed to the skeleton, liver and kidneys. The time to excrete half of this remaining uranium is in the range of six months to one year.

27. No increase in lung cancer, even among people who work with uranium.

World Health Organization Report, "Depleted Uranium Mission to Kosovo," January 2001, <http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/pub_meet/en/Report_WHO_depleted_uranium_Eng.pdf>

Epidemiological studies provide consistent and convincing evidence of excess lung cancer, but not of leukaemia, related to alpha particle exposure among uranium miners. However, this effect is attributed to be related to exposure to gaseous decay products (radon). The risk of lung cancer appears to be proportional to the radiation dose received. Indeed, among nuclear workers involved in uranium processing (whose exposures to alpha particles from uranium are less than those of miners), no consistent excess of lung cancer has been found.

28. Study of gulf war veterans: No kidney problems from uranium

World Health Organization Report, "Depleted Uranium Mission to Kosovo," January 2001, <http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/pub_meet/en/Report_WHO_depleted_uranium_Eng.pdf>

Kidney dysfunction is considered the main chemically induced toxic effect of depleted uranium in humans, though this is thought to be reversible (Priest 2001). Until now, a study of 29 Gulf War veterans with embedded fragments of depleted uranium in their bodies has not shown adverse kidney effects (McDiarmid et al. 1998 & 2000).

29. Alternate causes: Cancer increase caused by other factors.

World Health Organization Report, "Depleted Uranium Mission to Kosovo," January 2001, <http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/pub_meet/en/Report_WHO_depleted_uranium_Eng.pdf>

No conclusion could be drawn from the available data regarding any change in cancer frequency in the population. The changing numbers of cases seen by the hospital in 1999 and 2000 could be due to a number of factors, such as changes in the size and age distribution of the population (for instance, more people of older age) served by the hospital as a result of the large migration of people following the armed conflict.

30. All Depleted Uranium together would only be 5% more than the natural occurrence in the soil.

World Health Organization Report, "Depleted Uranium Mission to Kosovo," January 2001, <http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/pub_meet/en/Report_WHO_depleted_uranium_Eng.pdf>

Even if all of the depleted uranium at the illustrative typical site (72kg) eventually degraded and was all within one square kilometre of the target with none removed, the additional amount of uranium compared to the natural occurrence of uranium in the soil would be 5%.

31. Additional elements mixed with uranium only increase radioactivity by 1%.

World Health Organization, "Depleted Uranium: Sources, Exposure, and Health Effects," Executive Summary, 2001, <http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/pub_meet/en/DU_Eng.pdf>

Depleted uranium may also result from the reprocessing of spent nuclear reactor fuel. Under these conditions another uranium isotope, 236U may be present together with very small amounts of the transuranic elements plutonium, americium and neptunium and the fission product technetium-99. The increase in the radiation dose from the trace amounts of these additional elements is less than 1%. This is insignificant with respect to both chemical and radiological toxicity.

32. Depleted uranium is only 60% as radioactive as natural uranium.

John J. Fialka, "Weighing Claims About Depleted Uranium," The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2003 [accessed via Proquest]

Depleted uranium is a byproduct of the process by which natural uranium is turned into nuclear weapons. It is only 60% as radioactive as natural uranium.

33. 50 years of depleted uranium studies show no health problems

John J. Fialka, "Weighing Claims About Depleted Uranium," The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2003 [accessed via Proquest]

The government's evidence on the medical implications of DU begins with 50 years of records on uranium miners. Although hundreds of those miners were exposed to uranium for years, even frequently inhaling powdered uranium, researchers have found no evidence of increased cancer risks, says Melissa A. McDiarmid, a toxicologist who runs the DU testing program in Baltimore. What's more, recent studies of battlefield exposure to DU by the think tank Rand Corp., the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the U.K.'s Royal Society, the European Commission and the World Health Organization all found no ties to cancer or other serious disease.

34. The places suffering from birth defects don't correspond to sites of depleted uranium use.

John J. Fialka, "Weighing Claims About Depleted Uranium," The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2003 [accessed via Proquest]

We've found no direct links," says Pekka Haavisto, chairman of the DU assessment team for the United Nations Environment Program, which looked at sites in Bosnia and Kosovo. Iraqi doctors have complained about leukemia and birth deformities near Basra, Mr. Arkin notes, but that isn't where the U.S. tanks or A-10s did their fighting.

DISADVANTAGES

DA 1: Compromised safety

Link: Affirmative mandates abolishing all production or use of depleted uranium.

1. Brink: Depleted uranium has important, peaceful applications.

World Health Organization Report, "Depleted Uranium Mission to Kosovo," January 2001, <http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/pub_meet/en/Report_WHO_depleted_uranium_Eng.pdf>

Depleted uranium has peaceful applications, such as counterweights in aircraft, missiles and racing sailboat keels and as a material used in hospitals for shielding X-rays or gamma radiation from equipment used for radiation therapy.

2. Brink: Depleted uranium can be used for protective armor.

World Health Organization Report, "Depleted Uranium Mission to Kosovo," January 2001, <http://www.who.int/ionizing_radiation/pub_meet/en/Report_WHO_depleted_uranium_Eng.pdf>

Depleted uranium is used in armour-piercing ammunition because it has a high density (1.7 times that of lead), and is also used for military armour to reduce the effect of other conventional munitions.

Impact: Safety threatened

The above-mentioned applications all relate to the safety of innocent people – keeping them safe in transit, shielding them from radiation from X-rays or from other dangerous treatments, and keeping our soldiers safe in battle. By abolishing depleted uranium, the affirmative is actually going to be hurting innocent citizens rather than helping them. (Turn Affirmative Harms)

DA 2: US defense capabilities impaired

Link: The affirmative team mandates abolishing the use of depleted uranium.

1. Internal Link: Uranium characteristics make it an ultimate warhead.

Tedd Wyman (UMRC Researcher), "UMRC's Preliminary Findings from Afghanistan & Operation Enduring Freedom," Uranium Medical Research Center, January 2003, <http://www.projectcensored.org/publications/2005/4.html> .

Uranium used in specially designed high velocity liquid metal penetrators can bore through 20 feet of super-reinforced concrete bunkers in classified weapons called "shaped charges" and "explosively formed penetrators". The hard (dense), resilient (ductile) and heavy (sustaining momentum) characteristics of uranium also make its optimal in the warhead of robust earth-penetrating bombs to carry them into buried targets and caves.

2. Its unique features make it attractive for defense use.

John J. Fialka, "Weighing Claims About Depleted Uranium," The Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2003 [accessed via Proquest]

It is heavier than lead and can keep its shape upon impact with other metal. These features made DU very attractive to the Pentagon.

3. Uranium is preferred because it has superior performance in battle.

Tedd Wyman (UMRC Researcher), "UMRC's Preliminary Findings from Afghanistan & Operation Enduring Freedom," Uranium Medical Research Center, January 2003, <http://www.projectcensored.org/publications/2005/4.html> .

Uranium is preferred over all other "ballistic" metals (e.g. lead, iron, tungsten) because it offers a set of unique metallurgical properties: it is extremely dense yet ductile metal (not brittle); it is pyrophoric (uranium dust burns spontaneously at room temperature); and, solid metal uranium is autoigniting at 170° F. Uranium metal has a very unusual property not available in any other metal; it is "self-sharpening", meaning that when it hits a target at high velocities (1 km/sec) it erodes and breaks in such a way as to continuously re-sharpen its point — the leading points of all other warhead metals flatten or mushroom under these conditions. These properties give uranium a superior performance as a penetrating warhead alloy capable of breaching the hardest and thickest armor plating, retaining penetration capabilities at 15 % greater distances and lower speeds than the most common alternative metal, tungsten.

4. Brink: The threat of terrorists acquiring weapons is increasingly real.

Mel Hurtig (National Chairman of the Committee for an Independent Canada and founder and former Chairman of the Council of Canadians), "Arming the Heavens," from the Tyee, a Canadian newspaper, June 26, 2006, <http://thetyee.ca/Views/2006/06/26/ArmingTheHeavens> .

The second threat is the very real and increasing dangers of nuclear proliferation, and the dangers of terrorists acquiring nuclear materials and weapons.

Impact: US military abilities will be impaired

Depleted uranium is one of the primary features of some of our most advanced weapons systems. The affirmative team may mandate that NATO countries cannot use it, but that will not stop the increasingly belligerent terrorist states to continue developing their weapons. In the end, the US will be at a military disadvantage. (Turn Aff terrorism harm)

NEGATIVE BRIEF: Eastern European Withdrawal

By Rachel Marie Blum

SIGNIFICANCE

1. Enlargement is a necessary step for NATO.

Rebecca R. Moore, Ph.D. (Professor of Political Science at Concordia College), "Europe ‘Whole and Free': NATO's Political Mission for the 21st Century," NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship Final Report, June 2003, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/moore.pdf>

To some degree, the decision to enhance NATO's political dimension made enlargement, if not a necessity, at least a logical next step in NATO's adaptation to the post-Cold War world. If NATO was to be understood primarily as a community of liberal democracies committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes, retaining the alliance's Cold War boundaries made little sense—assuming that other European states were committed to its ideals. Enlargement, however, also served as a means of rewarding those central and eastern European states who were actively making the political and economic reforms essential to NATO's vision of a Europe whole and free.

2. Ukraine and Georgia deserve NATO membership.

James M. Goldgeiger (Adjunct Senior Fellow for Europe Studies at the Council of Foreign Relations), "A New European Divide," Washington Post, March 28, 2004, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/6892/new_european_divide.html>

The United States and its partners should renew their focus on integrating other former Soviet states, in particular Ukraine and Georgia, into Europe. Both have tried to balance expressing an interest in membership in NATO (and perhaps down the road in the EU) with not provoking Russia (which continues to see these countries as in its sphere of influence). The United States grew increasingly frustrated with both countries in the 1990s. Western assistance seemed wasted, and patience grew thin. But now is not the time to give up. Not only has Georgia had its recent revolution, but Ukraine's fall presidential elections bear the prospect of a new reform leadership.

3. The accession of Baltic States to NATO doesn't change the region's power dispersion.

Yuri E. Federov (Professor at Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Russian Foreign Ministry), "The Ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe: A Long Overdue Necessity," Internationl Security Nonproliferation Arms Control (Yaderny Kontrol), No. 4, Vol. 10, Winter 2004, <http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/ykd34-2004.pdf>

The accession of the Baltic States to NATO, of itself, does not noticeably change the balance of forces in the southern part of the Baltic region whatsoever. The armies of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia are minimal compared to the troops of other states here. The total number of regular armed forces is less than 24,000, and they possess no military helicopters or attack helicopters, while the three battle tanks possessed by Latvia—obsolete T-55s—are only good for training purposes.

4. Russia does not consider NATO as a potential enemy.

Yuri E. Federov (Professor at Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Russian Foreign Ministry), "The Ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe: A Long Overdue Necessity," Internationl Security Nonproliferation Arms Control (Yaderny Kontrol), No. 4, Vol. 10, Winter 2004, <http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/ykd34-2004.pdf>

Russia does not consider NATO to be a potential enemy, and relations with the North Atlantic alliance are beginning to acquire the character of a partnership, while residual or new differences of opinion must be dealt with in a process of political dialog, within the framework of institutions created for just such a dialog.

5. There is no East-West rivalry because Russia and NATO are eye-to-eye on key issues.

Constant Brand (Writer), "NATO, Russia try to avoid new clash over Ukraine," Associated Press, December 9, 2004 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

This is not an East-West rivalry, De Hoop Scheffer said. Attempts earlier this week at a meeting of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe ended with no common stance. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, who had a run-in with Lavrov on the issue at that meeting was "pleased Russia was able to join with NATO" and see eye-to-eye on the Ukraine. "What we see here today is an expression of the Russian position," Powell told reporters. "We now have a path forward created by the Ukrainians."

6. The partnership with Russia is becoming more active and effective.

Russian News and Information Agency, "Russia-NATO Partnership Becomes More Active and Effective," April 21, 2005 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

Our partnership with Russia is becoming more active and effective, he said. We can discuss all issues of importance to us. We exchanged opinions on the situation in Afghanistan and ways to help its authorities, including by training specialists to stop the production of drugs and traffic from that country.

7. Russia has no concerns about NATO expansion.

Yuri E. Federov (Professor of Moscow State of Institute of International Relations of the Russian Foreign Ministry), "The Ratification of the Agreement on Adaption of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe: A Long Overdue Necessity," PIR Center for Public Policy Studies in Russia, published in Yaderny (Nuclear) Control, No. 4, Vol. 10, Winter 2004, http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/ykd34-2004.pdf, [ellipses in original]

There are no preconditions for such a development of events. President Putin has, with extreme clarity, established Russia's position as regards the consequences of NATO expansion for Russian security. In April of 2004 he stated: "Russia has not expressed apprehension at NATO's expansion, rather, it has suggested that this expansion is not the remedy to the modern threats the world faces. … We stated clearly that we have no concerns whatever with respect to NATO expansion, from the point of view of maintaining the security of the Russian Federation.

8. Western leaders should be more assertive with Russia (not more timid).

The Economist, "Reckoning with Russia,"July 10, 2006, <http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=7156731&fsrc=nwl>

All the same, western leaders should be more assertive. They could easily do more to help and encourage neighbours of Russia, such as Georgia and Ukraine, that fear its overbearing influence.

9. The war on terrorism has increased cooperation.

Rebecca R. Moore, Ph.D. (Professor of Political Science at Concordia College), "Europe ‘Whole and Free': NATO's Political Mission for the 21st Century," NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship Final Report, June 2003, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/moore.pdf>

NATO's new partnerships also suggest that what has been labeled "cooperative security" can be achieved even in the absence of shared values. Indeed, cooperation with the Caucuses and Central Asian states as well as with Russia expanded considerably in the aftermath of September 11th as the United States looked to them for assistance in the war against terrorism.

10. Russia's reactions shouldn't inhibit accession of former Soviet states.

Anthony Browne and Jeremy Page (Foreign Correspondents), "Ukraine Bid to Join NATO Threatens Wider Rift with Russia," The London Times, pg. 34, February 23, 2005 [accessed via Lexis Nexis and ellipses in original]

Antanas Valionis, the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, insisted that concern over Russia's reaction should not inhibit any plan by Nato to welcome former Soviet states. "We have to co-operate with Russia, but at the same time there are sovereign states which are choosing their road, their way to democracy...and our obligation is to support them," he said.

11. Democracy makes NATO good for Central and Eastern Europe.

Rebecca R. Moore, Ph.D. (Professor of Political Science at Concordia College), "Europe ‘Whole and Free': NATO's Political Mission for the 21st Century," NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship Final Report, June 2003, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/moore.pdf>, [ellipses in original]

The fact that NATO is not simply a military alliance but also a political organization grounded on the values enshrined in its preamble—"democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law"—is a key source of its appeal and therefore its leverage over prospective members. Presently, that appeal appears strong. As Robert Kaiser observed just prior to the Prague summit, NATO "has become the club of choice from one end of Europe to the other...For Central and Eastern Europeans, NATO is the happening place to be...More practically, it is the entrance hall to the Western world...."

12. Enlarging the alliance will increase security and democracy.

Rebecca R. Moore, Ph.D. (Professor of Political Science at Concordia College), "Europe ‘Whole and Free': NATO's Political Mission for the 21st Century," NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship Final Report, June 2003, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/moore.pdf>

The study concluded that enlargement of the alliance could enhance security and stability in Europe by "encouraging and supporting democratic reforms," fostering in new members "patterns and habits of cooperation and consultation and consensus-building," and promoting good neighborly relations.

13. Inviting recent members is an essential step to a whole and free Europe.

Bruce Jackson (President of the Project on Transitional Democracies), "NATO Enlargement," Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 1, 2003, <http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=6587>

The decision at the NATO Summit at Prague to invite seven countries to join NATO was a major step in the post-war strategy of the United States to build a Europe that is whole and free.

14. The new east European countries are not weak

Bruce Jackson (President of the Project on Transitional Democracies), "NATO Enlargement," Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 1, 2003, <http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=6587>

Many people believe that the seven Vilnius democracies are weaker militarily than their predecessors. This is also a misperception. In 1955, when West Germany was invited to join the Alliance, it had no army and no budget for defense. Today, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia and Slovenia have well-trained self-defense forces, regional security arrangements such as BALTBAT, and have achieved or are approaching defense budgets of 2% of GDP. The two larger countries, Romania and Bulgaria, can tell an even more impressive story. After downsizing and modernization, the end- strength of Romanian forces will be approximately 75,000 and Bulgarian forces approximately 45,000. Together, Romanian and Bulgarian forces in being are twice the size of what the European Union defense force might be in ten years.

15. The democracy of the new east European countries is strong

Bruce Jackson (President of the Project on Transitional Democracies), "NATO Enlargement," Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 1, 2003, <http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=6587>

Some critics have suggested that the quality of democracy in the Vilnius states is somehow more fragile and potentially reversible than the democracy in existing NATO states. While it is true that democracy in the Vilnius states flowered after the Revolution of 1989 making them some of Europes newest democracies, their youth in an historical context does not indicate a weakness of civic society. In fact, the opposite is true. Few countries in recent European history have struggled longer for their freedom or worked harder to build democratic institutions than the countries under consideration by the Senate.

16. Democracy in new east European members is stronger than some older members.

Bruce Jackson (President of the Project on Transitional Democracies), "NATO Enlargement," Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 1, 2003, <http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=6587>

Although these evaluations are highly subjective, it would seem to me that the democratic credentials of the seven Vilnius states are superior to Greece, Turkey and West Germany at the time of their invitations and comparable favorably to where Polish, Czech and Hungarian democracies were at the time of the Senates ratification in 1998. In some ways, the energy and enthusiasm of Europes new democracies make them more robust than the older democracies of Western Europe and more resistant to extremism and political backsliding.

17. Baltics bring stability to the region.

Bruce Jackson (President of the Project on Transitional Democracies), "NATO Enlargement," Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 1, 2003, <http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=6587>

The invitation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania would bring a comprehensive peace to the entire Baltic Sea and Nordic region and set the stage for a new relationship between Europe and Russia.

**18. Including Slovakia closes the door to transnational crime.**

*Bruce Jackson (President of the Project on Transitional Democracies), "NATO Enlargement," Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 1, 2003,* [*http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=6587*](http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=6587)

The inclusion of Slovakia would create a coherent center in the alliance and close the door to transnational crime. This would make Europe safe for historic neutrals and allow countries like Ukraine the opportunity to redefine their relations with Europe.

19. Slovenia accelerates Balkan democratization.

Bruce Jackson (President of the Project on Transitional Democracies), "NATO Enlargement," Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 1, 2003, <http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=6587>

The inclusion of Slovenia would create a model for post- Yugoslav success and accelerate the larger democratization of the Balkans.

20. Romania and Bulgaria limit threats to the Balkans.

Bruce Jackson (President of the Project on Transitional Democracies), "NATO Enlargement," Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 1, 2003, <http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=6587>

Invitations to Romania and Bulgaria would bring a Southern Dimension to NATO. This Southern Dimension would limit transnational threats to the Western Balkans, serve to bring Turkey and Greece closer to Europe, and begin to create a security structure for the Black Sea.

21. Inviting new countries would bring strategic integration.

Bruce Jackson (President of the Project on Transitional Democracies), "NATO Enlargement," Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 1, 2003, <http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=6587>

Collectively, invitations to Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia would signal the strategic integration of Southeast Europe in Euro-Atlantic institutions and could bring states as far away as Cyprus and the Caucasus into a peaceful European system. Surprisingly, these initial hopes for the Vilnius Group have been realized to a far greater extent than its founders had any right to expect.

22. A stronger alliance is bred by expansion.

Bruce Jackson (President of the Project on Transitional Democracies), "NATO Enlargement," Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 1, 2003, <http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=6587>

The integration of the seven Vilnius states in NATO will create a stronger, more inclusive alliance which can turn its attention to the final stage of this defining period in European history. This third phase will undoubtedly be the most complex of this historical period and in some ways may be the most critical to long-term Euro-Atlantic security.

23. We should not focus solely on NATO's capabilities but also on the peace and democracy bred by expansion.

Bruce Jackson (President of the Project on Transitional Democracies), "NATO Enlargement," Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 1, 2003, <http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=6587>

Therefore, we should not define the New NATO solely in terms of its capabilities, lest it become a tool kit without a purpose. Nor should we define NATO exclusively as an expeditionary force, which would only serve to create a Foreign Legion for out-of-area peacekeeping and garrison duties. The mission of the New NATO is to extend the peace. Over the next five years, we have excellent chances to bring the remaining three Vilnius countries, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, into Euro-Atlantic institutions, thereby building an enduring security structure in the Balkans. In the few short months since the Prague Summit, these three countries and the United States have developed an Adriatic Charter which will serve to accelerate democratic reform.

24. Russia understands our world and is not antagonistic.

Alexander Konovalov (president, Russian Institute of Strategic Assessments, "New Wave of NATO Expansion: How Will it Affect Partnership with Russia?" Center for Defense Information, Russia Weekly (RIA Novosti), March 30, 2004, No. 10, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/300-10.cfm>

Russia understands very well that we live in a world with military threats of an entirely new nature. And from this viewpoint, the establishment of basing points in Romania and Bulgaria for possible operations in the Middle East is easy to explain. After all, Russia consented to the recently inconceivable stationing of American aviation in Central Asian countries, since this meets Russian interests in the fight against international terrorism.

DISADVANTAGES

Disadvantage 1: Balkans/Baltics vulnerable to terrorism

Link: The affirmative team forces the Balkans/Baltic states out of NATO.

Internal Link: NATO membership can prevent terrorism.

Anthony Browne and Jeremy Page (Foreign Correspondents), "Ukraine Bid to Join NATO Threatens Wider Rift with Russia," The London Times, pg. 34, February 23, 2005 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

If Ukraine does join NATO**,** it will enable the alliance to control its weapons exports and to prevent them falling into the hands of hostile states or terrorist groups. Those risks were highlighted yesterday when Ukraine's Unian news agency reported that two anti-aircraft missiles had gone missing from a military depot in Crimea.

Brink: NATO's current state leaves a bloc of countries open to problems.

James M. Goldgeiger (Adjunct Senior Fellow for Europe Studies at the Council of Foreign Relations), "A New European Divide," Washington Post, March 28, 2004, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/6892/new_european_divide.html>

Given the expansion of freedom in most of Europe and the development of new American partners such as Poland and Romania, does it matter that the original vision remains unfulfilled? Yes. A geographic area from northeastern Europe across to Central Asia will at best be populated by countries that are quasi-democracies and partially market-oriented. It could easily become a continuous bloc of authoritarian governments on whose territory is located nuclear material and scientists with the know-how to proliferate it, human traffickers and groups with links to al Qaeda.

Impact: Terrorism increased

When Balkan/Baltic States are not members of NATO, they are more vulnerable to terrorism because they have nowhere to turn and no one to help them. By essentially banning these countries from NATO, we will be encouraging them to seek help elsewhere. The United States and the NATO countries are already struggling enough with terrorism in a few countries. Adding several more countries to the list of threats will correspondingly increase the threat of terrorism to the United States.

Disadvantage 2: Russian mistreatment of Eastern Europe

Link: The affirmative team pulls NATO out of the Baltics/Balkans and gives Russia more leverage.

Brink: Russia is increasing intimidation domestically

James M. Goldgeier, interviewee (Adjunct Senior Fellow for Europe Studies) and Bernard Gwertzman, interviewer (Consulting Editor), "Coldgeier: U.S.-Russia Relations at Lowest Point Since Cold War's End," Council on Foreign Relations, July 6, 2006, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/11060/goldgeier.html>

The biggest issues right now have to do with the climate of intimidation, particularly in the political sphere: the lack of a real opposition in Russia. There was a lot of news during the winter about the passage of a new Russian law on nongovernmental organizations—an effort by Russia to intimidate nongovernmental organizations and be able to shut down those they are concerned about. In a sense, Russia is trying to make sure it doesn't face the kind of Orange Revolution that occurred in Ukraine at the end of 2004.

Brink: Russia is bullying countries in the region

The Economist, "Reckoning with Russia," 7-10-06, <http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=7156731&fsrc=nwl>

Russia continues to bully and covet nearby countries from Ukraine and Georgia to Central Asia, apparently hoping to ensure that it has weak neighbours rather than strong ones.

Impact: Decreased human rights in the region

NATO has been a powerful force for good in Eastern Europe, stepping in over the years, such as in Kosovo, to ensure the preservation of human rights. By mandating the NATO turn a blind eye to these developing countries countries and the problems Russia is causing, we are essentially giving those who would abuse human rights a blank check.

Disadvantage 3: Democracy impaired

Link: The affirmative puts a ban on Central/Eastern European accession to NATO.

Brink: The possibility of NATO membership has brought about positive reforms.

Rebecca R. Moore, Ph.D. (Professor of Political Science at Concordia College), "Europe ‘Whole and Free': NATO's Political Mission for the 21st Century," NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship Final Report, June 2003, <http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/01-03/moore.pdf>

The lure of NATO membership would be sufficiently appealing to encourage prospective members to make the requisite political, economic, and military reforms. Although NATO has published no specific membership criteria, an internal study on enlargement released in September 1995, served to notify prospective members that only those states that had demonstrated a commitment to democratic values and practices would be considered for membership. This would include resolving ethnic and external territorial disputes by peaceful means and establishing "appropriate democratic and civilian control of their defense forces."

Uniqueness: Removing NATO will remove the incentive for or example of democracy.

Impact: Democracy undermined

The United States and NATO have worked for the past fifty-seven years to increase democracy in the world, especially in the former Soviet States. Mandating that NATO cease these operations undermines the work and benefits of democracy and means that, at worst, these countries will sink back into their lowest points and at best, NATO will have to spend years undoing this damage.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: SABATOGING EU DEFENSE FORCE (European Security and Defense Policy/ESDP)

By Matthew Baker

INHERENCY

French are moving back into NATO and do not intend the ESDP to undermine NATO

Jolyon Howorth (Jean Monnet Professor of European Politics ad personam at the University of Bath and visiting professor at Yale), "A work in progress: demystifying the European Security and Defence Policy," The Harvard International Review, January 1, 2006, <http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/HarvardInternationalReview/2006/01/01/1428247?ba=a&bi=2&bp=1> (brackets added)

Fourth, it [the ESDP] never has been intended, even by its strongest French advocates, to undermine or replace NATO. Since the early 1990s, France, which is heavily involved in alliance-coordinated peacekeeping activities, has been moving progressively back into NATO.

EU is committed to work through NATO for mutual defense

Kristin Archick (Specialist in European Affairs), 10 June 2005, "CRS Report for Congress - The European Union in 2005 and Beyond," CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, p. 2

The U.K. and other states, such as the Netherlands and Poland, had initially strongly opposed the French-German-backed proposals for the "mutual assistance clause" and "structured cooperation." They had worried that both could weaken NATO and the transatlantic link. The U.K. reportedly acquiesced on these provisions, however, after securing some revisions. The "mutual assistance clause" now includes stronger language reiterating that NATO remains the foundation of collective defense for those EU members that are also NATO allies. "Structured cooperation" activities have reportedly been refocused mostly on efforts to boost military capabilities rather than on conducting operations

SIGNIFICANCE

There's no significant difference between EU policy, NATO policy and US policy

German Chancellor Angela Merkel, quoted in 6 Feb 2006, "Munich Security Conference: NATO closes in front against Iran," Informationsstelle Militarisierung e.V., Neues IMI-Buch, WeltMacht EUropa, <http://www.imi-online.de/2006.php3?id=1300>

The European Security Strategy, NATO's Strategic Concept and the National Security Strategy of the United States of America provide a suitable foundation on which to conduct more intensive dialogue on the form our common security agenda should take. We only need to go through them once to see that they correspond to a remarkable degree.

EU defense force budget is too small to challenge to NATO

Dr. Gary Schmitt (PhD from the University of Chicago and director of Reagan's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board), "NATO & EU Defense Plans," October 17, 2003, <http://www.newamericancentury.org/nato-20031017.htm>

Most American commentators have viewed the creation of a separate EU defense capability as more a nuisance than a real problem. And given the meager defense budgets in Europe it certainly is the case that an independent EU defense force will not be a challenge to NATO anytime soon, if ever.

Naïve to imagine that an EU defense force will rival NATO

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (NATO Secretary General), "NATO's political and military transformation: Two sides of the same coin," April 15, 2005, of <http://152.152.96.1/docu/speech/2005/s050414a.htm>

It is naïve to imagine that the European Union can develop a military capability to rival that of NATO, which includes the US.

Only a few members want the EU to be a counterweight to the US

Henning Riecke (resident fellow at Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik in Berlin, specialising in European and transatlantic security), "The need for change," NATO Review, Spring 2005, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue1/english/art2.html>

Moreover, only very few EU members wish to build the European Union into a counterweight to the United States. The majority simply want Europe to become more powerful in order to be a more attractive and therefore more influential partner for the United States.

EU defense forces will aid NATO

Kurt Volker (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs), "The Road to NATO's Riga Summit," House International Relations Committee, May 3, 2006, [www.a.house.gov/international\_relations/109/vol050306.pdf](http://www.a.house.gov/international_relations/109/vol050306.pdf)

It is false logic to believe that EU steps to develop security capabilities must necessarily be steps away from NATO. The EU has already been in 15 operations, including in Bosnia, Darfur, Aceh, the Congo, and elsewhere. We believe that further development of European security and defense capabilities can reinforce NATO's transformation, and that it is essential that new EU capabilities, for example, in rapidly deployable troops, are compatible and complementary with NATO.

Balancing the US is not a goal of the ESDP

Prof. Jolyon Howorth (European Politics at the University of Bath and visiting professor at Yale), "A work in progress: demystifying the European Security and Defence Policy," The Harvard International Review, 1 Jan 2006, <http://www.keepmedia.com/pubs/HarvardInternationalReview/2006/01/01/1428247?ba=a&bi=2&bp=1>

Fifth, and most important, the ESDP is not designed to "balance" US power in the structural realist sense, even if that term is stretched to include "soft balancing" as discussed in the Summer 2005 International Security. The European Union has set its face squarely against the sorts of considerations of power politics that are inherent in structural realist logic and lie at the heart of "balancing."

NATO European commander will command EU operations making them dependent on NATO

Chandrashekhar Dasgupta (former Indian Ambassador to the EU and analyst at Institute of Defence Studies & Analyses), "The Reinvention of NATO," ORF Occasional Paper, Mar 2005, <http://www.observerindia.com/publications/OccasionalPapers/op050323.pdf>

Currently, under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements (agreed in March 1993), the NATO deputy commander in Europe (Deputy SACEUR) will "in principle" act as the operational commander for EU-led operations. In security matters, the EU is unable to act independently of NATO or to pose a challenge to US primacy.

Multipolarity not always unstable

John J. Mearsheimer (Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago), "Interview with Author," Foreign Affairs, September 2001, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20010901faupdate10416/john-j-mearsheimer/interview-with-the-author.html>

Regarding multipolarity, it is not always unstable. If one compares multipolar Europe between 1900 and 1945 with bipolar Europe between 1945 and 1990, it might seem that multipolar systems are especially prone to deadly wars. However, Europe was also multipolar from 1815 to 1853, as well as 1871 to 1914, and there were no wars between the European great powers during those two lengthy periods.

The Balkans demonstrates that NATO and the EU can complement each other

Michele Alliot-Marie (French Minister of Defence), "Defence Europe," Financial Times, 5 Dec 2005, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=20051205.gb.html>

Far from being rivals, as some suggest, the NATO alliance and the EU complement each other on defence – as can be seen in the Balkans.

A country can be both active in EU defense and NATO

Michele Alliot-Marie (French Minister of Defence), "Defence Europe," Financial Times, 5 Dec 2005, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=20051205.gb.html>

The EU's defence expertise must enable it to approach its relationship with NATO without any hesitation. A country such as France is thus both a driving force of European defence and a main contributor and operational pillar of the alliance. France is currently commanding the air force component of the NATO Response Force, as it commanded the international force in Kosovo and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

European Balancing can be good

Knud Erik Jørgensen, (Jean Monnet Professor of Political Science at the University of Aarhus), "Four More Years: perceptions of and strategies for emerging world orders," 2004, <http://www.ecsanet.org/conferences/ecsaworld7/documents/Knud_Erik_Joergensen.doc>

In several policy fields, the EU balances the US when it is deemed the right thing to do, ranging from the use of WTO authorised tit-for-tat games, to ICAO-based disputes concerning taxation of aircraft fuel and, to the launch of Galileo. The idea that the US cannot be balanced is widespread but it is nonetheless simply wrong. The idea is often based on overestimations of American power and deeply held beliefs in US willingness to take care of others' interests. By contrast, some point out that it would be a great favour to balance the US, in particular because a nation built on checks and balances feels uncomfortable being imbalanced.

Unipolar world has no force to correct errors

The Princeton Project on National Security, "National Security in the 21st Century," Sept 2005, <http://www.wws.princeton.edu/ppns/conferences/reports/september.pdf>

Moreover, in a unipolar world, there is no countervailing force that can immediately impose discipline upon our choices by punishing mistakes. As a result, errors take longer to be uncovered. Each additional decision to execute a flawed strategy only serves to compound the original problem, until the bubble bursts in a spectacular fashion.

STATUS QUO ADVANTAGES

ESPD could enhance NATO capabilities

H.E. Yves Doutriaux (Ambassador and Permanent Representative of France to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), "The State of Transatlantic Relations," November 11, 2004, <http://www.da-vienna.ac.at/userfiles/REDE%20Doutriaux.pdf>

The US should understand that ESPD is not anti-NATO. On the contrary ESPD- especially if EU contributors could increase their military spending- could enhance NATO capacities.

EU Defense integration could overcome Europe's inefficient defense spending

Rob de Wijk (Professor of strategic studies and international relations as well as director of the Clingendael Center for Strategic Studies in the Netherlands), "European Military Reform for a Global Partnership," The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2003-04, <http://www.twq.com/04winter/docs/04winter_dewijk.pdf>

If Washington wants transformed European armed forces and a bigger bang for a euro, the administration should vigorously support the European integration process and pledge its support for the creation of a European defense. Only European defense integration could overcome Europe's inefficient defense spending.

SOLVENCY

Multipolar world will happen anyway - just a matter of time

Prof. Knud Erik Jørgensen, (Political Science at the University of Aarhus), "Four More Years: perceptions of and strategies for emerging world orders," 2004, <http://www.ecsanet.org/conferences/ecsaworld7/documents/Knud_Erik_Joergensen.doc> (ellipses in original)

In the perspective of Richard N Haass, American primacy will not last – efforts to assert or expand US hegemony will fail, "the world is becoming more multipolar. American policy should not resist such multipolarity (which would be futile) but define it…A multipolar world could be one in which several hostile but roughly equal states confront one another, or one in which a number of states, each possessing significant power, work together in common (1999).

DISADVANTAGES

Unbalanced US-EU relationship source of tension

Dr. Christopher Layne (Ph.D. in Political Science from the Univ. of California, Berkeley), "Transatlantic Relations," CATO Handbook on Policy for the 109th Congress, 53, 2005, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb109/hb_109-53.pdf>

Analysts of U.S.-European relations long have recognized that the unbalanced nature of that relationship has been a source of serious transatlantic tensions. American policymakers, Congress, and the public believe that the United States contributes far too much to defending common interests and that the Europeans fail to pull their weight.

EU dependence on the US will breed resentment on both sides

Dr. Christopher Layne (Ph.D. in Political Science from the Univ. of California, Berkeley), "Transatlantic Relations," CATO Handbook on Policy for the 109th Congress, 53, 2005, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb109/hb_109-53.pdf>

Policymakers should overcome that ambivalence and endorse the EU's efforts to forge an independent foreign and security policy. The price of European independence is bound to be less than the price of Europe's continuing subordination to the United States, which is bound to fan resentment (albeit of a different kind) on both sides of the Atlantic.

Maintaining American preponderances triggers backlash

Dr. Christopher Layne (Ph.D. in Political Science from the Univ. of California, Berkeley), "Transatlantic Relations," CATO Handbook on Policy for the 109th Congress, 53, 2005, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb109/hb_109-53.pdf>

Second, attempts to maintain American preponderance are bound to trigger a nasty geopolitical backlash against the United States. By gracefully accepting Europe's strategic selfsufficiency— and acknowledging that the EU stands on an equal footing with the United States—U.S. policymakers can go a long way toward repairing the damage caused to the transatlantic relationship by the Iraq war and ultimately put that relationship on a healthier, more sustainable basis.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: AGAINST INCREASING EUROPEAN DEFENSE SPENDING

By Matthew Baker

INHERENCY

EU developing common defense technology research fund to bridge gap with US

Mark John, "EU Takes First Step on Research Fund," Reuters, 7 Mar 2006,[**http://www.**defensenews.com/story.php?F=1581196&C=europe](http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=1581196&C=europe)

EU defense ministers gave their backing to a proposed common fund for defense research on March 7 in a rare move towards pooling the bloc's jealously guarded national military budgets. Britain, a top spender in the area, said it would initially not divert money to the project, aimed at narrowing the United States' burgeoning technology lead, but gave its blessing as a way to encourage other European states to spend more.

New EU procurement code will reduce prices in long run (more bang for the euro)

Simon Taylor, "EU Defence Market Set to Embrace Competition," European Voice, June 29, 2006, <http://www.europeanvoice.com/current/article.asp?id=25748&print=1>

Defence ministers agreed in November last year to a new code of conduct on defence contracts which meant that tenders for military equipment worth more than €1 million would be open to all participating states. Under Article 296 of the EC treaty, the EU defence industry has been exempt from normal competition rules including those on public procurement. The defence industry has been fragmented into 25 separate markets, each dominated by national suppliers, suffering from higher costs, duplication and a lack of interoperability between armed forces. Witney admitted that the defence market opening would get off to a "slowish start" and that initially there would be only a handful of notices advertised on the agency's site. But further down the line, he said, the initiative would lead to "keener prices" for defence ministries as procurement officers no longer automatically selected their national suppliers. The initiative would help the restructuring of national industries which were struggling to survive in the face of tight national budgets, leading to a more competitive European defence industry.

Europeans are already increasing defense spending

Dr. Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of NATO's Secretary General, 14 Oct 2005, "NATO going global - or almost," NATO ATA Eduction, <http://www.ataedu.org/article_new.php?id=109>

Five years ago, 21 of the 24 current European Allies had at least some conscript forces; by 2010 there will be only nine, and remaining conscript forces are being thoroughly modernised. Fourteen Allies are currently planning increases in defence expenditure, even if often modestly; four project broad stability and only one is forecasting a decline.

SIGNIFICANCE

Europe has vast defense system, exceeding all except the US

E. Wayne Merry (former State Department and Pentagon senior official, currently Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), "Thinking Beyond NATO," In The National Interest, 25 Feb 2004, <http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol3Issue8/Vol3Issue8MerryPFV.html>

True, most European countries spend far less of their national income on defense than does the United States, but this is a doubly false comparison. First, the aggregate of European defense spending is vast and dwarfs the resources available to any power center on earth other than the United States. Without spending another euro, Europe has a combined military budget beyond the dreams of Russian, Chinese, Indian or other military planners.

European military force larger than US and Russia combined

Lt. Col. Brendan Wilson (Strategic Planner on the International Military Staff at NATO headquarters with a PhD in International Relations from Berne University) "Military Strategy for Transformation: NATO's Rubicon," Strategic Insights, Volume I, Issue 10, 2 Dec 2003, <http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/dec03/europe.asp>

Despite the draw-down of the past thirteen years, European nations of the Alliance still maintain a relatively large military force structure, reflecting a higher percentage of the population in uniform than that of the United States. With 2.8 million men and women in their armed forces, the European members of NATO retain more military manpower than the United States (1.4 million) and Russia (1.2. million) combined.

US defense spending greater because of the Pacific and US continent, not just Europe

Professor Keith Hartley, "UK Defence Spending," Defence Research Institute at the Universities of Lancaster and York, 2002, <http://www.york.ac.uk/depts/econ/research/documents/rusi.pdf>

Second, the relatively high defence burden borne by the USA compared with NATO Europe is the focal point for debates about ‘burden-sharing' within NATO. However, the US burden figures are misleading since its defence effort is for the defence of the US continent and the Pacific and not solely for NATO.

Defense budget by GDP not accurate because of other military commitments

Binyam Solomon (Chief Economist, Department of National Defense, Canada), "NATO Burden Sharing Revisited," Defence and Peace Economics, June 2004, Vol. 15(3), pp. 251-258 (EBSCO HOST: <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=12583803>)

Note, however, that the use of the total defence expenditures as a portion of GDP may not be appropriate since only a portion of an ally's defence expenditure may be earmarked for NATO. For example, the US defence expenditures include other bi-lateral and multi-lateral commitments outside NATO, such as Asia and the Middle East.

In some areas like missiles, European Technology is superior to that of the US

The Washington Times, "Military skills key to European influences in US," July 18, 2004, <http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/washington_times_review_18july04.html> (brackets added)

Mr. [Charles] Grant [Director of the Center for European Reform] added that in some issues, such as air-to-ground cruise missiles and air-to-air missiles, European equipment is superior to that of the United States.

Europeans are better at peacekeeping

The Washington Times, "Military skills key to European influences in US," July 18, 2004, <http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/washington_times_review_18july04.html>

According to the conventional wisdom among defense experts, Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution explained, there is a division of labor in trans-Atlantic military operations in which the U.S. "cooks dinner" while Europeans "do the dishes." That analogy is a reference to how the United States dominates military campaigns because of its overwhelming military forces, but Europeans are often left to carry the largest peacekeeping burden because of their strengths in that task. As Mr. O'Hanlon said, "European soldiers are arguably better at peacekeeping than U.S. forces.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Social impacts outweigh benefits

Dr. Lutz Unterseher (PhD and head of the Organization Studies Department of the Institute for Applied Social Research, Bonn), "European Forces of Tomorrow: A New Perspective," October 20, 2003, <http://www.comw.org/pda/0310unterseher.html>

As a long-range goal Europe might be tempted to seek military parity with the U.S. Following this impulse would be a mistake. Firstly, this would run counter to the notion that the EU is well advised not to rely on military power as a leading instrument of its foreign policy. And, secondly, with respect to armaments the United States are outspending their potential competitors in Europe by such a margin that any substantial attempt at closing the gap would involve very serious political risks; It could destroy what is left of the *welfare state*, one of "Old Europe's" significant comparative advantages over the U.S.

2. Opportunity cost: Scientists diverted from other projects

The UN Group of Governmental Experts, "The Relationship between Disarmament and development in the current international context," June 23, 2004, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/402/50/PDF/N0440250.pdf?OpenElement>

The technological and human resources utilized for the research, development and maintenance of high-tech weaponry and new programmes (such as "mini-nukes" or space weaponization) impose a heavy opportunity cost on society, as scientists and researchers might otherwise be engaged in non-military pursuits.

3. Economic decline: 1% GDP increase in defense spending = 1.3% decline in GDP

Dr.Dale Bremmer (PhD and Professor of Humanities and Social Science at the Rose Hulman Institute of Technology) and Dr. Randall Kesselring (PhD and Professor of Economics and Finance at Arkansas State University), "The Opportunity Cost of Super Power Status: The Tradeoff Between Defense Spending and Economic Prosperity," July 1998, <http://www.rose-hulman.edu/~bremmer/professional/super_power.pdf>

Results indicate a statistically significant, inverse relationship between defense spending and economic growth. If the percentage of GDP spent on defense spending increase by one percentage point, economic growth decreases by almost 1.3 percentage points.

$1 billion spent in housing, transport, or health care produces more jobs than in defense

Scientist for Global Responsibility, "The Military Dimensions of Science and Technology: Web version of Notes for a lecture at Lancaster University Engineering Dept (Engineers in Society course) on 26th May 2004 given by Dr Stuart Parkinson," 2004, <http://www.sgr.org.uk/ArmsControl/MilitaryEngLancsNotes.html>

Centre for Defence Information estimates that per billion dollars, procurement of military technology produces 25,000 jobs, compared to 30,000 jobs in public transport; 36,000 in housing or 47,000 in health care (Harigel, 1997).

Not easy to convert military technology to civilian use

Scientist for Global Responsibility, "The Military Dimensions of Science and Technology: Web version of Notes for a lecture at Lancaster University Engineering Dept (Engineers in Society course) on 26th May 2004 given by Dr Stuart Parkinson," 2004, <http://www.sgr.org.uk/ArmsControl/MilitaryEngLancsNotes.html>

The military argues that there are 'spin-off' technologies from the science and engineering they fund which are good for the economy/ society. The evidence for this is limited. Military technology often requires substantial investment to convert it for civil use, which industry can be reluctant to spend if military markets are more lucrative, eg Ferranti, Vickers (Mort & Spinardi, 2004). Even if the major investment is forthcoming, the close connection with military applications means weapons proliferation is a constant headache (eg nuclear power, chemical pesticides). Attempts such as the UK's Dual-Use Technology Centres have been plagued by conflicting priorities. It would be more efficient to invest directly in civil science and technology.

4. Militarism: Europe opposes military action because they don't have a military

Dr. John C. Hulsman (PhD in International Relations and Modern History and Senior fellow at the Heritage Foundation specializing in European security and NATO affairs) "European Arrogance and Weakness Dictate Coalition of the Willing," Heritage Lecture #777, February 10, 2003, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/hl777.cfm>

The example of European military weakness is instructive. Given anemic European defense spending, it is little wonder that many politicians in Europe are implacably opposed to the military tool being used in international relations, that they don't want strength to matter in the international community, that they want to live in a world where international law and institutions predominate, that they want to forbid unilateral military action by powerful nations, and that they advocate all nations having equal rights that are equally protected by accepted international norms of behavior. The Europeans are merely making a philosophical virtue of a very practical necessity."

5. Global influence decline

Negative historical correlation between spending trajectory and strength

Kathy Chen "Opinion: Spent: The End of the American Empire," The Yale Economic Review, Spring 2005, <http://www.yaleeconomicreview.com/issues/spring2005/spent.php>

More so, there is a historical correlation between military spending and the trajectory of the relative strength of an empire. As a recent New York Times article noted, Great Britain and the Soviet Union are two examples of Great Powers that witnessed a decline in their international prestige resulting from international military campaigns.

High military spending creates enmity with poor states

Kathy Chen "Opinion: Spent: The End of the American Empire," The Yale Economic Review, Spring 2005, <http://www.yaleeconomicreview.com/issues/spring2005/spent.php>

It also might be wise to remember that high military spending equates an overemphasis of 'carrying the big stick', thus presenting the nation in a less than favorable light to the multitude of have-nots in the world.

6. Arms Cascade: Modernization will result in old arms being sold to unsavory nations to finance new systems

Chris Lindborg (BASIC Analyst with a MA degree in Political Science from University of South Carolina) and Dr. Ian Davis (PhD in Peace Studies from the University of Bradford), "NATO's Defense GAP: More Than Just Capabilities," British American Security Information Council, November 2002, <http://www.basicint.org/europe/NATO/fall2002defcapgap.htm>

Another problem with countries frantically trying to upgrade their capabilities is the cascade effect, whereby countries within NATO, and NATO aspirant countries, sell off their old military supplies and excess weapons--sometimes to dubious regimes--in order to produce cash for the purchase of upgrades or new weapons. Bulgaria, for example, was caught in a recent illegal export of military hardware to Syria - with some allegations that the materiel was destined for Iraq.

7. Net benefits loss: At best economic waste, at worst more wars

Dr. William Nordhaus (PhD in Economics from MIT and Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale), "The Problem of Excessive Military Spending in the Untied States," American Economic Association, 8 Jan 2005, <http://www.aeaweb.org/annual_mtg_papers/2006/0108_0800_0302.pdf>

At best, an excessive military budget is simply economic waste. At worst, it causes problems rather than solving them by tempting leaders to use an existing military capability.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: EXPULSION/DISCIPLINE

By Matthew Baker

INHERENCY

Status Quo has mechanisms to pressure non-conforming states

Jacob Mitchell, "NATO's New ID," BardPolitik, Volume 3, Spring 2003, <http://www.bard.edu/bgia/journal/vol3/iv-article2.pdf> (Interview Quoting DR. RONALD ASMUS (Senior fellow fro European Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and former coordinator of US Policy on NATO Expansion at the US Sate Department)

The existing implicit mechanisms in the treaty have worked. Once a country starts to stumble, it comes under tremendous pressure from its allies to get back on track. When the Portuguese in the midseventies were in danger of becoming a right wing dictatorship, and when Greece under the colonels was becoming a non-democracy, we froze it out of NATO activities.

An expulsion clause is unnecessary; membership is the best mechanism for democratic reform

Bruce Jackson (President of the Project on Transitional Democracies Washington and founder of the U.S. Committee on NATO), "NATO Enlargement," April 1, 2003, <http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=6587>

Some have suggested that NATO needs an expulsion clause to protect the institution from members who deviate from the principles of the alliance or otherwise fail to maintain accepted standards of human rights. Notwithstanding the fact that this clause has not been necessary for fifty-four years and that NATO membership has been the most effective mechanism for democratic reform we have found since 1989, advocates maintain we need to protect NATO from hypothetical bad actors.

Status Quo has informal disciplinary methods and they're better than formal policies

Col. Pavel Necas PhD (Assoc. Prof. at Slovak Air Force Academy), Nov 2004, BEYOND TRADITION: NEW ALLIANCE'S STRATEGIC CONCEPTS, NATO Defense College, p. 95-96

Still, the Alliance has dealt with members whose governments have not always supported common democratic values and principals. When such situations arose, for example with the Greek and Turkish military regimes in the late 1960s and early 1970s, other Allies effectively isolated or excluded them from sensitive discussions. In those instances however, suspending either or both would have risked sparking a nationalist backlash against the Allies or even possibly a war between the two long-time adversaries.

SOLVENCY

Better to deal with problems inside of NATO than isolate countries by expelling them

Robert A. Bradtke (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs, and Clinton's National Security Council Executive Secretary), "NATO and Enlargement: A United States and NATO Perspective," Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe Of the House Committee On International Relations," June 19, 2002, <http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa80289.000/hfa80289_0.HTM>

‘I would also say that there are cases in the past where a NATO country has run into problems. And I don't necessarily want to get into them here, but I think what the experience that we had showed was it was better to have the country in the Alliance, where we could try to deal with the problem, so to speak, within the family, than to have pushed them out and isolate them.

NATO pressure failed to fix problems in Greece in the 1960s

Szechy Balazs, 2002, Budapest University of Economic Sciences and State Administration, THE IMPACT OF NATO ENLARGEMENT ON CENTRAL EUROPEAN SECURITY, p. 48

Greece entered NATO in 1952. The (limited) postwar Greek democracy persevered until a military coup in April 1967, which was motivated by a desire to protect the corporate interests of the armed forces. Interaction with officers from other NATO states had failed to instill in the Greek military respect for the idea of civilian control; for example, the Greek military resisted a May 1964 effort by the civilian leadership to expand control over and depoliticize the armed forces. The coup did not disrupt support for and aid to Greece. Democracy returned in 1974, but not because of NATO or American pressure.

Solvency Turn: Staying in NATO helped restore democracy to Portugal in 1974

Szechy Balazs, 2002, Budapest University of Economic Sciences and State Administration, THE IMPACT OF NATO ENLARGEMENT ON CENTRAL EUROPEAN SECURITY, p. 47

Portugal was also a dictatorship after World War II, although unlike Spain it was an original NATO member. Interestingly, the government of Salazar in 1949 did not even pay lip service to the North Atlantic Treaty's rhetorical embrace of democracy. The dictatorship was toppled in a military coup in 1974 and replaced by a democracy. Here, NATO membership's contribution was to expose the Portuguese military to foreign influences, opening their eyes to the flaws in Salazar's dictatorship and producing rifts between civilians and the military.

DISADVANTAGES

1. WEAKENS THE ALLIANCE

Threatening to expel NATO members breeds insecurity and mistrust in the alliance

US Senator John McCain (member of the Armed Services Committee), "McCain Hails NATO's Progress But Cautions Senate of Sweeping Reform and Role of France," May, 8, 2003, <http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=Newscenter.ViewPressRelease&Content_id=946>

A clause threatening any individual NATO member with expulsion would weaken the heart of the Washington Treaty by casting doubt on the commitment of the NATO allies to come to the defense of any threatened member state. A suspension clause would effectively condition the mutual defense commitment that is at the heart of the Alliance in a way that would breed insecurity and mistrust, not security and confidence, among member states.

Threatening to expel NATO members risks the debilitation of the alliance

Sen. John McCain (member of the Armed Services Committee), "McCain Hails NATO's Progress But Cautions Senate of Sweeping Reform and Role of France," 8 May 2003, <http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=Newscenter.ViewPressRelease&Content_id=946> (brackets in original)

In the words of Bruce Jackson of the Project on Transitional Democracies, "A provision to expel [NATO members] would introduce a corrosive mental reservation into the commitment to defend an embattled democracy and would, therefore, debilitate the most powerful military alliance ever assembled.

Brink: The defense commitment must be made without reservation

Robert A. Bradtke (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs, and Clinton's National Security Council Executive Secretary), "NATO and Enlargement: A United States and NATO Perspective," Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe Of the House Committee On International Relations," June 19, 2002, <http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa80289.000/hfa80289_0.HTM>

The NATO Treaty does not have a provision that provides for members to be expelled from the Alliance. And I think that there are actually some good reason why that is actually the case. The countries that join NATO make a truly fundamental commitment to each other's defense, and it is a commitment that I think is- in my view needs to be made without some mental reservation that, yes we will take you in, but we might kick you out some day later.

Impact: An expulsion clause would cause NATO to abandon its defense commitments to vulnerable nations

Bruce Jackson (President of the Project on Transitional Democracies Washington and founder of the U.S. Committee on NATO), "NATO Enlargement," 1 Apr 2003, <http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=6587>

In my view, an expulsion clause would invariably be employed against the vulnerable and never against the deplorable. It is easy to envision a 1930s NATO expelling Czechoslovakia for their mistreatment of ethnic Germans immediately before Hitlers invasion or concluding that the abduction of Christian children by the Jews of Warsaw relieved the Atlantic Alliance of the obligation to defend Poland. And, today, if Turkey were threatened with military attack, I am certain there would be a motion to conclude that deteriorating human rights conditions obviated any obligation to honor NATOs Article V commitment. Although I have overstated for the purpose of effect, my point is that no country could fully rely on Article V, if the members of the Alliance harbored the option to expel.

2. EXPANSION

Link: Expulsion clause could weaken admission standards

Robert A. Bradtke (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of European Affairs, and Clinton's National Security Council Executive Secretary), "NATO and Enlargement: A United States and NATO Perspective," Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Europe Of the House Committee On International Relations," June 19, 2002, <http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa80289.000/hfa80289_0.HTM>

I would also say that I wouldn't want to see us weakening the standards, if you will; that if we knew that we could expel a member then we might be tempted to say, well, that country is not quite there, or we have some doubts; but so what? Let's take them in, and then we will worry about it later. We can always kick them out later.

Uniqueness: High admission standards currently keep 5 countries from joining NATO

R. Nicholas Burns (US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs), "Interview With Mats Carlbom of Dagens Nyheter," May 27, 2005, <http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/46884.htm>

We have five countries now that have formally said they want to join NATO. All of them need to meet the standards.

Brink: Russia is on the brink of retaliation against NATO enlargement

Dr. Denis Alexeev (PhD in History and associate professor at Saratov State University, Russia), "NATO Enlargement: A Russian Outlook," Conflict Studies Research Centre, November 2004, <http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/Russian/04(33)-DA.pdf>

Nevertheless, it is clear that an absolute majority of Russian parliamentarians were convinced that Russia needed to demonstrate some kind of *reaction* to the process of NATO enlargement, and that this reaction should be reinforced by making some alterations in the balance of power on the western direction. Even those who adhered closely to a moderate view on the enlargement process thought that Russia might reconsider its nuclear strategy and strengthen its military presence close to the western border with new NATO members.

Brink: Russia is beginning to growl: NATO expansion would increase concern

Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter (Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at CATO with a PhD in US Diplomatic history) and Justin Logan (Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute), "NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear," CATO Institutte January 25, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5421>

Now the alliance continues to poke at Russia by swallowing up former members of the Soviet bloc as fast as it can. Advocates of continued NATO expansion express inexplicable surprise when Russia protests. By taking in the Baltic republics as members, NATO is already deeply involved in countries that have historically been well within Russia's sphere of influence. The alliance seems poised to intrude further, and the Russian bear is beginning to growl. Nikolai Bordyuzha, spokesman for the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, has made Russia's views plain enough, warning that NATO bases surrounding Russia would constitute "a potential threat to Russia's security." Russia -- like any other country -- tends to get alarmed when the world's sole superpower extends security guarantees and military cooperation to countries on its borders.

Impact: Russia stops cooperating on terrorism and proliferation

Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter (Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at CATO with a PhD in US Diplomatic history) and Justin Logan (Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute), "NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear," CATO Institutte January 25, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5421>

The West can continue to press forward with NATO expansion indefinitely, antagonizing Russia and entering into security guarantees with countries on its border. But that course is unreasonable if we expect Russia's cooperation on nuclear proliferation, terrorism, or other issues vitally important to America. If the United States values those goals, let alone long-term peace with Russia, it needs to engage Moscow, not unnecessarily antagonize it.

Impact: Increased risk of conflict with Russia over Georgia or Ukraine

Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter (Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at CATO, PhD in US Diplomatic history) and Justin Logan (Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute), "NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear," CATO Institutte, 25 Jan 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5421>

Indeed, a crisis could be triggered if a future Russian president concludes that a Western military presence itself is an intolerable intrusion into what should rightfully be Moscow's sphere of influence. And a Russian president might well conclude that the United States would not really risk war over South Ossetia or a similar obscure conflict. We don't need to treat Russia with kid gloves, but reasonable caution and consideration is in order.

3. Anti-NATO backlash by new members

Col. Pavel Necas PhD (Assoc. Prof. at Slovak Air Force Academy), Nov 2004, BEYOND TRADITION: NEW ALLIANCE'S STRATEGIC CONCEPTS, NATO Defense College, p. 96

Ultimately, any presumed benefit in raising the suspension issue now must be weighed against the downsides of telling incoming Alliance members, in effect, that the United States is worried enough about their future performance that it might favor changing the rules of the game just as they are entering the Alliance. Such a perceived message might undercut strong pro-NATO sentiment in the aspirant countries and risk a backlash against Washington.

A kick out clause would send the wrong message to members

Sen. John McCain (member of the Armed Services Committee), "McCain Hails NATO's Progress But Cautions Senate of Sweeping Reform and Role of France," May, 8, 2003, <http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=Newscenter.ViewPressRelease&Content_id=946>

Advocating a kick-out clause suggests a lack of confidence in the democratic character and commitment of our new allies. It sends exactly the wrong message to these new members: that we fear they may regress from the democratic values we have certified that they share by inviting them to join NATO, values which NATO itself protects and strengthens.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: Israel/Middle East

By David Carter

HARMS

1. Israel does not need NATO to deter Iran for security

Ivan Eland (Director, Center on peace and Liberty, The Independent Institute) 28 Feb 2006, "Just Say 'No' to Israel in NATO," <http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1680>

Some pundits have used Iran's apparent quest for an atomic weapon as an excuse to push, with a straight face, the silly idea of inducting Israel into NATO. The idea is not just absurd because NATO stands for North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Israel is nowhere near the North Atlantic, but because Israeli security has never been better and doesn't need NATO protection. Furthermore, U.S. security would be undermined by admitting Israel into NATO.

2. Israel's neighbors are weak

Ivan Eland (Director, Center on peace and Liberty, The Independent Institute) 28 Feb 2006, "Just Say 'No' to Israel in NATO," <http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1680>

Most real threats to Israel's existence have long evaporated. Israel has been at peace with its most populous and dangerous immediate neighbor—Egypt—for almost three decades. It is also at peace with Jordan, a much weaker Arab bordering neighbor. Syria, the only nation-state bordering Israel that remains hostile, long ago lost its Soviet benefactor.

3. Iran can't effectively attack Israel

Ivan Eland (Director, Center on peace and Liberty, The Independent Institute) 28 Feb 2006, "Just Say 'No' to Israel in NATO," <http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1680>

One of the few possible significant future threats to Israel is Iran. Although advocates of admitting Israel into NATO—such as Ron Asmus, former Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs under President Clinton—have made much of this threat, they have grossly exaggerated the danger. Iran does not have a border with Israel, making a ground invasion extremely difficult. Besides, Israel has an annual defense budget that is more than twice that of Iran.

4. Israel can deter any Iranian nuclear threats

Ivan Eland (Director, Center on peace and Liberty, The Independent Institute) 28 Feb 2006, "Just Say 'No' to Israel in NATO," <http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1680>

Although Iran has missiles that can hit Israel and is probably working on a nuclear weapon, Iran will probably not have the "bomb" for five to ten years. Even then, Iran will have only a small number of warheads. Although Israel is coy about its nuclear arsenal, experts estimate that it has 200 or more atomic weapons. This arsenal will long deter any potentially hostile state from unleashing a nuclear attack on Israel.

INHERENCY/MINOR REPAIR

1. Let Israel finish building the fence: Better option than international Middle East peacekeeping

Robert Kagan; Washington Post, 18 Apr 2002, "Can NATO Patrol Palestine?" <http://www.newamericancentury.org/kagan-041802.htm>

Is there another option I'm missing? If not, the proposal for an international peacekeeping force looks less like a real plan than a desperate if noble attempt to solve the insoluble in the Middle East -- a deus ex America summoned to provide a miracle when all roads to peace have reached a dead end. Even Ehud Barak's idea of building a very, very big fence between Israel and the Palestinians looks better.

SOLVENCY

1. Divisions within NATO doom any effective Middle East Strategy

Fred Tanner (Deputy Director of the Geneva Centre for Security), Dec 2004 , "NATO's Role in Defence Cooperation and Democratisation in the Middle East," <http://www.gcsp.ch/e/publications/Issues_Institutions/Int_Organisations/Academic_Articles/Tanner-IntlSpectator-2004.pdf>

But, NATO is unlikely to serve as a forum for a common US-European approach to reforms in the Middle East because of its multiple identities and the resulting lack of a common strategy. There is a distinct US-European difference of view and policy with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Iraq war. Zbigniew Brzezinski rightly argues that Europeans suspect the sudden focus on democracy by US administration officials as an effort "to delay any serious American effort to push the Israeli and Palestinians to reach a genuine peace settlement".

2. International peacekeeping in the Middle East: already tried and failed

Robert Kagan; Washington Post, 18 Apr 2002, "Can NATO Patrol Palestine?" <http://www.newamericancentury.org/kagan-041802.htm>

Let's say we get a peace agreement and we put the peacekeeping force on the ground between the Israelis and Palestinians. What happens when, despite all our best efforts, the occasional Hamas suicide bomber gets through anyway and commits the occasional massacre in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv? Count on it: This will happen. And what about when Hezbollah tries to use the new Palestinian state created by the peace settlement the way it now uses southern Lebanon, as a convenient place from which to launch Katyusha rockets at Israeli population centers? What do we do then? Friedman et al. can't wish this problem away. And the options are less than enticing. One option is that the American-led peacekeeping force does nothing. But then we will have effectively created an American shield for terrorist attacks against Israel. This, by the way, was exactly the role a U.N. peacekeeping force played in Lebanon for several years in the late 1970s and early '80s, right up until the Israeli army invaded Lebanon and pushed the U.N. force (known as UNIFIL) aside.

3. Outside Middle East intervention just trades one war for another

Robert Kagan; Washington Post, 18 Apr 2002, "Can NATO Patrol Palestine?" <http://www.newamericancentury.org/kagan-041802.htm>

Option three is that the American-led force goes to war. We tell the Israelis to hold their fire and then send our own forces in to stop the terrorists. In essence, we take on the job the Israelis are currently doing in the territories. This prevents the outbreak of a new Israeli-Palestinian conflict -- and begins the first round of the U.S.-Palestinian conflict. Maybe that's a kind of progress, but it's not very attractive.

4. No benefit: Arab states see NATO as a threat that has little to offer

Helle Malmvig, 2005, Danish Institute for International Studies, A NEW ROLE FOR NATO IN THE MIDDLE EAST?ASSESSING POSSIBILITIES AND BARRIERS FOR AN ENHANCED MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE <http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2005/hma_nato_role_web.pdf>

This report, however, argues that this will be an extremely difficult task since there exists a number of deep-seated obstacles and barriers for creating a genuine partnership along the lines of the PfP Programme. The main impediments are: The Arab states in general view NATO and the Mediterranean Dialogue with scepticism and distrust. NATO is seen rather as a security threat than as a security provider and partner. The Mediterranean states have different security perceptions and concerns compared to those of NATO, and they are situated in a different security climate. In contrast to the case of the former socialist states in Eastern Europe, NATO has very few carrots to offer to the Mediterranean states. The armed forces in the Mediterranean states are primarily interested in upholding the political status quo, and are wary of notions of security governance

5. Stronger ties with the US not NATO are in Israel's strategic interest

Zaki Shalom, Jafee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, March 2005, Israel and NATO: Opportunities and Risks, <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v7n4p4Shalom.html>

From Israel's point of view, however, the time element is liable to be critical in periods of strategic crisis, and aid that is not supplied immediately may become irrelevant. At the same time, the American administration, considered the major element in Israel's defense, already demonstrated its willingness to defend Israel at a time when it faced grave danger during the Yom Kippur War, without being formally obligated to do so as part of any defense treaty. It is therefore doubtful if the marginal addition of NATO membership will provide a significant contribution to Israel's security, and thus it seems preferable for Israel to examine strengthening its strategic links with the US in the direction of a bilateral treaty, rather than joining NATO.

6. NATO influence minimal because they are not a member of Road Map to peace

Fred Tanner (Deputy Director of the Geneva Centre for Security), Dec 2004 , "NATO's Role in Defence Cooperation and Democratisation in the Middle East," <http://www.gcsp.ch/e/publications/Issues_Institutions/Int_Organisations/Academic_Articles/Tanner-IntlSpectator-2004.pdf>

The influence of NATO with regard to Israeli-Palestinian conflict management may be minimal, because NATO is – in contrast to the EU - not a member of the Road Map Contact Group.

7. Israel gains little if anything at all from NATO membership

Zaki Shalom, Jafee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, March 2005, Israel and NATO: Opportunities and Risks, <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v7n4p4Shalom.html>

Thus the question that must be asked is: will Israel's formal membership in NATO increase its deterrent strength *beyond* that which it would already possess and likely possess in the foreseeable future? It seems that joining NATO will contribute to Israel's deterrent capability only marginally, if at all.

8. Israel won't cooperate: Israel won't spend money and resources on international efforts

Uzi Eilam, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 11 Feb 2004, Israeli Membership in NATO: A Preliminary assessmentUzi , <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/tanotes/TAUnotes99.doc>

Israel has traditionally been wary of any foreign involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly on the part of Europe. Moreover, unless and until progress in the peace process leads to a significant reduction in terrorist activity against it, Israel will be unable to spare much of its limited financial and manpower resources for cooperative international efforts.

**DISADVANTAGES**

1. Security Turn: Israel's security options are diminished if it joins NATO

Zaki Shalom, Jafee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, March 2005, Israel and NATO: Opportunities and Risks, <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v7n4p4Shalom.html>

These circumstances would confront Israel with a grave dilemma. If it decides to consult members of NATO before taking military action, it must expect to encounter opposition from most if not all of them. If it acts despite this, it will be regarded as ignoring the views of its fellow members. If it acts without prior consultation with NATO countries, it will take the risk of prompting angry responses by them because they have been presented with a fait accompli contrary to the atmosphere that is supposed to exist between the members of the organization.

2. Security Turn: Israel would be pressured to give up nuclear options

Zaki Shalom, Jafee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, March 2005, Israel and NATO: Opportunities and Risks, <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/sa/v7n4p4Shalom.html>

Furthermore, Israel's membership in NATO would likely incur increased pressure to surrender the nuclear option it currently possesses. One of Israel's major arguments justifying its nuclear option was that the Western powers were not prepared to provide it with "absolute" guarantees for its defense as part of a permanent defense treaty, along the lines of the NATO alliance. Consequently, survival considerations dictated that Israel had no alternative other than to develop an independent nuclear option. If Israel did in fact join a strong and stable international defense treaty organization, in which the US is also a member, it could easily be argued that it no longer has a reason to justify retaining the nuclear option.

3. NATO divided: Europeans would object to anti-Palestinian alliance

Uzi Eilam, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 11 Feb 2004, Israeli Membership in NATO: A Preliminary assessmentUzi , <http://www.tau.ac.il/jcss/tanotes/TAUnotes99.doc>

European reservations would certainly be reinforced by the Palestinians, who can be expected to oppose any intensification of Israel-NATO ties even if the peace process gets back on track and a solution to the conflict seems attainable, but especially if those conditions are not met. In either case, the Palestinians (and other Arabs) would almost certainly object to any institutional arrangement that seemed to entrench Israeli military dominance in the region. Consideration of Palestinian sensitivities would give European members of NATO a reason to move very cautiously on the question of Israeli accession.

**4. Middle East and NATO upheaval if Israel joins**

*Judy Dempsey, 3 Mar 2005, "Israel explores closer link to NATO, even membership," International Herald Tribune* [*http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/news\_detail.asp?ID=357&frame=yes~main*](http://www.securitydefenceagenda.org/news_detail.asp?ID=357&frame=yes~main)

Were it to join NATO, Israel would have the automatic right under Article 5 of the alliance's treaty to the security guarantee that a member state that came under attack would be assisted by other members if it sought such assistance. When asked if all members would extend Article 5 to Israel, a senior NATO diplomat who asked not to be named said: "I don't want to think about the possibility. It could create upheaval in NATO and in the region.

5. Terrorism and reduced U.S. security

Ivan Eland (Director, Center on peace and Liberty, The Independent Institute) 28 Feb 2006, "Just Say 'No' to Israel in NATO," <http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1680>

Because threats to Israel's security have diminished over time, and Israel is wealthy compared with its immediate neighbors, it does not need NATO protection. NATO membership would obligate the United States—the security guarantor in NATO—and its feckless European allies to help Israel battle Hamas and other radical groups in the streets of Palestine. The United States is already involved in two quagmires in Islamic nations—Iraq and Afghanistan. It doesn't need to further inflame radical Islamist terrorists around the world by also helping Israel occupy Palestine. If you think anti-U.S. Islamist terrorism is bad now, try waving this red flag in front of the bull. Thus, admitting Israel into NATO would reduce U.S. security, not enhance it. This bizarre idea should be put to bed at once.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: HOMELAND SECURITY

By David Carter

INHERENCY

TERRORISM

NATO fights terrorism abroad to deny operating bases to terrorists

Ahto Lobjakas, "NATO: Alliance Head Says London Attacks Won't Stop Fight Against Terrorism" 8 July 2005, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (brackets in original)

Emerging from the meeting, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer indicated its main purpose had been to reassert the alliance's resolve to fight terrorism across the world. "It is clear that yesterday's horrific events in London only reinforce the determination of the NATO allies to continue with our operations and our missions," de Hoop Scheffer said. "We'll also have this drive, as far as NATO is concerned, to fight the fight against terrorism together, be it [in] Afghanistan, be it our NATO [naval] patrols in the Mediterranean, be it the training mission in Iraq. We must continue to deny operating bases to terrorists.

NATO committed to fighting war on terror

NATO Topics, NATO Official Web Site, 13 June 2006, "NATO and the fight against terrorism,"  [www.nato.int/issues/terrorism/index.html](http://www.nato.int/issues/terrorism/index.html)

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington thrust not only the United States but also the entire NATO Alliance into the fight against terrorism.Less than 24 hours after the attacks, NATO invoked for the first time Article 5 of the Washington Treaty - its collective defence clause - declaring the attacks to be an attack against all NATO members. The Alliance subsequently deployed aircraft and ships in support of the United States. Since then, and following other tragic attacks, NATO has been engaged actively in the campaign against terrorism on both the political and military fronts.

NATO has a concrete plan for fighting terrorism

NATO Topics, NATO Official Web Site, 19 Sept 2005, "NATO and the fight against terrorism," <http://www.nato.int/issues/terrorism/evolve_c.html>

At the 21-22 November 2002 Prague Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government expressed their determination to deter, defend and protect their populations, territory and forces from any armed attack from abroad, including by terrorists. To this end, they adopted a Prague package, aimed at adapting NATO to the challenge of terrorism. It comprised:

* a new Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism;
* a Partnership Action Plan on Terrorism;

five nuclear, biological and chemical defence initiatives: a deployable nuclear, biological and chemical analytical laboratory, a nuclear, biological and chemical event response team, a virtual centre of excellence for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons defence, a NATO biological and chemical defence stockpile, and a disease surveillance system;

protection of civilian populations, including a Civil Emergency Planning Action Plan;

NATO created NRF for fighting terrorism

NATO Topics, NATO Official Web Site, 19 Sept 2005, "NATO and the fight against terrorism," <http://www.nato.int/issues/terrorism/evolve_c.html> (NRF=NATO Response Force)

In addition, they decided to create the NATO Response Force, streamline the military command structure and launch the Prague Capabilities Commitment, to better prepare NATO's military to face new challenges, including terrorism.

NATO working hard at defeating terrorists

NATO Topics, NATO Official Web Site, 14 Apr 2005, "NATO's military concept for defence against terrorism," <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>

The Political Guidance provided by Council, which stipulated that NATO's actions should: \* Have a sound legal basis and fully conform to the relevant provisions of the UN Charter and all relevant international norms, including those concerned with human rights and humanitarian requirements. \* Help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist attacks or threat of attacks, directed from abroad against populations, territory, infrastructure and forces of any NATO member state, including by acting against these terrorists and those who harbour them. \* Act, on a case-by-case basis, if requested, in support of the international community's efforts against terrorism.

NATO determined to fight terrorism

John Colston, Assistant Secretary General for Defence Policy and Planning, 7 Oct 2003, Update on NATO's contribution to the fight against terrorism, NATO MEETING OF REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS

At the NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers meetings held in June, Allies once more categorically rejected and condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and reiterated their determination to combat this scourge for as long as necessary. The Allies confirmed their determination to deter, disrupt, defend and protect against any armed attack on them, including terrorist attacks directed from abroad, in accordance with the Washington Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations

NATO has reconsidered every aspect of work in light of terrorism

Dagmar de Mora-Figueroa (works on terrorism-related issues in NATO's Defence Policy and Planning Division), "NATO's response to terrorism," NATO REVIEW, Autum 2005

Even though the 1999 Strategic Concept, the document setting out the challenges that NATO faces and the ways in which it addresses them, recognised terrorism as a new threat in the post-Cold War era, Allies gave little collective attention to this issue until the events of 11 September 2001. There was little political discussion of the nature and sources of terrorism, or of the implications of terrorism for the Alliance's concepts, policies, structures and capabilities. Since then, however, nearly every aspect of work at NATO has been reconsidered in the light of the threat terrorism poses to our populations and forces.

NATO has reached consensus on serious threat of terrorism

C. Richard Nelson , "Expanding NATO's counter-terrorism role," NATO REVIEW, Autum 2004

Over the past three years, NATO has reached consensus on the serious nature of the threat and the fact that terrorism knows no boundaries. International terrorism is now understood to be a single problem with many manifestations, whereas in the past terrorism was viewed more as a series of discrete national phenomena with the result that differences between terrorists groups were highlighted. The older approach missed important linkages and consequently underestimated the value of broad cooperation among governments.

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT

NATO already engaged in consequence management

NATO Topics, NATO Official Web Site, 14 Apr 2005, "NATO's military concept for defence against terrorism," <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm>

Consequence Management is the use of reactive measures to mitigate the destructive effects of terrorism and is the responsibility of national civil authorities, but the Alliance could provide a wide range of military support, such as:

* Robust planning and force generation processes to rapidly identify and deploy the necessary specialist assistance. This could include, for example, the immediate assistance to civil authorities in the areas of: Chemical Biological, Radiological and Nuclear defence; engineering; and management of Displaced Persons.
* The creation of an Alliance Registry of capabilities which are available at short notice to support national efforts.
* The establishment of a training and exercise co-ordination capability for development of multi-national response capabilities.
* The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Co-ordination Cell could provide the necessary nucleus to enhance co-ordination between NATO and affected nations.

CBRN CAPABILITIES

NATO has plan to help with CBRN situations

NATO Topics, NATO Official Web Site, 14 Apr 2005, "NATO's military concept for defence against terrorism," <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm> (brackets added from words earlier in the context)

[NATO's actions should]

* Provide assistance to national authorities in dealing with the consequences of terrorist attacks, particularly where such attacks involve the use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) weapons.
* Work on the assumption that it is preferable to deter terrorist attacks or to prevent their occurrence rather than deal with their consequences and be prepared to deploy as and where required to deal with particular circumstances as they arise.

NATO enhancing CBRN capabilities

Dagmar de Mora-Figueroa (works on terrorism-related issues in NATO's Defence Policy and Planning Division), "NATO's response to terrorism," NATO REVIEW, Autum 2005

Allies have also taken a series of measures to enhance their military capabilities to tackle terrorism. Several key initiatives, including a deployable nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) analytical laboratory, an NBC event response team, a virtual centre of excellence for NBC weapons defence, a NATO biological and chemical defence stockpile and a disease surveillance system, are being developed to improve NATO's defences against NBC weapons. In addition, a NATO CBRN Defence Battalion has been formed to respond to and manage the consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction, especially against deployed forces

CBRN Defence Battalion is fully operational

Boosting NATO's CBRN capabilities," NATO REVIEW, Autum 2005

Specifically, the CBRN Defence Battalion represents an acceleration of the decision taken at Prague to enhance Alliance capabilities to build a prototype NBC response team and a prototype deployable NBC Analytical Laboratory. The decision to form the Battalion was taken at the June 2003 meeting of NATO defence ministers in Brussels. In December 2003, an initial operational capability was achieved as the Battalion was launched in the Czech Republic. After six months of NATO certification and training the Battalion was declared "fully operational" at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004. At the same time, the CBRN Defence Battalion became part of the six-month rotation of the NATO Response Force.

CBRN Battalion provides defence against CBRN attacks

Boosting NATO's CBRN capabilities," NATO REVIEW, Autum 2005

The essential mission of the Multinational CBRN Defence Battalion is to provide NATO joint forces and commands, wherever deployed, with a rapidly deployable and credible defence against nuclear, biological and chemical attacks. In practice, this means providing the NATO Response Force with the full spectrum of NBC defence, including the capability to conduct consequence-management operations in the event of attacks with weapons of mass destruction. As a secondary assignment, the unit may also be committed to assisting civilian authorities of Allied nations as during the 2004 Olympic and Paralympic Games, where elements of the Battalion were deployed to Halkida, Greece, as part of NATO's efforts to provide CBRN assistance to the Greek government

NATO CBRN and disaster response capabilities already working well

C. Richard Nelson , "Expanding NATO's counter-terrorism role," NATO REVIEW, Autum 2004

To help deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack, the Alliance's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre provides unique capabilities. The Centre maintains a NATO-wide registry of capabilities that may be called upon for disaster relief. It has a force-generation process including communications, transport and logistics, as well as monitoring and relief units. These capabilities are exercised regularly, providing substantial experience with disaster relief. The Centre deals directly with a dedicated organisation in each of the 46 participating countries and it does not need to wait for approval by the North Atlantic Council to act. NATO's support to Greece during the Olympic and Paralympic Games is an example of the kind of preventive role for which NATO is well-suited. In this case, NATO provided AWACS aircraft, maritime patrols and augmentation to Greece's chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defence capabilities.

OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR

Operation Active Endeavour already combating terrorism

Dagmar de Mora-Figueroa (works on terrorism-related issues in NATO's Defence Policy and Planning Division), "NATO's response to terrorism," NATO REVIEW, Autum 2005

Operation Active Endeavour, NATO's counter-terrorism operation in the Mediterranean, clearly demonstrates the Alliance's resolve and ability to respond to terrorism. Launched in October 2001 in the context of the invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, it began with the patrolling of the eastern Mediterranean and monitoring of merchant shipping. The operation was subsequently extended to include escorting civilian shipping through the Straits of Gibraltar and compliant boarding of suspicious vessels, and its geographical scope further expanded to the whole Mediterranean Operation Active Endeavour is increasingly attracting the attention of NATO's Partners. Agreements with Russia and Ukraine concerning their support to the operation have been finalised. Negotiations are also under way with several Mediterranean Dialogue countries on how they might support the operation.

**Operation Active Endevour is improving and expanding**

*Vice Admiral Roberto Cesaretti , "Combating terrorism in the Mediterranean,"* *NATO REVIEW, Autum 2005*

In the intervening years, the operation, subsequently named Active Endeavour, has become increasingly sophisticated as the Alliance has refined its counter-terrorism role and integrated lessons learned in the course of the operation. In this way, Active Endeavour's mandate has been regularly reviewed and its mission and force composition adjusted to create an effective counter to terrorism throughout the Mediterranean In February 2003, the operation was expanded to include escorting merchant shipping from Allied states through the Straits of Gibraltar. This was a precautionary measure taken on the basis of intelligence indicating that ships passing through this extremely narrow passage were potential terrorist targets.

Operation Active Endevour is boarding suspicious ships

Vice Admiral Roberto Cesaretti , "Combating terrorism in the Mediterranean," NATO REVIEW, Autum 2005

In April 2003, NATO extended Active Endeavour's scope to include compliant boarding operations, that is boarding with the consent of the ships' masters and flag states in accordance with international law. Then in March 2004, NATO expanded Active Endeavour's area of operations to include the entire Mediterranean. As of 15 September 2005, some 69 000 ships had been "hailed" and 95 boarded. In addition, 488 non-combatant escorts had been conducted through the Straits of Gibraltar.

NATO presence helps maintain Mediterranean security

Vice Admiral Roberto Cesaretti , "Combating terrorism in the Mediterranean," NATO REVIEW, Autum 2005

Sheer physical presence goes a long way to maintaining security at sea. The Mediterranean is patrolled by frigates and corvettes specifically dedicated to Active Endeavour by Allies on a voluntary basis. They are supported by the Alliance's two maritime high-readiness forces, if and when needed. In addition to these surface units, submarines provide complementary surveillance by providing discreet monitoring of specific areas to detect suspicious behaviour. Maritime patrol aircraft also provide wide area coverage across large areas, using a variety of sensors to detect and classify vessels and other objects of interest.

NATO developing merchant shipping database

Vice Admiral Roberto Cesaretti , "Combating terrorism in the Mediterranean," NATO REVIEW, Autum 2005

NATO is also developing an experimental networking system to enable all Mediterranean countries to exchange information about the merchant shipping in the basin more effectively. Once approved and implemented, our understanding of the extent of illegal activities and therefore our ability to control them will be improved. The resulting picture of the merchant shipping traffic in the Mediterranean should assist law-enforcement agencies, as well as NATO forces in international waters, to act decisively against these problems.   
  
**JIAC is the new Active Endeavour system for better anti-terrorism information sharing and cooperation**

Vice Admiral Roberto Cesaretti , "Combating terrorism in the Mediterranean," NATO REVIEW, Autum 2005 (JIAC=Joint Information and Analysis Centre) <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue3/english/art4.html>

Over the years, Active Endeavour has increasingly become an information and intelligence-based operation through the sharing of data gathered at sea by Allies and Mediterranean-rim countries. The level of information-sharing achieved to date provides a sound foundation upon which to build in the future. The aim is to develop a much more effective information collection and analysis system and to change the character of the operation from one that is intelligence-supported to one that is intelligence-driven. The main tool for this concept will be the JIAC, with the aim of promoting a common information collection and reporting strategy, providing analysis and warning, and advising on deployment of assets. Its establishment is meant to encourage the widest sharing of information and ensure that the JIAC output is passed in a timely manner to the countries or agencies most likely to be able to make use of it. The JIAC should help energise efforts of both NATO and individual Allies to provide usable information that contributes to the struggle against the destabilising factors of terrorism, organised crime and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region.

SOLVENCY (see also Blue Book Standard Edition brief on Terrorism for more Neg solvency evidence)

NATO alone can't solve for terrorism: need national policies + UN efforts

C. Richard Nelson , "Expanding NATO's counter-terrorism role," NATO REVIEW, Autum 2004

To better understand NATO's potential and develop realistic expectations for the organisation, we should consider where NATO fits in the broad fight against terrorism from both structural and functional perspectives. Logically, NATO fits between the broadest-scope efforts orchestrated by the United Nations and the more specific national approaches to fighting terrorism. A combination of all three levels of effort – national, regional and global – is needed to treat both the symptoms and the disease. Taken together, they can provide the most effective response possible to the threat of terrorism.

LINK TO UNILATERAL COUNTERPLAN

Primary responsibility for terrorism response is with individual nations

C. Richard Nelson , "Expanding NATO's counter-terrorism role," NATO REVIEW, Autum 2004

Primary responsibility for fighting terrorism lies with the individual nation states because terrorism ultimately is a local phenomenon and for a variety of reasons, much of the cooperation between governments will necessarily be bilateral, primarily between law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Nevertheless, NATO, the G8, that is the group of seven most industrialised countries and Russia, the European Union, the United Nations and other organisations play important coordinating and integrating roles in supporting the primary efforts undertaken by the states. The key is to coordinate these efforts and avoid any unnecessary duplication.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: MEDITERRANEAN DIALOGUE ENHANCEMENT

By Matthew Baker

INHERENCY

NATO has already decided to move towards partnership in the dialogue

NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, "Secretary General's Speech in Jordan at the World Affairs Council," January 13, 2005, <http://ls.kuleuven.be/cgi-bin/wa?A2=ind0501&L=natopres&P=225>

Last June, at NATO's Istanbul Summit, the Allies agreed, in close consultation with Jordan and the other Mediterranean Dialogue countries, to move from dialogue to partnership -- from the still fairly limited contacts we have to more focused cooperation. It was agreed, in particular, to take a close look at NATO's other major cooperation framework the Partnership for Peace and then apply suitable elements of this framework to the Mediterranean Dialogue.

In Istanbul, NATO launched terrorism initiatives with Mediterranean partners

General Hilmi Ozkok (Commander of the Turkish Armed Forces), "The Opening speech by General Hilmi ÖZKÖK at Silk Road-2006 Flag Officers Seminar," July 3, 2006, <http://www.tsk.mil.tr/eng/konusma/ipekyolusemineri_03072006.htm>

Since the Istanbul Summit, Allies, in cooperation with the Mediterranean partners, established necessary tools and mechanisms to enhance interoperability and to promote the efficiency of the common fight against terrorism.

Cooperation opportunities under the MD have more than doubled in recent years

Alessandro Minuto Rizzo (NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador), "NATO's aims and actions for the Mediterranean Dialogue and the broader Middle East Region" June 26, 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2006/s060626a.htm>

NATO wants to complement ongoing cooperation in and with other international fora, rather than to duplicate or complicate this cooperation," he said, adding that over the past years the number of opportunities for concrete, practical cooperation under the Mediterranean Dialogue has more than doubled. This cooperation, he added, ranges from a wide array of military activities in the field of border security to airspace management, civil emergency planning and many other arenas.

Mediterranean Dialogue is among NATO's highest priorities in its transformation process

Ministry of Defence of Finland "New Partnerships," 2006, <http://www.defmin.fi/index.phtml?l=en&s=99>

However, the basic elements for cooperation now exist, and the Mediterranean Dialogue is among NATO's highest priorities in its transformation process.

SOLVENCY

Differences in opinion could harm further cooperation in Dialogue

Dr. Helle Malmvig, "From Diplomatic Talking Shop to Powerful Partnership?: NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the democratization of the Middle East," Danish Institute for International Studies, May 2004

Difference in interest do exist between the seven dialogue countries. Especially Israel and Algeria have been keen on intensifying military cooperation, whereas Egypt and Morocco have been the most skeptical. But as a whole, the Arab member states are suspicious of NATO's aims in the region, and they are reluctant to deepen their cooperation and exchange with a Western defence alliance. Moreover, Israel's membership of the Dialogue and the escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict have equally made multilateral cooperation and meetings difficult.

Not many shared values between Middle East and NATO

International Security Information Service Europe, "NATO's outreach to the Mediterranean: From Dialogue to Partnership," Vol. 6 no. 1, Feb 2004, <http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/download/med%20dialogue.pdf>

Like wise, it can be argued that there is no real community of values between the Allies and the Mediterranean countries.

Arab world mistrusts NATO and sees ‘cooperation' talk as a means of NATO infiltration *(link to Intervention Bad disad brief in Blue Book standard edition)*

Dr. Helle Malmvig, "From Diplomatic Talking Shop to Powerful Partnership?: NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the democratization of the Middle East," Danish Institute for International Studies, May 2004

The general mistrust of NATO in the Arab world is one of the main barriers to intensified cooperation. NATO is widely seen as an instrument of the United States and a symbol of Western military power. When the former Secretary General Willy Claes infamously remarked that Islamic fundamentalism was a major threat to the Alliance and as dangerous as communism had been, this was interpreted as a proof that NATO is looking for a new raison de etre in the Middle East. The current war in Iraq and the escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict have in many ways sustained the Arab suspicions of the intentions and policies of the West, and as a result, talk of partnership and cooperation is easily perceived as hypocrisy and mere rhetoric by the Arab member states.

Conflicting Goals: PfP asks military leaders to give up power and give intelligence

Joseph Braude (degree in Near Eastern Language from Yale and degree in Arabic and Islamic History at Princeton), "Mixed Message: The Problem with NATO's Outreach to the Arab World," The New Republic, March 29, 2005, <http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=w050425&s=braude042905>

But how much will the Mediterranean Dialogue really resemble the PFP? New partners of the PFP are called upon to "facilitate transparency in national defense planning ... [and] ensure democratic control of defense forces." If these words mean anything, they are a call to hold free elections, depoliticize the army, and demilitarize police work. And that poses a problem, because you don't exact intelligence cooperation from Arab rulers by asking them to give up power.

Conditionality Bad: would not work in Muslim World

Chris Donnelly (Senior Fellow at the UK Defence Academy in Shrivenham and former NATO special advisor on Central and Eastern Europe)"Building a NATO partnership for the Great Middle East," NATO Review, Spring 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue1/english/art3.html>

In one area in particular it is important to draw the correct lesson from the development of Partnership for Peace. PfP membership was originally offered to all countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union without conditionality. Subsequently, for those countries such as Serbia and Montenegro that aspire to join the Partnership for Peace as a path to rejoining the Western community, a condition of democratisation and good governance has been imposed. While the value of this can be debated, one thing is certain. It is essential that a new programme for partnership and cooperation with North Africa and the Greater Middle East should include no such condition. The countries of the region will choose different paths towards democracy and modernisation, and will move at different speeds. They will resent anything that appears condescending or culturally imperialistic. The cultural gap between Europe and North America on the one hand and North Africa and the Greater Middle East on the other is greater today than that between East and West at the end of the Cold War.

4 Barriers for moving the MD to a PfP type program

Dr. Helle Malmvig (Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Copenhagen),, "The New For NATO In the Middle East?: Assessing Possibilities and Barriers for an Enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue," DIIS Report, 2005

This report, however, argues that this will be an extremely difficult task since there exists a number of deep-seated obstacles and barriers for creating a genuine partnership along the lines of the PfP Programme. The main impediments are:

1. The Arab states in general view NATO and the Mediterranean Dialogue with scepticism and distrust. NATO is seen rather as a security threat than as a security provider and partner.
2. The Mediterranean states have different security perceptions and concerns compared to those of NATO, and they are situated in a different security climate.
3. In contrast to the case of the former socialist states in Eastern Europe, NATO has very few carrots to offer to the Mediterranean states.
4. The armed forces in the Mediterranean states are primarily interested in upholding the political status quo, and are wary of notions of security governance.

Incentives for PfP to work in Europe do not apply in the Mediterranean

Dr. Helle Malmvig(Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Copenhagen), "From Diplomatic Talking Shop to Powerful Partnership?: NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the democratization of the Middle East," Danish Institute for International Studies, May 2004

Given this negative perception of NATO, deepened cooperation and partnership with the Mediterranean countries are much more difficult to achieve than with the East European and newly independent states. NATO's PfP programme is primarily successfully because it serves as an anteroom to membership of the Alliance. The PfP member states wish to become closer associated with NATO. They identify themselves as part of Europe and view the Alliance as a form of security guarantee against any remaining threat from Russia. These incentives for cooperation and integration with NATO do, however, not apply to the Mediterranean states. They do not foresee a membership of the Alliance nor do they perceive themselves as part of Europe/The West. NATO does not function as a "magnet" in the South, as it does in the East.

Unlikely that NATO will be able to promote democratic control of the military

Dr. Helle Malmvig(Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Copenhagen), "From Diplomatic Talking Shop to Powerful Partnership?: NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the democratization of the Middle East," Danish Institute for International Studies, May 2004

Yet, the role and power of the military is one of the most sensitive issues in the Middle East. The very survival of the regimes in the region is heavily dependent on the support from the military, and the military is much involved in the political and civilian life. In Algeria it was, for instance, the army which in effect annulled the second round of parliamentary elections in 1992, and in Egypt military courts have been widely used to try civilians suspected of plotting against the state, in particular Islamic fundamentalist. The military is also deeply involved in the economy and production – for instance in the food sector - and military officers receive a range of special privileges. Therefore it seems unlikely that NATO will be able to promote civilian and democratic control over the influential and highly politicised military in the Mediterranean.

DISADVANTAGES

Cooperation on anti-terrorism initiatives in the Middle East undermines democracy

Dr. Helle Malmvig (Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Copenhagen), "From Diplomatic Talking Shop to Powerful Partnership?: NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the democratization of the Middle East," Danish Institute for International Studies, May 2004

Yet, if cooperation on terrorism and defence reform is intensified, NATO will risk undermining the goal of democratization and political change. Democratic principles and the rule of law are often set aside in the Middle East, and much of the power of the government in the region depends on their military forces and security apparatuses. Since September 11, government repression has increased and the fight against terrorism has been widely used as a means to crush internal opposition. By increasing cooperation on counter-terrorism and helping to restructure the armed forces, NATO, hence, runs the risk of enhancing the repressive power of the existing regimes.

Democratizing states twice as likely to go to war as authoritarian

Dr. Andrew Kuchins (Ph.D. from the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University), "Democracy and War," February 10, 2004, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/8058-10.cfm>

Important research conducted in the 1990s by American scholars Jack Snyder and Edward Mansfield concluded not only that democratizing countries are more likely to go to war than democratic states, but that they are also less peaceful than stable authoritarian regimes. Further, they found that states making the huge leap from total autocracy to broad-based mass democracy are twice as likely to fight wars as those that remain authoritarian; and that moving backward in the democratization process, as opposed to no regime change, similarly increases the probability of war.

Democratizing states have weak political institutions vulnerable to hawkish nationalism

Dr. Andrew Kuchins (Ph.D. from the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University), "Democracy and War," February 10, 2004, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/8058-10.cfm>

Our explanation, however, is incomplete without remembering that democratizing countries typically suffer from poorly developed political institutions and weak political parties. Opening the political process allows more and diverse interests to have a voice, but the lack of strong institutions and parties makes it harder to mitigate and reconcile fundamental differences. Political coalitions emerge, but they are unstable and often resort to nationalist appeals to hold constituents together. Not surprisingly, military and related security interest groups will seek to strengthen their domestic political strength in a weak institutional environment, and the residual appeal of nationalism can often result in the emergence of more belligerent coalitions that increase the likelihood of war.

Security Cooperation destabilizes Mediterranean governments by casting them as pro-western

Umit Neset Cayan (1st Lieutenant in the Turkish Army with a Master of Arts in National Security Affairs from the US Naval Postgraduate School), "NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue: Challenges and Prospects," Naval Postgraduate School, December 2003, <http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA420952&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>

Security cooperation with NATO might have some unintended implications for the already unstable Arab governments of the southern Mediterranean region. Such cooperation reinforces the governments in many respects. However, if mismanaged and not bolstered by well-planned public information programs, such cooperation could in some circumstances contribute to the destabilization of some governments. Accusing the governments of pursuing pro-Western policies is a well-known tactic of anti-government radicals.

EU COUNTERPLAN LINKS

The EU, not NATO can best address the problems of the Middle East

Dr. Helle Malmvig (Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Copenhagen), "From Diplomatic Talking Shop to Powerful Partnership?: NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the democratization of the Middle East," Danish Institute for International Studies, May 2004

When it comes to tackling the root causes of the security challenges in the Middle East, NATO can only play a limited role. Here the EU must take the lead. The EU can address the deep economic and social problems of the region and is able to push the agenda of human rights and political liberalization."

EU can better meet the security problems of the dialogue

Dr. Helle Malmvig (Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Copenhagen), "From Diplomatic Talking Shop to Powerful Partnership?: NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the democratization of the Middle East," Danish Institute for International Studies, May 2004

The nature of the security problems in the dialogue countries also makes increased cooperation difficult. They security problems of the dialogue countries are mainly internal in the form of political instability, lack of economic growth, and radical Islamism. To tackle the sources of these threats demands long term economic progress and political reforms. Within these areas NATO only possess a limited range of tools, in comparison with the EU. EU's comprehensive partnership programme (EMP) covers economic, political, cultural and social issues, and the Union can for instance support civil society organizations and offer economic aid and trade agreements.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS - NOT A PROBLEM

By Matthew Baker

INHERENCY

1. 1990s Saw US remove significant nuclear munitions

General Sir Hugh Beach (former Commandant of the UK Army Staff College and former Director of the Council for Arms Control with an honorary Doctorate of Civil Laws from the University of Kent in Canterbury), "Tactical nuclear weapons: Europe's redundant weapons of mass destruction," International Security Information Service Europe. April 2004, <http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/Download/WMDBriefing.pdf>

On 2 July 1992 President Bush declared that all ground-launched and naval TNW had been returned to US territory. By 1993 NATO had reduced the number of nuclear weapons available for its sub-strategic forces in Europe by 85 percent. By 1994 the US Army had been completely denuclearised.

2. US plans to significantly reduce European Nukes

Ron Jenson, "Bush nuke plan may not affect Europe Stores," Star and Stripes (Daily newspaper of the US military) August 30, 2004, <http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=23249&archive=true>

Hopes were raised in the European anti-nuclear crowd a few months ago when Gen. James L. Jones, EUCOM commander and supreme allied commander in Europe for NATO, told a Belgian senate committee that U.S. nuclear weapons would be reduced in Europe. "The reduction will be significant. Good news is on the way," Jones told the committee in March, according to La Libre Belgique, a newspaper.

3. NATO has no intention of deploying nukes in the territory of any new member

Stanley R. Sloan (former CIA Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe), "Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities," ed. Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, Institute for National Security Studies, Chapter 3, June 2001, <http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss/books/lk/frontpiece.pdf>

In practice, and as declared in the NATO enlargement study, NATO has no intention of deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of any new member state.

HARMS

1. No NPT violation: Transfer is allowed as long as control is maintained

Henry Sokolski (Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center) "Bush's Global Nonproliferation Policy: Seven More Proposals," March 30, 2004, [www.a.house.gov/international\_relations/108/sok033004.htm](http://www.a.house.gov/international_relations/108/sok033004.htm)

The treaty, in fact, allows nuclear weapons to be transferred to nonweapons state members (e.g., to nations like Saudi Arabia) so long as the weapons remain under the control of the exporting state. This loophole was explicitly inserted into the NPT in the l960s by U.S. officials who were anxious to continue to deploy U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on NATO's and Pacific allies' soil.

2. The 1995 NPT Review committee ruled all states in compliance with Articles I and II

Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, "Report of Main Committee," May 12, 1995, <http://www.un.org/Depts/ddar/nptconf/20fe.htm> ( all brackets in original)

[The Conference agrees that [existing security arrangements are implemented in full compliance with articles I and II of the Treaty] the provisions of articles I and II are fully compatible with the commitment undertaken by States parties in existing security agreements.]

3. PAL system prevents unauthorized use

NATO Website, "NATO's Positions Regarding Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament and Related Issues," updated June 20, 2005, <http://www.nato.int/issues/nuclear/position.htm>

The U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe are in the sole possession and under constant and complete custody and control of the United States. They are fitted with sophisticated Permissive Action Links (PAL) that guarantee absolute positive control by the U.S. and prevent unauthorized use."

4. Conventional Arms and Iraq are more important Russia-US problems than Nukes

Anatoli Diakov (professor of physics at the MIPT), Eugene Miasnikov (PhD in physics from the MIPT) and Timur Kadyshev (Ph.D. in mathematical modeling from MIPT), "Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Problems of Control and Reduction," Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, 2004, <http://www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/en/NSNW_en_v1b.pdf>

It is symptomatic that Russian officials, commenting on disputes with NATO, in the last year were mostly focused on such questions as the coming into force of the adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, adherence of the Baltic countries to the Treaty, approaches to the Iraq problem, etc., but did not mention the necessity of a complete withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from the territory of Europe.

SOLVENCY

1. Nukes not the only barrier to Russia relationship: Conventional Superiority still a problem

Anatoli Diakov (professor of physics at the MIPT), Eugene Miasnikov (PhD in physics from the MIPT) and Timur Kadyshev (Ph.D. in mathematical modeling from MIPT), "Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Problems of Control and Reduction," Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, 2004, <http://www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/en/NSNW_en_v1b.pdf> (brackets added)

Thus, it could be assumed that US NSNW [non-strategic nuclear weapons] withdrawal from Europe is not the only condition for Russia's entry into negotiations. NATO superiority in conventional arms may be another obstacle.

2. Russia doesn't trust US unilateral nuclear reduction declarations

Andrea Gabbitas (former RAND consultant and PhD candidate in Security Studies at MIT), "The Enduring Problem of Tactical Nuclear Weapons," Breakthroughs (Publication of MIT's Security Studies Program), Vol. XI. No. 1, Spring 2002, <http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/breakthroughs/breakthroughs02.pdf>

Already, the United States has backtracked from its promises. In January, the Pentagon announced that some of the weapons Bush promised to destroy will instead be placed in storage. This has caused significant concern about the degree to which the US unilateral declarations can be trusted and makes it less likely that Russia will follow through with its own reductions.

Advantage Turns: RUSSIA IS STILL A THREAT

1. Putin has centralized the political structure and eliminated competition

Dr. Andrew Kuchis (Ph.D., Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University and Director of the Russian & Eurasian Program and a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) "Russian Democracy and Civil Society: Back to the Future," February 8, 2006, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18007>

We now have a lot of data to help us answer the famous question, "Who is Mr. Putin?" While Mr. Putin continuously claims to support civil society and democracy, virtually all the evidence of the past six years speaks to the contrary. It is true that he inherited at best a very weakly institutionalized system of democratic governance. But as weak and deformed as Russian democracy was during the Yeltsin period, there were competitive and pluralistic aspects to it that could have been nurtured and strengthened. Instead, President Putin has consistently and systematically eliminated competition among independent contending political forces and centralized, at least on paper, more and more political authority in the office of the Presidential administration.

2. Moscow establishing ties with Beijing

Dr. Andrew Kuchis (Ph.D., Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University and Director of the Russian & Eurasian Program and a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) "Russian Democracy and Civil Society: Back to the Future," February 8, 2006, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18007>

As Russia's ties with the West have cooled in the last few years, Moscow's relationship with Beijing continues to deepen. The Sino-Russian military exercises of last summer may not have carried much military significance, but they did reflect Russia's frustration with the West.

3. Russia enacting anti-Democracy foreign policy

Dr. Andrew Kuchis (Ph.D., Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University and Director of the Russian & Eurasian Program and a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) "Russian Democracy and Civil Society: Back to the Future," February 8, 2006, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18007>

But the larger point is that Russia has been consistently siding with regional authoritarian leaders like Karimov in Uzbekistan and Lukashenko in Belarus while opposing more democratically oriented leaders like Yushenko in Ukraine and Saakashvili in Georgia."

4. Russia gave Iraq intelligence on the Iraq attack

Dr. Ariel Cohen (Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Heritage Foundation) "Russian Spying for Saddam Demands a Careful U.S. Response," March 31, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/wm1023.cfm>

On March 25, the Pentagon reported that Russia had given Saddam Hussein intelligence about U.S. military plans for the invasion of Iraq back in the spring of 2003. Recently declassified documents suggest that Russia's ambassador to Iraq at that time, Vladimir Titorenko, provided Hussein with information on the timing of the U.S. attack on Baghdad, U.S. troops, and invasion tactics.

5. Russia helped Saddam organize the current post-war resistance in Iraq

Dr. Ariel Cohen (Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Heritage Foundation) "Russian Spying for Saddam Demands a Careful U.S. Response," March 31, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/wm1023.cfm>

Moscow's hostile actions in Iraq were not limited to intelligence-sharing. Retired Russian generals, including a former commander of the Soviet air defenses (Igor Maltsev) and a former commander of Soviet paratroops and special forces (Vladislav Achalov), advised Saddam on preparations for war with America. They focused, among other things, on the USSR's World War II "partisan" movement. The USSR successfully deployed this guerilla movement in territories occupied by the Wehrmacht, and it was highly effective at disrupting supply operations, cutting communication lines, and gathering intelligence. Additionally, Saddam, a life-long admirer of the Vietnamese General Võ Nguyên Giáp, the architect of Vietnam's military strategy, integrated guerilla tactics into post-war resistance planning.

6. Russia may also be responsible for hiding Saddam's WMD

Dr. Ariel Cohen (Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Heritage Foundation) "Russian Spying for Saddam Demands a Careful U.S. Response," March 31, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/wm1023.cfm>

Former Pentagon officials also suggested that the Russians may have supervised a cover-up of the Iraqi WMD development program. According to these allegations, Russian special forces (Spetsnaz) secreted away and hid components of the Iraqi WMD program in Syria, Lebanon, and possibly Iran, with additional materials dumped in the Indian Ocean.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Damage NATO alliance relations: Strong objections to the withdrawal of TNWs

Andrea Gabbitas (former RAND consultant and PhD candidate in Security Studies at MIT), "The Enduring Problem of Tactical Nuclear Weapons," Breakthroughs (Publication of MIT's Security Studies Program), Vol. XI. No. 1, Spring 2002, <http://web.mit.edu/ssp/Publications/breakthroughs/breakthroughs02.pdf>

In the minds of Europeans (and many in the US defense establishment), these weapons still form a critical part of the US commitment to NATO's nuclear deterrent. In fact, the importance of US TNW deployments in Europe was reinforced in NATO's 1999 strategic Concept. Thus, there would probably be strong objections to their withdrawal.

2. Damage NATO alliance relations: Nuke sharing gives Europeans consulting role and makes them risk sharers

Stanley R. Sloan (former CIA Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe), "Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities," ed. Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, Institute for National Security Studies, Chapter 3, June 2001, <http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss/books/lk/Chap3.pdf>

In addition, the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons on European soil both ensures continued nuclear risk sharing and affords European governments a consultative relationship with the United States concerning nuclear weapons strategy and doctrines.

3. Damage NATO alliance relations: US military believes nukes are an essential link

Oliver Meier, "Belgium, Germany Question US Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe," Arms Control Association, June 2005, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_06/Belgium_Germany_Tactical.asp>

Nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are an essential political and military link between the United States and Europe," Lt. Commander Rick Haupt, spokesperson for U.S. European Command, told *Arms Control Today* May 17.

4. DA Placeholders: US loses ability to redeploy nukes

Stanley R. Sloan (former CIA Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe), "Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities," ed. Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, Institute for National Security Studies, Chapter 3, June 2001, <http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss/books/lk/Chap3.pdf>

The apparent conclusion is that, from a military perspective, the bombs are largely intended as place-holders, presuming that withdrawal of the bombs could foreclose, or at least make politically more difficult, future U.S. deployment of any nuclear weapons in Europe.

5. Loss of Deterrence: Maintaining large capabilities makes it futile for other countries to compete

Donald H. Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense), "NATO North Atlantic Council (NAC-D), " June 7, 2001, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2001/s20010607-secdef.html>

We do not intend to abandon nuclear deterrence. Rather, we see it as one layer of a broader deterrence strategy that includes several mutually reinforcing layers of deterrence. Such a strategy would aim to: dissuade countries from pursuing dangerous capabilities in the first place, by developing and deploying capabilities that reduce their incentives to compete; discourage them from investing further in existing dangerous capabilities that have emerged, but are not yet a significant threat; deter them from using dangerous capabilities once they have emerged to threaten us all, with the threat of devastating retaliation. For example, overwhelming Naval power discourages potential adversaries from investing significant resources into a competing Navy to threaten freedom of the seas – because, in the end, they would spend a fortune and not accomplish their strategic objectives.

6. DA Militarization: NATO nukes keep Germany nonnuclear

Stanley R. Sloan (former CIA Deputy National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe), "Controlling Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Obstacles and Opportunities," ed. Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kurt J. Klingenberger, Institute for National Security Studies, Chapter 3, June 2001, <http://www.usafa.af.mil/df/inss/books/lk/Chap3.pdf>

One of the major factors affecting attitudes toward NATO's nuclear strategy is the position of Germany. No government in Europe wants Germany to become a nuclear weapons power. For the last four decades, the U.S. nuclear guarantee for Europe has served in lieu of a national German nuclear role. Germany apparently remains comfortable with the U.S. guarantee and has not sought a "European" replacement for it, in spite of past French suggestions that its nuclear force could serve as a nuclear umbrella for Germany. There is no indication that a united Germany has any desire to become a nuclear power and it has reasserted the pledge made earlier by the Federal Republic of Germany to abstain from production or possession of atomic, biological or chemical weapons. Many European governments support a continuing U.S. military presence and role in Europe in part to ensure that Germany will remain a non-nuclear power. European governments do not articulate this concern openly because they do not want to be seen as distrustful of Germany which has made significant constructive contributions to the Atlantic Alliance, as a leader for the process of European integration, and in relations with the East.

Germany might go nuclear if the US pulled out nukes from Europe

Dr. Jeffrey Record (PhD in International Relations from Johns Hopkins and Professor of Strategy and International Security at the Air War College), "Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Countreproliferation," Policy Analysis, No.519, July 8, 2004, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa519.pdf>

The success of the NPT has been reinforced by U.S. defense commitments that reassure allies that they can foreswear nuclear weapons without endangering their security. To the extent that insecurity is a motive for acquiring nuclear weapons, a U.S. defense guarantee reduces that insecurity to tolerable levels as long as the guarantee remains credible. This reassurance has been especially critical for South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Germany, all of which have had the capacity to "go nuclear" and would have had the incentive to do so absent the extension of credible nuclear deterrence by the United States.

7. Proliferation turn: Without US nukes, nuclear proliferation among allies & enemies would increase

Dr. Jeffrey Record (PhD in International Relations from Johns Hopkins and Professor of Strategy and International Security at the Air War College), "Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Countreproliferation," Policy Analysis, No.519, July 8, 2004, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa519.pdf>

As Michael Tkacik at Stephen F. Austin State University observes: "There are many reasons to believe nuclear proliferation would have been far greater without U.S. possession of large, usable forces. Allies and enemies alike would have been driven to acquire such weapons: enemies, because such weapons would then matter; allies, to protect themselves.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: PEACEKEEPING BY NATO IS GOOD

By Matthew Baker

HARMS

NATO better suited than the UN to mount large peacekeeping missions

James Dobbins (Director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, former assistant Secretary of State and U.S. Special Envoy in Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, and Afghanistan.), "NATO's Role in Nation-Building," New York Jewish Times, August 17, 2005, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/region/2005/0817nato.htm#author>

The austere nature of UN headquarters staffing for peacekeeping operations limits that organisation's capacity to plan and support large or highly complex missions. As a practical matter, the UN capacity to mount and sustain expeditionary forces tops out at about 20,000 men, or a reinforced division. UN forces always require permissive entry, which means they can only go where they are invited. NATO, by contrast, is capable of deploying powerful forces in large numbers, and of using them to force entry where necessary. In consequence, whereas the United Nations is the most suitable organisation for most peacekeeping and even some low-end peace enforcement, NATO is better suited for more demanding missions on the Balkan model.

The UN can never fully meet the peacekeeping need

James Dobbins (Director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, former assistant Secretary of State and U.S. Special Envoy in Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, and Afghanistan.), "NATO's Role in Nation-Building," New York Jewish Times, August 17, 2005, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/region/2005/0817nato.htm#author>

Even if significantly strengthened, UN peacekeeping can never fully meet the need for collective military action. The United Nations has never deployed more than a reinforced division in any single operation. It has never itself conducted a forced entry, although it has authorised many.

NATO better for more demanding peacekeeping missions than the UN

James Dobbins (Director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center, former assistant Secretary of State and U.S. Special Envoy in Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, and Afghanistan.), "NATO's Role in Nation-Building," New York Jewish Times, August 17, 2005, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/region/2005/0817nato.htm#author>

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Peacekeeping works: 40% drop in conflicts during the 1990s

Gareth Evens (former Foreign Minister of Australia, president of the International Crisis Group, Masters from Oxford in Politics, Philosophy and Economics)"The Dogs That Never Barked: International Peacekeeping Efforts Have Gone Largely Unnoticed Despite Success," Los Angeles Times, 22 Nov 2005, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/2005/1122dogs.htm#author>

Contrary to what just about everybody instinctively believes, there has been a dramatic decrease in the number of conflicts, down 40 percent since the early 1990s. There were just 25 armed secessionist conflicts under way in 2004, the lowest number since 1976, according to the meticulously documented Human Security Report 2005, a new multi-government study. The number of mass killings has fallen 80 percent since the late 1980s, according to the report. And around the world, there has been a spectacular increase in the number of civil conflicts resolved — as in Indonesia's separatist Aceh province this year — not by force but by negotiation. There are many reasons for these turnarounds. They include the end of the era of colonialism, the aftermath of which generated two-thirds or more of all wars from the 1950s to the 1980s. The end of the Cold War meant no more proxy wars fueled by Washington or Moscow, and it also hastened the demise of a number of authoritarian governments that each side had been propping up and that had generated significant internal resentment and resistance. But the best explanation is the one that stares us in the face: the huge increase in international efforts to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts."

NATO support for UN peace operations prevents likelihood of last-minute high-risk intervention

Dr.Peter Viggo Jakobsen (PhD in Political Science from the Univ. of Aarhus and Head of the Department of Conflict and Security Studies at the Danish Institute for International Studies) "Should NATO support UN peacekeeping operations?" NATO Review, Summer 2005, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/english/debate.html>

Finally, NATO support for UN peace operations would also reduce unwelcome pressure on the Alliance or individual Allies to launch last-minute, high-risk interventions. These include interventions to evacuate UN peacekeepers (a real possibility in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995); to prevent UN operations from failing (as in Rwanda in 1994 or Sierra Leone in 2000); to enable the start-up of UN operations (as in Somalia in 1992 and in Liberia in 2003); or to prevent large-scale human suffering (as in Darfur today).

Inverse relationship between peacekeeping and war causalities

Chris Donnelly (Head of Advanced Research and Assessment Group at the Defence Academy, UK), "Outcome of the Final Session," Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, March 2005, <http://www.challengesproject.net/roach/images/pdf/Microsoft%20Word%20-%20Shrivenham%20Challenges%20Seminar%20Report%2016%20Jan%2006.pdf>

There is a strong inverse relationship between peacekeeping deployment and war casualties- as peacekeeping goes up, casualties come down. With peacekeeping operations, the rate of success of peace agreements almost doubles. In purely economic cost-benefit terms- not counting the human cost- peacekeeping is on the best possible investments.

Peacekeeping is one of the most effective ways to stabilize failed states

The Economist, "From chaos, order," Vol. 374, Issue 8416, 3/5/2005, (EBSCO Host: <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=16331428>) (brackets added)

By far the most cost-effective way of stabilising a failed state, however, is to send peacekeepers. Mr [Paul] Collier and Ms [Anke] Hoeffler [from Oxford University] calculated that $4.8 billion of peacekeeping yields nearly $400 billion in benefits. This figure should be treated with caution, since it is extrapolated from one successful example. In 2000, a small contingent of British troops smashed a vicious rebel army in Sierra Leone, secured the capital and rescued a UN peacekeeping mission from disaster.

Preventing state failure is in NATO's strategic interest

Dr.Peter Viggo Jakobsen (PhD in Political Science from the University of Aarhus and Head of the Department of Conflict and Security Studies at the Danish Institute for International Studies) "Should NATO support UN peacekeeping operations?" NATO Review, Summer 2005, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue2/english/debate.html>

In a globalised world, the argument that Africa is none of NATO's business is untenable. If a failing state in Afghanistan can serve as a launching pad for a devastating attack on a NATO member an ocean away, so might one in Africa. Preventing state failure and frustrating terrorist networks operating on the African continent is very much in NATO's strategic interest and use of the NRF along the lines I have suggested would further this objective.

Third Party Intervention most likely to resolve civil wars

Jared F. Lawyer, "Military Effectiveness and Economic Efficiency in Peacekeeping: Public Versus Private," Oxford Development Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1, March 2005,

Research in the field of conflict resolution in civil wars has shown the need for third-party intervention. Walter (1997, p. 341) argued that civil wars that have intervening third parties are more likely to be resolved than those that do not. As outside forces have the ability to guarantee the safety of oppositional groups (by military force if necessary), domestic opponents are more likely to reach and execute a final deal.

NATO is the most successful peacekeeping organization

Ward Sanderson, "US Vision Shows NATO in Iraq," Stars and Stripes European Edition, April 5, 2004, <http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,FL_nato_040504,00.html> (Brackets added)

NATO is one of the world's most successful peacekeeping organizations, if not the most successful peacekeeping organization," he [Nicholas Burns, the U.S. NATO ambassador] said. "We're certainly the strongest military alliance in the world. We have enormous power to do positive things, and so there's a feeling at this headquarters that we ought to seriously consider such a role.

NATO's military strength prevented humanitarian tragedy in Kosovo and removed the Tailban

Former NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson, "NATO: The Challenges Ahead," 2003, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2003/s031027d.htm>

But we have seen in Bosnia that the use of economic sanctions or moral condemnation availed us little without the credible backing of military power. In Kosovo, NATO's military strength was essential in preventing a man-made humanitarian tragedy. And without the application of military power in Afghanistan, the Taleban would still be in control and playing host to Al Qaida.

DISADVANTAGES

1. No NATO peacekeeping = More FAILED STATES

Link: NATO forum for addressing failed states

NATO, Official web page,"Briefing: Combating terrorism at sea," 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/terrorism_at_sea/html_en/terrorism_sea02.html>

In the words of NATO Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer: "NATO is the place where common responses are being developed to the challenges posed by the spread of weapons of mass destruction and failed states and the place where common decisions are converted into common action."

Brink: NATO only forum where political decision can be seamlessly translated into military action

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, "Keynote Speech," July 11, 2005, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2005/s050711a.htm>

In managing transatlantic security cooperation, NATO remains key. It is the only permanent structure where Europe and North America can shape a common approach to the new security challenges. And it is the only forum where political decisions can be seamlessly translated into effective transatlantic military action.

Brink: NATO increasingly responsible for providing security zones in the Euro-Atlantic Area

NATO, Official web page,"NATO Transformed: 4. The changing role of NATO's forces," 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/nato-trans/html_en/nato_trans04.html>

The Balkan operations have allowed NATO forces to build up a great deal of experience in peace-support and crisis-management operations, and in leading multinational coalitions also involving non-NATO countries. This makes NATO an invaluable asset in today's security environment. Since the 11 September terrorist attacks, the Alliance is increasingly being called upon to contribute to building security in zones of instability beyond its traditional Euro- Atlantic area.

Impact: Failed States spur regional conflict

Dr. Susan E. Rice (PhD in International Relations from Oxford and former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs), "The New National Security Strategy: Focus on Failed States," Brookings Institution, February 2003, <http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb116.htm>

Among the most important elements of President Bush's first National Security Strategy (NSS) is its focus on failed states. The president is wise to draw attention to the significant threats to our national security posed by failed and failing states. Such states can and often do serve as safe havens and staging grounds for terrorist organizations. Failed states create environments that spur wider regional conflicts with significant economic and security costs to neighboring states.

Impact: State failure = regional wars and billions of dollars in losses

The Economist, "From chaos, order," Vol. 374, Issue 8416, 3/5/2005, (EBSCO Host: <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=16331428>) [brackets added]

The chief reason why the world should worry about state *failure* is that it is contagious. Liberia's civil war, for example, infected all three of its neighbours, thus destabilising a broad slice of West Africa. Congo's did the same for Central Africa. Lisa Chauvet and Paul Collier of Oxford University have tried to measure the cost of a typical poor country becoming a LICUS [a low-income countries under stress], ie, as unstable as Nigeria or Indonesia, but nowhere near as bad as Liberia. They added together an estimate of growth forgone because of instability and an estimate of the spillover effect on neighbouring countries, and arrived at the startling figure of $82 billion.

2. No peacekeeping = NATO CREDIBILITY UNDERMINED

Without ability to deploy military force, NATO's credibility decreases

Lord George Robertson (Former NATO Secretary General), "The Future of NATO: A New Organization for New Threats?" The Harvard International Review, Fall 2004, <http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1263/2/>

Third, NATO's credibility lies in its capability. Military capability is the crucial underpinning of our security. It directly translates into political credibility. As UN Secretary General Kofi Annan once said, you can do a lot with diplomacy, but you can do a lot more with diplomacy backed up by the threat of force. The more military capabilities you have available, the less you may need to use them. If NATO becomes a noise box with no ability to act, it will wither and die.

3. No NATO participation in peacekeeping = U.N. UNDERMINED

NATO enforces some UN economic sanctions, arms embargos, and no flight-zones

NATO, "Briefing: Crisis Management," September 2005, <http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/crisis_management2/crisis-management2-e.pdf>

Over the years, NATO became involved in support of the United Nations through various air- and sea-based support operations – enforcing economic sanctions, an arms embargo and a no-flight zone – and by providing the United Nations with detailed military contingency planning concerning safe areas and the implementation of a peace plan.

**NATO major enabler for the UN and most experienced** **peacekeeper**

Military Technology, "NATO in the 21st Century," Vol. 30 Issue 3, March 2006, p38-42, 5p (EBSCO Host: <http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=20903617>)

Since 1990, NATO has rapidly established itself as the world's most experienced peacemaking and peacekeeping force, and is becoming a major enabler for the United Nations. Regular contacts now take place between the Secretaries-General and the staffs of both organizations.

Impact 1: Strong UN only hope for a peaceful future

US Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Ranking member of the US Senate Armed Services Committee) "Remarks at the World Federation of United Nations Association," December 8, 2004, <http://kennedy.senate.gov/~kennedy/statements/04/12/2004C08C55.html>

In the age of instant global communication and trade zones that span hemispheres, of transnational criminal gangs and international terrorism, and the prospect of massive devastation by the atom - the need to work together is even greater. The challenges we face today are too complex, too immense, and too pervasive for the United States or any nation to face alone. The United Nations is the one and only organization through which the nations of the world can link their unique strengths in a realistic hope of building a peaceful future for all humanity.

Impact 2: Strong UN crucial to addressing cross-border non-military threats like disease and crime

Dr. Bernard Bot (PhD from Leiden University, Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Deputy Permanent representative to NATO) "Public Speech and Debate: UN Reform and International Order," October 28, 2005, <http://www.ishss.uva.nl/Lectures/0510UN.htm>

We face unprecedented cross-border threats that can only be tackled through cross-border cooperation. Climate change, rising sea levels, environmental degradation, poverty and diseases like HIV/Aids and bird flu do not respect international borders. Neither do human traffickers, criminal gangs or terrorists. In particular, terrorism involving nuclear, chemical or biological weapons is such a horrific prospect that we should all work side by side to prevent it. Partly as a result of these cross-border threats, a global common interest is gradually taking shape. We need a strong United Nations to help us defend it. In other words, an effective United Nations is both a means and an end, both an interest and an ideal.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: SLOVAKIA ARMS TRADE

By Matthew Baker

INHERENCY

General: NATO has destroyed 4.5 million SALW (small arms + light weapons) in the last 5 years

Matt Schroeder (manager of the Arms Sales Monitoring Project at the Federation of American Scientists) and Rachel Stohl (Senior analyst at the Center for Defense and Information at the World Securities Institute), "Small Arms, Large Problems: The International Threat of Small Arms Proliferation and Misuse," The Arms Control Association, June 2006, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_06/SmallArmsFeature.asp>

In the past five years alone, NATO countries have funded the destruction of more than 4.5 million small arms and light weapons. Similarly, a modestly funded State Department program has destroyed more than 800,000 surplus weapons, including 18,500 MANPADS, and 80 million rounds of ammunition.

The Slovak Government has passed anti-corruption legislation

Freedom House, "Country Report: Slovakia (2005)," 2005, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=374&year=2005>

Many Slovak citizens believe that corruption and clientelism are among the most pressing social problems in the country. In the course of 2004, Parliament and the cabinet adopted various legislative and executive measures aimed at reducing opportunities for corrupt behavior. The most important legislative accomplishment was passing a constitutional Law on Conflicts of Interest, which introduced stricter performance criteria for a large group of public officials. Another achievement was strengthening control mechanisms within self-governance bodies with the adoption of several amendments to particular laws.

Slovak government's corruption rating has improved

Freedom House, "Country Report: Slovakia (2005)," 2005, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=374&year=2005>

Taking into consideration the substantial changes in anticorruption legislation, Slovakia's corruption rating improves from 3.25 to 3.00.

Slovakia supports UN arms control legislation

UN Information Service, "Security Council Debates Global Progress Against Illicit Small Arms Trade, Strengthened Arms Embargos, Brokering Regulations Among Issues Raised," March 21, 2006, <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2006/sc8667.html>

Slovakia urged all Member States to respect and enforce all Security Council resolutions, including those imposing arms embargoes. Member States had to make violations of United Nations arms embargoes a criminal offence.

Slovakia passed arms export reforms in 2002

Amnesty International, "Europe campaigns to control the arms trade," 2003, <http://web.amnesty.org/pages/ttt4-article_1-eng> (brackets added)

AI [Amnesty International] Slovakia campaigned for the introduction of a better arms export law in the Slovak Republic. In 2002 the Slovak government changed the legislation regarding arms export licences, introducing the right to veto for the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Slovak reforms have dramatically reduced arms trade

Eugene Kogan, "Southeastern European Defence Industry: International Cooperation & Market Opportunities," Conflict Studies Research Center, February 2005, <http://www.da.mod.uk/CSRC/documents/balkans/05(06)-EK.pdf>

In an effort to address some of the Slovak problems, the Export Licensing Commission, the body responsible for granting permission for individual arms deals, was reorganised in February 2002 in order to rationalise its functions. The previous commission comprised three members who held salaried positions in the arms trade. Now, it includes six representatives: one each from the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs (which has a veto), Interior, the Customs Directorate, and two from the Ministry of Economy. These changes were the result of bitter political in-fighting, with some ministries resisting the inclusion of representatives from Customs and Intelligence on the basis that their role is 'enforcement' rather than 'policy making'. It took several months to persuade one of the representatives to give up his seat. Well-placed international sources were quoted as telling *Jane's Intelligence Review* that they were encouraged by the recent performance of the reformed licensing board and the reorganised Customs Directorate in terms of implementing and upholding international standards.9 According to the new regulations all old permits for trading in military equipment expired on 28 February 2003. Arms trading private companies had to apply for new permits under stricter regulations. The number of companies licensed by the Ministry of Economy to trade in arms decreased by as much as two-thirds: according to various estimates to between 150 and about 600. The Ministry of Economy, however, issued a press release in May 2003 confirming that about fifty companies had received general licences for arms trade according to the new criteria.10

SIGNIFICANCE

Slovakia abides by UN and EU arms criteria

Ron Synovitz (Masters from Southern Illinois University-Carbondale)., "East: HRW Urges Clampdown on Weapons Trafficking in Central, Eastern Europe," Radio Free Europe, February 10, 2004, <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/02/8a3a4c7d-5f70-45d2-8b6d-913f2d579761.html>

A spokesman for the Slovak Foreign Ministry, Juraj Tomaga, told RFE/RL today that officials in Bratislava have received the report and are studying its details. But Tomaga denied Slovakia is exporting weapons to violators of human rights. He said Bratislava respects all UN and EU criteria on arms deals and embargoes. 'Just on the first preliminary reading of the report, we can say that the situation that has been described in the report does not correspond with the reality at all.'

Slovakia follows international export rules

The Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance Program (A US State Department Initiative to improve international export controls), "Slovakia Export Control Policy," 2005, <http://www.exportcontrol.org/library/conferences/1379/Slovakia_2.pdf>

Slovakia closely observes its international obligations, primarily the UN and EU sanctions and obligations arising from its membership in international export control regimes (AG, NSG, WA, ZC).

DISADVANTAGE

Alienating Allies

The V7 nations (including Slovakia) politically and logistically supported the war in Iraq

US Senator John McCain (member of the Armed Services Committee), "McCain Hails NATO's Progress But Cautions Senate of Sweeping Reform and Role of France," May, 8, 2003, <http://mccain.senate.gov/index.cfm?fuseaction=Newscenter.ViewPressRelease&Content_id=946>

We received significant political and logistical support from the V-7 nations during the war in Iraq. NATO's new democracies provided their airspace, airfields, ports, and military personnel in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Several of these nations deployed troops to the Iraq theater. Many of NATO's newest members more resolutely, and more concretely, supported the military campaign in Iraq than did some of NATO's founding members. These seven democracies have also served as de facto allies in NATO operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan.

Slovakia deployed a chemical warfare unit during the Iraq war

Marco R dell Cava, "Around world, more criticism than support," USA Today, March 21, 2003, <http://www.usatoday.com/educate/war20-article.htm>

Slovakia sent 69 chemical warfare experts to Kuwait. Slovak President Rudolf Schuster said his country was doing its part to "rid (Iraq's) suffering people of unbearable tyranny.

Slovakia strong US ally with 100 troops in Iraq

The Washington Times, "Bush gives message of freedom in Slovakia," February 24, 2005 <http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20050224-074237-2165r.htm>

Part of what Defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld once called New Europe, former communist Slovakia is a strong ally of the United States and has around 100 troops stationed in Iraq.

Impact: Treating European allies like they don't matter will turn them against the US

Dr. Philip H. Gordon (PhD and Professor at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University), "Bridging the Atlantic Divide," Foreign Affairs, volume 82, number 1, January/February 2003, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/gordon/20030101.p>

Today the United States risks alienating those it is most likely to need as twenty-first-century allies. European sympathy and support for the United States will not disappear from one day to the next, but over time, treating allies as if they do not matter could produce that very outcome; the United States would find itself with an entire European Union that resembles the common US perception of France: resentful of American power, reluctant to lend political support, and out to counter American interests at every turn.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF)

By David Carter

INHERENCY

1. US already heavily engaged with NATO partners using SOF resources

Interview with Major General Thomas R. Csrnko (Commanding General Special Operations Command Europe), Special Operations Technology Online, 2 Oct 2005

The global war on terror exacts a great demand on our in-theater special operations forces. We are committed to denying terrorists and terror organizations sanctuary in Trans-Sahara Africa, a geographic area devoid of improved lines of communications and infrastructure, and larger in expanse than the continental United States. We are heavily engaged with our NATO partner-nations, transitioning the lead from U.S. to NATO in Afghanistan.

2. Already high degree of interoperability of SOF in Europe fighting terrorism

Interview with Major General Thomas R. Csrnko (Commanding General Special Operations Command Europe), Special Operations Technology Online, 2 Oct 2005

Our relationships with our SOF brethren in other nations are essential. We learn from each other, and we share the same burden abroad in the global war on terror. We have long-standing and very positive relationships with many special operations forces across our area of responsibility. We've trained together to develop our skills and operated together to improve the global security environment. These relationships have proven invaluable over the past five years, developing a high degree of interoperability within our global coalition against terrorism. The location of SOCEUR and our subordinate elements in Europe has dramatically enhanced this effect. The efficiency of communication and travel because we are here allows for far more multi-lateral training than would otherwise be possible. Our special operations partners join us as observers and participants at a rate we could not hope to match from North America.

3. NRF (NATO Response Force) already includes SOF

Interview with Major General Thomas R. Csrnko (Commanding General Special Operations Command Europe), Special Operations Technology Online, 2 Oct 2005

The NATO Response Force is an organization created to provide a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force that is expeditionary in nature and capable of high- to low-intensity operations within a Combined Joint Task Force [CJTF]. It includes a DJTF—a headquarters ready to deploy at five days' notice complete with land, sea, air and, if required, a special operations component. There is also the intent for the NRF to act as a catalyst for change to transform NATO's forces to become more capable, agile and responsive to future requirements.

4. Nothing stops Status Quo NATO SOF cooperation: They did it in Afghanistan

US Dept of Defense, Allied Contributions to the Common Defense, 2003, Chapter 1 Responsibility Sharing Report, <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/allied_contrib2003/Allied2003_Chap_1.html>

Six allies actively participated in combat operations inside Afghanistan during 2002. Denmark, France, Germany, and Norway contributed elite special operations forces (SOF) units, while Canada deployed 850, and the United Kingdom about 1,000, conventional ground troops in addition to SOF personnel.

MINOR REPAIR

1. Increased training, capability and interoperability is the answer not dedicated NATO SOF

Testimony by Daniel P. Fata Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO PolicyHouse International Relations Committee Sub-Committee on Europe & Emerging ThreatsWednesday, May 3, 2006 "The Road to NATO's Riga Summit – Consolidating and AdvancingTransformation

We are considering ways that NATO might create not a Special Operations Force, but a NATO arrangement that would bring Allied SOF and elite forces together in training and capability development for NATO missions. We welcome the Alliance's work on developing common Special Operations Forces standards, and look forward to the benefits that will come from enhancing interoperability among SOF forces.

SOLVENCY

1. By law US SOF can not be put under NATO command

U.S. Special Operations Command: Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century, Bryan D. "Doug" Brown, [Joint Force Quarterly](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/) Issue 40, June 3, 2006

Because of this group's leadership, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Nunn-Cohen amendment to the act in 1987 instituted major defense reforms, including formal establishment of the U.S. Special Operations Command.

Brown goes on to say in the same context:

USSOCOM was assigned authority to: exercise combatant command authority over Active and Reserve SOF in the United States

2. Not enough additional SOF troops available

Sean D. Naylor, Mar 2006, "More than door-kickers - Special ops forces are misused as man-hunters, critics say," ARMED FORCES JOURNAL, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/03/1813956> (brackets in original)

But several special operations sources expressed doubt that the Army, which is struggling to fill the A-teams it has now, could man those extra battalions without lowering standards. Only a mind-set that equates SOF with direct action and man-hunting could have convinced the Pentagon that it would be able to create all the extra SF battalions laid out in the QDR, the former JSOC staff officer said. "There aren't enough people in the Army to come up with the raw material for these extra battalions," he said. "So the only way this can be done, in my estimation at this time, is reducing standards and focusing on a very narrow mission set. And UW [unconventional warfare] is the most difficult mission set — you're talking about more mature folks, you're talking about language, you're talking about culture, you're talking about people who have a lot of in-country experience and are really sort of savvy in a street way, which you can't learn in school. This can't be done overnight.

3. SOF anti-terrorism strategies are doomed to failure

Sean D. Naylor, Mar 2006, "More than door-kickers - Special ops forces are misused as man-hunters, critics say," ARMED FORCES JOURNAL, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/03/1813956>

My concern is that all we're focused on is direct action, to the absolute exclusion of all other things," said Mark Haselton, a retired Special Forces lieutenant colonel. "The war we are fighting (and will be fighting for years to come) will require the ability to export training in ways that others can use to organize their own capabilities. If we spend the rest of our lives 'capturing and killing' terrorists at the expense of those SF missions that are more important — gaining access to the local population, training indigenous forces, providing expertise and expanding capacity — we're doomed to failure.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Terrorism turn: SOF strategies applied to terrorists are more likely to increase terrorism

Sean D. Naylor, Mar 2006, "More than door-kickers - Special ops forces are misused as man-hunters, critics say," ARMED FORCES JOURNAL, <http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/03/1813956> (brackets added)

The direct action-type missions are usually fast and violent, and you can show effect immediately," he [active-duty Special Forces lieutenant colonel] said. "In an insurgency, though, they're detrimental to your cause. Civil affairs, MPs, SF doing foreign internal defense, civil-military operations — those kind of things are the ones [that work]. Insurgencies by their nature last a long time, and they take a long time to defeat. So you're going to defeat an insurgency by doing the things that it takes to defeat it, which are civil-military actions, psyops, CA [civil affairs], not necessarily DA [direct action]. With DA you create more insurgents than you eliminate. For every one guy you kill, you've just created five or six more.

EU COUNTERPLAN LINKS

EU should develop SOF capabilities

Special Forces Capabilities of the European Union Military Forces A Monograph by MAJ Ronny Modigs Swedish Armed Forces, SF School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College 26 MAY 2004

European Union military force should develop a capability to conduct special operations in the realm of crises management. These special operations missions should be direct action: manhunt or capturing of, e.g., PIFWC's; hostage rescue or recovery of designated personnel; and counter-terrorism (a mission not seen in this case study but a prerequisite in the future environment). Special reconnaissance is another special operation mission that should be developed by the EU military force, to be conducted as: directed telescope, reconnaissance, and surveillance to obtain or verify information no one else can get access to.

EU should develop SOF command and control structure

Maj. Ronny Modigs (Swedish Armed Forces), May 2004, "Special Forces Capabilities of the European Union Military Forces," SF School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College

That special forces are able to operate in a full spectrum environment is obvious. This means that special forces can be the force or operation of choice for the EU as a single operation of economy of force or as an alternative to other options. To have this strategic utility the EU SF concept must have a command and control structure that allows strategic command and control of special operations as the single instrument of EU policy in a conflict or situation. The EU SF command and control structure must also have an operational level capability to command and control SF conducting initial entry operations, that later evolves into a supporting effort to a conventional force.

EU SOF could prepare the battlefield

Maj. Ronny Modigs (Swedish Armed Forces), May 2004, "Special Forces Capabilities of the European Union Military Forces," SF School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College

It is also recommended that the EU develop its ability to conduct certain other tasks with its special forces, in this case initial entry operations to spearhead coalition conventional forces' efforts in order to conduct preparation of the battlefield.

EU combined joint task force is needed

Maj. Ronny Modigs (Swedish Armed Forces), May 2004, "Special Forces Capabilities of the European Union Military Forces," SF School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College

A serious attempt to create an EU special forces capability must therefore mitigate these problems of joint interoperability and culture. The recommendation is therefore, to avoid failures like Desert One, to create a standing CJSOTF headquarter and a training centre within the EU military structure. A standing CJSOTF headquarter and training centre would give the EU military force a number of advantages. First and foremost the purpose must be to create the technical, doctrinal and cultural interoperability, needed among contributing countries.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: AGAINST TRANSATLANTIC FREE TRADE AREA

By Matthew Baker

INHERENCY

1. Tariffs are largely dismantled and TEP solves

Corporate Europe Observatory (Non profit Amsterdam-based research group on Corporate Interests), "EU-US free trade talks aheard," June 2004, <http://www.corporateeurope.org/tpntabd.html>

Instead, the US and EU governments agreed to launch a Transatlantic Economic Partnership (TEP), a step-by-step and more low-profile process. With tariffs on trade between the EU and the US already largely dismantled, the focus is on so-called non-tariff barriers, such as divergences in standards and regulations. As part of the TEP, elaborate structures have been established in the last five years to streamline EU and US rule-making. Examples are the Early Warning System (EWN) and Guidelines for Regulatory Co-operation between government officials.

HARMS

1. Only 2% of US-EU trade is involved in disputes

European Commission, "Bilateral Trade Relations," updated Feb 2006, <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/usa/index_en.h>

Being the largest players in global trade, the EU and the US are committed to cooperate both politically and economically, be it on bilateral issues or in the multilateral framework of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Several trade-related disputes which regularly hit the headlines in reality only impact of some 2% of EU-US trade.

2. US-EU trade relations doing fine

Fraser Cameron (adviser in the External Relations Directorate-General of the European Commission) "Transatlantic relations: A European Perspective," The European Policy Centre, June 3, 2002, <http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/transatlantic-relations-european-perspective/article-117097>

For decades, people have written about "the crisis" of transatlantic relations. It is important not to forget that the political, economic, financial, trade and cultural links between the EU-US are the densest in the world. Both share the same fundamental commitment to democracy and the rule of law, market economics and free(ish) trade.

SOLVENCY

1. TAFTA would have no significant impact on national incomes

Dr. Rolf J. Janghammer (PhD in economics), Dr. Daniel Piazolo PhD. (researcher at the Kiel Institute of World Economics), and Prof. Horst Siebert PhD (teaches European Integration and Economic Policy) , "Assessing Proposals for a Transatlantic Free Trade Area," Kiel Institute for World Economics, 2002

It is obvious that the dismantling of remaining low average tariffs in bilateral trade parallel to the implementation of the Uruguay Round implies small preference margins compared to MFN treatment. Static trade effects would be small, too. SCHOTT (1995, p. 6) estimates that the total elimination of tariffs on bilateral trade would increase US exports to the EU by about 10.8 per cent and EU exports to the US by 6.3 per cent.This would be equivalent to an increase of total US trade of only 2.3 per cent (1993 figures) or 0.2 per cent of US GDP. For the EU, such static effects would be even lower (1.1 per cent and 0.1 per cent). Even if one takes into consideration that neither non-tariff barriers nor dynamic effects are taken into account, it is suggestive to argue that intra-TAFTA tariff liberalization confined to merchandise trade is unlikely to have a strong effect on changes in national income of the two trading partners.

2. Benefits of Transatlantic trade are small - 1% for US, 2% for EU

Bruce Stokes (Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, "Trans-Atlantic Solutions Are Hard to Find," Council on Foreign Relations, July 27, 2002, <http://www.cfr.org/publication/4694/transatlantic_solutions_are_hard_to_find.html>

One reason for such opposition is that the economic benefits of trans-Atlantic free trade are comparatively small. A free-trade area would add no more than 1 percent to the U.S. economy and 2 percent to the EU economy, according to various preliminary estimates. Economists argue that a successful global trade liberalization under Doha offers a greater payoff from the investment of trade negotiators' time and political capital than a bilateral agreement between Washington and Brussels.

3. No reduced risk of war: Multilateral trade may increase bilateral war

Philippe Martin, Thierry Mayer, and Mathias Thoenig, "Make Trade not War?," Princeton International Economic Section, April 12, 2006, <http://www.princeton.edu/~ies/MartinPaper.pdf>

We have shown that even in a model where trade increases welfare and war is Pareto dominated by peace, higher trade flows may not lead to peace. The intuition that trade promotes peace is only partially right: bilateral trade, because it increases the opportunity cost of bilateral war indeed deters bilateral war. However, multilateral trade openness, because it reduces the opportunity cost of going to war with any given country, increases the probability of war between any given pair of country.

4. Alternate Causality: Non-economic disagreements are the most acute in the transatlantic alliance

Prof. John Peterson (International Politics, Univ. of Edinburgh), "Trade and Transatlantic Relations: New Dogs and Old Tricks," <http://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/Peterson%20Young%20Memo.pdf>

But the central problem is that both sides are subject, in a post-Cold War context, to domestic political pressures that make it more difficult for either side to exhibit true statesmanship in their relations with the other (Kahler 2005; Peterson 2005). These general observations may seem to apply to trade relations less powerfully than to other areas, especially non-economic, of policy. After all, it is above all on matters of high politics – the ‘war on terrorism', global warming, the United Nations, the EU's defence policy ambitions, counter-proliferation, and so on – that transatlantic political tensions seem most acute.

5. Alternate Causality: The first transatlantic relations snag was Kyoto withdrawal

François Bujon de l'Estang (French Ambassador to the United States) "The Transatlantic Relationship after September 11," March 5, 2002, <http://www.ambafrance-us.org/news/statmnts/2002/bujon030502.asp>

The announcement of the American withdrawal from the Kyoto Agreement was the first snag in the transatlantic relationship under the Bush Administration.

5. Can't solve for social values blocking trade

Tim Reason, "Euro Clash: Removing tariffs is easy. Breaking down social barriers to trade is hard," CFO Magazine, May 1, 2004, <http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3013415/c_3046612?f=insidecfo>

This is not a classical 20th century trade dispute," argues Maria Aranzazu Gonzalez Laya, trade spokesperson for the European Commission. "It's a 21st century trade issue. It's about values, it's about what is risky and what is not risky." Indeed, the GMO quarrel may signal a new stage in transatlantic trade relations. As obvious trade barriers such as tariffs, quotas, and subsidies fall, left standing are more complex obstacles — differing regulatory regimes, standards, and values.

6. Historically every FTA (free trade agreement) has failed so far

Thea Lee (former board member of the Interhemispheric Resource Center , Chief International Economist for AFL-CIO), 12 Mar 2004, "Bush Administration's "Free Trade" Policies Lead to Trade Deficit, Job Loss," SOUTHWEST GLOBAL-LOCAL LINKS, <http://southwest.irc-online.org/article.php?id=67>

The net impact has been a negative swing in our trade balance with every single country with which we have negotiated a free trade agreement to date. While we understand that other factors influence bilateral trade balances (notably, growth trends, and exchange rate movements), it is nonetheless striking that none of the FTAs the U.S. has signed to date has yielded an improved bilateral trade balance, including Israel, Canada, Mexico, and Jordan.

7. FTAs don't open up new markets -- don't need any new FTA's

Thea Lee (former board member of the Interhemispheric Resource Center , Chief International Economist for AFL-CIO), 12 Mar 2004, "Bush Administration's "Free Trade" Policies Lead to Trade Deficit, Job Loss," SOUTHWEST GLOBAL-LOCAL LINKS, <http://southwest.irc-online.org/article.php?id=67>

If the goal of free trade agreements is truly to open foreign markets to U.S. exports (and not to reward and encourage companies that shift more jobs overseas), it is clear the strategy is not working. Before Congress approves new bilateral free trade agreements based on an outdated model, it is imperative that we take some time to figure out how and why the current policy has failed.

Subsidies Turn: Subsidies are actually good

1. Subsidies promote agriculture price stability

Jim Langcuster, "Here's six-point defense of farm subsidy program," November 3, 2004, SOUTHEST FARM PRESS, http://southeastfarmpress.com/mag/farming\_heres\_sixpoint\_defense/index.html [Robert Goodman is an Auburn University associate professor of agricultural economics.]  
  
"During famine, food became scarce and prices spiked," Goodman says. "Now, thanks to subsidies, we are — to some degree, at least, — better protected by these higher food reserves." Critics argue that subsidies create an excessive and even burdensome over-supply of inventory. To a great extent, that's true, Goodman says. On the other hand, he argues, the huge year-to-year carryover of large inventories safeguards against huge prices fluctuations that otherwise would follow natural or market-driven setbacks. "Simply put, subsidies promote stability by protecting consumers from high prices and farmers from low prices and, ultimately, bankruptcy," he says.

2. Preserving a domestic food supply is a national security issue

Jim Langcuster, "Here's six-point defense of farm subsidy program," November 3, 2004, SOUTHEST FARM PRESS, http://southeastfarmpress.com/mag/farming\_heres\_sixpoint\_defense/index.html [Robert Goodman is an Auburn University associate professor of agricultural economics.]  
  
"From the beginning of civilization, self-sufficiency always has been associated with security. While Americans increasingly look to other countries to supply many of their basic foods, farm payments nonetheless serve a useful purpose in preserving a farming infrastructure that could quickly adapt to raising other commodities in the event of a national emergency, Goodman says "If only on the basis of national security, farming is a sector of the economy that should be maintained," he stresses.

3. Farm subsidies lower consumer food prices

Jim Langcuster, "Here's six-point defense of farm subsidy program," November 3, 2004, SOUTHEST FARM PRESS, http://southeastfarmpress.com/mag/farming\_heres\_sixpoint\_defense/index.html [Robert Goodman is an Auburn University associate professor of agricultural economics.]

One of the major misconceptions associated with farm subsidies, particularly among consumers, is that producers are the only ones who benefit — not true, says Goodman. Subsidies virtually guarantee that products such as corn, cotton and wheat are produced in large amounts — a factor that not only benefits producers but others along the food-processing and marketing chain. "It's not just the final products we eat that are affected by these payments but the building blocks along the way that comprise the food production and distribution chain," Goodman says. "Farmers receive direct benefits, but others along the way benefit indirectly through cheaper production inputs, which, in turn, contribute to lower production costs.

4. Farm subsidies work historically

Jim Langcuster, "Here's six-point defense of farm subsidy program," November 3, 2004, SOUTHEST FARM PRESS, <http://southeastfarmpress.com/mag/farming_heres_sixpoint_defense/index.html> [Robert Goodman is an Auburn University associate professor of agricultural economics.]

Moreover, in assessing the risks, Goodman says it's important to remember the positive effects associated with subsidies within the past century. "In spite of everything critics say, when we reflect on the almost 100-year history of subsidies and consider the role they've served, we have to say, ‘Gee whiz, they worked; they've been successful.'" Subsidies, Goodman contends, have accomplished what they had intended to do - supporting farm income and securing a safe, reliable food supply.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Free trade kills US jobs

Thea Lee (former board member of the Interhemispheric Resource Center , Chief International Economist for AFL-CIO), 12 Mar 2004, "Bush Administration's "Free Trade" Policies Lead to Trade Deficit, Job Loss," SOUTHWEST GLOBAL-LOCAL LINKS, http://southwest.irc-online.org/article.php?id=67

Since NAFTA and the WTO were put in place (1994 and 1995, respectively), the United States has lost over 3 million jobs, according to estimates by the Economic Policy Institute (EPI) based on calculating the employment impact of changes in the U.S. trade balance. Most new jobs are in the low-paying service sector, particularly temp and retail.

2. Free trade kills global economic growth

Thea Lee (former board member of the Interhemispheric Resource Center , Chief International Economist for AFL-CIO), 12 Mar 2004, "Bush Administration's "Free Trade" Policies Lead to Trade Deficit, Job Loss," SOUTHWEST GLOBAL-LOCAL LINKS, <http://southwest.irc-online.org/article.php?id=67>

Meanwhile, "free trade" has brought mixed results to many developing countries—often spurring growth in investment and trade flows but failing to improve wages and working conditions for the typical worker or small farmer. Global economic growth has slowed, not accelerated, in the past two decades of increased trade and capital liberalization compared to the previous two decades, 1960-1980.

3. Unemployment and poverty: Free trade agreements are a disaster

Thea Lee (former board member of the Interhemispheric Resource Center , Chief International Economist for AFL-CIO), 12 Mar 2004, "Bush Administration's "Free Trade" Policies Lead to Trade Deficit, Job Loss," SOUTHWEST GLOBAL-LOCAL LINKS, <http://southwest.irc-online.org/article.php?id=67>

The Labor Department has certified that more than half a million U.S. workers have lost their jobs due to NAFTA, while the Economic Policy Institute puts the trade-related job losses at almost 900,000. Meanwhile, in Mexico, real wages are actually lower than before NAFTA was put in place, and the number of people in poverty has grown.

4. Social Costs: Anti-People and Anti-Health ‘reforms' in Europe

Corporate Europe Observatory (Non profit Amsterdam-based research group on Corporate Interests), "EU-US free trade talks a heard," June 2004, <http://www.corporateeurope.org/tpntabd.html>

No matter what free trade proponents claim, convergence in EU-US rule-making would mean a further step backwards in the quality of European policies and regulation, already under immense pressure due to the EU's obsession with international competitiveness. Beyond concerns for the diminishing space for sustainable and people-centred policies, the proposed convergence (to be exercised in un-transparent structures between government officials and business) is fundamentally at odds with genuine democratic processes.

5. East Asian hostility: They will view TAFTA as hostile move

Interview with David Gompert (Senior Director for Europe and Eurasia on the National Security Council with a Masters from Princeton), "Burden Sharing' and Other Sticking Points," RAND, 1997, <http://www.rand.org/publications/randreview/issues/RRR.97.europartner/burden.html>

In any case, the security agenda we envision for our new "more global" Atlantic partnership does not extend to East Asia--a bridge too far, for now. That said, there is a possibility that East Asians might see a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement as somehow directed against them.

6. US-EU trade agreement hurts Australia

Alan Oxley (Chairman of the Australian APEC Study Centre at Monash University), "Australian APEC Study Centre Issues Paper 13: Global trade liberalisation: the next phase,"  
23 April 1998, <http://www.apec.org.au/docs/iss13.htm>

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has created some problems in agricultural trade for Australia, creating preference in the US market for some Mexican agricultural exports. Mercosur, the South American common market has had little effect on Australia because Australia's trade with the countries concerned is small. The idea of free trade arrangement between the US and the European Union raises some questions about whether an arrangement for more open services markets between those two economies might disadvantage Australia. Australia has clear access to the US and the EC, although the later has linked access to reciprocal market access.

7. DA Bipolarity: Link: A Regional FTA will create a competing regional FTA

Aaron Cosbey (Masters of Development Economics (cum laude) from Dalhousie University and Senior Trade Advisor at the International Institute for Sustainable Development) Dr. Simon Tay (LLB National University of Singapore and LLM from Harvard, visiting professor of international law and diplomacy at Harvard), Dr. Hank Lim (Ph.D and MA in Economics from the University of Pittsburg), and Matthew Walls (internship with the Singapore Institute of International Affairs), "The Rush to Regionalism: Sustainable Development and Regional/Bilateral Approaches to Trade and Investments," International Development Research Center, November 2004, <http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/trade_rush_region.pdf>

But the intensification of negotiations we now see has much of the flavour of a process that is feeding on itself, tending to exponential growth, and there may be some credibility to the assertions of Bhagwati (2002) that we are witnessing a drive to not be left out of the widening phenomenon of regional and bilateral integration. Baldwin (1995) makes the argument that FTA negotiations react to one another in a widening domino effect. Since FTAs disadvantage non-members, every time one is signed there is pressure from non-member exporters to engage in integration of their own, bringing the economic and political balance back further in their favour.

DA Bipolarity: Impact- Bipolarity more seriously threatens the world with war

Dr. Hans Binnendijk (Ph.D. in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University and Director of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy) and Alan Henrikson (Ph.D. in History from Harvard University), "Back to Bipolarity?," The Washington Quarterly, 22:4 pp. 7-14, 1999, <http://www.twq.com/autumn99/224Binnendijk.pdf>

As the French writer Raymond Aron noted of bipolarity: "Such a system may not, as such, be more unstable or more belligerent than a multipolar system, but it is more seriously threatened by a generalized and inexorable war. Indeed, if all the political units belong to one camp or the other, any kind of local conflict concerns the whole system.

DA Bolarity: Impact- Historically Bipolarity leads to disintegration of international systems in war

Dr. Hans Binnendijk (Ph.D. in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University and Director of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy) and Alan Henrikson (Ph.D. in History from Harvard University), "Back to Bipolarity?," The Washington Quarterly, 22:4 pp. 7-14, 1999, <http://www.twq.com/autumn99/224Binnendijk.pdf>

International systems tend to last two to three generations. They are both created and destroyed by large-scale conflict. Like complex biological systems, international political systems appear to go through life cycles with birth, flexibility in youth, more rigidity as the system matures, and demise. Each of these five systems was initially multipolar rather than bipolar. Multipolarity made them more complex, movement in the system was relatively fluid, and state diplomacy could be flexible. As each of the five previous systems matured, a degree of bipolarity set in. This was most prominent during the twentieth century with the rigid sets of alignments that eventually resulted in World Wars I and II and with the bipolarity of the Cold War. But similar phenomena occurred earlier, when major powers aligned against France early in the nineteenth century and again against Russia at mid-century.

8. Net Benefits: Regional and multilateral trade negotiations are zero-sum

Aaron Cosbey (Masters of Development Economics (cum laude) from Dalhousie University and Senior Trade Advisor at the International Institute for Sustainable Development) Dr. Simon Tay (LLB National University of Singapore and LLM from Harvard, visiting professor of international law and diplomacy at Harvard), Dr. Hank Lim (Ph.D and MA in Economics from the University of Pittsburg), and Matthew Walls (internship with the Singapore Institute of International Affairs), "The Rush to Regionalism: Sustainable Development and Regional/Bilateral Approaches to Trade and Investments," International Development Research Center, November 2004, <http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/trade_rush_region.pdf>

A final consideration is that any given country has only a finite amount of capacity to negotiate. This capacity vests not only in having enough capable negotiators to cover the bilateral meetings, but also in having adequate analytical power, political energy and mechanisms of consultation to determine what negotiating positions might be in the national interest. In those countries with scant capacity of this sort, it tends to be a zero-sum game: negotiations at the regional level mean fewer resources to devote to multilateral negotiations, and vice versa. Widespread regional negotiations of the sort we are now seeing will surely make multilateral negotiations proceed more slowly.

NEGATIVE Topicality: Can't add new countries to NATO

By David Carter

"Fiat" means that we assume the government will pass this plan if you vote Affirmative. The purpose of debate is to examine the merits of a specific policy; not if a policy would actually be implement but should it.

But fiat affects topicality because if the affirmative team uses fiat improperly, they are no longer abiding by the resolution. The line between the abuse of fiat power and staying within the resolution is simple: Has the affirmative team adhered to the spirit and intent of the resolution?

Since there is no specific actor specified in the resolution who is supposed to carry out the reforms, the Affirmative team has taken upon itself to pick any actor it wants to fulfill the resolution.

1. Implied actor.

First, there is without a doubt an implied actor within the resolution. NATO is the only actor mentioned in the resolution and NATO has full authority to reform NATO. When you open it up to any actor at all, you open up the scope of debate abusively wide such that no Negative team could properly prepare for a debate round. Judge, if they can fiat any action by anyone on earth, how can a fair debate take place? Could the Affirmative fiat God to intervene in NATO? if not, then you must agree with us that there are at least some limits implied in the resolution. Don't let the Affirmative come up and argue that absence of a specified actor means "anything goes" unless they can explain their answer to that question.

2. Contextual limitations.

Second, closely tied to the first argument, for the sake of reasonability this change should come from NATO itself. To change NATO, the change must come from within. Who else could possibly change the organization except somebody who is already a member? If the topic was to change the US federal government we would not expect an affirmative team to say that Mexico will become a state and join the government and then start changing things. Everyone would recognize that as extra-topical and abusive. It is no different here.

3. Slippery slope allows the Affirmative to fiat Utopia

The Affirmative sets up a dangerous slippery slope for this year's debate season. If it is within the resolution to simply fiat any country joining NATO then what is really accomplished? As a judge if you allow this violation and your fellow judges also agree this abuse is OK, where will it end? The ultimate end is every affirmative team saying all nations in the world will join NATO and sign an amendment to the NATO charter declaring World Peace. As a judge how could you vote against world peace? The real-world competitive clash of ideas is destroyed by this abusive behavior.

4. Fiat abuse ignores the real-world implications defeats the purpose of scholastic debate

Debate is supposed to be about debating realistic policy options and whether they should be adopted. When the affirmative fiats options that could never happen in the real world, they take debate out of the realm of education and into the realm of fantasy. That's why it's unheard of for Affirmatives to fiat that UFOs land on earth and aliens give everyone a million dollars and create world peace.

The Affirmative's similar violation is this: Only two routes exist for the affirmative team, first simply stating that county X will join NATO and second, having NATO invite country X to join. How would this take place? Several things must happen; country X must ask to join, then NATO would have to invite them to join upon meeting certain criteria, country X would have to meet those criteria, then NATO would hold a final vote and let country X in. A country cannot simply force themselves upon NATO without NATO's OK. Now the affirmative has crossed the line by fiating countries outside NATO becaue they would have to also magically assert that the country meets all the criteria in terms of GDP, military strength and more.

Fiating the GDP and defense spending of a country outside of NATO is obviously beyond the affirmative's power and if they chose to waive these requirements that would not work either because now they have let in a "weak" country that will actually harm NATO and not help it. If they'd like to avoid this topicality argument on the grounds of waiving the entrance requirements, they will have to tell us so that we can run this as a Disad in the 2NC. They will have to choose whether they want topicality or the disad.

If all the affirmative does is invite a country to join, it would be of no effect because the affirmative cannot fiat country X accepting NATO's offer. Without country X actually joining NATO, the affirmative has accomplished nothing but a symbolic gesture and they lose on Solvency.

5. No actual reform

Even if you allow all these violations of topicality and abuses of fiat, ask yourself one last question: has NATO been reformed? The answer is no! By simply adding a country NATO has not been reformed…no policies, practices or procedures have changed, the organization isn't doing anything differently, they aren't moving tactically or strategically in a different direction and they haven't changed structurally? All the definitions of reformed below are taken form Merriam Webster's online dictionary:

* amendment of what is defective, vicious, corrupt, or depraved  
  - a removal or correction of an abuse, a wrong, or errors
* to amend or improve by change of form or removal of faults or abuses  
  - to put an end to (an evil) by enforcing or introducing a better method or course of action  
  **-** to induce or cause to abandon evil ways
* to put or change into an improved form or condition

Ask yourself: has the affirmative actually changed the form of the organization? have abuses or wrongs been corrected? The answer is NO, the organization itself is not reformed it is simply bigger.

VOTING IMPACT

Topicality is the first issue to be considered by every judge in any debate round. Should we even be here talking about this plan proposed by the affirmative? Proposing plans that violate fairness and evade the spirit of the resolution ruin the academic value of debate. Regardless of whether the Negative team has evidence or not, such plans should be given a clear signal that they are not welcome and that Affirmatives should stick to plans that clearly comply with the resolution. A Negative ballot is the only way to send that signal.

NEGATIVE Topicality: Reforming NATO Operations is not topical

By Rachel Marie Blum

1. Framework

This topicality argument will be showing that reforming one [or more] operations of NATO is not an actual reform of the alliance itself. We will be showing this by first giving you a counterdefinition, then giving you standards to prefer our counterdefinition over the affirmative's definition, then showing you how the affirmative's case violates the resolution, and finally, giving you the impact to non-topicality and showing you why it's a voting issue in this round.

2. Counter-definition

a. NATO

Princeton University WordNet 2.0 2003

North Atlantic Treaty Organization: an international organization created in 1949 by the North Atlantic Treaty for purposes of collective security.

**3. Standards**

**a. Context of Resolution**

The resolution calls for a significant reform [or abolishment] of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – that is – the organization controlled by the North Atlantic Treaty. The resolution does not say "the policies" of the Organisation, but the organisation itself. Anything that is not part of the North Atlantic Treaty, such as individual missions NATO might be pursuing at the present time, is not in the context of the resolution. Thus the negative team's definition of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as governed by the North Atlantic Treaty fits better in the context of the resolution.

b. Bright-line

The negative team gives you a defining measurement of what is and is not topical. If something is reforming principles in the treaty governing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it is topical. If something is not reforming principles in the governing treaty, it is not topical. Thus for its clarity, you should prefer the negative definition.

c. Limits

Anyone can make any issue broad enough that we obscure its original intent. In normal conversation, this is annoying. In a debate round, it detracts from the value of the round. The negative team's definition allows for any affirmative case that actually reforms the framework of how NATO works (which, after all, is what we've been asked to do), while making sure that we don't open the field to every possible case that could have some potential affect on some country in NATO. For the sake of clarity and a good debate round, the negative's definition should be preferred because it properly limits the round.

4. Violation: No reform of *NATO*

a. NATO is 26 countries committed to fulfilling goals of the treaty

NATO Homepage, "What is NATO?" July 11, 2006, [http://www.nato.int/#](http://www.nato.int/)

NATO is an alliance of 26 counties from North American and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty signed on 4 April 1949.

Judge, none of NATO's operations are or have ever been part of the treaty. The NATO foundation is not on operations – it is on the treaty itself. Reforming one or multiple operations will have no reformatory effect or any effect at all on how NATO functions, because these operations will never actually change the treaty which is the framework on which NATO functions. A reform of the NATO treaty can affect operations, but reforming operations of NATO will never actually reform the Organization that planned the operations. Thus, the affirmative team is failing to fulfill their fundamental burden by violating the resolution.

b. NATO is in numerous operations right now

NATO Homepage, "NATO Update," July 10, 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/07-july/e0707a.htm>

The discussions focused on the key elements of the Riga agenda, including the transformation of NATO's mission-critical capabilities, strengthening NATO's partnerships, and the way ahead for the Alliance's operations and missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Iraq and Darfur.

NATO is also involved in deployability operations.

NATO Homepage, "Improving NATO's Operational Abilities," August 2, 2005, <http://www.nato.int/issues/capabilities/index.html>

NATO is putting into place a series of measures to increase the deployability and usability of its forces.

NATO is also involved in an operation to destroy surplus arms.

NATO Homepage, "Fighting the Illegal Trade in Small Arms," July 5, 2006, <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2006/06-june/e0629a.htm>

The day prior, an EAPC-sponsored side event highlighted the contribution of NATO's Partnership for Peace to the destruction of surplus munitions and small arms and light weapons.

NATO is monitoring Mediterranean shipping.

NATO Homepage, "Operation Active Endeavor," May 24, 2006, <http://www.nato.int/issues/active_endeavour/index.html>

Under Operation Active Endeavour, NATO ships are patrolling the Mediterranean, monitoring shipping and providing escorts to non-military vessels through the Straits of Gibraltar to help detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity.

Judge, these are just the seven operations that NATO as a whole is involved in right now. Individual NATO countries could be involved in more operations than this.

c. NATO has been involved in even more operations in recent years (Macedonia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Pakistan)

Note: You can read the following cards or you can just reference them as above.

Until 2004, NATO operated in Macedonia.

NATO Homepage, "NATO HQ Skopje," August 6, 2004, <http://www.nato.int/fyrom/home.htm>

NATO remains fully committed to helping the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to become fully integrated in Euro-Atlantic structures. To that end NATO will maintain a Senior Civilian Representative and a Senior Military Representative in NATO HQ Skopje, who will continue to assist the authorities in the development of security sector reform and adaptation to NATO standards.

NATO was involved in Bosnia until two years ago.

NATO Homepage, "The Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina," February 25, 2005, <http://www.nato.int/issues/sfor/index.html>

Between December 1996 and December 2004, NATO led an international Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, helping to maintain a secure environment and facilitating the country's reconstruction in the wake of the 1992-1995 war.

NATO was involved in Kosovo 7 years ago

NATO Homepage, "NATO's Role in Kosovo," October 28, 2003, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/kosovo.htm>

1999 Operation allied force: NATO intervened in Kosovo to halt a humanitarian catastrophe and restore stability in a strategic region lying between Alliance member states. Despite strains, the Alliance held together during 78 days of air strikes in which more than 38,000 sorties - 10,484 of them strike sorties - were flown without a single Allied fatality.

NATO was involved in Pakistan until 2006.

NATO Homepage, "Pakistan Earthquake Relief Operation," March 9, 2006, <http://www.nato.int/issues/pakistan_earthquake/index.html>

NATO airlifted close to 3,500 tons of urgently-needed supplies to Pakistan and deployed engineers, medical units and specialist equipment to assist in relief operations after the devastating 8 October 2005 earthquake. The mission came to an end, on schedule, on 1 February 2006.

As you can see, not only are there 26 members of NATO that can each be involved in operations, but as a whole over the past 7 years, NATO has been involved in a large and diverse number of operations and may enter into more at any time. None of these operations reformed or even changed the NATO alliance. An affirmative reform of a NATO operation will likewise not be a significant reform.

In addition, allowing the Affirmative to change NATO's operations makes the resolution too broad for Negatives to research it adequately or to have any hope of preparation. After all, the Affirmative can just fiat that NATO peforms some operation to change anything in the world, intervene in any country in the world, solve any problem in the world, and there is no way Negatives can prepare fairly for such a debate. But if the debate is limited to the organizational structure of NATO, Negatives know exactly what to prepare for and judges know exactly what to expect to be covered in the round.

5. Impact: Boundaries

If you're playing basketball and you shoot what looks like the perfect 3 point shot and it goes into the basket, but you shot it from outside the boundary line, it doesn't count. In the same way, in debate, no matter how beautiful or persuasive the affirmative case may be, if it is not within the boundaries of the resolution, it does not count towards an affirmative ballot.

6. Voting Issue

Topicality is the first issue to be considered in the round – it comes before everything else. If the affirmative case is topical, there's a reason to debate the rest of the round. If it isn't topical, nothing else matters. If you believe the affirmative case is non-topical, please weigh this as the most important issue in the round.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: Against Removing U.S. Troops From Europe

By Rachel Marie Blum

INHERENCY

1. 70,000 troops are already being redeployed out of Europe

BBC, "US Troops Set for Bulgaria Bases," April 28, 2006

Some 70,000 US troops are being withdrawn from their traditional bases in Western Europe - the bulk of them from Germany - and they are being redeployed mostly at home or in and around trouble spots, such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

SIGNIFICANCE

1. Europe's lower defense spending is justified.

Wayne Merry (former State Dept. & Pentagon official, is a Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), ‘‘Therapy's End: Thinking beyond NATO,'' National Interest, no. 74, Winter 2003–4 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

True, most European countries spend far less of their national income on defense than does the United States, but this is a doubly false comparison. First, the aggregate of European defense spending is vast and dwarfs the resources available to any power center on earth other than the United States. Without spending another euro, Europe has a combined military budget beyond the dreams of Russian, Chinese, Indian or other military planners. Second, America spends defense money in ways Europe need not, as Europe has no pretensions to being a global military power with the attendant-and costly-instruments of global force projection.

2. Europe is not passive or inactive – they are greatly enlarging the EU.

Prof. William Wallace (London School of Economics, specialist in European and International Relations), "Venus Observed: Postmodern Europe in an American-led International Order," published by Council for European Studies at Columbia University, June 2004, <http://www.ces.columbia.edu/pub/Wallace_june04.html> .

The greatest achievement is, of course, the completion of the enlargement process of the European Union: another 100 million people, in 10 different states, extending the EU to the borders of Ukraine and Belarus.

3. Europe has accepted a major responsibility for peacekeeping.

Prof. William Wallace (London School of Economics, specialist in European and International Relations), "Venus Observed: Postmodern Europe in an American-led International Order," published by Council for European Studies at Columbia University, June 2004, <http://www.ces.columbia.edu/pub/Wallace_june04.html>.

The EU has – in effect – accepted a trusteeship role across the Western Balkans, through the South-East Europe Stability Pact. The EU has already taken over responsibility for military and civilian assistance to public order in Macedonia, and for the external police mission in Bosnia – and will shortly take over military responsibilities in Bosnia as well. This is a long-term commitment to state reconstruction and nation-building across the region.

4. Europe has given as much help as the US accepts.

Prof. William Wallace (London School of Economics, specialist in European and International Relations), "Venus Observed: Postmodern Europe in an American-led International Order," published by Council for European Studies at Columbia University, June 2004, <http://www.ces.columbia.edu/pub/Wallace_june04.html>.

European reactions to the attacks on New York and Washington were united and constructive. French, Spanish and German frigates patrolled the Indian Ocean while the United States engaged the Taliban. US planes operating over Afghanistan relied heavily on British planes for air-refuelling. British, French, Danish and German special forces operated inside Afghanistan. More military support, within the NATO framework, was offered, but the US Administration preferred to operate independently of NATO, picking and choosing which assets might be useful for its campaign. Two years after the overthrow of the Taliban regime, troops from every EU member state have served in Afghanistan.

5. Europe is bearing its share: it has sustained 60-70,000 troops outside of Europe.

Prof. William Wallace (London School of Economics, specialist in European and International Relations), "Venus Observed: Postmodern Europe in an American-led International Order," published by Council for European Studies at Columbia University, June 2004, <http://www.ces.columbia.edu/pub/Wallace_june04.html>.

Some 60-70,000 European troops have been sustained on operations outside the EU throughout 2003, in the Western Balkans, in Afghanistan, in Africa, and now also in Iraq. Most current and candidate members of the EU have troops and paramilitary police in Iraq, recognising that whatever their attitude to the case for war they share a strong common interest in successful reconstruction.

6. European economies are growing as well as making the needed reforms.

Prof. William Wallace (London School of Economics, specialist in European and International Relations), "Venus Observed: Postmodern Europe in an American-led International Order," published by Council for European Studies at Columbia University, June 2004, <http://www.ces.columbia.edu/pub/Wallace_june04.html>.

The widespread image of a sclerotic Europe facing a dynamic United States is not as simple as it looks at first impression. If the German economy is taken out of the calculation, the rest of the European economy has grown as fast as the American over the past 10 years; if the French and Italian are taken out as well, the peripheral countries of the EU have grown much faster than the USA. The three large states of ‘core' Western Europe are shuffling unhappily towards necessary economic reforms.

7. Because of American dominance, NATO has not reached a true consensus.

Nicola Butler (research associate), "NATO's Istanbul Challenge: Transformation or Irrelevance?" from the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 77, May/June 2004, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77nb.htm>

In theory, NATO's decisionmaking is by consensus, but in practice the United States is extremely dominant. For many years, Washington has expected to be able to assert that dominance and for the rest of the allies to fall into line.

8. Other allies have no options once the US states an opinion.

Nicola Butler (research associate), "NATO's Istanbul Challenge: Transformation or Irrelevance?" from the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 77, May/June 2004, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77nb.htm>

Since NATO acts by consensus, our declaration essentially settled the matter." In other words, once Washington had asserted its position, other allies had little option but to back down - which on this occasion they did.

9. The US worked around allied decision-making during Kosovo.

Nicola Butler (research associate), "NATO's Istanbul Challenge: Transformation or Irrelevance?" from the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 77, May/June 2004, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77nb.htm>

Another example of the US finding ways of working around allied decisionmaking happened during the Kosovo conflict. Several countries - including France, Germany, Italy and Greece - made clear that they were not prepared to escalate the aerial bombing beyond certain limits laid out in the warplans approved by the Alliance in October 1998 to include Phase Three targets. These included power stations and buildings in central Belgrade that would have a disproportionate impact on civilians. Any such escalatory decision should have required a consensus within NATO. However, once the NATO bombing campaign was underway, the allies were told that the original phased plan was no longer going to be used, though assurances were given that only "strictly military targets" would be hit.

10. The US changes the rules to suit them (so America is the problem, not Europe)

Nicola Butler (research associate), "NATO's Istanbul Challenge: Transformation or Irrelevance?" from the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 77, May/June 2004, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77nb.htm>

At the time, BBC correspondent Mark Urban described the Kosovo war as, "a triumph of ruthless alliance management by Washington. When it suited them - for example in keeping the 'bombing pause' lobby in check they used NATO's constitution with its stress on unanimity skilfully. When Washington needed to escalate the bombing and it didn't suit them, they worked their way around these same rules.

11. Europe isn't fully capable yet, but it is working on getting there (note: this card brings the significance and solvency points together so they are not contradictory)

NATO Transformed," from the NATO Online Library, 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/nato-trans/html_en/nato_trans02.html>.

At present, Europe lacks the necessary capabilities to launch and sustain a military operation of the kind that eventually ended both the Bosnian and the Kosovo conflicts. However, the European Union is taking serious steps to strengthen its capabilities and a framework for EU-NATO cooperation (described below) has been developed. This allowed NATO to hand over to the European Union its mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(1), where NATO forces had been deployed since 2001, at the request of the country's president, to overcome the crisis in the country). In March 2003, the European Union, using NATO facilities, launched Operation Concordia to take over from NATO, which provided important planning and logistical support to the EU-led troops. Moreover, NATO and the European Union agreed on a joint strategic approach for the Western Balkans in July 2003, and options for the European Union assuming responsibility for security in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with NATO support, by the end of 2004 are being discussed.

12. We are asking European allies to risk their lives for an American conflict in Iraq (extension: we expect them to help us, but we won't stay in Europe and help them. What's wrong with this picture?)

Nicola Butler (research associate), "NATO's Istanbul Challenge: Transformation or Irrelevance?" from the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 77, May/June 2004, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77nb.htm>

Now that it needs NATO allies to risk the lives of their own troops to help extricate the US-led coalition from a quagmire of its own making, the Bush administration has recently adopted a more conciliatory tone by emphasising that it supports "effective multilateralism".

13. NATO shouldn't be more involved in US-driven conflicts unless the US gives European countries equality.

Nicola Butler (research associate), "NATO's Istanbul Challenge: Transformation or Irrelevance?" from the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 77, May/June 2004, <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd77/77nb.htm>

If the allies are to be expected to increase their risks and responsibilities on the ground, they need to ensure that the United States pays heed to their views and concerns. NATO cannot continue to operate on the basis that all allies are equal, but one is more equal than others. NATO must also recognise that conflicts such as those in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq cannot be resolved solely by military forces and capabilities.

SOLVENCY

1. The EU is purely economic – is not meant to take over defense.

Economist (British news magazine), "Let's talk—but where?" May 24, 2005, <http://economist.com/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=3690939>

IT USED to be said that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Union were in the same city, but on different planets. As George Bush will have noticed this week, the two Brussels-based organisations are just ten minutes apart by motorcade. But they have always had different missions and cultures. NATO is a military alliance, invented during the cold war to deter the Soviet Union; the United States is by far its biggest and most powerful member. The EU grew out of the European Economic Community, a title that encapsulates everything that sets it apart from NATO: it is purely European and its business has always been primarily economic.

2. Europe is not ready to defend itself.

Economist, "Stay together, fight together," May 2, 2002, <http://economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=1109858>

Even with the formation of a 60,000-strong EU-sponsored rapid-reaction force (promised for next year but unlikely to be ready), Europeans would be woefully ill-equipped to march off on their own.

3. Europe lacks the power to project militarily outside of Europe.

Christopher Layne (visiting fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato), "Casualties of War - Transatlantic Relations and the Future of NATO in the Wake of the Second Gulf War," the Cato Institute Executive Summary No. 483, August 13, 2003, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa483.pdf>

Except for Britain and France, NATO Europe lacks the ability to project military power outside of Europe. And, as became evident during the Kosovo war, all of the European NATO members lag well behind the United States in leading-edge conventional military power such as precision-guided munitions, advanced command and control, and reconnaissance/surveillance capabilities.

4. The British military, one of the strongest in NATO, is already overstretched.

John Hulsman (Senior Research Fellow in European Affairs) and Nile Gardiner (Fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy at the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation in Washington), "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy toward Europe," European Affairs, Winter/Spring 2005 Issue, <http://www.europeanaffairs.org/current_issue/2005_winter_spring/2005_winter_spring_09.php4>

Militarily, along with France and the United States, the UK is one of only three NATO powers capable of sustaining a global military presence in terms of both transport capacity and logistics. It is unfortunate that Britain is embarking on major cuts in its armed forces as part of a modernization program.While supposedly improving Britain's niche military capabilities, the cuts are likely to leave the British military severely overstretched.

5. Europe needs American forces.

Philip Gordan (Director of the Brookings Institution's Center on the United States and Europe, Senior Fellow of Brookings Foreign Policy Studies, Member of Council on Foreign Relations and the Board of the US Committee on NATO), "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2006, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/gordon/emirates20060530.pdf>

Europe wants more defense autonomy but is not willing to pay for it. Whereas the US defense budget continues to rise – so much so, that it will soon be spending more than the rest of the world combined – European defense budgets remain stagnant.Moreover, Europeans realize that the United States will be driving the security agenda in the Greater Middle East – as is the case in Iraq – and would prefer to have some say over US actions within NATO than to drop out of the picture altogether. Finally, as much as they resent unilateral US leadership, a number of the smaller and more Atlanticist European states have no interest in exclusive membership of an EU defense force dominated by their larger European neighbors. The result of all this is continued European support for a significant NATO role.

6. Europe would be hard pressed to deploy its own ground forces.

Philip Gordan (Director of the Brookings Institution's Center on the United States and Europe, Senior Fellow of Brookings Foreign Policy Studies, Member of Council on Foreign Relations and the Board of the US Committee on NATO), "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East," The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2006, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/papers/gordon/emirates20060530.pdf>

Collectively, NATO Europe spends about 45 percent of what the United States does on defense—or some $175 billion. But even that disparity understates the difference, since the process through which Europe produces military power (via numerous separate defense budgets and bureaucracies) means that this money is spent less efficiently than in the United States. As a result, although Europe has more than 1.5 million men and women in its ground forces, it would be hard pressed to deploy.

7. Europe is occupied with integrating the EU.

Peter W. Singer (Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies) and John M. Olin (Post-Doctoral Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies), "New Thinking on Transatlantic Security: Terrorism, NATO, and Beyond," from Weltpolitik, a publication of the Brookings Institute, January 15, 2003, <http://www.brookings.edu/views/speeches/singer/20030115.htm>

It goes without saying that Europe in the midst of a massive and unprecedented social experiment in the form of the European Union. The institutionalization of the EU and the accompanying tearing down of state borders is an all-consuming task. It is a fair assessment that bringing in new members and integrating them into a European structure will occupy European political and societal focus for at least the next generation.

8. Reconfiguration of NATO will not solve its problems.

Wayne Merry (former State Dept. & Pentagon official, is a Senior Associate at American Foreign Policy Council), ‘‘Therapy's End: Thinking beyond NATO,'' National Interest, no. 74, Winter 2003–4 [accessed via Lexis Nexis]

No reconfiguration of NATO will solve this problem. Moving bases from Germany or the Low Countries to Poland or Romania may provide some employment in the recipient states, but bases are not much good if in a crisis you cannot rely on overflight rights from other countries. European governments more than once denied overflight or use of facilities to American forces even in the halcyon days of Cold War solidarity when the issue at hand was out of area.

DISADVANTAGES

DA 1: Europe more susceptible to Russian aggression

Link: Affirmative mandates removing US military presence from Europe.

Internal Link: Russian risk is not over.

Justin Logan (Foreign Policy Analyst at the Cato Institute) and Ted Galen Carpenter (Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute), "NATO Insists on Poking Russian Bear," by the Cato Institute, January 25, 2006, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5421>

True, there is little risk of a clash with Russia in the near term. Russia's military is in no condition to challenge the United States, even in Moscow's backyard. Moreover, Vladimir Putin has adopted a surprisingly accommodating policy in an effort to secure economic and political benefits from the United States and its allies. But who knows what Putin's successor might be like? Who would dare predict the political environment in Russia a decade or a generation from now? All that would be required to trigger a crisis is a Russian president who tires of a neighboring state's treatment of its Russian inhabitants as second-class citizens and decides that Moscow should rectify that situation by force if necessary. Indeed, a crisis could be triggered if a future Russian president concludes that a Western military presence itself is an intolerable intrusion into what should rightfully be Moscow's sphere of influence. And a Russian president might well conclude that the United States would not really risk war over South Ossetia or a similar obscure conflict.

Brink: Russia is already pursuing non Euro-Atlantic values.  
  
Ariel Cohen, PhD, "NATO's Frontiers: Eurasia, the Mediterranean, and the Greater Middle East," Heritage Foundation Lecture #919, January 9, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl919.cfm>

Russia is slowly drifting away from the common Euro-Atlantic sys­tem of values and shared net threat assessments. It is pursuing a policy to exclude NATO and the Unit­ed States from Central Asia and keep the "frozen conflicts" in Moldova, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Karabakh on ice.

Uniqueness: lack of US military presence in Europe will remove deterrent to Russia aggression

Impact: If Russia decides to be aggressive, there will be no one to defend Europe.

As we saw in our solvency points, Europe is not yet able to defend itself and needs US military presence. When there is no longer any barrier to Russian expansion or aggression, it is quite likely that they will be hostile towards the Europeans, who will then be left without defense to any threats.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: U.S. PULLOUT FROM NATO

By David Carter

**HARMS**

**1. Nothing wrong with US/Europe alliance: NATO is the cornerstone of US and European relations**

*Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service, 22 Feb 2005, Bush: NATO Is 'the' Vital U.S. Security Relationship,* [*http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2005/n02222005\_2005022206.html*](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2005/n02222005_2005022206.html)

The president said the meetings were important and he was glad to have attended. "It gave me a chance to say that the relationship between the United States and Europe is a vital relationship, a necessary relationship, an important relationship, and our relationship within NATO is the cornerstone of that relationship.

**2. Good for Europe: American force projection through alliance helps European interests**

*Lawrence H. Summers, Henry A. Kissinger, and* [*Charles A. Kupchan*](http://www.cfr.org/bios/68/charles_a_kupchan.html) *(Senior Fellow and Director for Europe Studies), "Renewing the Atlantic Partnership," Council on Foreign Relations Press, March 2004*

Likewise the Atlantic alliance serves fundamental European interests. The world remains a dangerous place and the American capacity to project force is not likely to be matched in the next several decades.

**3. NATO of great value to the US and Europe**

*Kurt Volker, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Remarks at Howard University's Model NATO Conference, 23 Feb 2006, Transatlantic Security: The Importance of NATO Today*

The second thing I would highlight that is embedded in this is that NATO is still of great political value to the U.S., to Europe, to the world. We wouldn't have eight operations going on simultaneously in 2005 if the leaders of NATO didn't look around the world and say when there's a problem, okay, what do we do about it? Who can we get to do something? Can we get NATO to do this? So NATO is politically important for our leaders because it can deliver solutions. It can deliver assets on the ground. It can bring capabilities to bear to deal with the problem. That's important to people because that's what leaders look for. They're saying, how do we deal with this?

**4. NATO brings US and Europe together every day to work major security issues**

*R. Nicholas Burns, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Forum Bundeswehr and Gessellschaft, Nov 2004, NATO and the Transatlantic Relation,* [*http://nato.usmission.gov/ambassador/2004/2004Nov08\_Burns\_Berlin.htm*](http://nato.usmission.gov/ambassador/2004/2004Nov08_Burns_Berlin.htm)

I believe NATO is, by far, the most effective vehicle for multilateral action available to Europe, the U.S., and Canada. NATO is still the vital core of the Transatlantic relationship. It offers the only forum in which the U.S. and our European allies work together every day to confront the major security issues of our time. It also brings together the NATO Allies and the Partnership nations – Russia, Ukraine, and our friends in Central Asia and the Caucasus -- in a way that reinforces the common values we share.

**5. US, Canada and Europe are promoting stability and peace**

*R. Nicholas Burns, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Forum Bundeswehr and Gessellschaft, Nov 2004, NATO and the Transatlantic Relation,* [*http://nato.usmission.gov/ambassador/2004/2004Nov08\_Burns\_Berlin.htm*](http://nato.usmission.gov/ambassador/2004/2004Nov08_Burns_Berlin.htm)

Third, when all is said and done, the U.S., Canada and Europe are natural allies. We are the most like-minded peoples on the planet, sharing a common history, common democratic values, and an interconnected economy. NATO will stay together because we need each other and because we want the same future of stability and peace.

**SOLVENCY**

**1. Europe can not provide the same security as NATO**

*FAES (Spanish acronym for the* [*Spanish*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spain)[*think tank*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Think_tank) *Foundation for Social Analysis and Studies), NATO: AN ALLIANCE FOR FREEDOM - How to transform the Atlantic Alliance to effectively defend our Freedom and democracies, FAES Study, 2005*

Allowing NATO to die as a joint defense mechanism has implications that are much more harmful to Europeans than they are to the Americans. Europe is not capable of defending itself on its own and it is even less capable of defending its interests beyond its borders

**2. International security structure without US is not possible**

*NATO has nothing to do with Pak status as major non-NATO ally, PAK TRIBUNE, Pakistan News Service, 21 Feb 2005, (brackets added)* [*http://www.paktribune.com/news/print.php?id=94781*](http://www.paktribune.com/news/print.php?id=94781)

Answering a question about NATO without US the spokesman [NATO spokesman, James Appathurai] said that an international security structure without the active participation of the United States is not possible, 'NATO without US is just EU', he said.

**3. Europe not yet ready to take care of itself**

*Ambassador Gebhardt von Moltke (Former Representative of Germany on the North Atlantic Council), 8th annual autumn NATO conference in Budapest, 27 Nov 2003, Parliament's Office for Foreign Relations, "The Transformation of the Atlantic Alliance in the Age of Global Threats*

What does this mean for NATO and its member states? First it is our common European interest to keep NATO active, strong and relevant. Europe can not take care of its security without the US for a long time to come.

**4. America must have partners to succeed**

*Lawrence H. Summers, Henry A. Kissinger, and* [*Charles A. Kupchan*](http://www.cfr.org/bios/68/charles_a_kupchan.html) *(Senior Fellow and Director for Europe Studies), "Renewing the Atlantic Partnership," Council on Foreign Relations Press, March 2004*

If the United States is to succeed in achieving its primary objectives in the world, whether those objectives be the successful confrontation of terror, ensuring the preservation of peace and prosperity, or the spreading of democracy, Americans must recognize that they cannot succeed alone.

**5. Europe weaker and falls short on unity and military capability**

*Lawrence H. Summers, Henry A. Kissinger, and* [*Charles A. Kupchan*](http://www.cfr.org/bios/68/charles_a_kupchan.html) *(Senior Fellow and Director for Europe Studies), "Renewing the Atlantic Partnership," Council on Foreign Relations Press, March 2004*

Despite the EU's aspirations, European weakness is likely to present more of a problem for the transatlantic partnership than European strength. The EU still falls short of unity on matters of foreign policy, and its military capability, despite recent reforms, remains quite limited. The impending entry of ten new members is bound to absorb its attention and resources over the next several years; that task may delay progress toward forging a common Europe

**6. America and European security indivisible**

*R. Nicholas Burns, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Forum Bundeswehr and Gessellschaft, Nov 2004, NATO and the Transatlantic Relation,* [*http://nato.usmission.gov/ambassador/2004/2004Nov08\_Burns\_Berlin.htm*](http://nato.usmission.gov/ambassador/2004/2004Nov08_Burns_Berlin.htm)

Second, I believe the great majority of Europeans and Americans understand a central fact—our security is indivisible. We must stand together because we need to meet the challenges of the modern world as an alliance of shared values and goals. Simply put, NATO will stay strong because our mutual interests demand it. European Allies continue to rely on the U.S. for the nuclear and conventional defense of the continent. Of the many issues being debated for the new European constitution, for example, one that is not is the need for an overarching European security umbrella to maintain peace on the continent. No such initiative is needed, because NATO and the U.S. provide that now, as we will in the future. Europe also needs NATO to project power beyond the continent.

**7. NATO essential alliance for achieving peaceful and prosperous future**

[*R. Nicholas Burns*](http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0604/ijpe/bio.htm) *(U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), Foreign Policy Agenda,* [*June 2004*](http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0604/ijpe/ijpe0604.htm)*, "NATO Remains Our Essential Alliance"*

The United States will remain committed to NATO and to effective multilateralism in our effort to repair transatlantic divisions and rebuild NATO for the future. Allied cooperation on issues of international peace and security helped NATO win the Cold War and will be indispensable to winning the global war on terror. The new NATO remains our essential alliance for achieving the common European and American vision for a secure, peaceful, democratic, and prosperous future.

**DISADVANTAGES**

**1. Hurts Anti-Terrorism Efforts: NATO allies are indispensable part of war on terror**

*Center for the Study of the Presidency, David M. Abshire, (Project Chair), Jonah Czerwinski (Project Director and Writer) Wesley Cross (Project Assistant), Maxmillian Angerholzer III (Project Advisor), 2005, MAXIMIZING NATO FOR THE WAR ON TERROR - PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP CAN STRENGTHEN THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP* [*http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/NatoReportMay05.pdf*](http://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/NatoReportMay05.pdf)

NATO is more than a military alliance; it was a political alliance, at first, and remains so today. America seeks to lead NATO in such a way that this historic alliance does more than add boots to the ground wherever the "front lines" may be. Nowhere else can the President engage 26 Allies, 20 Partners, and unique relationships with more than a dozen countries in the Mediterranean and Middle East in one place. NATO is, therefore, President Bush's best strategic option for establishing dialogue, building a common risk assessment, and marshaling needed partners. The goal is to shift that coalitions mission from fighting the war on terror to winning it.

**2. Security Risk to US: NATO is THE vital relationship for US security**

*Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service, 22 Feb 2005, Bush: NATO Is 'the' Vital U.S. Security Relationship,* [*http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2005/n02222005\_2005022206.html*](http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Feb2005/n02222005_2005022206.html)

President Bush called NATO "*the* vital relationship for the United States when it comes to security." Bush spoke during a press conference today at NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. During a press conference with NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Bush said NATO has worked in the past, and all nations must work together to ensure the alliance works in the future.

**3. Security Risk to Central & Eastern Europe: US involvement vital to security**

*Celeste A. Wallander (Director and Senior Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies), Foreign Affairs,* [*November/December 2002*](http://www.foreignaffairs.org/2002/6.html)*, "NATO's Price: Shape Up or Ship Out*

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains today a unique and invaluable alliance. The single most important international institution serving U.S. national security interests during the Cold War, NATO has since continued to function as a reliable instrument for multilateral military cooperation. The alliance's outreach programs and the lure of membership for former Soviet bloc countries have constituted the core of U.S. security policy in central and eastern Europe for a decade. Just as a healthy and effective NATO is vital to U.S. national security, a strong U.S. commitment to the alliance is vital to NATO's future health.

**4. Wrecks perfect combination of US power + European statecraft**

*Lawrence H. Summers, Henry A. Kissinger, and* [*Charles A. Kupchan*](http://www.cfr.org/bios/68/charles_a_kupchan.html) *(Senior Fellow and Director for Europe Studies), "Renewing the Atlantic Partnership," Council on Foreign Relations Press, March 2004*

At the same time, a common strategy should not be understood as requiring equivalent capabilities. "If the United States is the indispensable nation in terms of its military power, then surely the Europeans are indispensable allies in most of the other categories of power upon which statecraft depends.

**5. Net benefits: Maintaining the Alliance is better than breaking it**

*R. Nicholas Burns, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Forum Bundeswehr and Gessellschaft, Nov 2004, NATO and the Transatlantic Relation,* [*http://nato.usmission.gov/ambassador/2004/2004Nov08\_Burns\_Berlin.htm*](http://nato.usmission.gov/ambassador/2004/2004Nov08_Burns_Berlin.htm)

We have all heard this kind of doomsday negativism before. It is grossly exaggerated and deeply destructive, masking not only all that we have done together to counter terrorism since 9/11, but also our long-term collective self-interest to maintain a Transatlantic Alliance that works. I can assure you of one irrefutable truth -- the NATO Alliance is not heading for a separation or divorce. We will keep this marriage together because it is in our clear mutual interest to do so.

**6. Global problems cannot be solved without US/Europe cooperation**

*R. Nicholas Burns, U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO Forum Bundeswehr and Gessellschaft, Nov 2004, NATO and the Transatlantic Relation,* [*http://nato.usmission.gov/ambassador/2004/2004Nov08\_Burns\_Berlin.htm*](http://nato.usmission.gov/ambassador/2004/2004Nov08_Burns_Berlin.htm)

We Americans cannot confront the global transnational threats that go under, over, and through our borders and that are the greatest challenges of our time, without Europe. Weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, the huge increase in international crime, narcotics flows, trafficking in human beings, global climate change, AIDS—there are no unilateral solutions to these challenges. Instead, we can hope to succeed only through multilateral cooperation, especially with Europe. There is a saying in the U.S. – "We all live downstream." In an era of globalized threats, no matter where we are in the world, we live downstream. What happens in one region of the world affects all others.

**7. Europeans would be harmed without NATO**

*FAES (Spanish acronym for the* [*Spanish*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spain)[*think tank*](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Think_tank) *Foundation for Social Analysis and Studies), NATO: AN ALLIANCE FOR FREEDOM - How to transform the Atlantic Alliance to effectively defend our Freedom and democracies, FAES Study, 2005*

To allow the United States' current lack of interest to become a sense of aversion means leaving NATO to die in its capacity as a collective organization that links the two sides of the Atlantic. And let us be clear about one thing: allowing NATO to die as a joint defense mechanism has implications that are much more harmful to Europeans than they are to the Americans.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: UN PEACEKEEPING/NATO SUPPORT

By Vance Trefethen

INHERENCY/MINOR REPAIR

1. Japan does it instead: Japan has offered a strategic reserve force for UN peacekeeping

United Nations Dept. of Public Information, News & Media Division, 31 Jan 2005, "UN NEEDS TO CONSOLIDATE PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS, REFORMS FOLLOWING 2004 SURGE IN OPERATIONS, UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL TELLS SPECIAL COMMITTEE," p. 11

Turing to some specific issues highlighted in the High-Level Panel's report, he agreed with those experts that the United Nations rapid-deployment capabilities needed to be enhanced. Japan was prepared, in that regard, to seriously consider the creation of a strategic reserve force, including the feasibility of such a force and making sure that its effectiveness and efficiency could be guaranteed.

2. African Union does it instead: AU plans to have a standby peacekeeping force by 2010

United Nations Dept. of Public Information, News & Media Division, 31 Jan 2005, "UN NEEDS TO CONSOLIDATE PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS, REFORMS FOLLOWING 2004 SURGE IN OPERATIONS, UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL TELLS SPECIAL COMMITTEE," p. 11

FRANCIS MUTISI (Zimbabwe) said that, as the Secretary-General observed, the United Nations had already provided some assistance to African Union peacekeeping efforts and it must be ready to "provide a new level of support" as the Union moved forward. The United Nations needed to be guided by the principles of flexibility and openness, and to support any initiative that promised to add real peacekeeping capacity, while eschewing any mechanism that would limit the room for non-African Member States to shoulder some of the continent's peacekeeping burden. The Union was in the process of establishing an African standby force and had until 2010 to realize that plan.

SOLVENCY

1. UN is too fragmented to successfully carry out peace & development missions today

Tarjei Kidd Olsen, 9 July 2005, INTER PRESS SERVICE, "UN to Integrate Blue Helmets and Humanitarians," <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/2005/0709integrated.htm>

Espen Barth Eide from Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), one of the authors of the report, said that the UN today is "too fragmented" to be able to lead effective multifunctional operations that can secure long-term peace and development. "This is not due to a lack of will or a lack of understanding of the issues. We think these elements are basically there. We are pointing out that the existing structures don't fit with the aim," he said in an IPS interview.

2. UN is reluctant to use peacekeepers any more

Michael Taylor, 25 June 2005, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, "UN Peacekeeping Mandate Stretched to the Limit," <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/2005/0625pkpgstretched.htm>

The old ways have changed. Instead of having the traditional old-style blue helmet (soldier) patrolling a border," he said, peacekeepers now have to deal with one faction that invited them in and another one that didn't. The upshot, Davies said, is that not only has "the Security Council been very, very slow to give a mandate to peacekeepers to take action to protect themselves, but also to protect the civilians caught in the middle."

3. UN fails to reorganize nations politically after a conflict

Michael Taylor, 25 June 2005, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, "UN Peacekeeping Mandate Stretched to the Limit," <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/2005/0625pkpgstretched.htm>

Retired U.S. Army Maj. Gen William Nash was sent to the Yugoslav province of Kosovo in 1999 as the U.N. civilian administrator. Nash, who is now a conflict prevention specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said his job was to "try to provide services, managing the infrastructure projects, and promote enterprise development." Nash said it was complicated because "the issues associated with peace- building are so political in nature and the (U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations) are more bureaucrats than politicians. So they can be pretty good at getting the electricity working, but not necessarily at getting the political dynamics right."

4. Poor track record: 1/2 of all UN peacekeeping fails

Michael Taylor, 25 June 2005, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, "UN Peacekeeping Mandate Stretched to the Limit," <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/2005/0625pkpgstretched.htm>

Ultimately, Barton wrote in a recent report, U.N. peacekeepers are a bit like Sisyphus, the character from Greek mythology who spent his days pushing a rock uphill, only to have it roll down again. "Half of all peace agreements fail," Barton said, "with a reversion to conflict within five years.

5. UN Secretary General admits long-term success of peacekeeping is "too low"

Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent and Karen von Hippel, May 2005, "Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations," p. 3

The Secretary-General, however, still refers to a "gaping whole" [sic] in the UN system's institutional machinery when it comes to meeting the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace effectively. While performance is improving, the success rate in long-term stabliszation is still too low, and many countries relaps into conflict after an initial period of stabilisation.

6. Lack of resources is not the problem with UN peacekeeping: It's incompetent use of resources already available

Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent and Karen von Hippel, May 2005, "Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations," p. 5

More and more regional organisations are becoming engaged in peacekeeping and peacebuilding independently of, or in parallel with, UN efforts, and international organisations and member states alike are struggling to improve the tools required for peacebuilding. While there is a tendency to blame the limited success rate on lack of resources, it is equally possible that the main problem is more related to a lack of coherent application of the resources already available.

Incompetent management reduces effectiveness of UN field operations

Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent and Karen von Hippel, May 2005, "Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations," p. 27

In the field, mission assets and resources are not consistently used in ways that support or promote the overall effort of the mission. Opportunities to foster greater UN cohesion and integration are lost, for example, by the way that decisions regarding the use of aircraft are made and implemented. The sharing of mission equipment to support agency projects is limited by mission compartmentalisation as much as it is by restrictive rules and regulations. Decisions about infrastructure, such as improving access roads, are made by one part of the mission (in this instance, the military), with little consideration about the needs of the wider UN community and the local population.

7. Even if UN has enough money, peacekeeping projects are poorly managed

Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent and Karen von Hippel, May 2005, "Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations," p. 27 (brackets added)

Ironically, if one listens to the impressions of those heads of agencies in UNCTs [UN Country Teams], it is donor behaviour that often leads to funding "feasts and famines," duplication, unnecessary overlaps and gaps in the provision of humanitarian assistance. On the other hand, inadequately defined mission mandates, as well as lack of coordination among the various appeal mechanisms may also be to blame.

8. UN administration admits: New UN peacekeeping missions must wait until reforms are accomplished

United Nations Dept. of Public Information, News & Media Division, 31 Jan 2005, "UN NEEDS TO CONSOLIDATE PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS, REFORMS FOLLOWING 2004 SURGE IN OPERATIONS, UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL TELLS SPECIAL COMMITTEE," p. 1

And now, with the imminent deployment of a complex operation in the Sudan, while the United Nations was at the same time managing extremely complex and sensitive political processes in Kosovo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Georgia, [UN Under-Secretary-General] Mr. [Jean-Marie] Guéhenno said that there comes a point when demands exceed your ability to get the job done properly and implement the necessary reforms to ensure better performance down the road. "It is difficult to run and tie your shoe laces. There is a danger that you will trip and fall ... I want to avoid that."

9. No cost savings: UN peacekeeping costs have risen sharply

United Nations Dept. of Public Information, News & Media Division, 31 Jan 2005, "UN NEEDS TO CONSOLIDATE PEACEKEEPING SUCCESS, REFORMS FOLLOWING 2004 SURGE IN OPERATIONS, UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL TELLS SPECIAL COMMITTEE," p. 1a

Speaking on behalf of the European Union, the representative of Luxemburg said that, because of the surge in operations, the costs of peacekeeping had risen substantially. As the largest collective financial contributor to the United Nations peacekeeping budget, the countries of the Union considered an efficient and effective use of funds of the utmost importance, in order to be able to sustain operations in the long term.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Sexual abuse and botched missions

Michael Taylor, 25 June 2005, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, "UN Peacekeeping Mandate Stretched to the Limit," <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/2005/0625pkpgstretched.htm>

The U. N. force itself has come under criticism because several troops have been accused of sexually abusing Congolese girls. Over the past five decades, the report card on these U.N. missions has been mixed, frequently because the peacekeepers find themselves saddled with a task for which they were not prepared.

UN peacekeepers engage in criminal behavior and won't be prosecuted for it

Michael J. Jordan, 21 June 2005, "UN Tackles Sex Abuse by Troops," CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/2005/0621sexabuse.htm>

While an overwhelming majority of peacekeepers conduct their duties without incident, the UN says, wherever the UN has planted its flag in recent years, violations of women seem to follow. One reason, say observers, is that UN troops are typically sent to conflict zones thousands of miles from home. They're generally well-paid, but surrounded by poverty. In a stressful environment, the outlet for some is alcohol, drugs, and sex. Lawlessness in the countries where peacekeepers are operating may convince them "they, too, can get away with things they can't get away with back in their country," says former UN official Edward Luck, of Columbia University. Another factor may be the fact their home countries neither prosecute gender-based violence nor respect the rights of women.

2. UN neutrality promotes genocide

Michael Taylor, 25 June 2005, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, "UN Peacekeeping Mandate Stretched to the Limit," <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/2005/0625pkpgstretched.htm>

The study also said peacekeepers should be allowed to discard their neutrality when faced with rebel groups that are slaughtering civilians. "Where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worst may amount to complicity with evil," said the report led by Lakhdar Brahimi, a U.N. undersecretary-general.

3. Casualties and backlash against the UN

Michael J. Jordan, 21 June 2005, "UN Tackles Sex Abuse by Troops," CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/general/2005/0621sexabuse.htm>

This new robust model may bring repercussions, including the prospect of open battles with armed groups, greater threat to nonmilitary UN personnel, and the possibility of reprisals against the very civilians peacekeepers aim to protect. "It requires a willingness to put peacekeepers' lives on the line," says Victoria Holt, codirector of the Henry L. Stimson Center's Future of Peace Operations project, a think tank in Washington. "And to risk backlash that the UN may be identified with one side or another, even if the UN itself has tried to remain impartial but is taking a side to uphold a peace agreement.

4. Integrating UN intervention with military force endangers the lives and rescue efforts of humanitarian workers

Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent and Karen von Hippel, May 2005, "Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations," p. 14

Beyond the immediate needs of beneficiaries, there is another very practical element to their argument. They hold that the mere fact of operating side-by-side with the military and political components of a [UN] mission puts humanitarian actors at risk of being identified with the mission. Accordingly, they become soft targets for enemies of the mission, and their operations are undermined by the resulting security constraints.

5. Legitimacy turn: UN peacekeeping lacks legitimacy in the world because of Security Council procedures (also use this as link to Blue Book standard edition Intervention Is Bad disads)

Saira Mohamed, 2005, COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW, Vol 105 p. 823, "From keeping peace to building peace: A proposal for a revitalized Unitd Nations trusteeship council"

The legitimacy of Security Council peacekeeping missions is threatened in large part by the structure of the Security Council. Authorization of peacekeeping operations by the Security Council means only a maximum of fifteen UN members approve actions against a member state -- actions that often occur without the consent of the target state and entail massive expenditures and profound commitments of personnel. The composition and procedures of the Security Council make these far-reaching decisions vulnerable to heavy criticism. Because of its extremely limited membership, many states, especially smaller ones, consider the Council the agent of its most powerful members -- France, the United States, and the United Kingdom.

NEGATIVE BRIEF: US/UK ALLIANCE

By Rachel Marie Blum

INHERENCY

1. Status Quo bilateral cooperation between the UK and US is doing fine.

Pierre Chao (Director of CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives) and Robin Niblett (Executive Viec Preident and Director of CSIS Europe Program), "Sharing Technology Within the U.S.-UK Security Relationship," Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership Working Paper, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 26, 2006, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/USUKSecurity.pdf>

Bilateral U.S.-UK cooperation in the fields of intelligence, nuclear defense, and military deployments is unprecedented in U.S. alliances. And the U.S. and UK defense industrial bases have become increasingly intertwined through investment and trade.

2. The US-UK relationship is solid and already accomplishing a lot in the Status Quo.

Pierre Chao (Director of CSIS Defense Industrial Initiatives) and Robin Niblett (Executive Viec Preident and Director of CSIS Europe Program), "Sharing Technology Within the U.S.-UK Security Relationship," Initiative for a Renewed Transatlantic Partnership Working Paper, published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 26, 2006, <http://www.diig-csis.org/pdf/USUKSecurity.pdf>

The United Kingdom and the United States possess one of the closest bilateral security relationships in the world today. It is a relationship that has endured and thrived despite the coming and going of administrations in Washington and governments in London for over a half century. More than just flowery rhetoric underpins this alliance; it is built on tangible structures such as the highly strategic and sensitive U.S.-UK cooperation in intelligence and in nuclear weapons and policy.

SIGNIFICANCE

1. NATO decision-making process not a problem: Unless multiple countries disagree, there's no problem reaching consensus.

Paul Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs; Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), "NATO's Decision Making Process," Congressional Research Service report for Congress, RS21510, 5 May 2003, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21510.pdf>

By not sending a letter to the Secretary General within a specified time period, a government can avoid the step of stating its explicit objection to a policy if it believes other allies are set on a course of action. This procedure failed in the effort to begin defense planning for Turkey when three governments were in opposition. The procedure can be more successful if only one government is put in the position of having to take the formal step of sending a letter of opposition to the Secretary General, and may refrain from doing so to avoid being isolated.

2. The 2% GDP defense spending requirement is only a recommendation.

Thomas Ries, "Finland and NATO," The Finnish Defense Forces, 20 Sept 2004, <http://www.mil.fi/perustietoa/julkaisut/finland_and_nato/chapter_6.dsp>

This is a recommendation only, and not an obligation. In fact in 1998 only eight of NATO's sixteen members actually met the 2% standard, and one NATO member - Iceland - has neither defence forces nor defence budget. Thus NATO's enforcement of this requirement is not strict.

3. Everyone's military spending – the US including – has dropped since the Cold War.

Marian L. Tupy (assistant director of Project on Global Economic Liberty at Cato), "Worse Than Useless?," the Cato Institute, 1 May 2003, <http://www.cato.org/research/articles/tupy-030501.html>

The collapse of the Soviet Union saw western military budgets shrink. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, between 1990 and 1999 the defense expenditure of all European NATO members decreased from 3 percent to 2.3 percent of GNP. American military spending fell from 5.3 percent to 3.1 percent of GNP over the same period.

4. US/UK "Special Relationship" isn't really very important or necessary.

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

The fact that other avenues, particularly other European avenues, have proved disappointing for American foreign policymakers is, however, in itself no proof of the worth of the Special Relationship. A global superpower, the only pole in a unipolar world, the United States is not compelled to enter into enduring relationships with any state. It has to perceive interests that are satisfied by doing so. Nor should those in Britain who urge the Special Relationship's importance engage in special pleading based upon nostalgia for past comradeship, not least because the original case for the Relationship was based upon harsh reality, not comforting illusion.

5. NATO has become a non-issue to Russia.

Dr. Steven E. Meyer PhD (Professor of Political Science, National Defense University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: the Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, pp. 83-97, Winter 2003-04, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/03winter/meyer.htm>

For President Putin and his primary leadership circle, the salience of NATO for Russia's security interests has declined dramatically since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. For example, the opposition of Putin and other Russian officials to the inclusion of the Baltic states in NATO—a crisis in Russian-Western relations just a few years ago—has become virtually a non-issue. The Putin government supported the establishment of US military bases in Central Asia after 9/11, an area still considered part of the Russian "near abroad," which was unthinkable before the terrorist attacks.

6. None of Russia's security interests relate to NATO but rather have to do with establishing ties with the West.

Dr. Steven E. Meyer PhD (Professor of Political Science, National Defense University), "Carcass of Dead Policies: the Irrelevance of NATO," from Parameters, pp. 83-97, Winter 2003-04, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/PARAMETERS/03winter/meyer.htm>

Today, Russia has four major security interests under Putin: (1) reversing the centrifugal pressures on the Russian state; (2) economic development, established especially through ties to the West and a secure position in the oil market; (3) combating terrorism; and (4) China. Although rebuilding the Russian state and economic development are the most important long-term goals, the battle against terrorism is the most important contemporary security issue driving Moscow's overtures to the West. Especially since 9/11, Moscow sees a convergence of interests between the US struggle against al Qaeda and the Russian struggle against Muslim separatists in the Caucus region, accusing "Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda of being behind the problems in Chechnya.

7. NATO's enlargement is a significant European success.

Kurt Volker (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs), "Transatlantic Security: The Importance of NATO Today," U.S. Department of State, Remarks at Howard University's Model NATO Conference, February 23, 2006, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2006/62073.htm>

The second major success that I would talk about with NATO is enlargement. NATO started as an alliance of 12 countries, or 15 countries, gradually grew, gradually grew. Spain was added in the ‘80s. Three countries were added at the Madrid Summit in 1997. Seven more were added at the Prague Summit in 2002. And so now you have an alliance of 26 countries. That has a practical implication not just for the enlargement of the organization itself. It has an implication for the lives of people, because going from that time when NATO was just an alliance of 15 countries to NATO being an alliance of 26 countries, it means that tens of millions of people, more than 100 million people are now living in a society that they feel is secure, that has individual rights and freedoms, a democratic system, a market economy, opportunities for hope and development for their lives and their children's lives that didn't exist before. So that is a tremendous success on the European continent.

8. NATO's operations are directly related to the challenges we face.

Kurt Volker (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs), "Transatlantic Security: The Importance of NATO Today," U.S. Department of State, Remarks at Howard University's Model NATO Conference, February 23, 2006, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2006/62073.htm>

In today's world we're not looking at such a passive response and focused only on the territory of NATO allies. We're looking at the complex challenges that we face in security in the world writ large, and NATO's operations are directly related to the types of challenges that we face. So we see, for example, in 2005, peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, leading a more complex and challenging peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan, conducting counter-terrorism measures, naval counter-terrorism measures in the Mediterranean through Operation Active Endeavor. Helping to provide logistical support to the African Union so it can run an operation in Darfur. Training Iraqi military forces inside Iraq. Delivering humanitarian relief supplies through an airlift to Pakistan and also to Louisiana.

9. NATO is of great political value to the US and Europe.

Kurt Volker (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs), "Transatlantic Security: The Importance of NATO Today," U.S. Department of State, Remarks at Howard University's Model NATO Conference, February 23, 2006, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2006/62073.htm>

NATO is still of great political value to the U.S., to Europe, to the world. We wouldn't have eight operations going on simultaneously in 2005 if the leaders of NATO didn't look around the world and say when there's a problem, okay, what do we do about it? Who can we get to do something? Can we get NATO to do this? So NATO is politically important for our leaders because it can deliver solutions. It can deliver assets on the ground. It can bring capabilities to bear to deal with the problem. That's important to people because that's what leaders look for.

10. NATO has enlarged multiple times successfully and contributes to security.

Kurt Volker (Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs), "Transatlantic Security: The Importance of NATO Today," U.S. Department of State, Remarks at Howard University's Model NATO Conference, February 23, 2006, <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2006/62073.htm>

NATO has enlarged successfully a number of times, most recently at the Madrid Summit in '97; in Prague in 2002; with ten new Central and Eastern European democracies joining NATO. We don't believe that that process has run its course or that it is complete. There are countries in Europe, in Eurasia, that seek to join NATO, that are strengthening democratic societies, market economies, that are working together with NATO already in terms of contributing to security both within Europe and Eurasia and to operations beyond.

11. NATO consensus stipulates equality.

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, "George Robertson: No Longing for the Cold War," Exclusive interview with NATO Security General, Center for Defense Information, #18, February 18, 2003, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/245-18.cfm>

Like the European Union, the United Nations doesn't require a consensus. It has its own reasons. In NATO, however, the process of decision-making stipulates equality.

12. NATO-Russia cooperation is extensive.

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, "George Robertson: No Longing for the Cold War," Exclusive interview with NATO Security General, Center for Defense Information, #18, February 18, 2003, <http://www.cdi.org/russia/245-18.cfm>

Overall, NATO-Russia cooperation is very extensive. We discuss nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rescue of submarines, peacekeeping operations, and so on. This is indeed cooperation on an unprecedented scale, and Russia is viewed as a partner.

13. Russia is no longer a military threat.

Paul E. Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), "NATO Enlargement," Congressional Research Report, RS21055, May 5, 2003, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21055.pdf>

Many participants in the debate favor different standards that, in their view, reflect the current political situation in Europe, where Russia is no longer a military threat but ethnic conflict, nationalism, and terrorism are a danger.

14. Putin views unity on terrorism as more important than opposing NATO.

Paul E. Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), "NATO Enlargement," Congressional Research Report, RS21055, May 5, 2003, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21055.pdf>

The views of the Russian government play a role in the debate. Putin's softer rhetoric against NATO enlargement since the September 11 terrorist attacks has allayed concerns that his government would strongly oppose enlargement. It is possible that Putin now views a unified front against terrorism, in part due to Moscow's ongoing conflict in Chechnya, as more important than potential divisions with the allies over enlargement.

15. Enlargement of NATO contributes to Russia's security.

Paul E. Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), "NATO Enlargement," Congressional Research Report, RS21055, May 5, 2003, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21055.pdf>

Officials from allied states often counter such an argument by underscoring that enlargement's purpose in large part is to ensure stability in Europe, and that the addition of new member states provides stability, and therefore security, to Russia's west. Putin may also view the entry of Estonia and Latvia into NATO (and the EU, in 2004) as a means to protect Russian minorities in those countries, given NATO and EU strictures over the treatment of ethnic minorities.

16. Consensus rests on the strength of solidarity.

Paul E. Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), "NATO Enlargement," Congressional Rsearch Report, RS21510, May 5, 2003, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21510.pdf>

Support for preserving the principle of consensus centers upon a desire to maintain political solidarity for controversial measures. In this view, the consent of 19 sovereign governments, each taking an independent decision to work with other governments, is a formidable expression of solidarity.

17. Consensus outweighs speed.

Paul E. Gallis (Specialist in European Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division), "NATO Enlargement," Congressional Rsearch Report, RS21510, May 5, 2003, <http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RS21510.pdf>

Officials involved in that NAC debate say that the need for obtaining consensus outweighed the need for acting quickly.

SOLVENCY

1. Britain and the US are moving in different economic directions and view the world differently.

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm

The fact remains, however, that Britain has become more socially liberal and less (in the classical sense) economically so, while America has been moving in completely the other direction. At one level, this does not matter much. People who share other things in common—language, history, legal traditions, practical interests—can get along well enough even if they live their lives according to very different standards. But at another level, it does matter because, in the end, there can arise such a level of incomprehension about how the other nation views the world that it erodes basic trust in every sphere.

2. Britain's military weight is inadequate for the tasks the US needs it to perform.

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

The trouble is that Britain's weight, in the sense of its overall military capability, is inadequate for the tasks which it faces and which, as America's leading ally, it must expect to continue to face. Like other NATO countries, including the United States, Britain sharply reduced its defense expenditure at the end of the Cold War. Both countries, as almost everyone can now see and some saw at the time as well, cut too far. The U.S. Army was downsized by 30 per cent in the 1990s, which is one reason why the strain of Iraq is so intense; but unlike America, which at least pushed up its spending after the attacks of 2001, Britain has not increased spending at all to cope with the new threats. Indeed, since Tony Blair became Prime Minister in 1997, budgeted defense spending as a share of GDP has fallen from 2.7 percent to about 2.3 percent.

3. Britain commits less to weapons research.

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

Britain gets less for every dollar spent on defense than does the United States; and this is connected with (though not wholly dependent on) the second problem: that Britain commits less to weapons research.

4. The US spends 10 times more than Britain on defense, meaning that Britain can't sufficiently help the US.

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

Defense budget percentages on R&D are somewhat misleading, simply because the total sums involved bear no comparison with each other. In 2004, the U.S. spent more than twice as much on defense as the 25 EU member states combined. So when one looks at defense R&D, one finds that the U.S. spends almost exactly ten times as much as the UK. Yet it is precisely through keeping and, where possible, increasing its technological lead that the U.S. is ensuring its unchallenged status of global superpower. And it is because Britain has not either itself invested enough or drawn sufficiently on American expertise that it is becoming questionable whether forces from the two countries will be able to serve together in future years on the same battlefield.

5. British forces can't integrate effectively.

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

The huge gap between the capabilities of the allies first became embarrassingly clear in the 1999 air operations over Kosovo. Tony Blair was prominent in the martial rhetoric, but the British bombs—when the British aircraft could fly at all—almost always missed their targets. Similarly, in Iraq, the fact that the British were given their own separate zone to run was not just sensible military division of labor: It was an implied reflection of the difficulty of integrating British forces effectively when the Americans had more advanced equipment.

6. America's unpopularity hurts the Special Relationship with Britain.

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

That said, being as unpopular as America now is in most Western countries does constitute a serious indirect weakness for American power. It means that, as recently in Germany and Spain and as regularly in France, European politicians play up to anti-Americanism to get elected, and this makes subsequent cooperation with the U.S. much more difficult. This is even more important in Britain, precisely because the Special Relationship has always been based upon strong popular support and because Britain, like America, is a country where democracy is both vibrant and demanding.

7. Britain doesn't have any clout in Europe anymore.

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

Britain no longer needs, if it ever needed, to be partially integrated into Europe to gain a hearing in Washington. Similarly, the days when Washington needed London as a means of influencing Europe are gone, partly because the Europeans are less important anyway, partly because the European Union is determined to go its own way, and partly because almost the last world leader the other Europeans are inclined to heed is Britain's Prime Minister—this or any other one, incidentally.

8. Other policy changes would be needed for Britain to be a workable US ally

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

Moreover, through continuing European integration, especially in defense, Britain under Blair has been sucked further into arrangements which will render it difficult for the British to remain the reliable ally they have so often proved to be. An important element of this is defense procurement. Regrettably, the Bush Administration continues to support European integration, even endorsing the now rejected European Constitution. If the Special Relationship is to survive, let alone fulfil its potential, a different approach in a range of areas will be needed in the post-Blair era.

9. Democracy turn: The British people are against a closer relationship with the US.

Robin Harris, PhD (former advisor at the UK Treasury & Home Office, former Director of Conservative Party Research Department, former member of Prime Minister Thatcher's Policy Unit and advisor. Is now an author and journalist.), "Beyond Friendship - The Future of Anglo-American Relations - Executive Summary," The Heritage Foundation, May 24, 2006, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/wm1091.cfm>

Overall, the British, like the other main European nations, now support a more distant foreign and security relationship with the U.S. They give higher favorability ratings to Germany, France, Japan, and even China than to the U.S.

10. By forcing Britain to choose the US, we're hurting their relationships with other nations.

Matthew Riemer (former Senior Analyst), "The US-UK Alliance," The Power and Interest News Report, January 14, 2004, <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=133&language_id=1>

But, on the other hand, the U.K. has to live with a diverse and sprawling European mainland right on its doorstep, the only isolating factor being the island nature of the country. London is going to have to continue its intimate diplomatic and economic ties with these countries, so it is more affected by a potential cooling of relationships between erstwhile allies, such as France and Germany and the United States. If a hypothetical and significant split grew between, for example, France and the United States -- as some Washington insiders like Richard Perle are advocating, to the point of calling France an enemy as a matter of policy -- the pressure would grow on London to perhaps fully side with the United States in a conflict.

11. The US and the UK don't share common global interests.

Matthew Riemer (former Senior Analyst), "The US-UK Alliance," The Power and Interest News Report, January 14, 2004, <http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=133&language_id=1>

The United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union may be on three completely different trajectories, with the U.K. on the most tumultuous path. European-U.S. relations may come to be the dominant factor in what role the U.K. plays in the coming years, as a new security and war doctrine is implemented by the United States.

12. There are significant differences between US and UK policies.

Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart, Editors, U.S.-UK RELATIONS AT THE START OF THE 21st CENTURY, a collection of essays on foreign policy, published by the Strategic Studies Institute (Pennsylvania, 2006), http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/Articles/McCauslandStuart.pdf.

In some areas, however, there is a significant difference in policy. The most notable example is the environment, particularly in attitudes toward the Kyoto Convention. The United Kingdom has agreed with the consensus view within the EU—and indeed virtually the rest of the world—and worked toward the adoption of the Convention, while the United States has firmly refused to accede to it.

13. Solvency Turn: The US-Britain relationship can only improve if the US gets more allies, not less

Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart, Editors, U.S.-UK RELATIONS AT THE START OF THE 21st CENTURY, a collection of essays on foreign policy, published by the Strategic Studies Institute (Pennsylvania, 2006), <http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/Articles/McCauslandStuart.pdf>.

From an American perspective, therefore, the state of the special relationship is bound to be a delicate one over the next few years. British political and public opinion will warm only to a more multilateralist United States that eschews the "robust brand of internationalism" practiced in recent years. Britain will also have a Prime Minister who will raise issues that Americans may want to sweep under the carpet. Britain will also certainly be embroiled—this is the right word—in the internal politics of an EU whose purpose is increasingly contested and whose chief policy orientations are under threat.

14. Britain is more pro European than pro US.

Jeffrey D. McCausland and Douglas T. Stuart, Editors, U.S.-UK RELATIONS AT THE START OF THE 21st CENTURY, a collection of essays on foreign policy, published by the Strategic Studies Institute (Pennsylvania, 2006), <http://www.smallwars.quantico.usmc.mil/search/Articles/McCauslandStuart.pdf>.

Britain is less different than she often seems from the rest of the big EU states. Britain, while far more pro-American than almost any other European country, nevertheless shares some of Europe's disquiet at current U.S. foreign policy and is alarmed by many of the same global trends as her European neighbors.

DISADVANTAGES

Disadvantage 1: Vulnerable Europe

Link: The affirmative eliminates Europe from NATO.

1. Brink: Europe doesn't have independent defense capacity.

John C. Hulsman, PhD (Research Fellow in Foreign Affairs), and Nile Gardiner, PhD (Fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy), "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe," by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, published by the Heritage Foundation, No. 1803, October 4, 2004, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=70052>

Of the 5,000 attack aircraft available to Western European militaries for deployment, barely 10 percent are capable of precision bombing. The technological discrepancies continue in the field of "lift," the ability to transport an army at will. Europe has almost no independent lift capacity. While unglamorous, logistical lift is probably the key component for fighting wars in the post–Cold War era. For example, even in their backyard, the Balkans, the Europeans are dependent on American lift capabilities.

Impact: Defenseless Europe

Since most European countries do not have substantial or even adequate defense capabilities, removing NATO's protection will leave them defenseless to any threats.

Disadvantage 2: Security turn: Increased strain on US military capabilities

Link: Affirmative places the burden of NATO solely on the US and the UK.

1. Internal Link: The US needs help from multiple European powers.

John C. Hulsman, PhD (Research Fellow in Foreign Affairs), and Nile Gardiner, PhD (Fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy), "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe," by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, published by the Heritage Foundation, No. 1803, October 4, 2004, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=70052>

The United States simply cannot act effectively without the support of at least some European powers. But neither is the world one in which a concert of powers dominates. Whatever the issue, the U.S. remains first among equals. This global power reality makes America's courting of allies vital while also confirming U.S. leadership. Indeed, the U.S. must accept these paradoxical truisms at the same time. *First,* there is no other part of the world where political, diplomatic, military, and economic power can be generated in sufficient strength to support American policies effectively. The cluster of international powers in Europe—led by the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Poland—has no parallel in the rest of the world. There are simply a larger number of major powers with which to ally in Europe than anywhere else.

2. Brink: The British army is undergoing cuts and is severely overstretched.

John C. Hulsman, PhD (Research Fellow in Foreign Affairs), and Nile Gardiner, PhD (Fellow in Anglo-American Security Policy), "A Conservative Vision for U.S. Policy Toward Europe," by the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, published by the Heritage Foundation, No. 1803, October 4, 2004, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Europe/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=70052>

The British government is embarking upon major cuts in the U.K.'s armed forces as part of its modernization program. The British Army will be reduced from 108,500 troops to 102,000, with four infantry battalions being disbanded. The Royal Air Force will lose 7,500 personnel and four squadrons. While supposedly improving Britain's niche military capabilities, the cuts are likely to leave the British military severely overstretched.

Impact: The US worse off

Not only will the US be losing its European allies, but the one ally it will be preserving is currently cutting its already inadequate forces and will be overstretched. Rather than gaining any advantages, the affirmative team is putting American security in jeopardy.

Partnership for Peace: Framework Document

Accessed at: [www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110b.htm](http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c940110b.htm)

1. Further to the invitation extended by the NATO Heads of State and Government at their meeting on 10th/11th January, 1994, the member states of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other states subscribing to this document, resolved to deepen their political and military ties and to contribute further to the strengthening of security within the Euro-Atlantic area, hereby establish, within the framework of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, this Partnership for Peace.

2. This Partnership is established as an expression of a joint conviction that stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area can be achieved only through cooperation and common action. Protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy are shared values fundamental to the Partnership.

In joining the Partnership, the member States of the North Atlantic Alliance and the other States subscribing to this Document recall that they are committed to the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law.

They reaffirm their commitment to fulfil in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; specifically, to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means. They also reaffirm their commitment to the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents and to the fulfilment of the commit- ments and obligations they have undertaken in the field of disarmament and arms control.

3. The other states subscribing to this document will cooperate with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in pursuing the following objectives:

a. facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes;

b. ensuring democratic control of defence forces;

c. maintenance of the capability and readiness to con- tribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;

d. the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;

e. the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

4. The other subscribing states will provide to the NATO Authorities Presentation Documents identifying the steps they will take to achieve the political goals of the Partnership and the military and other assets that might be used for Partnership activities. NATO will propose a programme of partnership exercises and other activities consistent with the Partnership's objectives. Based on this programme and its Presentation Document, each subscribing state will develop with NATO an individual Partnership Programme.

5. In preparing and implementing their individual Partnership Programmes, other subscribing states may, at their own expense and in agreement with the Alliance and, as necessary, relevant Belgian authorities, establish their own liaison office with NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This will facilitate their participation in NACC/Partnership meetings and activities, as well as certain others by invitation. They will also make available personnel, assets, facilities and capabilities necessary and appropriate for carrying out the agreed Partnership Programme. NATO will assist them, as appropriate, in formulating and executing their individual Partnership Programmes.

6. The other subscribing states accept the following understandings:

* those who envisage participation in missions referred to in paragraph 3(d) will, where appropriate, take part in related NATO exercises;
* they will fund their own participation in Partnership activities, and will endeavour otherwise to share the burdens of mounting exercises in which they take part;
* they may send, after appropriate agreement, permanent liaison officers to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) that would, under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, carry out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programmes;
* those participating in planning and military exercises will have access to certain NATO technical data relevant to interoperability;
* building upon the CSCE measures on defence planning, the other subscribing states and NATO countries will exchange information on the steps that have been taken or are being taken to promote transparency in defence planning and budgeting and to ensure the democratic control of armed forces;
* they may participate in a reciprocal exchange of information on defence planning and budgeting which will be developed within the framework of the NACC/Partnership for Peace.

7. In keeping with their commitment to the objectives of this Partnership for Peace, the members of the North Atlantic Alliance will:

* develop with the other subscribing states a planning and review process to provide a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available by them for multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces;
* promote military and political coordination at NATO Headquarters in order to provide direction and guidance relevant to Partnership activities with the other subscribing states, including planning, training, exercises and the development of doctrine.

8. NATO will consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.